


THE POLITICS OF GENDER AND THE CULTURE OF SEXUALITY

*Western, Islamic,
and African Perspectives*

Ali A. Mazrui
Edited by Etin Anwar





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**University Press of America,[®] Inc.
Lanham · Boulder · New York · Toronto · Plymouth, UK**

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University Press of America,[®] Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard
Suite 200
Lanham, Maryland 20706
UPA Acquisitions Department (301) 459-3366

10 Thornbury Road
Plymouth PL6 7PP
United Kingdom

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Printed in the United States of America
British Library Cataloging in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014940073
ISBN: 978-0-7618-6402-8 (paperback : alk. paper)
eISBN: 978-0-7618-6403-5

 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992

This volume is dedicated to

Pauline Mazrui

Contents

Acknowledgment	ix
Copyright Acknowledgment	xi
Editor's Introduction	xiii
Author's Introduction	xxiii
I. The Politics of the Human Body	1
1.1. On Revolution and Nakedness	3
1.2. Political Man and the Heritage of Hair: Some African Perspectives	21
1.3. The Poetics of a Transplanted Heart	41
II. The Politics of Sexuality	55
2.1. Political Sex: Monogamy and Racialism	57
2.2. Monogamy and Descent in Black-White Relations	67
2.3. Suttee and Levirate in Black-Brown Relations	97
2.4. Africa's Triple Heritage of Play: Reflections on the Gender Gap	113
2.5. On Gender and Power: A Post-Colonial Sexual Equation	125
2.6. Inter-Racial Mating and Cross-Racial Milestones: From Princess Diana to Barack Obama	139
III. The Politics of Gender	151
3.1. The African Renaissance: A Triple Legacy of Skills, Values, and Gender	153
3.2. Language Planning and Gender Planning: Some African Perspectives	173
3.3. The Black Woman and the Problem of Gender: An African Perspective	183
3.4. The Dialectic Between Men and Women: The Legacy of 'A'isha	197
IV. The Politics of Citizenship	205
4.1. Armed Kinsmen and the Origins of the State: An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology	207
4.2. Gender, Skill, and Power: Africa in Search of Transformation	223
4.3. From Kinship to Citizenship	237
4.4. The Warrior Tradition and the Masculinity of War	249
4.5. Gandhi, Marx, and the Warrior Tradition: Towards Androgynous Liberation	263

4.6. Post-Liberation Movements: In Search of Racial, Sexual, and Class Utopias	281
V. The Politics of Population	291
5.1. Islamic Doctrine and the Politics of Induced Fertility Change: An African Perspective	293
5.2. Ethnicity, Power, and Population in Eastern Africa	307
5.3. Population Control and Social Justice: An African Perspective	321
Conclusion	331
Index	337

Acknowledgment

The Politics of Gender and the Culture of Sexuality: Western, Islamic, and African Perspectives is a collection of Ali A. Mazrui's previously published and unpublished works. While the collection follows all of Mazrui's previous works and speeches very closely and its original forms, it has been modified and appropriated to create a coherent idea of his scholarship on gender, and to avoid repetition. The volume is organized into five parts: human body, sexuality, gender, citizenship, and population using Mazrui's paradigm as a political scientist. The volume itself is a testimony of how the Western concept of gender shapes Mazrui's discourses of the human condition in Islam, Africa, and the West comparatively. As a result, Mazrui's corpus on gender is intellectually, politically, and emotionally challenging. It invites policy makers, feminists, scholars and readers to question their own assumption of what gender means and how we, in our various capacities, could contribute to gender justice locally and globally.

I am indebted to many people to have involved directly and indirectly to this project. I would like to thank Professor Ali A. Mazrui for "believing" in me to undertake this important project. I apologize for taking it too long to finish. I also thank the former Associate Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at Binghamton University, Dr. Robert Ostergard for his generous support. Librarians, especially Margie of Hamilton College assisted me in locating the materials for this collection and Mr. Abdul Bemath sent me the materials found outside the United States. I also thank the Associate Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at Binghamton University, Dr. Seifudein Adem for his endless support. I am indebted to my institution, Hobart and William Smith Colleges for securing me student research assistants, Ally and Julia.

My infinite gratitude goes to Shalahudin Kafrawi, who has endured long hours, days, and months, perhaps years, of scanning, proofreading, and formatting the manuscript, and has been critical to my understanding of Mazrui's view on gender. There would not be enough words to compensate his generosity with time, love, and devotion. My children, Rizky, Fadly and Jenna have been very patient whenever they have to put up with my schedules for interviews with Professor Mazrui or my visits his house.

My thanks also go to the IGCS staff, Jennifer Winans and F. Sonia Arellano-López, Ph.D. for putting perfection into the manuscript. My ultimate thanks go to Professor Mazrui's families for extending their hospitality and friendship. Pauline, Goretti, Maria, Mama, Farid, Harith, Ali and Grace always welcome us heartily whenever we visit them at Binghamton. We are forever grateful.

—Etin Anwar

Indonesia, November 30, 2013

Copyright Acknowledgment

This volume is composed of Ali A. Mazrui's published and unpublished articles. We hereby acknowledge the venues of the published articles.

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Editor's Introduction

MAZRUI'S TRIPLE HERITAGE AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF GENDER

"How do we deal with scholarship on gender and feminism by men?" Feminism as a revolutionary movement and an academic discipline historically comes from a female collective experience of diverse histories and contexts, but shares a common method of consciousness-raising, ethics of care, and the politics of reform to close the gender gap, to eliminate oppression, and to promote equality. Feminist starting point stems from excitement to share personal experience as political, to question the *status quo* and to share consciousness-raising as a method of awakening and solidarity among women.¹ From the 1960s onward, feminist issues, researches, and ideas shook the traditional paradigm of the study of women at higher education. Feminism transforms the study of women from which women are the objects of study to women's studies where women are seen as the subject matter. Feminist commitment to gender justice and to the elimination of oppression often goes beyond cultures and sexes, but retains the ownership of feminist experiential paradigm as a measure of what constitutes feminism.

Although feminism is specific to women's experience, its effect pervades on all aspects of life. The meaning of feminism varies depending on histories, cultures, and politics of localities. In the twenty-first century, feminism serves as an avenue to signify a political standpoint and to represent various ideas and movements toward equality. Mazrui's volume on *The Politics of Gender and the Culture of Sexuality: Western, Islamic, and African Perspectives* denotes a man's journey to feminist stories of equality. Mazrui is, by training, a political scientist. Over the course of five decades, Mazrui's scholarship ranges from philosophy, Islamic studies, political science, and many other disciplines. The interdisciplinarity and the depth of his scholarship provide a ground for gender discourses to take root. He is, in some ways, a theorist of gender, just like many other scholars who happen to write on gender. Critics may dismiss Mazrui's contribution to gender discourses because he does not necessarily engage with gender issues the way gender activists and feminists would.

Mazrui's scholarship, however, falls within the theoretical schematization of gender. His high profile as a Muslim leading political scientist in the world makes his theories of gender accessible for all, especially dignitaries, policy makers, scholars, and general audiences to consider. He schematizes his theories of gender within the living experience and the intellectual paradigm of the triple heritage: Islam, Africanity, and the West. Mazrui is African by blood, Islam by religious tradition, and Western by education. The combination of these heritages gives him the advantage of presenting gender from the Islamic, African and Western points of views. Certainly, Mazrui's volume on *The Politics of Gender*

and the Culture of Sexuality: Western, Islamic, and African Perspectives needs no introduction. I will, however, discuss how Mazrui's treatment of gender in his triple heritage evolves and advances the comparative discourses of gender.

A. THE QUESTION OF GENDER AS A SOCIAL JUSTICE ISSUE

Mazrui's scholarship on gender has spread over the span of forty years. Mazrui formulates a multi-faceted gender relationship with the following patterns: (1) human body carries multiple meanings depending on individual contexts and politics, but the attribution of masculine characteristics to men makes them more powerful militarily, economically, socially, politically, and religiously; (2) men and women are partners in procreation, but the politicization of their sex, depending on its context varies depending on how men and women relate to each other in the contexts of monogamous and polygamous marriage, race rivalries, slavery, miscegenation, cultures of procreation, family planning, and the Islamic view of women's dignity *vis-à-vis* the Western view of women's liberty; and (3) the collaboration between men and men in the military subjugates women to the point that women need to control the military power, parliamentary seats, and other decision making mechanisms to make them men's equals. Within these various contexts, Mazrui perceives the question of gender as a social justice issue.

Mazrui pursues gender justice within the contexts of human equality. His early writings speak about the appropriation of male and female bodies within the contexts of divided Africa. He argues for the equality of humans regardless of race, sex, religion and any other external attributes. His writing on "The Poetics of a Transplanted Heart" shows how the heart transplant could become a common ground for sameness among human beings. A combination of human organs constitutes human beings. As human organs denote the commonalities among humans, what is external to humans should not become the determining factor in valuing humans. Humans are valuable for who they are, not because of their race, nationalities, or religions.

Women, as much as men, are important because they are partners for men in humanity. While men and women are biologically different, they are complementary in nurturing humanity. What is problematic, Mazrui notes, is that women are valued as partners in procreation. The assumption of women as sexually useful for procreation elevates women's position as mothers, especially in Islamic cultures. Not only such a view has a religious and social significance, but also has policy implication. According to Islam, heaven lies at the mother's feet. As mothers determine one faith in life, they are honored socially. As women are valued based on their biological essentials, their roles are constructed to meet what is culturally available to them. In traditional African cultures, women's roles are closely associated with the biological roles as a custodian of water for sustenance in the family, a custodian of fire with the responsibility to cook, and a custodian of land for farming activity. Such a sexual division of labor is

not unique to African cultures. Most societies rely on men and women to perform specific duties and jobs associated with their biological determinism.

Women's sameness with other women is a plus. Mazrui argues that if a Yoruba woman from Nigeria and a Muganda woman from Uganda strip themselves naked, both share biological similarities. Such biological sameness provides the basis for the equality of women with other women across cultures. The idea of equality among women across cultures was common among pioneering women leaders and activists since the nineteenth century. As women were valued on the basis of their biological determinism, pioneering women on women's rights perceived motherhood as the best role for women. Later generations of feminists, however, do not stop at biological sameness as the argument for equality. The biological determinism only reproduces the politicization of women's bodies as the site for creation that reaffirms the subjugation of women. In my previous work, I have argued for inclusive humanity as the argument for the equality between men and women.²

Mazrui is aware of various forms of subjugation towards women. He lists three forms of sexism: benevolent, benign, and malevolent. Mazrui defines benevolent sexism as a form of sexism that is protective of women. Benign sexism refers to a form of sexism that causes indifferent treatment to men and women, whereas malevolent sexism is a form of sexual, economic, and exploitation of women. Mazrui calculates sexism on the basis of the advantage and disadvantage toward the other gender. Opening the door and carrying the wood for women are the examples of benevolent because they benefit women, whereas naming male and female babies can exemplify benign sexism because none is harmed. However, Mazrui treats the sexual, economic and political exploitation of women seriously by calling it a type of malevolent sexism.

Feminists would disagree with Mazrui's assessment of sexism. Sexism is a name attributed to describe the unequal power relationship between men and women that discriminates against women. The depth of sexism often comes to the fore during consciousness-raising sessions.³ Women define sexism based on their everyday experience of how they are treated by societies. As the context of women's definition of sexism is their personal experience at private and public spheres, they differ from Mazrui who considers some forms of sexism as acceptable in so far as it does not harm women. For Mazrui, sexism is about preferential treatment on the basis of gender. Alimony, for instance, could represent a malevolent sexism if either party is violated. It could also be gender-neutral, if none is inflicted with harm.

Mazrui's definition of sexism provides a glance of how the meaning attributed to the way men and women carry their bodies is interpreted differently across cultures. In the pre-independent Africa, male bodies were associated with political protest, masculinity, attractiveness, and ritual, whereas female bodies represented beauty as well as sites for reproduction and labor. Both men and women, however, had to endure racial intolerance, sexual puritanism, cultural aggression and fragmented identity. In African and Islamic cultures, polygamy is arguably encouraged, whereas in the West, it is regarded as an abominable

practice. Similarly, the example of hair in African culture is to symbolize an identity marker for men and women, whereas for Muslim women, it is to be covered. In the West, hair symbolizes beauty, identity, and class. Polygamy, hair and veil could constitute the grounds for sexist treatment in some cultures, but they offer different meanings in other cultures. In this sense, the discourse of gender roles is culturally specific and what constitutes gender justice should include local values that are friendly to women.

Mazrui brings his personal experience into the analysis of gender as a social justice issue. He is an African growing up in a polygamous family with strong women's presence in his extended household. He has experienced himself what constitutes injustice within the colonized African families and cultures. As a Muslim, Islam is dear to his heart and is part of who he is as a person. Islam as the subject of study, however, is what makes his name, Ali, relatable to Muslims and a suspect to others. His interest is not the formal observance of Islam, but the ethical value stemming from the teachings of Islam. His view of Islam as an ethical paradigm often collides with the Western homogeneity of Islam as a religion that promotes violence. Growing up as a Muslim, the British colonialism shaped his dream to study abroad in England. His experience with the West is like a love affair. The West indigenizes him through his educational training and a marriage to a British woman and the children they have had together. His Western encounter also nurtures his scholarship that flourishes globally. The blending of Africanity, Islam, and the West makes him who he is and is reaffirmed with the household of a global African family: a Nigerian-Christian wife and American children.

B. GENDER IN TRANSITION: FROM KINSHIP TO CITIZENSHIP

The post-colonial Africa in the 1970s–1980s entered the era of developmentalism in which women were seen as a new economic force. Women's participation in the national development was a key theme in the World Women's Conference in Mexico and the United Nations Resolution of 15 December 1975, which declared 1975–1985 as the "Women's Decade." Mazrui's writings during this decade reflect his interest in the empowerment of women within the development project. Mazrui shapes the developmental discourses and policies by showing the interplay between the nationalistic pursuit of development and the global forces of post-colonialism, capitalism, and women's movements that have changed the landscape of gender relationship in Africa.

The most noticeable change, according to Mazrui, is the landscape of the African kinship. The Western encroachment of African land, her people and her cultures changed kinship membership to nation-state, masculinity to bio-cultural mobility, traditional to Western dresses, kinship identity to citizenship, and gendered traditional role to interchangeable gender roles. The major transition in southern African countries after the 1960s–1970s was the introduction of the new form of the governance from kinship to nationhood. In the nation-states,

women along with men are citizens with rights, obligations, and responsibilities. The state plays a key role to balance the individual claim within the collective. Mazrui in his chapter on "From Kinship to Citizenship" notes that the introduction of the new world order attempts to minimize violence, maximize social justice, and optimize economic welfare.

Mazrui identifies Christianity as particularly important in altering the African kinship cultures and the minimization of violence. The Christian teachings of "Loving thy neighbor" and "Turn the other cheek!" have had a pacifying power in instilling compassion and the reduction of tribal confrontation. Similarly, the Christian prudishness and monogamy regulate a new mode of sexual relationship among men and women. African sexual richness of polygamy and polyandry is heading toward a monogamous relationship along with the changes of kinship masculinity to the political authority of new military governments, such as Idi Amin. While Christianity has taken roots in Africa with the rise of predominantly Catholic and Protestant countries in which affiliation with Christianity serves as identity marker and a unifying factor in creating political power, it has not taken away the ethnic rivalries within Africa. The artificial divides of the African continent undergird the ethnic and racial rivalries such as in South Africa (Whites against Blacks) as well as Burundi and Uganda (Blacks against Blacks). Indeed, the territorial and expansionists strategies by dominant and hegemonic race, ideology, ethnic, and economy produce and prolong conflicts despite the peaceful teachings of religions either in Islam or Christianity.

Despite differences in religious orientation in new Africa, African countries seem to accord on fertility. Most Christian and Islamic countries cannot discipline their citizens' politics of reproduction. Governmental policies on national family planning, however, led to the bio-cultural mobility of men and women as the impact of women's liberation. The most important contribution of women's movements in the West are the rights to contraception, to choose spouses or sexual partner, and to reproduction. By choosing to postpone having children or less children, women are able to pursue careers. Mazrui defines women's liberation as a demand to have a similar right for men and women in roles and functions. The waves of women's liberation within the contexts of African developmentalism provide a rich opportunity for women to have careers outside their houses and go beyond the biological, social, and psychological confinements. Women's involvement in public spheres produces a new phenomena of bio-cultural mobility: the interchangeability of gender roles in the household where men and women could be more responsible for household duties, the use of cow's milk to nurture babies, and the quest of social justice issues.

Mazrui, particularly, locates the quest for gender as a social justice issue within the intricacy of racial relationship. At the interpersonal level, women within diverse racial groups relate to men in reproduction. The offspring could be caught in the war of race superiority. The competing interest of race supremacy often subjugates the less presumed race. Mazrui is critical of such subjugation and marks his own experiential interracial marriage as a betterment of racial relationship between Africa and the West. He classifies four models of miscege-

nation that shape the racial relationship. Ascending miscegenation allows the offspring to be equated with the father's race that is common among Arab descendants. Descending miscegenation considers the offspring's lineage to follow a mother's skin color, like the descendants of White Americans. Ambivalent miscegenation is common in Latin America where the offspring is grouped according to the pigmentation of the skin. Symmetrical miscegenation values the offspring of a racial marriage equally.

While Mazrui sees gender equality as a platform for human equality, the transition to real equality requires a change in the sexual division of labor as it relates to men as the carrier of military power. The residue of sexual division continues to persist in the military. After all, women living in the patriarchal system are still dominated by men. Similarly, peace and conflict are still determined by women. Most noble appreciation is given to men who solve crises created by men. Women are largely exempted from the military obligation to defend its countries in battlefields with the exception of Israel and the United States. Muslim women are also exempted from *jihad*-warrior cultures. For Mazrui, the exclusion of women from military cultures and policies holds women from achieving true equality. Women should become the equal partners in military for them to have equal power with men.

C. GENDER PROBLEM:

THE PURSUIT OF TRANSFORMATION AND CHANGES

Mazrui's epistemological formulation of gender—referring to the social roles of men and women in societies—is more developed in the 1990s. Like feminists, Mazrui looks at the gender gap as the starting point for transforming women's lives and the key factors that hinder women's advancement. The interplay of religion and colonialism certainly transform women's roles. These new roles, however, are linked to the existing kinship cultures in which women live. African women traditionally are custodians of fire, water, and land. Women as the custodians of fire make them more responsible for the means of production in the house, whereas their role as the custodian of water provides opportunity in providing water for the family. Women's role as the custodian of land culminates their position as the nurturer of soil and children to which the collection of water and wood becomes a necessity in sustaining families.

The empowerment of women within more traditional societies should take into consideration the interplay of their role as wives and mothers and their social role in societies and various forms of marginalization, especially in areas of technological advancement, leadership, and gender planning. Mazrui outlines in his speech ways for women to transition to modern life⁴:

1. Woman as Custodian of Fire:
The science of energy supplies, from firewood to petroleum and natural gas.

2. Woman as Custodian of Earth:
The science of agriculture with greater facilitation in credit access and equipment for women.
3. Woman as Custodian of Water:
The science of water-management and the role of women in water supply.
4. Woman as Home Manager:
A whole new science needs to be developed to make home management more efficient, cost-effective, and part of the wider computation of the Gross National Product of a given society.

While Mazrui seems to romanticize women's traditional roles, he is very supportive of women to move forward. His proposal is to androgenize science and knowledge so that women's advancement happens.

Nevertheless, the sexual division of labor has made women lag behind in economic and political spheres, including technology.⁵ Women as mothers and wives have generally dedicated themselves to care for earth, water and wood for family sustenance. When the advancement of technology was introduced to the third world countries in Africa and Asia, men were the beneficiaries of such advancement. Lack of credit-worthiness and experience with machine left women marginalized from the mechanization of agricultural technology. Even women with Western education, Mazrui notes, their skills are valued to confirm the existing sexual division of labor. The way women are involved in the technology-related works follows the suit of the sexual division of labor. Men engage in the field of "techno-muscular capitalism,"⁶ while women work in the "regime of labor intimacy."⁷ The notion of "techno-muscular capitalism" refers to skilled jobs that integrate technology, trade, production and communication facilitated by globalized financial networks, whereas the "regime of labor intimacy"⁸ deals with low-wage and menial service by women.⁹ Women are also mostly users of technology for personal uses, such as cell-phones, beautification of technology, and household items.

The gap in technology correlates to the overall status of women in politics. Mazrui argues in his "Gender, Skill and Power: Africa in Search of Transformation,"¹⁰ that the interplay of gender, skill and power can empower women with the leadership capacity. The gender gap in politics puts women in marginal positions in the areas of warfare and welfare decision-making. Mazrui identifies that the task for the universal nuclear disarmament and effective arms control should be part of women's warfare leadership, whereas women's involvement in economic process, means, production and marketing, would advance women's welfare. As the decision-making in warfare and welfare in many Asian and African countries is largely a masculine domain, attempts to empower women's economic and political leadership countries should be channeled through governmental policies.

Certainly, Asian countries more than any Western countries, have produced female leaders in the highest capacity as presidents and prime ministers, such as

President Maria Corazón Sumulong Cojuangco Aquino of The Philippines (1986–1992), Executive President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka (1994–2005), Executive President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of The Philippines (2001–2010), Executive President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia (2001–2004), Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan (1988–1990), and Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh (1991–1996), Prime Minister *Sheikh* Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh (1996–2001) and (2009).¹¹ Nevertheless, these women came to power through kinship connection to family legacies either as daughters or wives of men in powerful positions in their respective societies.

Africa also has two female presidents: President Joyce Banda of Malawi (2012) and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia (2005) and vice-president Dr. Wandira Speciosa Kagibwe of Uganda (1994–2003). African women also have held strategic positions, such foreign minister, Paramount Chiefs and Prime Ministers. While women have gained more powerful positions, they cannot move forward without a solid gender plan. Mazrui has proposed solutions to equip women with skills and to ask governments to regulate an affirmative action on women's parliamentary seats in the following manners:

- PHASE 1 The candidates would be women and the voters for these particular seats would also be exclusively women.
- PHASE 2 The candidates for these seats would still be women. The women candidates would thus have to address the concerns of men as well as women.
- PHASE 3 When female parliamentary candidates would be in sufficient numbers to stand a chance of winning without special gender-reservation of seats. Gender-reservation of seats would be abolished? And women would compete on the common electoral role.

To what extent Mazrui's recommendation took hold in Africa? Uganda, a country to which Mazrui sought refuge in his younger days, secured female parliamentary representation through women's election such as in the 9th Parliament.¹² Other sub-Saharan countries, such as Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo are still working to improve women's participation in politics. Kenya, Mazrui's home country, reached 8.1 percent in 2007, whereas Rwanda has the highest women's participation in the parliament.¹³ The political gap in the era of democracy poses gender problems because most economic, social, and political policies are decided in parliaments.

CONCLUSION

Mazrui's contribution to the study of gender is his inclusion of women as male partners in humanity. Humanity is no longer androcentric, Eurocentric, and sexist, but is inclusive of differences in gender, sexes, races, religions, and civilizations. The expansion of humanity from exclusively men, Caucasian, and Western reflects a powerful effect of feminism. Such an expansion does not just come

by itself, but it is through a traversal of local and global efforts and through progression of a thinking process from a cultural domination to an inclusive paradigm of the equality between men and women as inviolable subjects. Mazrui enters the debate of the appropriation of gender roles through the convergence of Islam, the West and Africa. He compares women's rules, roles and rights in Islamic, Western, and African cultures and finds a pattern of how men and women relate to each other at the private and public spheres through biological sameness. He is critical of such views and proposes how men and women could progress toward equality even if women could military decision-making.

As Mazrui supports gender equality, his works are important to feminism. The definition of feminism changes and varies depending on its histories and contexts, but it has effects on how humanity is viewed. The feminist flourishing is far from universal since feminism early on captures only the White women's experience of oppression and liberation. Mazrui's work is important because it provides a glimpse of how male and female scholars engage readers with sites of oppression and liberation in the non-Western world that are not always identical to situations in the West. Therefore, any discussion of feminism can no longer revolve around Western ethnocentrism. Likewise, ideas specific to Western feminism are not readily applicable to the non-Western world since what constitutes oppression differs from one place to another. Global feminism, however, affords women to recognize what is oppressive to them within their localities as well as to demonstrate what is parallel to women in various global sites.

NOTES

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Author's Introduction

In the first half of the twentieth century political relations between Westerners and the Muslim world were relatively hostile and mutually distrustful. On the other hand, the gender culture of the West and that of Islamic culture had a lot in common with each other.

From about the second half of the twentieth century, there was a reversal. Relations between Muslims and Westerners across the world got better politically and were more mutually accommodating, yet the gender cultures of the Western world became more and more different from each other.

But what is a “gender culture?” It is the configuration of rules, roles and rights differentiating men and women in society. What are the rules which govern the roles of men and women in relation to a gender division of labour? And what are the gender rights sanctified by those rules, and affected by the roles which men and women play in society?

In the first half of the twentieth century both Western culture and traditional Islam were highly patriarchal. Both civilizations acquiesced in male dominance in the home. The husband was widely accepted as the head of the family, reinforced by his traditional role as bread winner. In both civilizations the father's role as disciplinarian was to ensure that the children were brought up as good children. The mother's loving and sympathetic role in both civilizations was to ensure that the children were brought up as happy children. In the idealized forms, fatherhood was a source of authority and discipline, while motherhood was a source of love and compassion.

Also in the first half of the twentieth century both the West and Islam severely limited the roles and rights of women in the economy and the market place. It is true that economic constraints on the roles and rights of women in some Muslim societies were more severe than in some stern countries. But the differences between the two civilizations were a matter of degree. In both civilizations it was conceded that women could own more of the economy than they actually controlled. In the history of Islam this went back to the Prophet Muhammad himself and his first wife, Khadijah. The Prophet and his wife were business partners. But even at that time it was clear that she owned more of the business than he did; but he gradually controlled more of the business than she did.

This difference between what women owned and what they controlled continued in both civilizations throughout the twentieth century. But in the course of the second half of the twentieth century, Western women demanded more and more economic roles, while Muslim women acquiesced in the ancestral imbalance between ownership and control.

In the first half of the twentieth century both Islam and Western culture marginalized women in the army and security forces. Both Western and Muslim armies were overwhelmingly male in composition. Both civilizations operated on the dictum: “Our sons are our warriors.” Women could have supportive roles

in warfare, but were seldom in combat functions either as Muslims or as Westerners, right up to the Suez War in 1956 or the Vietnam War in the 1960s.

In both Islam and Western civilization women were marginalized in the political process in much of the first half of the twentieth century. In the United States women did not have the vote until the constitutional amendment of 1920. Under Mustapha Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, women had the vote not far behind American women. And when compared with the vote for women in France, this was essentially after World War II. And Switzerland conceded the federal vote to women in the 1970s, long after some Muslim societies like Pakistan and Bangladesh had enfranchised women into national elections.

For much of the first half of the twentieth century, women in political campaigns were still rare, either as voters or as candidates for office in both civilizations. But the suffragettes' movements in Britain and the United States began to enfranchise women ahead of the Muslim world.

Before World War II virginity before marriage commanded a high premium in both Western culture and Islamic traditions. In Europe and North America young men and women were permitted to date, but actual premarital sexuality was strongly discouraged. Among both Muslims and Westerners young women were more strongly protected from premarital sex than young males. Muslim parents did not take risks, even with dating. Western parents tried to regulate the dating, sometimes to the extent of providing chaperons to ensure good behavior between young couples. What was shared between the two civilizations before World War II was a moral standard which strongly discouraged sexual activity before marriage, especially for young women.

The first half of the twentieth century was also part of an ancient homophobic tradition in both the West and in Muslim lands. Homosexual activity did indeed flourish in aristocratic English boarding schools, among Arab sailors in dhows on the Indian Ocean, among American *literata*, among young male pages in Ottoman palaces, among rich and poor. But the ethical codes of both Islam and the West regarded homosexuality as immoral and anti-social. Indeed, in almost all Western and Muslim countries before World War II, male homosexuality was actually illegal. Lesbianism, on the other hand, enjoyed greater *de facto* tolerance among both Muslims and Westerners throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

Both civilizations also disapproved of pregnancies out of wedlock. Women who conceived outside marriage continued to suffer in both the West and the Muslim world in earlier decades of the twentieth century. And both civilizations tended to regard the children as in some sense "illegitimate" or "children of sin." But it was easier for those children to be accepted into regular families in Muslim societies than in the West. Indeed, in the West they often ended up in foster care or in orphanages.

To summarize the argument so far, gender cultures and sexual mores in the West and in the Muslim world before World War II tended to converge. By the term "gender culture" we refer to the rules, roles and rights which govern relations between men and women in society. In both the West and the Muslim

world until after World War II, women were subordinate to men in the family, owned more property than they controlled in the economy, were relatively disempowered in the political process, and were substantially neutralized in the army and security forces. Rules governing sexuality outside marriage were also similar in the West and Muslim world. Premarital sex was strongly disapproved of, especially for girls, pregnancies out of wedlock were heavily stigmatized, male homosexuality was often outlawed, lesbianism was at best tolerated, and more often disapproved of.

ISLAM AND THE WEST: A POLITICAL DIVERGENCE

But in this same period when gender values between Westerners and Muslims were so similar, the actual political relations between the West and the Muslim world were often antagonistic. Millions of Muslims in South and South-East Asia and the Middle East were under the colonial rule of Great Britain (such as the Indian subcontinent and Egypt), The Netherlands (mainly Indonesia), France (the Maghreb and Muslims south of the Sahara), Italy (the Horn of Africa and Libya) and others.

The Ottoman Empire was the last great Muslim empire. It was defeated by the West and broken up in the course of World War I. Arabs were encouraged to revolt against the Ottomans with the promise of independence and Arab unification. Instead, Iraq and Jordan fell under British rule, Syria and Lebanon under French rule, and Palestine became first a British mandate and was partitioned later into Israel and fragments of Palestinian desolation.

During World War II, hundreds of thousands of Muslims were enlisted to fight for the British Empire against Germany, Italy and Japan. Parts of the Muslim world were World War II battlegrounds against Germany (such as North Africa) or against Japan (such as Indonesia).

In the 1950s some Muslim countries struggled to assert control over their resources—such as Moussadeq's effort in Iran to nationalize the country's petroleum industry in 1953, Jamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1956, and Algeria's effort to regain its territory and independence in the 1954–1962 war against France.

Throughout these earlier decades of the twentieth century, political relations between Muslims and Westerners were poisoned by mutual distrust, and by Western colonialism, racism and militarism. On the other hand, these were the final decades when the gender cultures of the Western world and of Islamic traditions continued to be essentially compatible.

However, in the remainder of the twentieth century gender values in the Western world began to diverge fairly fast from the ancient gender traditions of Islam. The feminist movement in the post World War II Western world began to gather momentum, giving Western women greater freedom than they had ever had before. The rules were loosening in Western gender relations, leading to the expansion of roles and enhancement of female rights in Western societies. By

comparison with women's liberation in the West, the status of Muslim women remained relatively stagnant.

In North America and Western Europe the 1960s also witnessed a sexual revolution. The students' revolution in the Western world as a whole, and the civil rights movement in the United States, broke down many generational, sexual and racial taboos. The younger generation in the West asserted greater independence, including greater sexual liberties. The students' revolt and the civil rights movement were reinforced by the popular uprising against the United States' war in Vietnam. Alongside gains in race relations and women's rights, the Western world also underwent a revolution in the rules of sexuality. The 1960s witnessed not just such fashion-foibles as the mini-skirt, but also substantial sexual libertarianism among the young in the West. Many taboos against premarital sex, and against living together without being married, were eroded almost overnight. Western parents began to tolerate dating without regulation. Western mothers started teaching their daughters how to avoid unwanted pregnancies. The moral code governing sexuality in the West underwent substantial loosening up—in contrast to the rules in the Muslim world.

What was happening was a dramatic divergence of Western sexual mores from what was traditional in Muslim cultures. On the other hand, the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s began to generate not only greater racial tolerance, but also greater acceptance of people of other faiths. This was reinforced by the forces of decolonization in the wider world, as European empires disintegrated and the culture of egalitarianism was internationalized. Migration of people of diverse faiths and races to the West improved inter-faith dialogues and strengthened the spirit of ecumenicalism during the rest of the twentieth century.

There were, of course, contradictory trends at the same time. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 inaugurated a period of bitter relations between Muslims and Jews, with consequences for relations between the United States and the Muslim world. On the other hand, the partition of British India in 1947, inaugurated a new international Muslim actor in world politics. Since then Pakistan has sometimes enriched relations between Islam and the West, and has at other times endangered those relations. Pakistan became unique when it produced the first woman Prime Minister in Muslim history—Benazir Bhutto.

On balance the final three decades of the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented good relations between the United States and Western Europe, on one side, and the Muslim world, on the other. The United States helped Afghanistan to liberate itself from Soviet Occupation. Soviet failures in Afghanistan in turn contributed to the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

After considerable hesitation, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at last intervened in Bosnia, and stopped the slaughter of Muslims there. They also helped initiate proper state-formation in Bosnia. It was also only a matter of time before the United States and NATO militarily intervened in Kosovo to rescue ethnic Muslim Albanians from further massacre by Christian Serbs.

Even the 1979 Iranian revolution, though a great setback to relations between the United States and Iran, demonstrated great American restraint when the staff of the US Embassy were held hostage in Tehran for more than a year—and Washington limited itself to economic, rather than military sanctions, even after the hostages were released.

Within the United States itself attitudes towards Muslims continued to improve under President Bill Clinton. There were important strides in assimilating US Muslims into the body politic of the United States. One or two US Muslims rose high in the American foreign service. The US army started appointing Muslim Imams to serve the spiritual needs of Muslim troops in the US armed forces at home and abroad. The Clinton White House began a new tradition of celebrating the Muslim festival of Eid el Fitr (the end of the fast of Ramadan), and Bill Clinton stopped describing the United States as a purely “Judeo-Christian country.”

But while relations between Muslims and Westerners continued to improve in the final decades of the twentieth century, the sexual mores of their respective communities continued to diverge. Indeed, homosexuality in Western societies was in transition from basic tolerance, to increasing social acceptance, and on its way towards social respectability. Debates about legalized same-sex marriages in North America had started before the twentieth century came to a close. All this was way ahead of the sexual mores of the Muslim world.

This was indeed a century which had started with considerable convergence between the sexual mores and gender cultures of the West, on one side, and of the Muslim world, on the other. It was also a century which began with hostile political relations between Westerners and Muslims throughout the first five decades of the century.

But, by the final decades of the twentieth century, political relations between the West and the Muslim world had positively converged, while sexual mores and gender principles between the two civilizations rapidly diverged.

In the overall picture of the twentieth century, Muslims and Westerners were much less friendly to each other at the beginning of the century than they were at the end. But in terms of their gender values and sexual mores, Muslims and Westerners were much more alike at the beginning of the twentieth century than they were at the end.

And then came September 11, 2001. How far were political relations between Islam and the West thrown back to conditions before World War II? How were gender mores between the two civilizations affected by the new world after September 11? Whole new challenges had now emerged.

“WAR ON TERROR”: BETWEEN GORE AND GENDER

September 11 precipitated severe setbacks in the political relations between Westerners and Muslims. These setbacks sometimes had gender implications, both positive and negative.

One major military aftermath of September 11 was the American war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. On the negative side, many Afghan civilians were killed—men, women, and children. Also on the negative side were the so-called “enemy combatants” captured in Pakistan or Afghanistan, many of them destined for detention without trial in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, or dispatched by America for torture in third countries under extraordinary rendition.

But the overthrow of the Taliban also had positive consequences. Women under Taliban rule had been among the most oppressed anywhere in the world. The overthrow of the Taliban regime was therefore a major relief for millions of Afghani women and their families.

Less directly related to the “war on terror” was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since then more than a million Iraqis have been killed by the war, by the insurgency, by Iraqi resistance to occupation, and by the sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shi’a. About four thousand Americans have also been killed. In addition, three or four million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes, and hundreds of thousands have been injured.

The gender consequences of the Iraqi war have also been negative. Quite apart from the fact that most civilians in Iraq today are less secure that they were under Saddam Hussein, the status of Iraqi women has deteriorated under the new political and sectarian dispensation. Women under Saddam Hussein were much more liberated than they have since become.

Then there are the prison conditions for political detainees. The Abu Ghuraib exposé of torture and sexual humiliation of male suspects added other dimensions to the total tragedy of Iraq. Even in their own homes many Iraqi women and their families have been harassed and humiliated by American troops, Iraqi security forces, and by different insurgent militias.

The United States has also established different degrees of a military presence in more than one hundred countries worldwide. It has also encouraged surrogate wars, such as the 2007 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. The United States has also facilitated the capture and export of suspects to third countries for severe interrogation under extraordinary rendition. Some Muslim suspects from Kenya were exported with their wives to Ethiopia for severe forms of interrogation.

As compared with the last decades of the twentieth century, relations between the West and the Muslim world have definitely deteriorated. But not all the gains of the 1980s and 1990s have been reversed. Prominent American Muslims have been guests at the White House, or have broken the fast of Ramadan (Iftar) with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The US government defended the ethnic Albanian Muslims of Kosovo against their Christian tormentors in Serbia. And when Muslim Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence in February 2008, the United States, Great Britain and France were the first to recognize this young republic—in the teeth of opposition from not only Serbia but also Russia and a number of other European countries.

On the other hand, the American “war on terror” in South Asia put a lot of stress and strain on the politics of Pakistan. US efforts to manipulate the internal politics of that country contributed to radicalization and militancy—which finally led to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the first woman Prime Minister in the history of Islam. She was killed in the course of a campaign to win a third term as premier. She missed her chance of becoming the first Muslim woman to preside over a country with nuclear weapons. (Pakistan was not yet a nuclear power when Benazir was last in office as Prime Minister).

As for sexual mores and gender culture between the West and the Muslim world in the post-September 11 era, Danish cartoons made fun of the Muslim belief that to die for Islam is a passport to a paradise full of beautiful women (houries). Because the Danish media satirized the Prophet Muhammad, there was worldwide Muslim outrage, and calls for boycotting Danish goods.

A grandson of Vincent Van Gough, the Dutch painter, was killed on a street in Holland by a Muslim fanatic after Van Gough produced a film about alleged Muslim abuse of their women. The filmmaker was aided by a Somali woman apostate from Islam, Ayaan Hirsi Ali. This Somali Member of Parliament needed state protection after the murder of Van Gough.

From September 11, 2001 to the US election of 2008, the United States experienced no major act of terrorism by a Muslim on its soil. But both Madrid in Spain and London, England experienced Al-Qaeda bomb attacks on their transportation systems, with dozens of casualties.

On the positive side, in Europe President Nicolas Sarkozy of France appointed two Muslim women to ministerial positions in his government. And in Britain there were Muslim members of Parliament, including at least one Muslim woman in the House of Lords in London.

Both the negative and positive developments in Euro-Muslim relations would have been inconceivable a few decades earlier. A new reality had emerged—a configuration which goes beyond “Islam and the West” and includes “Islam in the West” and “the West within the Muslim world.”

CONCLUSION

In this overview we have sought to demonstrate that while political relations between Muslims and Westerners in the first half of the twentieth century were colored by distrust, racism and colonialism, the actual values of the Western world, and of Islam, were substantially compatible.

In the concluding decades of the twentieth century the balances were reversed. Political relations between the West and the Muslim world had improved dramatically, but the sexual mores and the culture of genders between the two civilizations became less and less compatible. Women were much more liberated in the West than ever before, while the status of women in the global ummah remained stagnant.

Paradoxically, four Muslim countries had female Heads of State or Heads of Government long before the United States had a woman President or Italy a

woman Prime Minister, or France a woman Head of State or even Germany a woman Chancellor. Germany had since caught up with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Turkey, all of which had female Heads of Government well ahead of most of the Western world.

We indicated that progress in the political relationships between Westerners and Muslims worldwide was explosively damaged though only partially reversed as a consequence of September 11, 2001. The war in Afghanistan killed many Afghan men and women, but at least the war improved the status of women. The war in Iraq, on the other hand, was a bigger disaster, killing more than a million people, displacing hundreds of thousands, and leaving women worse off than they ever were under Saddam Hussein.

On the other hand, the United States has protected the ethnic Muslim Albanians of Kosovo. France has elevated Muslim women to ministerial positions—while banning the head scarf for Muslim girls going to state schools.

Canada, The Netherlands, and South Africa have moved towards recognizing same-sex marriages or civil unions. So has Massachusetts in the United States, and potentially Hawaii and California. Sexual mores between the West and traditional Islam continue to diverge, while political relationships fluctuate between militancy, diplomacy and interfaith dialogue.

The gender cultures between the two civilizations may continue to diverge, but prospects for less political conflict and greater harmony will improve when the United States elects a President who is more interested in leading the world than in trying to dominate it.

I.

The Politics of the Human Body

Chapter 1.1

On Revolution and Nakedness

Far away, many dust-laden miles away in Arusha some little man in the administration, such as are to be found in all the governments the world over, in his little white shirt and collar and his little Western tie, or in his national dress that gives him prickly heat around his neck whenever the weather gets excessively hot and humid, has decided that the Masai must wear clothes.¹

This bitter lament against a new policy statement from Tanzania early in 1968 formed part of the debate which was unleashed by the declaration of that policy. The authorities in Tanzania had decided that the Masai had been permitted naked indulgence for far too long; that their withdrawal from normal attire constituted a withdrawal from the main stream of progress in their country. It had therefore been decreed that no Masai men or women were to be allowed into the Arusha metropolis wearing limited skin clothing or a loose blanket. The Masailand Area Commissioner, Mr. Iddi Sungura, kept on issuing a number of warnings to the Masai threatening retribution if they clung to awkward clothing and soiled pigtailed hair.²

From prominent Masai across the border in Kenya came protests. A Kenya Masai Member of Parliament holding a ministerial position, Mr. Stanley Oloitipitip, asserted that Tanzania was denying the Masai the right to be themselves. Another Kenyan Mr. John Keen, threatened to turn up at Arusha, the new capital of the East African Community, dressed in his Masai attire to see what the authorities there would do to him. Tanzanian authorities in turn replied in this debate across the border that such interference in the policies of Tanzania towards modernization and national integration was totally unacceptable. The Masai of Kenya could remain in their pristine traditionality, but the Masai of Tanzania were to be converted to the trappings of modernity.³

This whole controversy on the future apparel of the Masai has links with an important theme in the history of nationalism and of revolutionary fervour. Our concern in this chapter is not with the Masai controversy as such. It is with this

wider theme of the place of dress and nakedness in the history of thought. In its ramifications, this is a human phenomenon which has contacts with such important issues as firstly, authenticity; secondly, identity; and thirdly, rebellion, both religious and political. One might discuss each of these in turn.

NATURE UNCOVERED

In order to understand some of the implications of the concept of authenticity we have to relate it to other intellectual ideas. What is authentic is often deemed to be that which is not artificial. That which is not artificial is often deemed to be that which is natural. Major intellectual movements in world history have romanticized nearness to nature and lamented the growth of civilization and industrialization because of the presumed concomitant growth of artificiality in man's life. The idea that expanding complexities of social organization maximizes man's distance from the essence of things has been discerned in the works of political philosophers like Rousseau, and of poets like William Wordsworth. The romanticization of the Noble Savage was at the heart of these critiques of developed life. Rousseau sometimes argues that civilized life enfeebles man and makes him too dependent on gadgets and artificial comforts. Equipped with all his artificial aids, civilized man is indeed at a great advantage, but if you stripped him of these, and confronted him with bare nature, the effeminate ways of civilization will expose his lack of vigor. In Rousseau's own words,

Give civilized man time to gather all his machines about him, and he will no doubt easily beat the savage; but if you were to see a still more unequal contest, set them together naked and unarmed, and you will soon see the advantage of having all our forces constantly at our disposal, of being always prepared for every event, and of carrying oneself as it were, perpetually whole and entire about one.⁴

Sometimes the Noble Savage was placed by philosophers and literary figures in the Americas. The Noble Savage was the Indian, in Alexander Pope's words,

... whose untutor'd mind
Sees God in clouds, or hears him in the wind;
His soul proud Science never taught to stray
Far as the solar walk, or milky-way;
Yet simple Nature to his hope has giv'n,
Behind the cloud-topt hill an humbler heav'n ...⁵

But with the greater interest in Africa that came with the great debates about the slave trade, the Noble Savage in European imagination came to be located also in the African continent. The African came to be regarded as natural man *par excellence*. He might lack the capacity to blush, but commanded full ability to be bold. In the words of the poets Day and Bicknell,

What tho' no rosy tints adorn their face,
 No silken ringlets shine with flowing grace?
 Yet of ethereal temper are their souls,
 And in their veins the tide of honour rolls;
 And valorous kindles there the hero's flame,
 Contempt of death, and thirst for martial fame.⁶

In our own time, the image of the African as a child of nature has been inherited by the movement of negritude, of which the most distinguished spokesman on the African continent is Léopold Senghor, the poet-President of Senegal. Senghor defines negritude as "the sum total of the values of the civilization of the African world. . . . More precisely, it was the communal warmth, the image-symbol and the cosmic rhythm which instead of dividing and sterilizing, unified and made fertile."⁷

Jean-Paul Sartre, the French philosopher, also draws attention to the "proud claim of non-technicalness" which is at the heart of negritude. The nearness to nature is persistent. In the words of Sartre, "in concerning himself first with himself, Negro proposes to gain nature in gaining himself." Sartre proceeds to cite the poet who said,

they abandon themselves, possessed to the essence of all things ignoring surfaces but possessed by the movement of all things,
 needless, taking no account, but playing the game of the world,
 truly the elder sons of the world
 porous to every breath of the world
 flesh of the flesh of the world throbbing with very movement of the world.⁸

The nearness to nature which is attributed to the Negro becomes associated with spontaneity; spontaneity finds expression times in responsive sexuality; and sexuality connotes the nakedness of things. The entire lifestyle of the Negro is romanticized into one constant work of natural creation. To quote Sartre again,

Techniques have contaminated the White worker, but the Black remains the great male of the earth, the sperm of the world. His existence—it is time great vegetal patience; his work—it is the repetition from year to year of the sacred coitus. He creates and is fertile because he creates. The sexual pantheism of these poets is without doubt that which first strikes the reader. To labor, to plant, to eat, is to make love with nature . . .
 Behold yourself
 Erect and naked
 Shaft you are and you remember
 But you are in reality the child of this fecund shadow
 Which feeds of the milk of the moon
 Then you slowly shape yourself into a rod
 On this low wall entwined by the dreams of flowers
 And the perfume of the idle summer.⁹

If the Negro is sometimes conceived as a symbol of masculinity, Africa is sometimes conceived in decidedly feminine terms. But in both conceptions the theme of nakedness is again recurrent. For example, Léopold Senghor thinks of his part of Africa in feminine terms in his famous poem *Black Woman*. The poem describes Africa as a beautiful woman clothed with luxurious nature which prompted man to be jealous and destroy it.

THE DRESS OF IDENTITY

But it is not simply the issue of authenticity that is at stake in this area of political argumentation; it is also the issue of identity. Identity is sometimes in regard to a particular individual and the kind of quality and personality he has; and sometimes it is in regard to a member of a particular community, nationality or religious affiliation and the cultural traits exhibited by such a community. The identity of the individual on his own may indeed include these traits inherited from his cultural group, but insofar as they define his own distinctive personality, these traits are combined with other qualities. Whether a man is temperamentally cheerful or moody, whether he is warm-hearted or reserved, whether he is meticulous and formal in his behavior, or easy-going and jovial—all these are intensely personal characteristics which may not necessarily be derived from the social group to which a person belongs. The characteristics may sometimes be accentuated or mitigated by cultural factors, but in general there are personality factors in each individual that are distinctive to the person and not typical of the community from which he springs.

Dress is related to this issue of the distinctive person. There has been a school of thought which has assumed that you can indeed judge a man by the way he dresses. It was Shakespeare's character Polonius who, in his fatherly advice, made the famous statement, "For the apparel oft proclaims the man." A man of good taste might therefore be judged by the way he dresses. The class to which he belongs might be discernible by his general attire. In general etiquette, dress is sometimes in relation to the particular occasion to which a man is called upon to respond. A man turning up at a formal dinner in a bush shirt is dismissed in Western terms as Bohemian. Some restaurants in the more Westernized parts of Africa would insist on a tie and perhaps a jacket for dinner, but not necessarily for lunch. The two meals have been ritualized and permitted to demand distinctive attire for those who participate in the ritual. In some British universities the academic gown becomes important for some ceremonial occasions and a less flamboyant gown becomes indispensable for some of the dinners at college at high table. The person who ignores these conventions is again judged to be inadequately attuned to the civilized values of the society. And old Polonius might once again nod his head saying "For the apparel oft proclaims the man."

But these very examples themselves illustrate how closely related are the *personal* aspects of dress to the *cultural*. The identity, which is established by personal attire, sometimes presupposes the tastes and norms of the society as a whole. The Bohemian who turns up for dinner without a jacket or a tie is a Bohe-

mian by the canons of the society *within* which he is operating. But as *between* one society and another there may also be a place for dress as a distinctive differentiating characteristic. It was Franz Fanon, the late revolutionary thinker from Martinique and participant in the Algerian insurrection, who once said:

The way people clothe themselves, together with the traditions of dress and finery that custom implies, constitutes the most distinctive form of a society's uniqueness, that is to say the one that is the most immediately perceptible. Within the general pattern of a given custom, there are of course always modifications of detail innovations which in highly developed societies are the mark of fashion. But the effect as a whole remains homogeneous, and the great areas of civilization, immense cultural regions, can be grouped together on the basis of original, specific techniques of men's and women's dress.¹⁰

In the streets of Marrakesh and Algiers one therefore often knows that one is in a Muslim country. If one opened one's eyes in Bombay or New Delhi, the dress of many of the passers-by would be part of the revelation that one was in the midst of an Indian civilization. An exposure to Disneyland or other pleasure centers of California would soon familiarize the stranger to some of the dress manifestations of the American sub-culture.

In reality, the idea of differentiating civilizations by the way their members dress is rapidly being antiquated by events. Perhaps the most successful cultural bequest from the West to the rest of the world has in fact been precisely Western dress. Mankind is rapidly homogenized by the sheer acquisition of the Western shirt and trousers. The Japanese businessman, the Arab minister, the Indian lawyer, the African civil servant have all found a common denominator in the Western suit.

To some extent this is what made the case of the Masai an elegant exercise in sheer cultural obstinacy. Here were a people who refused to climb on the bandwagon of Westernized apparel. The Area Commissioner of Masailand in Tanzania was particularly frustrated to note that even those Masai that had been exposed to modern education continued their attachment to Masai modes of personal adornment. Area Commissioner Sungura admitted to being surprised to find amongst a group of "bright-looking English-speaking secondary school-taught Masai youth" a young man called George Koyo, who was complete with ochre-soiled clothing and hair, "showing no sign whatsoever of his education which is better than mine."¹¹

The whole Tanzanian policy of seeking to "modernize the Masai" by getting them to wear trousers seemed to be a direct attack on the most distinguishing aspect of the cultural identity of the Masai. Surprise was widely expressed that Tanzania, which in many ways had stood for the African right to be distinctive, should at the same time have embarked on one of the most blatant acts of enforced de-culturation since the great debate on female circumcision among the Kikuyu in Kenya half a century earlier. In fact one participant in the debate on the

Masai, O. N. Njau, argued on the futility of enforced de-culturation by citing the example of the circumcision debate. In the words of Njau,

Far back in the early 1930s the missionaries saw the need of advising Kikuyu of the obvious fact that circumcision of girls was unnecessary. Despite the much publicized campaign against this practice, even today more than 70 per-cent of all Kikuyu girls are circumcised. The then Colonial Government attempted to carry out this advice and I remember that, as late as 1957, circum-cized girls were not admitted in the then-intermediate schools. However, as we all know, there must have existed many loopholes as Kikuyu women are among the best educated in this part of Africa.

Njau also discussed the impact of Westernization on Indians and Pakistanis. To some extent he echoes the view of John Plamenatz, the Oxford philosopher, that the Indians are perhaps the most deeply Westernized of all non-Western peoples.¹² But Njau notes,

Indians and Pakistanis have been acquainted with the Western civilization for centuries, yet they proudly use their traditional dress.¹³

A governmental policy that the Masai become more westernized in their dress, when pursued in a nationalistic country like Tanzania, had historical as well as cultural anomalies. Nyerere himself had once complained how in a certain period of colonial rule Africans themselves regarded it as a compliment rather than an insult to be called "Black Europeans."¹⁴

African poets have on occasion satirized the so-called Black *evolué* or *assimilé* who had absorbed too readily the trappings of the conquering nation. But what ought to be borne in mind is that nakedness, while revealing the body of a man, may at the same time be disguising his identity. After all, when everyone strips they are reducing themselves to their basic commonality. If a Yoruba woman from Nigeria and a Muganda from Uganda were both dressed in this national apparel you would have a basis for distinguishing Nigerian from the Ugandan. But were the two women to strip themselves, the badge of nationality would immediately be seriously blurred. The women would then have been reduced to their essential femininity. A stranger seeing them would know more about their personal bodies, but less about their personal identities. The price of bodily revelation in this case is national obscurity.

In this regard one might say that complete nakedness on the one hand, and Western dress on the other, are having the same total effect on the problem of identity in the second half of the twentieth century. The spread of Western dress and its acceptance by peoples vastly differing in cultural background and historical origin does itself have this consequence of blurring distinctions between peoples. A Nigerian man in a suit and a Ugandan in a suit might be as difficult to differentiate nationally as the naked Nigerian and Ugandan women we have discussed already. Identity as the ultimate basis of distinctiveness therefore stands to

suffer whether Africa moves in the direction of total Westernization in dress or in the direction of total renunciation of dress.

Yet the Masai man retains a feature of distinctiveness by falling short of total nakedness. The *Shuka* with which he covers part of his body, and the ochre with which he colours his body, together constitute a persistent claim to cultural uniqueness. The acquisition of trousers by the Masai would be a step away from this uniqueness.

NUDITY AND RELIGIOUS REBELLION

In the course of the press debate on Tanzania's policy about clothing the Masai, the Masai elders in Kenya were reported to have asked the following question:

If the Almighty God could stomach seeing the entire anatomies of Adam and Eve in their complete nudity, is it not a little prudish for an African government to have fits by merely viewing a casually exhibited Masai buttock?¹⁵

In a reply a correspondent writing for an East African magazine said, "It should be remembered that the Masai are not living before the fall of mankind as Adam and Eve did. When Adam and Eve disobeyed God, they were clothed by God before He drove them out of the Garden."¹⁶

These remarks immediately dramatized the long-standing link between nakedness and certain forms of rebellion. The link goes back, as this correspondent has suggested, to Adam and Eve and their own act of disobedience to God. This human act of disobedience to God was itself connected with a prior act of rebellion by Satan and his followers. Milton in *Paradise Lost* begins by first presenting Satan and his followers as rebels against divine absolutism—believing as they did that it was "better to reign in hell than to serve in Heaven." In Miltonic terms, this was, as it were, the first political rebellion ever. But it was a rebellion of angels—who were then deported from Heaven.

What could the fallen angels now do in revenge against God's punishment? The Miltonic version of this story was that Satan and his followers decided to have their own back by perverting God's purposes for man. God had just created a new creature and given him a companion in the Garden of Eden. The creature had in fact been forged in God's own image, and a place of distinction was intended for this creature in God's grand design for the universe. What better way could the fallen angels have of "hitting back" for their deportation from Heaven, than by setting out to frustrate God's intentions for man? And so the Miltonic Satan makes the great journey towards the Garden of Eden intent on this ultimate subversion. On arrival there he sees the grandeur and richness of the habitat, and then finally casts his eyes on the two creatures whose destiny he was about to subvert. Adam and Eve were striking pieces of creation. In their very nakedness lay the glory of their innocence:

God-like erect, with native honour clad
In naked majesty seemed lords of all,

And worthy seemed, for in their looks divine
 The image of their glorious Maker shone...
 Nor those mysterious parts were then concealed;
 Then was not guilty shame; dishonest shame
 Of nature's work, honour dishonourable,
 Sin-bred, how have ye troubled all mankind
 With shows instead, mere shows of seeming pure,
 And banished from man's life his happiest life,
 Simplicity and spotless innocence.¹⁷

Obviously this was not a symbol of sensuous desire, but was a symbol of innocence:

So passed they naked on, nor shunned the sight
 Of God or angel, for they thought no ill. . .¹⁸

There are theological difficulties as to what the Original Sin consisted of. One major interpretation is that the Tree of Knowledge was in fact carnal knowledge. Adam and Eve took a step towards sinfulness when they became conscious of their nakedness. And with their Original Sin death came to mankind.

If this interpretation is correct, if the forbidden fruit was indeed love-making, there is perhaps a touch of mystery that Christianity should regard this original capitulation to lust as the cause of all human death. In some sense it would seem more plausible to argue that the moment of lust between Adam and Eve was the guarantee of all human reproduction. It might even be argued that to a certain extent it is sin which makes us *human*—just as it is death which completes our definition as mortals. A human being who is not mortal is almost a contradiction in terms. And it was Adam's sin which created human mortality.

But there are other implications of sin too. In political philosophy government itself has sometimes been interpreted as the political equivalent of dress. There was once a political Garden of Eden where men lived happily in innocent abandon and naturalness. But this political Garden of Eden came to be lost in terms comparable to the loss of the personal Garden of Eden when Adam and Eve experienced a moment of intimacy. In the words of the Anglo-American philosopher, Thomas Paine, "Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence."

Sometimes political philosophy and theology have merged in this equation. To Augustine, the "earthly city," in the sense of secular government, became necessary when man proved his capacity for lawlessness by disobeying God himself. In a way, the first godly city was the Garden of Eden—though it consisted of the most primary of all societies, man and wife. But Augustine carries the argument further. He not only says it was sin which made government necessary. This is implied in the trend of his argument, but his more specific formulation is of the relationship between sin and servitude. He says: "Sin, therefore, is the mother of servitude and first cause of man's subjection to man."¹⁹

The worst form of servitude, however, is servitude to sin itself. Augustine views subjection to evil as being worse than any form of slavery to man: "It is a

happier servitude to serve man than lust. . . He that is good is free, though he be a slave, and he that is evil, a slave though he be king.”²⁰

With the coming of lust to human life, nudity ceased to be a pure symbol of innocence and began to acquire all the connotations of bodily temptation. As that correspondent in an East African magazine put it: “When Adam and Eve disobeyed God, they were clothed by God before He drove them out of the Garden.”²¹

The very concept of “flesh” came to imply sensuousness; and the very idea of “the flesh is weak” connoted the frailty of human discipline.

And yet Christian theology, while rejecting some of the more literal forms of bodily symbolism, nevertheless used a good deal of metaphor based on flesh as something sacred. The relationship between Christ and the Church is sometimes portrayed in decisively sensuous terms: “Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church and gave Himself up for her” (Ephesians 5:25) or “Husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no man ever hates his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ does the Church, because we are members of His body” (Ephesians 5: 28–33). Such notions of the body and the flesh as characteristic of Christ’s relation to the Church are recurrent in the language of Paul. In condemning prostitution, for example, Paul said to the Corinthians,

Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never! . . . Every other sin which a man commits is outside the body; but the immoral man against his own body. Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God? You are not your own; you were bought with a price. So glorify in your body (I Corinthians 6: 15–20).

PAIN AND THE BODY

But it was not merely in its original theological formulation that Christianity managed to establish a link between rebellion and the body. There were also other ways, including the very notion of naked pain inflicted on the body as a form of divine passion. In the case of Jesus himself the martyrdom, though self-willed, was not self-embraced. Jesus did not *revel* in the sentence which awaited him. He gave guarded or ambiguous answers to many of the crucial questions posed to him. He would not admit to his message or to his position in clear unequivocal terms, but shrouded them all in the shadows of multiple meanings: “And Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answered him and said, Thou sayest it” (St. Luke 23: 3, 4).

To the extent then that Jesus was careful in what he said, he was not rushing headlong towards his martyrdom. And even when he was crucified there was still in him a sense of despair as he cried out, “My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?” Here again is a dignified reluctance to revel in affliction.

But this dignity was not always present in the martyrdom of Christians later on. Some of the enthusiasm with which Christian martyrs later awaited their sentences

of torture led to a spate of psycho-analytical speculation as to the basic motives for their behavior. As Theodore Reik has pointed out, the study of psychological and psycho-analytical literature shows that many scientists in these fields are inclined to hold that religious martyrdom is a form of sexual masochism. A host of references has been offered to prove that the sexual element unconsciously determined the psychic life of many Christian martyrs. Reik himself describes the equation as excessive. Such scholars had an inadequate appreciation of an important difference. To dramatize this difference Reik presents two typical attitudes towards sexuality that have a common starting point. He cites the case of a 25-year-old man who whips himself to obtain sexual satisfaction from the sight, in a mirror, of his own blood.

For his other example Reik cites a Catholic legend which illustrates the counterpart of this conduct. One of the kindest of all Christian Saints passed many years of his manhood in sacred contemplation in the Chapel next to the Church San Marie near Assisi. One day he felt an intense and almost overpowering sexual desire. Reik continues:

It was winter at its hardest; Nature seemed asleep under the snow that covered the little garden of the monastery, but the Evil One was awake. When St. Francis was tortured by this thorn in his flesh so that he was in danger of succumbing to the temptation, he rushed into the snow and rolled himself in a thorn bush of wild roses. And then and there a miracle happened and the dew of his blood made the green sprout and in the snow roses blossomed whose petals were sprinkled blood-red. Up to this day the nuns of Assisi sell pressed roses, the white petals of which bear the stigmata of the Saint in memory of his victory over the impure spirit.²²

This psycho-analyst then proceeds to draw the distinctive features of each of these two cases. In the experience of the 25-year-old man in front of the mirror the pain constitutes an access to the otherwise forbidden satisfaction. In the experience of St. Francis the pain served as defense against the sinful desire. In the first case it means a promotion of the sensual excitement, in the second its counterweight. Reik goes on to argue that both do approximately the same thing, but the meaning of each act is different as it is performed under different psychic conditions. "In the first case the affliction of severe punishment brings forth the enjoyment, in the second the self-punishment has to prevent gratification."²³

What matters from the point of view of our analysis here is that both in masochism and in martyrdom the body provides the means to a higher plane of experience. Even the most spiritual of the martyrs needs the body as the foundation of his martyrdom. There would have been no passion in the Crucifixion had Jesus not possessed a human body.

In Sunni Islam martyrdom is a peripheral phenomenon. There is little glorification of self-willed suffering, but in Shi'a Islam there is an important masochistic theme. For example, the murder of Hussein, the prophet's grandson, is celebrated every year by one Shi'ite School with wailing and a passionate beating

of the chest. The *Ithnasharis* sometimes go to the extent of making their chests bleed in ferocious sympathy with the martyrdom of Hussein. Here again the body of the believer is needed to provide access to physical suffering.

In some of the more simple religious movements the body is used not so much to provide access to pain as to provide access to ecstasy. The dance that leads on to a trance and to spiritual elevation becomes part of a total religious experience. R. R. Marett has even gone as far as to assert that "primitive religion is not so much thought out as danced out."²⁴

African writers have often used the symbol of the African dance and the response to the drum as intimations of the ancestral spirit of Africa. And Senghor has sometimes sung about "the leader of the dance [making] fast his vigor to the prow of his sex."²⁵

The half-naked body, bleeding in places, has at times symbolized the agony of martyrdom in Christian history; the half-naked body, sweating in places, has at times symbolized the ecstasy of a religious trance in the history of African rhythmic experience.

NUDITY AND POLITICAL REBELLION

It is not simply in the religious sphere that the issues of nakedness and dress have been interlinked with problems of rebellion and assertion. The realm of politics has, as we intimated, also sensed the relevance of apparel for human sensibilities.

Political rebellion can sometimes take the form simply of an obstinate refusal to change. To some extent this theme was discerned quite early in the attitude of the Masai when the new Tanzanian policy on their attire was proclaimed. One member of the tribe wrote an article to a Dar es Salaam newspaper pointing out that the policy was having the effect of forcing the tribe in more remote places back into itself. The tribe was becoming more defensive than ever. The members that lived nearer to the towns, and who had to establish contact with the towns, might feel the brunt of coercion and make concessions to it. But others who might at one time have been tempted to seek greater social intercourse with the urban areas might now be forced to reject these areas more completely:

These people have resolved to ignore any force that is out to destroy their traditional outlook whatever the cost might be. . . Since they value their traditions more than all those things they can get from the so-called 'civilized' society they will do whatever they can to keep away from it.²⁶

If this was the correct interpretation of the Masai response to the new policies in the days ahead, it constituted rebellion by withdrawal, a cultural assertion by a quiet defiance.

A second form of assertiveness is that of residual cultural distinctiveness. In this latter case a person may have been basically de-culturated away from his ancient civilization, and might have adopted a new way of life in many respects. But he then decides to retain a residue of this former cultural identity. This is the case of a highly Westernized person whose main literary interest is in Shake-

speare, whose favorite composer is Beethoven, who eats with a knife and fork at home, uses a flush lavatory, and has the rest of his house furnished in exquisite Western standards, but who nevertheless then decides to dress himself not in a suit but in an African or Oriental national garment. Pandit Nehru often made this assertion of residual cultural distinctiveness—permitting himself to be Indian by dress and by general sympathy—yet Western by the totality of his intellectual and even domestic behavior.

This form of assertion can sometimes invite ridicule from critics. Gandhi's determination to move around simply with a Dhوتي, naked from the waist upwards, even when he was having an audience with British Royalty, was a striking case of cultural assertiveness. But it did provoke from Winston Churchill the taunt that India could not be entrusted to "a naked fakir."

Yet Indians have often been admired by nationalists elsewhere for their determination to retain at least these residual trappings of their ancient culture. Even in the course of the controversy over the Masai early in 1968 in East Africa, one African correspondent, as has already been noted, had occasion to note, "Indians and Pakistanis have been acquainted with Western civilization for centuries, yet they proudly use their traditional dress."²⁷

A third type of cultural assertion is that of ritualized rejection of a foreign dress that had already been adopted. This is somewhat different from the former case, where the residual trapping may never have been adopted. Moreover, in the case of ritualized rejection of Western dress, for example, the rejection may be only on special occasions or in the course of political demonstrations. The rest of the time the nationalists might still go about in their neckties.

Ritualized rejection of Western dress of this kind happened in the history of Kenya's nationalism, for example. Eliud Mathu, the first African member of the Kenya Legislative Council in the colonial period, once tore off his jacket at a public meeting in a dramatic gesture of rejecting Western civilization—if the price was the loss of land for the African. "Take back your civilization—and give back my land!"

In the course of the Mau Mau Rebellion there were similar moments of ritualized rejection of Western dress. Perhaps even more interesting was the utilization of nakedness as a method of adding solemnity to an oath. Josiah Kariuki tells us of the ritual which constituted the Mau Mau *Batuni* oath:

We sat down and Biniathi then told us to take all our clothes off except our trousers, and we stood patiently waiting to be called by him. I was called second after Kanyoi and there was no disobeying the summons. I took off my trousers and squatted facing Biniathi. He told me to take the thorax of the goat which had been skinned, to put my penis through a hole that had been made in it and to hold the rest of it in my left hand in front of me.

This was part of the ritual that culminated in this undertaking:

I speak the truth and vow before God
 And by this *Batuni* oath of our movement
 Which is called the movement of fighting
 That if I am called on to kill for our soil
 If I am called on to shed my blood for it
 I shall obey . . .
 I speak the truth and vow before God
 That I shall never take away the woman of another man
 That I shall never walk with prostitutes
 That I shall never steal anything belonging to another person in the movement
 Nor shall I hate any other member for his actions
 And if I do any of these things
 May this oath kill me . . .²⁸

There was in this oath a commitment to fight the enemy, a commitment to collective solidarity among the “Mau Mau” fighters, and a commitment to frugality and self-denial, especially in the all too dangerous sensuous area of relations with women. But to give the whole *Batuni* oath the overpowering air of binding force, it was deemed necessary to strip the man who was taking it. Nudity in this case was the requisite atmosphere for ominous awe.

A fourth form of political assertiveness connected with dress is itself a form of imitation. In some of the previous cases what was being dramatized was the rejection of a blind imitation of Western ways, but under this other category there is an imitation not necessarily of Westerners, but of those who have already come to symbolize a prior anti-Westernism. The adoption of Chinese attire among revolutionaries in countries like Tanzania is one case of revolutionary imitativeness. The Chinese style of dress becomes a symbol of solidarity worthy of adoption by African radicals as well.

Perhaps even more dramatic was the case of Cuban styles of attire as manifested among revolutionaries on the island of Zanzibar. Soon after the revolution which overthrew the Sultan's regime in January 1964 there was a widely publicized report that Cuban militiamen were among the revolutionaries. But Michael Lofchie's theory about the source of the confusion is persuasive. It is probable that the Cuban rumor was due to the presence of several trade union leaders who had joined the revolutionaries early on the first day of the New Era. Lofchie points out that:

Many members of these groups had adopted the Cuban style of dress and appearance, and even employed the Cuban cry ‘Venceremos’ (We Shall Conquer) as a political symbol. Their Cuban type of uniform set them off clearly from the [Afro-Shirazi Youth League] members and was probably the basis of the report that the revolutionary army contained Cuban soldiers.²⁹

In this case imitation of the dress of others, far from being a detraction from nationalism, was in fact an ally of it. “For the apparel oft proclaims the man,”

Polonius had said. And Zanzibaris in Cuban apparel proclaimed their revolutionary affiliations.

The fifth form of revolutionary assertion in politics, insofar as it is connected with the issue of dress and nakedness, comes as a response to the indignity of being compulsorily undressed or re-clothed by a conquering power. The conqueror lays down the law about a new mode of dress or against an old item of attire. The nationalist then responds to this with the militancy of offended pride.

A striking example of this kind of phenomenon in revolutionary Africa was the veil in Algeria. Franz Fanon, the West Indian psycho-philosopher who fought in the Algerian insurrection, had time to analyze before his death the symbol of "Algeria unveiled." Fanon saw the veil of the Algerian woman both as a badge of identity and as a basis of solidarity:

In the Arab Maghreb, the veil belongs to the clothing traditions of the Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan and Libyan national societies. For the tourist and the foreigner, the veil demarcates both Algerian society and its feminine component. . . . The woman seen in her white veil unifies the perception that one has of Algerian feminine society. Obviously what we have here is a uniform which tolerates no modification, nor variant.³⁰

Fanon goes on to discuss the policy of the French authorities in their attempts to eliminate the veil from Algerian society. The French formula was "Let's win over the women, and the rest will follow." It was assumed that beneath the patrilineal pattern of Algerian society there was a matrilineal essence.

The success of the French assimilationist policy therefore depended in part on an adequate awareness of the importance of the Algerian mother, the Algerian grandmother, the aunt and the "old woman." The colonial administration was, according to Fanon, convinced of this doctrine:

If we want to destroy the structure of the Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the women; we must go and find them behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men keep them out of sight.

But in the heat of the Algerian War, it was not simple propaganda which was used. The occupying forces resorted at times to the personal aggression of forceful unveiling of women in the streets. The situation got worse when Algerian women became more systematically committed to revolution. They were unveiled in the streets partly out of the French soldiers' desire to subject the Arab woman to indignity, but also at times out of suspicion that behind the veil was a Sten gun. Fanon discerned in European behavior deeper psychological reasons as well. He had himself served as a medical psycho-analyst in Algeria and had treated both French soldiers and some prisoners of the Algerian War. Fanon notes: "The rape of the Algerian woman in the dream of the European is always preceded by a rending of the veil."

The French soldiers were sometimes influenced by a rape complex at the sub-conscious level if not in complete awareness.

Unveiling this woman is revealing her beauty; it is baring her secret, breaking her resistance, making her available for adventure. Hiding the face is also disguising a secret; it is also, creating a world of mystery, of the hidden. In a confused way, the European experiences his relation with the Algerian woman at a highly complex level. There is in it the will to bring this woman within his reach, to make her a possible object of possession.³¹

But in fact, this is the time when the Algerian woman converted the veil more fully into a military camouflage. A technique was evolved of carrying a rather heavy object dangerous to handle under the veil, and still give the impression of having one's hands free, of there being nothing under this *hiak* except a poor woman or an insignificant young girl. It was not enough to be veiled. One had to look so much like a "fatma" that the soldier would be convinced that this woman was quite harmless.

But the Algerian woman sometimes *abandoned* the veil as an exercise in military camouflage. There were occasions when it was important that the feminine Algerian soldier should walk the streets looking as Europeanized as possible. For some of these girls it took a lot to escape the sense of awkwardness which came with the act of walking in the street unveiled. A newly unveiled feminine revolutionary "has an impression of being improperly dressed, even of being naked. She experiences a sense of incompleteness with great intensity. She has the anxious feeling that something is unfinished, and along with this a frightful sensation of disintegrating. . . . The Algerian woman who walks stark-naked in the European city relearns her body, reestablishes it in a totally revolutionary fashion."

Fanon describes this as "a new dialectic of the body and of the world." The newly unveiled must overcome all timidity and awkwardness "for she must pass for a European."³²

In the case of the Zanzibari rebels in January 1964, the adoption of a foreign dress was an exercise in imitating admired revolutionaries elsewhere. The Zanzibaris embraced the Cuban style of attire. But in the case of the unveiled Algerian woman the idea was to embrace the French mode of attire and pass for a French woman. It will be seen that both exercises were in fact forms of revolutionary imitation. In the Zanzibari case it was an act of emulating comrades-in-arms on the international stage. In the example of the unveiled Algerian woman it was a case of imitating the enemy. Yet both remained acts of symbolic combat.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to demonstrate in this chapter that dress and nakedness are factors in human existence which have had important connections with diverse forms of assertiveness and rebellion. The policy of the Government of Tanzania to

try and revolutionize the lives of the Masai by making them wear trousers, fell into line with a long stream of human experience in which dress, culture and social transformation have been intimately linked. Sometimes two acts can be the same but the meaning might be different. A French attempt to abolish the veil in Algeria and the campaign by Kamal Atatürk to abolish the Fez in Turkey do, at one level, appear to be comparable types of phenomena. And yet Atatürk's quest to abolish the Fez (and the veil) in Turkey following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was in a large measure an act of cultural defensiveness. It was a quest for the kind of modernized status which would make the new Turkey survive. But the French attempt to unveil Algeria was by contrast an exercise in cultural aggression, compounded in the Algerian War by considerations of military precautions and tactical subterfuge.

The place of dress and nakedness in relation to rebellion goes back, as we have indicated, at least to Adam and Eve. In Christian mythology one long-term consequence of the Original Sin was the evolution of the concept of "private parts." Until then these were not private. It was the consciousness of their role in sensuality, and the attempt to cover this up, which gave rise to the aura of intimacy surrounding the parts. In short, private parts became private when God sentenced Adam and Eve to eternal clothing.

But nudity and dress have political as well as theological implications. In Africa the political implications have sometimes touched the whole movement of Negritude as a glorification of African naturalness. The emotive sensibilities of African culture, and the glistening response of the African body to rhythm and to the demands of the ancestral dance, have all become relevant.

But there have been other manifestations of the political meaning of dress and nudity in Africa's experience, ranging from the Mau Mau *Batuni* oath taken naked before the thorax of a goat, to the adoption of a Chinese style of dress in Tanzania as an act of identification with Mao Tse-tung.

"For the apparel oft proclaims the man," the voice of Polonius might once again remind us. Yet so does the lack of apparel. The song of nationalism in Africa has sometimes included a vow of nudity; the trumpet of revolution has at other times awakened radicalism to its uniform; and the world of social issues has often had to touch the revealed parts of personal intimacy. The problem of the Masai in Tanzania early in 1968 belonged to a whole universe of human experience. Here once again was one of the tense meeting points between the garment of culture and the body of man in history.

NOTES

1. See Richard Brooke-Edwards, "A Fourth Freedom," *Transition*, No. 34 (December-January 1968), p. 39.

2. See, for example, *The Daily Nation* (Nairobi), February 6, 1968.

3. See *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), February 8 and 16, 1968.

4. See Rousseau, *A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind Everyman's Edition of The Social Contract and Discourses* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1955), p. 164.

5. See Pope, *Essay on Man* (1732).

6. Thomas Day and John Bicknell, *The Dying Negro* (London 1775), pp. 7–8. First published in 1773.

7. See Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*, John Reed and Clive Wake, (trans.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 99.

8. See Sartre, *Black Orpheus* (Paris: Présence Africaine), pp. 43–44.

9. *Black Orpheus*, op. cit., pp. 45–47.

10. Fanon, *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*, translated from the French by Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965), p. 35.

11. See *The Daily Nation* (Nairobi), February 6, 1968.

12. Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government* (London: Longmans, 1960).

13. “Masai and Their Fashions,” letter in *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 17, 1968.

14. President Nyerere’s *Address to the Tanganyika National Assembly*, December 10, 1962, special publication, p. 21. In this regard it is instructive to compare the Masai controversy with the agitation about mini-skirts in Tanzania. In October 1968 some girls wearing mini-skirts were man-handled by members of the TANU Youth League in Dar es Salaam. Riot police had to be called in to handle the youth. A resolution (“Operation Vijana”) was proposed to ban mini-skirts, wigs, and tight trousers from Tanzania with effect from January 1969, but younger members of the ruling party thought January was too far away and embarked on measures to speed up the change. The Afro-Shirazi League in Zanzibar soon endorsed the move by their sister organization on the mainland. In a resolution marking the close of a three-day seminar the Afro-Shirazi Youth League pledged they would work resolutely to eliminate such remnants of foreign culture in the country. In the background of these resolutions was the memory of Kariakoo Market Place, Dar es Salaam, a few days earlier when these youthful gangs stopped girls wearing mini-skirts and tight dresses and assaulted them, and riot police carrying guns and tear gas helped to disperse huge crowds at the market place.

It was clear that Tanzanian disapproval of the semi-nakedness of the Masai had a different basis from their disapproval of the semi-nakedness of mini-skirts. In the case of the mini-skirts, part of the disapproval stemmed from the allegation that this was a disreputable foreign intrusion into the dress culture of the country. On the other hand, getting the Masai to wear trousers was to impose on them a foreign mode of attire. For a further discussion of the politics of mini-skirts, see Ali A. Mazrui, “Mini-skirts and Political Puritanism,” *Africa Report* (Washington, DC), October 1968. See also *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam) and *East African Standard* (Nairobi), 8th and 9th October, 1968.

A related instance of Tanzania’s political puritanism was the country’s decision to abolish in 1968 the beauty contest for Miss Tanzania.

15. This question is cited and discussed in a letter by “Marko” in *Reporter* (Nairobi), February 23, 1968, p. 4.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Book IV, lines 288–318.

18. *Ibid.*, lines 319–320.

19. See Augustine, *Civitas Dei*, Vol. XIX, 15.

20. *Civitas Dei*, Vol. IV, 3, 4, 6.

21. *East Africa’s Reporter*, February 23, 1968, p. 4.

22. See Theodore Reik, *Masochism in Sex and Society*, Margaret H. Beigel and Gertrude M. Kurth, (trans.), (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1962 edition), pp. 349–350. For a discussion of related issues see Chapter XVI following.

23. Reik, op. cit., p. 350.

24. Marett, *Threshold of Religion* (London, 1909), p. xxxi. See also B. G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961 edition), p. 198.

25. “Congo,” *Prose and Poetry*, p. 141.

26. L. M. Ole Paraipuny, “The Masai: One Tribesman’s Views on a Complex Problem,” *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), February 25, 1968, p. 4.

27. Letter from O. N. Njau, “Masai and Their Fashions,” *East African Standard*, February 17, 1968. See p. 326, n. 14.

28. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, “*Mau Mau*” *Detainee* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 29–30.

29. Michael P. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 276.

30. *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*, op. cit., pp. 35–36.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 42–44.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Chapter 1.2

Political Man and the Heritage of Hair: Some African Perspectives

In 1953 the King of the Baganda entered into a political confrontation with the British Governor of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen. The issues at stake ranged from whether Uganda should be forcibly tied to Kenya and Tanganyika to form an East African federation dominated by White settlers to the more immediate issue concerning the limits of the Governor's authority over the King of the Baganda. The British finally decided to send the Kabaka away into exile in England. There thus started one of the most fascinating wrangles between an African tribal community and the Colonial Office in London. The Kabaka's people were plunged into grief, but not into a spirit of resignation. Debates, petitions, and demonstrations in favor of the Kabaka's return became part of the strategy of his people to get him back to his throne.

Protests by the Baganda against the exile of their king took a variety of forms. But from the point of view of this chapter, one manifestation deserves special mention. It is a form of protest which has been observed in other parts of the world, in societies vastly different from that of the Ganda. Yet its very universality as a medium of protest raises questions about man's perception of its significance. A number of devoted subjects of the Kabaka of Buganda took a vow to let their hair and beards grow without cutting or shaving. Some of these were civil servants, and limited themselves to letting the beard grow. His Excellency the Governor of Uganda later declared that it was not seemly for civil servants to have beards. Yet many persevered all the same.¹

By 1955 the Baganda's strategy of protest on all fronts had ultimately succeeded. The British capitulated to the idea of returning the Kabaka to his kingdom. The symbolic band of bearded men prepared to end their mourning. A decision was taken that they should all assemble at Entebbe Airport and ceremonially shave their beards collectively when the Kabaka's plane arrived. The hair had

served its purpose as a symbol of protest. But the protest had been victorious. Should there not be a memorial to some of the forms that it took? It was suggested that the mass of hair and whiskers thus shaved should be collected together and used to stuff a cushion that could then be presented to the King. But would not this violate the Kiganda custom that decreed that the king was not to come into contact with the clippings of other men? True to the style of the old political culture of Uganda a debate ensued over this proposition. A way out was finally found in another Kiganda dictum—that although every custom was sacrosanct, the Kabaka had the right to innovate. He could thus depart from custom if he so wished. The only question that remained was whether he would agree to receive a cushion stuffed with the hair of those who had endured its discomfort as a measure of their loyalty to him. His Highness accepted the cushion.²

The case of the bearded Baganda was, as I indicated, in a tradition quite widely dispersed in different parts of the world. We shall discuss this tradition more fully in the course of the analysis, but what needs to be noted for the time being is that the Ganda case was an instance of the functions of hair in contexts of political protest. Another area in which hair plays a part is that of cultural nationalism. In the ultimate analysis, situations of cultural nationalism concern areas of cultural interaction between one society and another. Hair acquires this significance in inter-societal relations partly because hair is important in intra-societal arrangements. Issues of identity arise not only when one civilization finds itself resisting the encroachment of another, but also in matters concerning the individual's place within his own civilization. This chapter proposes to address itself to these three dimensions of the functions of hair in politics: hair as a medium of political protest; hair as a focus of cultural nationalism; and hair as an area concerning an individual's membership of his own society. Behind it all is the meaning of hair as a biological residuum and the final purposes that nature might still have intended it to serve on the body of man.

ON NATURAL AND SEXUAL SELECTION

The place of hair in relation to African nationalism has to be related in part to the history of European racialism. And this history has included an important biological dimension. In 1859 Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published. It was soon to have long-term repercussions both for the study of biology and for the study of social science. Racists could now proceed to demonstrate, by the utilization of the theory of natural selection, that major differences in human capacity and human organization were to be traced to biological distinctions between races. But to some extent this theory was much older than Darwin. What Darwin added to it was the dynamism which converted mere classification of beings into a *process*. The static version of the theory goes back to the ancient idea that God had so organized the world that the universe and creation were arranged in a "Great Chain of Being"—that all creatures could be classified and fitted into a hierarchy extending "from man down to the smallest reptile, whose existence can be discovered by the microscope."³ It was not just

the different species that were so classified. Even within the highest species (that of human beings) there were in turn sub-divisions. Theories of the Great Chain of Being assumed that the Almighty in His wisdom did not want a big gap between one type of creature and the next. And so there had to be intermediate categories between orang-outangs and White men. As early as 1713 naturalists began looking for the “missing link” between men and apes and apparently speculated on the possibility that Hottentots and orang-outangs might be side by side in “the scale of life,” separated only by the fact that orang-outangs could not speak.⁴

Darwin’s concept of *natural selection* was particularly crucial as a basis of classification in racial theories. It was also the foundation for theories of physical differentiation between races, and the presumed implications of those physical differences. Darwin’s argument was that in every generation of animals there is an array of individuals varying in a random fashion from the average type. The differences may be in terms of size, shape or general performance. One individual may be larger, or may possess an organ with a slightly different shape, or may have an aptitude above average. The differences themselves could be small, but those who possess variations in their makeup which are better suited to withstand the environment would tend to live longer, or reproduce more. Over a period of time the favorable characteristics might accumulate, and if the specimens which lacked the strong characteristics gradually diminished in numbers, the stronger type might gain ascendancy. A large accumulation of differences could result in a new species altogether.

It was this gem of an idea which Darwin called “natural selection.” As we know, this was a significant departure from the previous theory put forward by the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck. Lamarck had published a book in 1809 entitled *Zoological Philosophy* in which he suggested that it was the environment which caused organisms to acquire certain changes and these changes were then passed on to their descendents. His famous illustration was the giraffe, then a newly-discovered sensation. The theory was that the giraffe started as an antelope-like creature that fed on tree leaves. It then ran out of food and found that it had to stretch a bit to reach the leaves. By the habitual stretching of its neck, tongue and legs the animal gradually lengthened these organs. In minute stages, generation after generation of stretching, the primitive antelope feeding on leaves finally evolved into the elongated giraffe.

Darwin’s theory argued that the giraffe got its neck not by stretching but because some giraffes were born with longer necks than their fellows, and the more elongated individuals found that they could reach their food more effectively and stood a better chance of survival. In the end, by this process of natural selection, the long-necked characteristic prevailed. Natural selection also went some way towards explaining the blotched skin of the giraffe—certainly it was more effective as an explanation for that skin than anything that Lamarck could advance. An animal with blotches on its skin again enhanced its survival capability by blending against the sun-spotted vegetation and disguising its presence from lions on the prowl.

In relation to hair as a biological residuum of man, it was not merely Darwin's theory of *natural selection* which was relevant, but also his idea of sexual selection as worked out in his later book *The Descent of Man and Selections in Relation to Sex*. Natural selection to Darwin was an idea which was needed to operationalize the theory of evolution as a whole in relation to all species. Sexual selection, on the other hand, was introduced by him to meet the special problem of the evolution of the human being. The greater part of Darwin's *Descent of Man* does indeed attempt to explain the action of sexual selection in animals. But the aim is to some extent oriented towards the descent of *homo sapiens*. The theory is to the effect that in all species of sexually differentiated animals, individuals of both sexes vary genetically in their attractiveness to the opposite sex. In animals, those who are more attractive or more aggressive are likely to have more opportunities for sexual fulfillment, and leave more progeny. Each sex would then evolve in the direction of maximizing characteristics congenial to sexual success. The process itself could either modify, accelerate, or occasionally conflict with the broader process of natural selection.

In his recent book on *The Evolution of Man and Society*, C. D. Darlington places human hair predominantly within the stream of ideas of sexual selection, but with some residual link to natural selection:

Today we do not need to share Darwin's misgivings about natural selection in order to see the point of sexual selection. In the evolution of man the development of the beard is no doubt due to sexual rather than natural selection. In the evolution of woman the hairlessness of the body is manifestly due to sexual selection.⁵

Darlington distinguishes between sexual differences that are primary and crucial for fertility and sexual differences that are secondary. With regard to primary differences the two sexes usually evolve independently. When the independence breaks down, when the chromosome mechanism gets mixed up, "which frequently happens in heterogeneous outbred communities" intermediate tendencies may be produced in individuals—tendencies which are inter-sexual, homosexual, neuter, or sterile in any one of a hundred different ways. But regarding what is secondary, Darlington asserts that the two sexes evolve only in part independently. "Thus the male, in selecting for hairlessness in women, has also been selecting for hairlessness in men. In selecting for good looks in women he has also been selecting in the same direction less effectively in men."⁶ Here Darlington is not entirely convincing. It is not self-evident why genetically determined secondary differences should not evolve independently.

Darlington is on firmer (and more orthodox) ground when he describes hair as one adaptation in man's sexual evolution that has reached its limit. He first noted that as man became more upright, he found it possible to change his mode of copulation. He was no longer condemned to the single mammalian type of back to front, and could now more characteristically choose a face-to-face pos-

ture. He argues that the selective tensions induced by this versatility are still not fully released, and further anatomical changes favored by it are incomplete:

The directly structural effects are seen in the anatomical variation of genitalia between human races and individuals today. Only in one direction has adaptation reached its limit. The development of pubic hair in both sexes, unknown in any of our ancestors, became necessary to avoid damage from friction in coitus. It is now universal; so also is the useless but developmentally correlated 'axillary hair.'⁷

Applying sexual selection to racial differences, we note first Darwin's own mundane admission that in the mind of man there was no "universal standard of beauty with respect to the human body." He thought rather that each society tended to admire those characteristics which were distinctive of their own race, and which therefore marked them off from others. The result was that sexual selection exaggerated any racial differences, which already existed. Darwin asserted that "of all the causes which had led to the differences in external appearance between the races of man, and to some extent between man and the lower animals, sexual selection has been the most effective."⁸ In fact, as we shall later indicate in relation to the problem of acculturation in the colonies, Darwin's assumption about human partiality for one's own distinctive characteristics was exaggerated. But for the moment it remains pertinent simply to note that theories of racial gradation following the publication of *The Origin of Species* re-examined physical differences between the races, and formulated hypotheses concerning their respective social and cultural performance.

ON HAIR AND RACISM

One of the curious factors in the history of racial theories in Europe was the extent to which skin color was regarded as a more meaningful differentiating characteristic between races than comparative hairiness or differences in the texture of hair. One would have expected hair to feature prominently in, at least, the pseudo-scientific theories for two reasons. One reason concerns the evolutionary kinship with the apes. It might therefore have been a matter of interest to pseudo-scientific theories of race to compare human groups partly by the yardstick of propensity for hairiness. Another factor that might have aroused greater interest in the phenomenon of hair concerns the concentration of hair about the skull. Phrenology grew up as a science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, shifting the criterion of race classifications away from language and skin color towards head shape. The ultimate hope of phrenology was, in the words of Philip Curtin, the hope of "discerning the inner nature of the human mind by examining its outer covering."

It was George Combe who first went the whole way in applying phrenology to groups of people and attempting to analyze the entire character of races. He argued that African skulls showed a higher stage of development than those of

American Indians or Australian aborigines, but a lower stage than those of Europeans. The evidence provided by African skulls was to him as follows:

The organs of Philoprogenitiveness and Concentrativeness are largely developed; the former of which produces love of children, and the latter that concentration of mind which is favourable to settled and sedentary employments. The organs of Veneration and Hope are also considerable in size. The greatest deficiencies lie in Conscientiousness, Cautiousness, Ideality, and Reflection.⁹

The evidence deduced from the skulls of Black people supported the traditional concept of the Negro as it then prevailed.

S. G. Morton put more emphasis on the size rather than on the shape of the skull. Curtin refers to Morton's attempts in measuring cranial capacity in cubic inches by filling each skull with white pepper seeds and then measuring the volume of the seeds. His findings as published showed a range of mean capacity from 87 cubic inches for "Caucasians" to 78 cubic inches for "Negroes." Curtin comments: "In fact, his measurements had no statistical validity (even if the capacity of the skull was a genuine measure of intellect): his sample of Negro skulls consisted of only 20 from Negro Americans and 9 from Liberia."¹⁰ Considering this importance of the skull in such pseudo-scientific theories of race, it remains surprising that the outer growth on the skull—hair—did not invite more curiosity in relation to racial differentiation.

Perhaps one explanation might lie in the embarrassment which might be caused if hairiness as a quality were to be placed as a relevant factor in the chain of being from apes to the White man. The Indo-Europeans are among the more hairy of the human groups. Does this establish a closer proximity to the hairy species of the animal kingdom? Isaac Asimov, in his popularized introduction to the biological sciences, has captured the dilemma of racial theories neatly. He draws attention to the pseudo-scientific theorists and their assertion that the Negro was inferior to the White man "because he obviously represented a lower stage of evolution." The physical characteristics were again invoked. Were not the Negro's dark skin and wide nose, for instance, reminiscent of the ape? Asimov gives the ultimate answer in these terms: "Unfortunately for their case, this line of reasoning leads to the opposite conclusion. The Negro is the least hairy of all the groups of mankind; in this respect and in the fact that his hair is crisp and woolly, rather than long and straight, the Negro is farther from the ape than the White man is!"¹¹ It may have been partly these considerations that pushed questions of hairiness, and of the texture of hair, outside the mainstream of racial theories propounded by Caucasians.

Relatively understressed as hair has been in European racialism, it has in fact been quite significant in African nationalism. The distinctive physical characteristics attributed to Africans have been black skin, flat nose, thick lips, and woolly hair. In fact, the flat nose and thick lips are much less universal as characteristics of Black Africans than has sometimes been assumed. Nilo-Hamites and some branches of both Bantu and Nilotes have noses and lips which would

not obviously be out of place within a Caucasian collection. The black skin and the woolly hair are more strikingly peculiar to natives of sub-Saharan Africa. Even images of a Black Christ some African religious movements have permitted Jesus a straight nose and thin lips, while attributing to him a black skin and woolly hair. B. G. Sundkler, in his contemplation of the Black Christ movements of South Africa, is suddenly reminded of a verse as old as Xenophanes:

The Ethiop's Gods have dusky cheeks,
Thick lips and woolly hair;
The Grecian Gods are like the Greeks,
As tall, bright-eyed, and fair.¹²

The thick lips have again been less of a prerequisite for images of the Black Christ than either the skin color or the peculiarly African woolly hair.

While African religious nationalism has tended at times to Africanize Jesus Christ, African cultural nationalism has often insisted on the Africanization of the Pharaohs. It was the Senegalese romantic historian Cheikh Anta Diop who once put it thus: "It remains . . . true that the Egyptian experiment was essentially Negro, and that all Africans can draw the same moral advantage from it that Westerners draw from Graeco-Latin civilization."¹³ Here again skulls are relevant as evidence. They were once important, as we indicated, in phrenology and the attempt to classify races by either the size or the shape of the skull. In this period of African cultural nationalism, the evidence of skulls has assumed a new relevance. But in this case so has the evidence of hair. Basil Davidson, in his romanticism, sometimes overargues the vision of a glorious African past. But he is probably well within the evidence available when he tells us the following:

An analysis of some eight hundred skulls from pre-dynastic Egypt—from the lower valley of the Nile, that is, before 3000 B.C.—shows that at least a third of them were Negroes or ancestors of the Negroes whom we know; and this may well support the view, to which a study of language also brings us some confirmation, that remote ancestors of the Africans today were an important and perhaps dominant element among populations which fathered the civilisation of ancient Egypt.¹⁴

The additional evidence comes from some of the contemporary descriptions of ancient Egyptians. Blackness on its own is not peculiar to Africans. There are communities in South India and in Ceylon that are blacker than some tribes in Africa. It is the combination of blackness and the particular texture of hair that carries the stamp of African distinctiveness. African cultural nationalism has sometimes turned to the Greeks for evidence to support the Africanness of ancient Egypt. The late W. E. B. Du Bois, the distinguished Black American and one of the founding fathers of the pan-African movement, used to cite the testimony of Herodotus that ancient Egyptians were, as Herodotus described them, "black and curly haired."¹⁵ European racial theorists had invoked the evidence of skulls to demonstrate intellectual endowments and intellectual deficiencies.

African cultural nationalists have more recently utilized the evidence of skulls and the evidence of texture of hair in contemporary records to demonstrate their own role in the oldest of all major ancient civilizations.

HAIR AND POLITICS OF BEAUTY

The African's own tendency to be culturally defensive in this way has, of course, its roots in the whole history of colonization and racial humiliation. History in turn has involved processes of cultural interaction and indeed cultural assimilation. The question of hair, especially in relation to sexual selection, touches new fields of cultural nationalism. We will remember Darwin's argument that each race tended to admire those of its characteristics which were peculiar to itself, and that sexual selection therefore tended not only to perpetuate but also exaggerate the differences which already existed between the races. The history of imperialism and its attendant acculturation have cast new doubt on Darwin's assumptions, in the words of J. Maynard Smith: "Often, conquered or technically backward peoples have abandoned their own standards of taste in favor of those of their conquerors, just as they have abandoned their own gods for those of Christianity or of Islam."¹⁶

Much of Africa, because it was colonized, is feeling the pull of conflicting criteria of sexual attractiveness. In Uganda, press discussion has periodically erupted since 1967 on the issue of the Miss World Contest. The concept of a Miss World as an aesthetic problem was partly initiated in Uganda by statements made by Miss Uganda on completion of the world contest in 1967. There was an increasing sense of awareness that in order to stand a chance in that Caucasian-dominated competition, Africa had to breed special females, seek advice from Western beauticians and physical statisticians and strive for comparability with the Western female. The Uganda press discussion included a call for a separate Black Beauty contest, which would seek out the most striking Black females from Africa, the West Indies, the United States, Brazil and elsewhere in the Black Diaspora.

It is, of course, conceivable that an African girl might win the Miss World competition before a separate Black Beauty contest comes into being. But an African Miss World could only win if, with the exception of her color, she is a "western" beauty by every other criterion. Indeed, choices of beautiful women from Uganda for the 1967 world contest were so influenced by presumed Western criteria that both number one and number three in the national competition for Miss Uganda were girls of mixed parentage racially. In 1968 the attempt to shine in London led to an emphasis on intellectual values in Kampala. The girl had not only to try to approximate Western criteria of beauty, but had, if possible, to be intellectually Westernized enough to feel comfortable in London society. The result was that both number one and number two in the Miss Uganda contest were undergraduate girls from Makerere University College. Indeed, number two, Miss Freda Lule, was the daughter of the Principal of Makerere. Number one was Miss Joy Leahai, a student of English literature at Makerere.

She reigned as Miss Uganda and went to London for the world contest. Her experiences, and sense of being cast in the role of an imitator, made her join the voices of those who were already clamouring for a separate Black Beauty contest.

In 1966 Miss World was Miss Reita Faria of India. She did seem to have broken the Caucasian monopoly of the world contest, and just as decolonization in Africa had been preceded by decolonization in India, and was in part influenced by it. So the Indian success in the beauty contest and the arrival of Miss Faria in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa, opened up African hopes of standing a chance. Even Tanzania, in spite of her radicalism and opposition to bourgeois values, competed in 1967. But shortly after that attempt Tanzania decided that the entire exercise was extremely decadent, and the Government prohibited such a contest in 1968. In any case, it should have been remembered that Miss Faria's features were strikingly Indo-European—the beauty judges of Europe had not ventured too far out of the comfort of their accustomed criteria.

Yet Western criteria of female beauty do continue to exert some influence in the former colonies. And if sexual selection proceeds under the influence of revised aesthetic criteria, some of the differences between the physical characteristics of the races of the world might begin to narrow. Questions relating to the height and shape of the human body are especially susceptible to both sexual and natural selection. Distribution of flat noses as against straight noses, and of thick lips as against thinner ones, might also be affected in situations where those with features accepted as handsome or beautiful by the new criteria become more successful sexually as “they scatter their Maker's image through the land.”

Inevitably the question of hair has also added to the tensions of aesthetic dualism and sexual acculturation. Straightening one's hair as a way of looking more attractive is a borrowed approach to beauty. Evidently this area of sexual acculturation arouses reactions among those who are more concerned with preserving cultural identity. The different imitative fashions which have emerged in Africa in response to Western criteria of beauty have not penetrated without some resistance. A passionate speech once given by a parliamentarian in Kenya captured some of the fire which is felt over these issues. That was in 1966 before Kenya merged her two Houses of Parliament. Senator J. Kabaso was speaking in the Upper House when he exploded with the words: “Some African women take much trouble applying Ambi Special so that they can look white in the face while the rest of their bodies are black. If this painting of lips continues, there is no reason why European women should not start painting their faces black.” He also condemned the reduction of African hair to something that “looks like sisal.” The Senator was arguing both for the preservation of African cultural identity and for the maintenance of simple authenticity in feminine beauty. He concluded his speech with a motion calling on the Kenya Government to prevent “this wholesale copying of alien cultures.” State action was necessary because, as he put it, “African women have a natural beauty that should not be allowed to disappear.”¹⁷ But if the Senator's call for state intervention was phrased in terms of

national identity, the Government's refusal to act was rationalized on the basis of individual liberty. Opposing Senator Kabaso's motion, the Attorney General argued that it was the Kenya Government's view that the question of fashions should be left to the people themselves.¹⁸

While governments have withdrawn from debates on fashions in East Africa, the poets and political commentators have not. Okot p'Bitek, one of the best known of Uganda's literary figures, has entrusted the cause of preserving Africa's hair to the heroine of his famous poem *Song of Lawino*. The poem is a long lament, originally written in Acholi and translated into English. Lawino is a traditionalist "bush wife" finding herself estranged from her husband by the intervention of Western tastes in his life. The increasing westernization in her husband has also affected his taste for women. Clearly there is a strong possibility here that Clementine may have more opportunities to beget Ocol's children than Lawino may now have. Would the triumph of Western criteria of beauty have consequences for sexual selection even with regard to hair?

This might have worked if Lamarck's theories had been vindicated in practice. We mentioned earlier Lamarck's example of the giraffe stretching its neck, tongue, and legs for so long to reach its food until, over a period of generations, the stretching resulted in elongated organs and the change from a primitive antelope to a giraffe. Lamarck's notion of "the inheritance of acquired characteristics" might conceivably have been applied to the genetical consequences of the prestige of Western hair in African societies. A skeptical experimenter did in fact embark on an exercise that bore some resemblance to the notion of straightening hair generation after generation in Africa. Following Lamarck's theory, the experimenter cut off the tails of mice for several generations and reported that the length of the tail in the last generation was not one fraction of an inch shorter than the length in the first. He was ascertaining whether consistent mutilation, generation after generation, might convert this acquired change into an evolutionary inheritance. In fact, as one commentator has said with regard to this neo-Lamarckian experimenter, "he might have saved himself the trouble [of cutting off the tails of mice] by considering the case of the circumcision of Jewish males, which after more than a hundred generations had produced no shriveling of the foreskin."¹⁹ Likewise the straightening of Clementine's hair, in spite of all the attractions that it might have for the Ocols of present day Africa, will never become subject to sexual selection in the evolutionary sense and be passed on biologically to succeeding generations of African women.

Where sexual selection might play a part is with regard to the length of natural hair among African women. There are African women who are so strikingly hairless that what they acquire on their head is never enough to distinguish them from men with regard to hairstyle. If African men in those communities begin to prefer women with longer hair, and if this, in turn, results in greater opportunities for reproduction among such women than among those with inhibited hair growth, it is possible for future generations of Africans to have an even greater preponderance of women with a greater capacity for the growth of hair on their heads. What is uncertain in the present stage of Black Nationalism is whether

the prestige of straight hair is, in fact, stable. Black nationalists in the United States have already rebelled against the preference for Caucasian texture of hair. The Afro hair-style has taken much of Black America by storm. And wigs have come into being to facilitate the Afro fashion. Like ideas of pan-Africanism the Afro hair did not only start in the Black Diaspora it then also struggled to find its way back to Africa. And in Africa this style has sometimes been accused of causing new tensions between men and women. In the words of one woman writer in a Uganda newspaper: "Men are ever poking their noses into women's fashions. They think it is rather ridiculous for our girls to copy the Afro fashion from the Afro-Americans who in turn considered they had copied it from us."²⁰

HAIR AND MODES OF PROTEST

We started with a discussion of the utilization of beards and hair as a medium of protest. Our illustration at the beginning was the oath-taking by subjects of the King of the Baganda not to shave until their king was returned to them by the British. Vows of this kind in relation to protest are, as we indicated, widespread in vastly divergent societies. The range is indeed from the experience at Entebbe airport on the return of the Kabaka of Buganda to the phenomenon of the hippies in the United States and the defiance of letting hair grow unattended.

If the utilization of hair as a medium of protest were purely cultural, one would not have expected it to manifest itself so persistently in cultural systems that are otherwise very different. Cultural variations do occur regarding the precise manner in which hair becomes either a symbol of protest or a medium of political articulation. There is enough similarity between some of the ways in which hair has been so used to raise questions of whether it might not be related to some of the psychological or physiological aspects of human perception. There is the famous painting by Rembrandt, affirming a commitment to the sword and a boycott of the razor. Both the readiness to use the sword and the calculated refusal to use the razor became martial symbols. As the beard grows unshaved, the blade is ready for the enemy and not for the chin.²¹ Then there is the whole story of Guru Nanak and the founding of Sikhism in India—the withdrawal of the brave disaffected into the forest, the subsequent vow not to shave, and the ritualistic carrying of a little blade meant more for valor in combat than for vanity in a shaving salon. Sikhism has, of course, to the present day retained an aversion to the shaving of hair. And Sikhism is, in a profound sense, a religion of protest *par excellence*. The enormous growth of hair has sometimes entailed problems of how to cover it. The turban has become as important a part of the personality of a Sikh as the hair itself, though the turban seems to have originated out of the compelling need to find a way of covering the hair. Sikhs in England have sought to retain their turban even when employed as bus conductors, for example. The politics of the Sikh turban have also been, in this sense, the politics of hair. Municipal corporations in some British cities have at times been reluctant to permit Sikh employees a dispensation for retaining their turban and not wearing the official conductor's cap. Both the turban and the hair then

come to be inseparable from questions of religious toleration. Debates on how much latitude the Sikhs should be given in their headgear have therefore been debates about religious toleration. Given the tolerant nature of British society, such debates have normally resulted in the triumph of the Sikh against his municipal employer.²²

But what in the original functions of hair, or in human responses to its perception, could have resulted in this phenomenon of its utilization for purposes of protest? An answer to such a question, considering the intrusion of a variety of cultural factors, can only be speculative. And yet the widespread nature of the phenomenon justifies an attempt to seek a satisfactory hypothesis as an explanation. We have already discussed the Darwinian approach to hair in relation to sexual selection. The beard in the male has sometimes been seen in terms similar to the functions of bright coloration among male birds. In *The Descent of Man*, Darwin develops the proposition that the focus of masculine life is the female, and that the dynamics of evolution rest in an important sense on the male's success or failure in enchanting the female. The bright feathers, crest and fleshy chin of the cockerel, the mane of the lion, and the beard of the male *homo sapiens* are all to be seen in terms of the dynamics of sexual enchantment. An alternative theory has got increasing attention in more recent times. C. B. Moffat, in a paper published in 1903 in the *Irish Naturalist*, disputed Darwin's idea that the bright coloration of the male bird serves primarily the purpose of enticing the female. Instead, he posed the following question: "Have we not here some ground afforded us for suspecting that the bright plumage may have been originally evoked as war paint? In other words as a sort of warning coloration to rival males, rather than attractive coloration to dazzled females?"²³

Robert Ardrey elaborates further with a more telling popular question. What does the male have on his mind? The male or the female? Ardrey refers to Darwin's answer in terms of heterosexual attraction; but then notes Moffat's negative answer.

What the male has on his mind is the male. The female will make her choice, well, and good. What is eternally bothering the male is not female estimate, but how he is doing in the eyes of his fellows. A contemporary school of psychology would regard this as a homosexual tendency. Nature sighs.²⁴

In fact the two theories are not mutually incompatible. It is possible that the beard, for example, is both a symbol of masculine dignity in relation to other males, and a point of potential attraction to females in the original state of *homo sapiens*. Most societies regard manliness in terms both of dignified behavior by males in the face of difficulties and dangers and in terms of effective relationships with females. Parity of esteem with fellow males and power of attraction to females both became embodied in the later evolution of the bio-cultural concept of *masculinity*. Some societies then, aware that the beard is the most distinctive thing on the face that differentiates the male from the female, have, therefore, opted to maximize its effect. The whole enterprise may not be uncon-

nected with the biological change in the sexual act itself that has resulted in face-to-face relationships.

We have referred earlier to the important biological change in man's sexual posture. This was the change from the general mammalian copulation style of back to front to the more characteristically human style of face-to-face. C. D. Darlington has asserted that the directly psychological and social effects of face-to-face mating have initiated evolutionary sequences that "will no doubt continue as long as man exists":

Concentrating attention on the face and breasts of woman, the reversal of position has, to use Haldane's words, tended to change man's idea of beauty from the steatopygous Hottentot to the modern European, from the Venus of Brassempouy to the Venus of Milo. Sexual selection, acting more slowly than Haldane supposed, has favoured the appearance of forms of beauty, first in woman and secondarily in man.²⁵

Facial beauty, as a major aspect of sexual attractiveness, therefore owes its origin to this major transformation of the sexual posture of man.

The beard became, in turn, a symbol of masculinity in the male precisely because it was peculiar to the male. But there is a difference between the beard as something seen by the woman, reminiscent of the man's masculinity; and the beard as something felt by the woman's face, a possible irritant in the movements of actual copulation. It is here that culture intruded to determine various answers for various communities. Among many Arab tribes the beard is retained as part of the honor of man and as a symbol of manliness. With the Arabs, the beard is at least as important as a symbol of dignity among men as it might be as a badge of masculinity in man's confrontation with woman. Issues of dignity then become related to—and associated with—the beard. In the 1930s a number of Arabs acting as grocery vendors in the streets of Mombasa were arrested and taken to prison overnight. The offence was minor, concerning the issues of vending licenses at a time when licensing was haphazard and not uniformly applied. While they were awaiting a ruling within the walls of Fort Jesus, then used as a prison, the prison warders shaved off their beards.

The people of the coast of Kenya had interacted with the Arabs for quite a while, and the significance of the beard in certain Arab customs, especially among those people from the Arabian Peninsular proper, was fully understood by many of the local Muslims in Mombasa. My father at the time had founded a rudimentary weekly newspaper, used more for debates and polemics on social issues than for any special news purposes. The shaving of the Arab vendors incensed my father so deeply that he wrote a furious open letter addressed to the Governor of Kenya denouncing this humiliation of people to whom the possession of the beard was part of the dignity of man. He wondered whether, had the vendors been Sikhs with all the power of rich Indians in East Africa and the authority of the India Office in London, this humiliation would have been perpetrated. Because of the initiative taken by my father in publicizing this slight,

other influential figures along the coast also articulated their own sense of outrage. In the end, a public apology came from governmental authorities in Nairobi, explaining that the indignity to which the poor Arab vendors had been subjected had been caused by a misunderstanding within the prison walls of Fort Jesus. The apology, however, was unqualified, and a point had been made in defense of the beard.

The dignitarian implications of the beard are important in some Sections of Christianity too, as indeed in Judaism. The beard sometimes becomes not a symbol of manliness as such, but a symbol of fatherhood. The bearded man emerges as a father figure in the very dignity he acquires. The Greek Orthodox Church responded to this equation, and had its priests resplendently bearded. The rabbis in Judaic synagogues have also invoked nature's heritage of the beard to add dignity to their presence as father figures in the community. In the case of historical figures like Karl Marx, there might have been a combination of the protest function of beards and the Judaic continuation. Bearded Karl Marx appeared to many as one more Jewish prophet, bringing forth in the nineteenth century a proletarian revolutionary religion. The beard, then, signified his status as a prophet; but it might also have signified his status as a revolutionary. Fidel Castro in Cuba again had his beard connected with the stream of history going back to Karl Marx and beyond. The bearded revolutionary—part prophet, part rebel—emerges in Castro. In his case there is the additional factor of having been a revolutionary who was once in the jungle, withdrawn like Guru Nanak.

The beard as protest becomes linked both to the concept of *withdrawal* and to the concept of *mourning*. The withdrawal might take the form of a return to the bare necessities of nature by the rejection of artificial adornments, or by the retreat to the original hairy essence of manhood. The beard as mourning also implies a rejection of artificial trimming and adornment. In the case of men, the mourning might take the form of unrestricted hair growth. In the case of women, the mourning sometimes takes the form of shaving the hair on the head. Leaving a man untrimmed and unshaven and rendering a woman totally hairless on the skull both become forms of the rejection of adornment and therefore modes of mourning. A widow in some denominations of Islam is indeed required to shave her head. But the Ganda utilization of unrestricted male growth following the exile of their King was an instance of the male plunging into mourning by letting the hair grow.

The cultural variations which arose as to whether the man's beard was attractive or repellent to the woman hinged on the difference between the beard as seen by the female and the beard when felt by her. The beard as masculinity was attractive by the judgment of vision and sometimes repellent by the judgment of sensation. Balancing sexual attractiveness to the eyes against sexual irritation to the touch has varied from society to society and from one human couple and another. In the case of Rembrandt's painting when the men let their hair grow, it was a way of announcing their sexual abstinence.

A similar phenomenon appeared in the case of the early days of the Mau Mau insurrection. Many of the rebels in the forest at first observed the Kikuyu

prohibition that men shall remain celibate during the course of a war. There were women around in the forest, though fewer in numbers than the men. There was first a determination to live up to the traditional abstinence of combat. This abstinence was accompanied by long beards and shaggy hair. There was, in addition, the element of convenience, as living in the jungle entailed difficulties in the refinements of shaving, but in the earlier days the shaggy hair and unattended beard were intermingled with issues of sexual abstinence as decreed by cultural ways. Later on the men decided, given the prolonged nature of the war, that the demands of the traditional requirements of combat should not apply to the agonizing durability of guerilla warfare. The camps met in jungles of Kenya, and finally decided democratically that the taboo on sex was to be ended. There was still a tendency to put women in separate camps, and each woman was to have only one man and each man only one woman. A form of enforced monogamy was observed among these people who in their own habits were sometimes polygamous. Warfare monogamy was respected wherever possible. The sexual abstinence was ended, but the long beards and shaggy hair continued among at least some of the rebels.

We might therefore say that the protest meaning of hair is derivative. Hair assumed significance as a medium of protest because it had already assumed significance in terms of withdrawal and mourning. Both angry disengagement and bitter sadness can be modes of articulating protest. Connected with these two other roles in the case of protesting *males* is the masculine dignity symbolized by the beard, and the related emotions pertaining to wounded dignity.

HAIR AND FAMILY RITUAL

As for the reasons that have helped to give hair these additional sociocultural roles, a major one is simply the ease with which hair can be cut. Human communities have often felt a compulsive need to leave ritualistic marks or ever inflict ritualistic mutilations on the human body as a point of entry into the membership of society or as a badge of continuing affiliation through the different phases of life. The range of bodily mutilations on both the bodies of men and women in different societies in history is quite wide. Very often the marking of the body, or sharpening of the teeth, has been connected with questions of mating and sexual attractiveness. Among the most enduring of all forms of bodily mutilations must be included the custom of circumcision. It has persisted among the Jews for thousands of years, and among Muslims for about half as long. It is also observed in a variety of communities in Africa and some Pacific islands. Male circumcision, partly because it can take forms that are less drastic, is on the whole a more enduring custom than female circumcision. There are, of course, communities that practice both. In Africa, the Kikuyu have sometimes been a controversial community because of the nature of their female circumcision, though, of course, they have also practiced male circumcision. The cousins of the Kikuyu, the Kamba, also have forms of tampering with the body inherited

from nature. Among their more distinctive customs has been the deliberate sharpening of the teeth partly for ritual and partly for adornment.

Of all the various physical parts of the body of man, the most easily manipulable for ritualistic purpose is hair. It can be clipped, or completely shaved, or cut according to specific designs, or plucked but selectively. It has also a range of distribution that makes it worthier of such ritualistic treatment than fingernails or toenails, the second most manipulable parts. There is hair on some of the most conspicuous areas of the human body, on top of the skull, and, in the case of men, around the chin and below the nose. The entire heritage of face-to-face relationships focuses attention on certain areas of hair. In addition, there is hair on more intimate parts of the body, connecting it with the range of experience that is deeply personal and yet also reproductive. Pubic hair acquires a wealth of suggestiveness partly because it surrounds intimate areas and also because it is hair which comes almost simultaneously with sexual maturity. A baby acquires hair on top of its head quite early, be it male or female; but hair in those private areas of sexual intimacy takes its time in appearing, almost afraid to adorn those parts before they have become sexually meaningful.

It is because of this manipulability of hair that among African communities we find it serving a variety of roles. Among the Nuer, their *rites de passage* are associated with nudity, the whole process of discarding old and acquiring new social roles and statuses. In the words of Beidelman:

The relation of hairlessness to nudity is unclear but obviously important. . . During his initiation a Nuer boy must be completely nude, shaved, and with no ornaments or garb whatsoever. . . Hair may perhaps be seen as some kind of concealing aspect of the self which must be removed to obliterate one's present status. Such a procedure, of course, is common to many societies where removal or neglect of hair are two methods of indicating a radical dissociation from a person's status.²⁶

Among the Kikuyu, hair is also called upon to serve a variety of ritualistic roles. A particularly intriguing selective clipping has raised questions about the origins of the symbol of the cross among the Kikuyu. In certain ceremonies involving attempts to chase away evil spirits, mothers shave off the hair of those children who had not been able to join in the ceremonial combat. The shaving is in the form of the cross, designed to protect the children against returning spirits. And yet this sign of the cross on the head of Kikuyu children seems to antedate the coming of Christianity to Kikuyuland in historical times. John S. Mbiti, Professor of Religious Studies at Makerere University, has speculated whether the sign of the cross in the fight against evil forces among the Kikuyu owed its existence to a previous coming of Christianity to this part of equatorial Africa—a previous contact with the religion of Jesus whose only legacy is that sign of the cross. In the absence of any other evidence of a “First-coming,” it seems easier to believe that the sign of the cross, shaved on the heads of Kikuyu children as a protection against evil spirits is an independent form of symbolism, born out of a

tradition which in its origins had nothing to do with the religion founded by Jesus Christ.²⁷

There are other functions that hair is called upon to serve in yet other communities in different parts of the world—functions that include the full life cycle—birth, initiation, marriage, parenthood and death. All these different phases of human experience have been known to manipulate the heritage of hair in symbolic terms for symbolic purposes.

CONCLUSION

We have examined the significance of the heritage of hair in relation to its sociopolitical roles. Against the background of the biological meaning of hair, we have attempted to unravel the different dimensions of symbolism that this growth on the human body has acquired in history. With the presumed operation of sexual selection, the beard especially became a symbol of ultimate manliness distinguishing man from woman. The emphasis on the face as an area of sexual relevance consolidated itself partly as a result of a transformation in the sexual posture of man, away from mammalian back to front styles of love making, to the more characteristic human style of face-to-face.

From symbolizing manliness in a sexual sense, the beard came later to symbolize manliness in the sense of readiness to fight, and readiness to endure the discipline of self-neglect. Masculine hair in Sikhism, the beard among rebels, the vow in Rembrandt's painting, and that oath of unrestricted hairiness which some Baganda loyalists took when their king was exiled, are all part of the transition of the beard from symbolizing manliness in a sexual sense to symbolizing manliness in situations of social combat. It is, in part, within such situations that hair serves functions of protest.

Protest also arises in contexts of wounded dignity. And hair, as we have indicated, does at times relate to dignity. Certainly the beard, from symbolizing sexual manliness and symbolizing the manliness of courage, then moves on to symbolizing dignified fatherhood. We have indicated that Judaic prophets, rabbis in synagogues, and priests in churches of the Greek Orthodox religion, have all utilized the beard for purposes of augmenting the image of the priestly father-figure. Hair in relation to dignity in the British tradition retains a residual role in the wig which judges wear as they listen to the solemnity of a court case in session. The even more ominous solemnity of giving judgment is again achieved in visual effect by making the man sitting on the judicial throne wear a wig of dignified presence. Just as protests often relate to wounded dignity, the neglect of hair or the shaving of hair find themselves serving protest functions.

We have also discussed social withdrawal and mourning as moods which again are sometimes concretized in man's treatment of his own hair. The ritualistic purposes in which hair, neglected or shaved, has been made to serve in different societies have touched almost all the stages of the life cycle, from birth to death. It is hair in relation to either social withdrawal or personal mourning which has been rallied to the cause of protest movements. This chapter has also

discussed hair in the context of group identity and cultural nationalism. We drew attention to its conspicuous absence in racial theories in Europe, in spite of the importance of hairiness among man's cousins, the apes. The scientific racists paid considerable attention to the skull, but seemed indifferent to the hairy covering of the skull in the living species.

African cultural nationalism has been less indifferent to the social significance of hair. The distinctive aspects of African hair, woolly and relatively tough, have been rallied in historical studies to establish African participation in the genesis of the civilization of ancient Egypt. African hair has also been subject to the forces of acculturation that came with the imperial presence in Africa. The prestige of straightened hair, on the model of the Caucasian texture, has illustrated the impact of the West on Africa's aesthetics and criteria for beauty. A counter-movement, more self-consciously nationalistic, has erupted first in Black America and now increasingly within Africa itself. This is the movement that turns its attention once more to a sense of pride in the physical characteristics distinctive to Africans, including a sense of pride in African hair, unstraightened and "uncooked." The Afro style, and even the Afro wig, become symbolic of a reassertion of black aesthetics. Politics, hair, art and beauty converge in the whole controversy about hairstyles for Black women.

Behind it all are not only the tensions of racial groups in cultural interaction, but also the persistent theme of man's identification with his own group and with his own society. The ritualistic manipulability of hair among the Nuer, the Kikuyu, the Maya, and the Aztecs defined social roles for different members of society and asserted their identity in group perspective. That dimension has persisted in a variant form to the latest debates on whether the heritage of hair will now become the central visual aspect of unisexuality as a social trend in the West.

Perhaps the real meaning of hair in human affairs is a compromise between its meaning to Charles Darwin and its meaning in the story of Samson Agonistes. For Darwinian theorists, hair emerges or disappears pre-eminently in response to the process of sexual selection. Some residual purposes are retained biologically after man has become man, but in general, hair is a biological residue in man. In the story of Samson, the inner meaning of his own hair is power and strength. The sexual dimension remains in that he confides the meaning of this hair to Delilah, with tragic consequences. A period of wounded dignity ensues along with a period of withdrawal and mourning. And then comes the final act of protest as Samson pulls down the pillars of the entertainment arena of the Philistines. His hair had come back; his strength had returned. He found in revenge the ultimate protest.

Somewhere between the science of Darwin and the romance of Samson Agonistes lies the real meaning of hair in human affairs. It is neither a biological anachronism nor a source of great power. It is a bequest from biology to the world of social and religious ritual, cultural innovation and political articulation.

NOTES

1. Mutesa acknowledges this gesture by some of his subjects in his book, *Desecration of My Kingdom* (London: Constable, 1967), pp. 123–124.

2. See *Uganda Argus* and *East African Standard*, 16–29 October 1955. See also Martin Southwold, “Was the Kingdom Sacred?” *Mawazo*, Vol. I, No. 2 (1967), pp. 21–22.

3. Charles White, *An Account of the Regular Graduations in Man* (London, 1799), Vol. I. See also A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, MA, 1936). For an attempt to trace the long-term implications of some of these theories consult Mazrui, “From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis.” *World Politics*, XXI (1968), pp. 69–83. The article occurs as Chapter 4 in A. A. Mazrui, *Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa* (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 85–101.

4. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain*, pp. 233ff; see also Lovejoy, “Some Eighteenth Century Evolutionists,” *Popular Science Monthly*, LXV (1904), p. 327.

5. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man and Society* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 56.

6. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man*, p. 56.

7. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man*, p. 55.

8. Darwin, *The Descent of Man*. Consult also J. Maynard Smith, “Sexual Selection” in S. A. Barnett, (ed.), *A Century of Darwin* (London: Mercury Books, 1962), pp. 231–244.

9. George Combe, *A System of Phrenology* (New York, 1845). I am indebted to P. D. Curtin’s book, *The Image of Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1965) for bibliographical guidance and stimulation.

10. G. Morton, *Crania Americana* (Philadelphia, 1839) and *Crania Aegyptiaca* (Philadelphia, 1844), cited by Curtin, *Time Image of Africa*, p. 367.

11. Isaac Asimov, *Time Intelligent Man’s Guide to Science*, Vol. 2, “The Biological Sciences” (New York: Basic Books, 1962), pp. 690–691. Darwin refers to “savage” communities elsewhere—the Aymara and Quichua Indians. Darwin says: “The men of these two tribes have very little hair on the various parts of the body where the hair grows abundantly in Europeans, and the women have none on the corresponding parts” (*Time Descent of Man*). In fact among the least hairy of the races of the world are the yellow peoples as well as the black peoples. As compared with East Indians and Caucasians, the Chinese are singularly hairless. Among the Africans there are in fact variations. The Nilotes tend, on the whole, to have even less hair than the Bantu groups.

12. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 279.

13. For a brief version of his views on this, see Cheikh Anta Diop, “The Cultural Contributions and Prospects of Africa,” Proceedings of the First International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists, *Présence Africaine*, Special Issue, June/November 1956, pp. 347–354. The meaning of Egypt for African cultural nationalism is also discussed in my inaugural lecture, *Ancient Greece in African Political Thought* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

14. Basil Davidson, *Old Africa Rediscovered* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), p. 28.

15. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa Has Played in World History [1946]* (New York: International Publishers, 1965 edition), pp. 120–121.

16. J. Maynard Smith, "Sexual Selection," p. 244.
17. See *East African Standard* (Nairobi), 29 July 1966.
18. See Mazrui, "Miniskirts and Political Puritanism," *Africa Report*, 13 (1968), pp. 9–12.
19. Isaac Asimov, *The Intelligent Man's Guide*, p. 668.
20. See Mary Apio, "African Hair Saloon on the Decline?" *The People* (Kampala), 8 July, 1970.
21. Rembrandt's vision of "The Conspiracy of the Batavians" postulated a vow. Rembrandt was also interested in Samson and his power.
22. Percival Spear has argued that the Sikh attitude to hair is partly an outcome of Islamic influence on the founding fathers of Sikhism. "The wearing of long hair is related to the orthodox Muslim custom of wearing beards." See Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 250.
23. Moffat, "The Spring Rivalry of Birds," *Irish Naturalist* (1903).
24. Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations* (London: Fontana Library, Collins, 1969), pp. 68–70.
25. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man*, p. 55.
26. T. O. Beidelman, "Some Nuer Notions of Nakedness, Nudity and Sexuality," *Africa*, XXXVIII (1968), pp. 113–131 and pp. 128–129.
27. Consult Reverend John S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (London: Heinemann, 1969), p. 90.

Chapter 1.3

The Poetics of a Transplanted Heart

In December, 1967, a team of doctors under the leadership of Professor Christian Barnard performed the world's first major heart transplant on Louis Washkansky. The heart which was transplanted came from 25-year-old Miss Denise Ann Darvall who had been fatally injured in a car crash. For the next eighteen days the world waited with a sense of medical drama to see if the man who had borrowed another's heart would be able to live for long. But Mr. Washkansky died after eighteen days. His doctors argued that it was not the heart of Miss Darvall that had failed him—the heart went on beating strongly right up to the end. The probable cause of Washkansky's death was described by Dr. Barnard as a germ in the nose or throat. The cause of death was apparently bilateral pneumonia.

Within a month the Groote Schuur transplant team performed a second operation. The second one was on Dr. Philip Blaiberg, a 50-year-old dentist. Dr. Blaiberg got his heart from a colored man, Clive Haupt, who collapsed on a beach on New Year's Day in 1968, and died later in a hospital of a brain disorder. The world stood at attention once again to see whether this second major heart transplant would sustain the recipient for a longer period of time.

Meanwhile in the United States news came of other attempts at this kind of heart treatment. One attempt had already failed. This was the attempt by Brooklyn's Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz, whose transplantation of the heart into a 19-day-old infant had failed after six and a half hours. Dr. Kantrowitz made another effort in January, 1968, which was again unsuccessful. A team connected with Stanford University in California also burst into the news with yet another heart transplant.

These events have raised a number of major problems in different spheres of human thinking and human sensibilities. Were the transplants consistent with medical ethics if the experimental stage of transplants between animals had yet to reach conclusive success? Was this a question of using human beings as guinea pigs? Was there a danger of people being hastened to their death by doctors

eager to save their hearts before they became inadequately useful for their new recipients?

Another moral issue concerned the question of supply. In a television discussion in the United States between Dr. Barnard and others, this issue came up. Though there were 500,000 adults in the United States reportedly dying each year of coronary disease and 6,000 to 7,000 children dying of incurable inborn heart defects, there was little hope of obtaining more than a few thousand spare hearts to go around. A painful moral question would therefore be the issue of which patient was to have priority. How were these very limited numbers of hearts to be distributed among those who desperately needed them for survival?

Dr. Barnard, himself, was apparently not unduly perturbed by the possibility of having two or more patients at a time with equal need. He was confident that one patient would clearly have a more urgent need for a new heart, and he would get it. If forced to choose between a psychotic who could never really be a useful citizen and one who was mentally normal, Dr. Barnard confessed, he would operate on the normal man first. It was clear that Dr. Barnard was expressing his own code of ethics on this matter. But this is in an area of extreme sensitivity; and the search for an order of priorities may be quite agonizing. Dr. Barnard might, in any case have underestimated the degree to which any doctor or group of doctors could determine which were the more urgent cases, let alone which lives were more worthwhile to save.

THE HEART AND THE MUSE

These moral issues are perhaps the most fundamental of them all when we are discussing the whole new drama of transplanted hearts. But our concern in this article from now on will not be on the ethics of the heart transplant, but on the *aesthetics*. More specifically, we propose to look at the whole multiple role of the concept of a heart in the language of poetry and of human rhetoric at-large. What effects have these cool clinical operations in the Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town had, or are likely to have, on the imagery of human discourse?

To begin with, we should note that the heart is associated with the very definition of poetry. In part, this is because poetry is supposed to be derived from a fund of emotive sensibilities, and the emotions have been deemed to reside in the human heart. It was William Wordsworth who defined poetry as: "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility" (*Preface to the Lyrical Ballads*). Then there is the famous admonition of the Muse to Sir Philip Sidney. The lover was desperately looking for a way of expressing his feelings in poetry, and wondered how best to do it. Tradition has it that the series of sonnets under the title *Astrophil and Stella* were an expression of Sidney's love for Penelope Devereux, daughter of the first Earl of Essex. In 1580 or 1581 she was married against her will to Lord Rich, and Sidney's amorous disappointment and passion are reported to have found expression in these poems. But it was an expression for which Sidney had to grope:

I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe / Studying inventions fine,
her wits to entertain: Oft turning other's leaves, to see if thence would flow /
Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sunburnt brain. / But words came
halting forth, wanting Invention's stay. . . / And other's feet still seemed but
strangers in my way. / Thus great with child to speak, and helpless in my
throes, / Biting my trewand pen, beating myself for spite, 'Fool,' said my Muse
to me, 'Look in thy heart and write' (*Astrophil and Stella*, 1).

It is clear then, that both for Sidney and for Wordsworth, the heart, because it is the source of feelings, is also the source of poetic inspiration.

But the heart is not simply intended as a fountain of the flow of poetry. It is not simply that which creates poetry. It is sometimes deemed to be that which appreciates poetry. It is not simply the poet who needs a poetic heart, but also the person addressed by the poet, or at any rate the person who seeks to get into the meaning of things and respond to poetic communication. It has even been suggested that while other forms of beauty have an autonomous existence independent of the human race, poetry as a phenomenon of beauty needs the continued existence of humanity in order to retain its own survival.

The problem goes back at least to George Berkeley, the 18th century Anglo-Irish philosopher who propounded theories of vision and of the principles of human knowledge. Berkeley had posed the question whether anything at all can exist if there was no one to perceive its existence. Everything was a complex of sensations, and if we abstracted from them that of which we have perception, nothing remained. But if I left my copy of *Transition* in my study, and I was not there to see or feel it, would my copy of *Transition* cease to exist? Berkeley had an outlet because he himself believed in an omnivisual God. Indeed, he was using the perceptive definition of existence partly as an argument to prove the existence of God himself. Everything exists, even when there are no people to see it, simply because there is, at the very least, God himself perceiving what is going on. The issue of whether God himself can exist without being seen remained difficult to handle. Berkeley partly solved it by the formula that "Existence is *percipi* or *percipere*"—existence is to be perceived, or to perceive. God as the ultimate *perceiver* existed by that very reason. In any case Berkeley's problem was no worse than the difficulties inherent in the proposition that if everything needs a cause, and God is the first cause, why did not God himself need to be caused? The question is a contradiction, but the contradiction is precisely the theological problem involved.

Berkeley's question as to whether anything can exist if it is not perceived raises a subsidiary question—can anything be beautiful if there is no particular person there to behold its qualities? Gray, in his *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*, does admit of beauty persisting even where there is no one to appreciate it, but regards such a situation as fundamentally wasteful. Hence he laments:

How may a gem of the purest ray serene,
The deep unfathomed caves of ocean bear?

How many a flower is born to blush unseen
And waste its sweetness on the desert air?

Here the lonely flower in the desert is deemed to have a sweetness, even if wasted. And the gem in the depths of the sea, sparkling unseen, retains “a purest ray serene.” There is an assumption here that beauty exists independently of someone to appreciate it. But it is a beauty wasted precisely because of the absence of a discerning and gratified eye.

THE HEART AND POETIC RESPONSE

But here certain distinctions might have to be made. In the first place, it is possible to argue that there is a difference between beauty for the eye on the one hand, and beauty for the ear on the other. A lonely fresh lily growing by the pond of an oasis has a concreteness that enables it to retain its beauty even if there were no Bedouin or caravan to behold its miracle. But what of the record of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony blaring away on its own in the midst of the vast desolation of Antarctica with no conceivable ear to hear it for hundreds and hundreds of miles? Is that music? Or has the Fifth Symphony been reduced to a multiplicity of sound waves drifting mechanically in a vast auditory vacuum? Indeed, it can even be asked whether music is music at all unless the sounds and noises that blare forth are recognized as music by a human audience. The music of poetry would, of course, pose identical questions of aesthetic existentialism.

Another level of distinction is not between visual and auditory beauty, but is between beauty that is created by man and beauty that is simply appreciated by man. Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony was, of course, man made; so was Gray’s elegy and Shakespeare’s sonnets. But a lonely lily in an oasis, or the Ngorongoro Crater itself, owe little of their existence to the exertions of man. The lily and the crater may need man for their appreciation, but not for their inception. On the other hand, poetry and music owe to man not just the acclaim they receive, but also their existence.

However, does not this difference affect the nature of acclaim accorded to the two types of beauty? After all, the music and the poetry were actually created *in order* to be appreciated, whereas the lily and the crater had no such motivation for their existence. If then music and poetry are not items for human acclamation in an incidental sense, but were humanly created in order to be humanly approbated, there is a fundamental fusion between their existence and their evaluation, between the act of giving *life to* a beautiful thing and the act of giving *credit for* a beautiful thing. If man was to destroy himself totally from this planet tomorrow, the lonely lily in an oasis and the yawning crater of Ngorongoro may continue to exist, but there will no longer be a sonnet. The fundamental assertion here is that visual beauty may, or may not lie in the eye of the beholder, but poetry must lie in the hearts of men. A poetic heart must reside both in the person who writes the poetry, and in the person who can listen to it with justice. Perhaps it was an assumption of this dimension, which made the

fate of Christopher Okigbo, the Nigerian poet recently killed in civil war, once remark at a conference held in Kampala, "I don't read my poems to non-poets!"¹

In this remark Okigbo might have been suggesting such a total fusion between the act of creation and the act of appreciation that only poets could constitute a poetic audience to the poetry of others.

THE SONG OF SURGERY

The trouble with recent achievements in heart transplants, from the point of view of poetry, is that when the symbolism is literalized a new grotesqueness enters the meanings of words. If Louis Washkansky in the course of his eighteen days of life with the heart of Miss Darvall had written a poem, where would the inspiration have come from? Sir Philip Sidney's Muse had admonished him with the words, "Fool, look in thy heart and write," but Washkansky was living on a borrowed heart for those eighteen days. Were he inspired to write a last farewell poem before he died, we might say of him that he wrote a poem from the depths of a borrowed heart.

We cannot know for certain what patterns of thought and worries someone in his position might have experienced. Washkansky himself appears to have been a man of courage, but the imagination has its own grotesque ways. It is possible for a person in his position to be suddenly bedeviled by a nightmare as he feels the heart of someone who is otherwise dead, pounding away within him and giving him life. It is as if out of the death of another, new sustenance has been given to the recipient of a transplanted heart. Would the dead person be envious? Would the beneficiary suffer frightening moments of imaginative confrontation with an accusing finger from the person who left him his heart? A certain biblical line from the *Song of Solomon* might assume a new haunting meaning. The dead person who donated a heart might cry with that famous line, "I sleep, but my heart waketh" (5:2). Perhaps in a fit of envy the dead woman might even point an accusing finger at the living beneficiary and say in the phraseology of Mathew Prior, "Thou hast my heart" (*A Better Answer*). What a poet in the 17th century had intended as a romantic flourish, a ghost in the latter half of the 20th century might utilize as an oath of reprobation.

Meanwhile, the beneficiary of the transplanted heart gets uncomfortable with a sneaking sense of semi-guilt that he should live while another is buried, heartless. The young lady who has donated the heart might have retained everything else intact. We might even give her the name Chloe after the character in Epistle I of Alexander Pope's *Moral Essays*. Of course, the patient who then yielded her heart must have been dying anyhow from other causes. But in the sight of those who were getting her ready for the funeral and the burial, she might have retained the appearance of completeness—except for her donation. And so here again Alexander Pope's lines assume a grotesqueness that was not there when he wrote them:

With every pleasing, every prudent part,
Say, what can Chloe want?—She wants a heart. (II. 159)

On the other hand, a beneficiary of the transplantation, overwhelmed by the haunting associations of his predicament, might cry out in his nightmare with a line borrowed from Michael Drayton—"Call home the heart you gave me!" The line itself is from a poet who died in 1631.

A major reason why the literalization of heart symbolism in our day and age assumes this grotesque and bizarre implication is because many of the poems that have used the heart as an image have related it to affection and love. Almost every Valentine card carries a heart visually for its message. For centuries it had been assumed that to give your heart to someone is to pledge your love. And yet here we are in the transition between 1967 and 1968, beholding a literal transplantation of hearts with a supreme impersonality. The donor and the beneficiary are total strangers, and might never have cast their eyes on each other. This ultimate symbol of human affection is reduced to a clinical convenience.

In the case of the transplantation of Clive Haupt's heart to Philip Blaiberg's body, the impersonality transcended a situation of racial hatred. Haupt, a colored man, had died, but his heart continued to live in the White body of Blaiberg in South Africa. The reservations about this kind of exercise were expressed in different parts of Africa. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Uganda, Vincent Rwamaro, expressed the fear that in the future an African might be dragged from his house to a hospital and his heart pulled out to save a dying White man. He was apprehensive about the feasibility of Africans becoming "spare parts for Whites." Mr. Rwamaro went on to assert "Africans in South Africa are not regarded as human beings, although their hearts have become very valuable for the Whites" (*The People*, January 6th, 1968, page 17). Mr. Rwamaro was right in seeing a touch of moral incongruity in the situation. Differences in color in South Africa have symbolized hate. The act of surrendering one's heart to another had for centuries symbolized ultimate love. Rwamaro was afraid that White South Africans might value the hearts of colored people precisely because they hated colored people. Moral inhibitions about extracting hearts from colored and African patients for the sake of survival of a White patient might be reduced precisely because the colored and Black patients were in any case under-valued as human beings. And so a line from Shakespeare's *Henry the VIII* captures the paradox of the situation if it is addressed to those South Africans who have heart troubles and who aspire to have those hearts replaced for the sake of longer survival—"Cherish those hearts that hate thee" (Act 3, Scene 2).

In fairness to the particular South African doctors who carried out those initial heart transplants, they were indeed sensitive to some of the wider implications of these matters, and had avoided too blatant an appearance of exploiting non-Whites for the sake of the survival of the Whites. Moreover, there had been a case in South Africa of a colored person benefiting by the donation of a kidney from a White patient. There might conceivably even be a defensible moral symbolism in a situation in which the so-called seat of love, the heart, is exchanged across the color-line. Yet for the moment feelings are high and Rwamaro poses a good point of logic when he asks, "Will the White man who gets a Black man's heart be classified as White or Black?" Consciences are offended in Africa over

the moral depravity of policies of apartheid in South Africa. Where people resent each other, it might *not* be easy to say of transplanted hearts what Benjamin Disraeli said of the Furies—"Their feelings are strong, but their hearts are in the right place" (*The Infernal Marriage*, Part I).

A major element in the complications of the situation is the simple fact that the human heart is often regarded as central to the human personality. Expressions like "The heart of the matter" or, "heart and soul" all identify the heart with the essence of things. To maintain one's own personality one has therefore to retain one's own heart. Even in the figurative language of love, surrendering your heart to another implies a reduction of one's own autonomy and completeness. It is sometimes an act of voluntary enslavement; it is therefore an act of self-diminution of personal authenticity. For those who would like their dead ones to retain a certain completeness of personality, the removal of the heart must be something that they could only sanction with a sense of moral and aesthetic unease. You may give away much in your Will, but a bequest of the heart might verge on the over generous. As A. E. Housman put in one of his verses:

When I was one and twenty
I heard a wise man say,
'Give crowns and pounds and guineas
but not your heart away' (*A Shropshire Lad*).

Again, this is all linked to the conception of the heart as a seat of great emotions. The heart is sometimes related to courage. Expressions like "lost heart" or, "weak-hearted" emphasize this identification of the heart as the seat of brave instincts. Winston Churchill led his people through World War II and earned the gratitude of millions of his countrymen. When years after the War, tributes were being paid afresh to his brave leadership at a moment of supreme trial for his nation, Winston Churchill expressed his modesty by passing back the tribute to the British people themselves—"Theirs was the lion heart, mine was the roar."

So powerful might the emotions that reside at the heart sometimes be that the rationalists have at times suspected the heart as a source of human subversion. The heart is the serpent that sometimes seduces the human mind. Alternatively, it is a pickpocket waiting somewhere to run away with human rationality, and leave man stranded in sheer unreason. In this universe of associations, the heart is made a foil, or even an antithesis, to the head. The process of decision-making in man is reduced to a constant duet between the heart and the head for supremacy within that process. Yet in at least some matters, emotion is not contrasted with reason, but the heart itself is converted into something that has its own unique reasoning process. In the immortal words of Pascal, "The heart has its reasons which are quite unknown to the head" (*Penses*, IV).

One of the great romances of the British Royal history in recent times was, of course, the romance of Edward VIII with a divorcee, culminating in the abdication crises of the 1930s. The King gave up his throne and married the woman he loved. He became the Duke of Windsor and wrote his famous explanation in

A King's Story. Much later the woman for whom he gave up his kingdom also explained that moment of commitment; and the title she used for her own book was direct from Pascal—*The Heart has its Reasons*. What is remarkable is that the presumed centrality of the heart in matters of spirit and of emotions is shared by cultures that are otherwise vastly different. From the idiom of a Royal romance in Britain we might now turn to the idiom of ancestral theology in Africa.

THE HEART OF NEGRITUDE

More specifically, we should perhaps now relate the phenomenon of heart transplant to at least some schools of African philosophy and African aesthetic movements. Even more specifically, we wish to examine this phenomenon in connection with aspects of African traditional religion and with negritude as a literary movement.

On the issue of the religious implications of heart transplant, a crucial equation assumes relevance. This is the equation of the heart with the soul. E. G. Parrinder refers to the centrality of the soul in African conceptions of man and its relationship with the basic spirituality of African traditional cultures. Parrinder says:

That there is a spiritual nature in man no African peoples doubt. In one aspect it is akin to what we call the personality of a man. It is identifiable with the ego, and is responsible for the peculiar characteristics of individuality. It helps to explain why people are different in face, why voices differ, why each has his own oddities.²

He mentions the logical intimacy between the concept of *soul* and the concept of the *heart*, "The heart, too, is a source of blood and life, and ceases beating at death; some people use the same word for heart as for soul."

Difficulties arise as soon as you conceive of death in terms of the soul leaving the body. What if it is the heart which leaves the body?—"The dying person has sent out his soul as in a dream, to visit his relatives who will realize at once that the friend is dead." So, Parrinder tells us about certain conceptions of communications between the living and the dead in African traditional cultures. But what if the dying person sends out his heart?

Related problems arise with the whole issue of reincarnation in African religion. Parrinder rightly points out that it is not widely realized how strong a part of some African belief systems is reincarnation. He argues that the idea of the rebirth of the departed soul is firmly held in most of Africa. It is as strong as one might find among Hindus and Buddhists. Connected with such belief systems is the idea of transmigration of souls—a capacity for one soul to find a new abode in another being. In Africa, this belief is compounded by a widely shared myth that the number of souls and bodies is limited. At the beginning of creation only a fixed number was made. For such African belief systems the transplantation of hearts poses theological problems for the whole doctrine of transmigration of souls. Where souls and bodies are rationed it becomes a problem of distribution

to determine who receives the heart and what this means for he who has surrendered it. This puzzle in distributive justice is only partially simplified in the case of those African belief systems that ration the number of souls in the world but permit infinite productivity of new bodies. For these particular beliefs, "as the body wears out, the soul is equipped with a new body made for the purpose of his rebirth."³

Perhaps it is partly these beliefs, and the deep spirituality of African traditional attitudes, which gave added impetus to Negritude as a literary philosophy in contemporary Africa. The leading exponent of Negritude within the African continent is Léopold Senghor, the poet-President of Senegal. Senghor has argued that the genius of Africa is not in the realm of intellectual abstraction; it is the domain of emotive sensibility. As he once put it in his own inimitable way, "emotion is Black . . . reason is Greek."⁴

This conception of Africa as being a demonstration of emotive genius rather than rational competence inevitably puts a special premium on the heart. We began this chapter by discussing the heart as the very source of poetry—"Fool, said my Muse to me, look in thy heart and write!" Jean-Paul Sartre has argued that Negritude itself was poetry, and it is poetry that is sometimes betrayed by the cold rationality of Western languages. Sartre quotes the Haitian poet when he said:

This beleagured heart
Alien to my language and to my dress
And on which bite like a brace
The borrowed sentiments and customs of Europe;

Mine is the agony
And an unutterable despair
In breaking with the cold words of France
This pulsing heart of the Senegal.

Sartre tells us that for the Negro it is impossible to express his Negritude with words of precision that efficiently strikes the mark at every blow. "He can scarcely express Negritude *in prose* . . . Negritude must take body in a poem, that is to say in a subjectivity-object."⁵ Negritude then is a system of epistemology that makes the heart the center of perception. At any rate, Senghor has argued that for the African Negro the world exists by the fact of its reflection upon his emotive self—"He does not realize that he thinks; he feels that he feels, he feels his *existence*, he feels himself."⁶

We had previously discussed Berkeley's dictum of perception as proof of existence. For Berkeley the formula was "I perceive, therefore I am." The same would apply if I were perceived by someone else. But, according to Senghor, Negro African epistemology starts from the premise "I *feel* therefore I am." And yet literary figures of Negritude hasten to point out that Negro poetry, like other forms of Negro art, is not simply a mere indulgence of the heart but is functional

and related to a world of social reality. In the words of Sartre, “Black poetry has nothing in common with the effusions of the heart; it is functional, it answers a need which exactly defines it.”⁷

Senghor also argues that in Africa, art for art’s sake does not exist. “All art is social.” It is directed towards fulfilling specific social needs. Senghor, however, goes on to add that the true nature of African literature and art would not be grasped if it was thought that they were merely utilitarian and that the African had no conception of *beauty*. He says that some anthropologists and art critics have gone about pretending that the words “beauty” and “beautiful” were not to be found in African languages. Quite the contrary, Senghor says. The truth is that the African had traditionally assimilated beauty to goodness and to effectiveness. Certainly this was true of the Wolof of Senegal and their words for beauty and the beautiful. African aesthetics for Senghor postulates functional beauty and “if a particular poem is effective, it is because it awakes an echo in the mind and the sensibility of those who hear it.” That is why the Fulani define a poem as “speech pleasing to the heart and the ear.” So the *heart* is still actively involved, certainly in its capacity to appreciate, and to some extent in its capacity to create.⁸ Negritude, therefore, takes us right back to the old problem of the centrality of the heart in certain areas of aesthetics.

POETRY VERSUS SCIENCE

Will there necessarily be a revolution in poetic imagery in different parts of the world simply because a team of doctors in Cape Town has now performed a dramatic act of heart transplant? Will the heart as the central feature of the human personality, or the great symbol of authenticity and essential emotions, be now interpreted in different ways simply because it can be transplanted from one personality to another? The issue really ultimately reduces itself to the question of whether poetry ever takes heed of the advances of science. Is the imagery of poetic discourse impervious to the charge of anachronism?

To some extent there does persist in the relationship between poetry and science the kind of antithesis that is sometimes associated with the relationship between emotion and rationality. The language of emotion in this case might refuse to listen to the great tidings from the scientific laboratory. The very idea of the heart as being the center of emotions was, after all, scientifically nullified quite a while ago. But the association of certain parts of the body with certain emotions is residual to the much older notion of “humors”—a notion that affected some of the medieval and early modern literature in Europe. In the field of drama the great symbol was Ben Jonson, though his plays were more satirical of this tendency than devotional towards it. Shakespeare, who happened to have been in the cast of Jonson’s *Everyman in His Humor* when it was performed at the Curtain Theatre in 1598, also utilized the symbolism of humors in some of his own work later on. The theory of a dominant humor in every human personality sustained scientific discredit quite early, but some of the associations per-

sisted, among which must be included the symbolism of the heart and its association with courage.

Another area of poetic imagery which has refused to conform with clinical discoveries is the great concept of *blood*. I have discussed before the links which the concept of blood has with a number of different phenomena. There is, for example, the link with great self-sacrifice: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat," Churchill had said when he was called upon to be Prime Minister during the War. But in fact he was offering everything. The measure of patriotism was what one was willing to give up for it—and offering one's blood had a suggestion of the ultimate self-sacrifice.

I have also discussed elsewhere the place of blood in Christian imagery. Christianity, a religion of love, nevertheless found it necessary to measure love in drops of blood. The God of Christianity so loved the World that He gave His only begotten Son—specifically to be crucified. As Tertullian put it seventeen hundred years ago: "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" (*Apologeticus*).

From the idea of "shedding blood" as a symbol of sacrifice we might now move to the idea of blood as a relationship between mother and child, brother and sister. The homely image of "blood being thicker than water" is reaffirmation of this kind of bond. There is, of course, a link between this and the imagery of nationalism. First, the parental and filial associations of the concept of patriotism—as dedicated loyalty to the *fatherland* or the *mother* country. Then there is the widening circle of blood relationship, or supposed relationship, as one moves from the family to the clan, from the clan to the tribe, the tribe to the nation, the nation to the race. And so to share blood is to belong to the same segment of humanity. When Léopold S. Senghor wanted to assert that the civilization of ancient Egypt was in fact an African civilization, he tried to do it by an affirmation of blood relationship, asserting that: "Negro blood circulated in the veins of the Egyptians."⁹

Blood is also used, at least when it is pure, as a symbol of authenticity. In racist countries the disapproval of "miscegenation" is a disapproval of "mixing blood." There have also been theories which postulated that the Negro in his "pure form" was intellectually inadequate; and if you found a so-called Negro who was very bright, go deep into his ancestry and you will find a non-Negro source of the brilliance. John C. Calhoun "the most philosophical of all the slaveholders" of the Southern States of America, apparently once said that if he could find a Black man who could understand the Greek syntax, he would then consider their race human, and his attitude towards enslaving them would therefore change. A Zulu student at Columbia University many years later commented on Calhoun's criterion of what is human and said in an oration in 1909:

What might have been the great sensation kindled by the Greek syntax in the mind of the famous Southerner I have so far been unable to discover; but . . . I could show him among Black men of *pure African blood* those who could re-

peat the Koran from memory, skilled in Latin, Greek and Hebrew, Arabic and Chaldaic.¹⁰

To some extent it is perhaps more ironic that *apartheid* should permit blood transfusion across the color line, than that it should permit a heart transplant.

In reality, the rules of apartheid do not permit complete license in inter-racial transfusion. Blood banks are kept carefully separate. And in the normal course of events no drop from one race is ever utilized to strengthen a patient from another. Nevertheless there are some areas of latitude in cases of emergency when the patient is non-White and there is White blood available. At a moment of crisis the White blood might indeed be used to save the patient. But if the patient is White and the blood available comes from a colored or African person, the condition of the patient has to be very critical indeed before the colored blood may be utilized. And yet, paradoxically, the condition of the patient must not be so critical that he is unconscious. For a White patient's permission seems to be normally indispensable before any drop of tainted blood can be permitted an entry into his stream.¹¹

The essential point is, in any case, that medical science had already confronted apartheid with critical, clinical dilemmas well before the transplantation of the heart from Miss Darvall to Mr. Washkansky in December, 1967. And the breach which medical science had modestly made was in precisely the major area of racial mythology—the mythology of blood and its presumed capacity for the purity of identity. The stream of ancestry must not be contaminated—yet in the test tube the bubbles of different flows have mixed.

Uganda's Deputy Foreign Minister had asked of the second case of a transplanted heart in South Africa: "Will the White man who gets the Black man's heart be classified as White or Black?" It was a pertinent question. But even more directly pertinent might be the issue of whether a White man, who has to have his entire blood supply replaced, arid uses the blood of a Black man for that purpose, how would he be classified? Apartheid, like poetry, is not logical. Just as the rigidities of bigotry may go on in South Africa in spite of an exchange of vital parts of body and life across the color line, so could the anachronisms of poetic imagery persist in spite of new miracles in medical science.

And yet, for at least these few months, the human imagination has sustained a shock. It is a shock which has traversed cultures and perhaps spanned centuries. As that team of doctors in an operating theatre at the Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town concluded that momentous transplant of the heart from Miss Darvall to Mr. Washkansky, who knows what oblivious drums were accidentally beaten in the villages of Southern Africa and beyond? The world of migrating souls might have stood in awe at the clinical sacrilege in the operating theatre. And the Muse of Sir Philip Sidney might have turned away in painful nostalgia for the days when he could, with wisdom admonish Sir Philip with the words, "Fool, look in thy heart and write." But now, in sheer scientific perplexity, he was no longer sure who was the fool.

NOTES

1. Reported by Lewis Nkosi, *Home and Exile* (London: Longmans, 1965), p. 116.
2. Parrinder, *African Traditional Religions* (London: S.P.C.K., 1962), pp. 134–135. Parrinder goes on to discuss the soul as the source of animation for the body, and when it is separated from the body, the body dies.
3. See Parrinder, *ibid.*, pp. 138–139. Other works of Parrinder worth consulting are *West African Religion* (London: 1949), and *West African Psychology* (London: Butterworth Press, 1951). Reports of African moral revulsion at the transplantation of hearts came from South Africa early in January. See the account in *East African Standard* (Nairobi), January 17, 1965, p. 5.
4. See Senghor, *Négritude et Humanisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1964), p. 24.
5. See Sartre, “Black Orpheus” (Paris: *Presence Africaine*, translated by S. W. Allen), pp. 23, 24 and 64.
6. Senghor “The Spirit of Civilization, or the Laws of African Negro Culture.” The First International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists, *Presence Africaine*, Special Issue, June–November, 1956, pp. 64–71.
7. Sartre, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–18.
8. See Senghor: *Prose and Poetry*, by John Reed and Clive Wake, (eds. and trans.), (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 82–83.
9. See his “Negritude and the Concept of Universal Civilization,” *Presence Africaine*, Vol. 18, No. 46, 2nd Quarter 1963, p. 12. Cited by Nkrumah in his opening address to the First International Congress of Africanists. See the *Proceedings of the Congress* (11–18 December, 1962), Lalage Bown and Michael Crowder, (eds.) (published for the Congress by Longmans 1964), p. 12. The emphasis is added here.
10. I am grateful to Professor Pierre Van den Berghe for some insight into the medical aspects of apartheid. But any errors in interpretation are exclusively mine. See also Van den Berghe’s book *South Africa: A Study in Conflict*.
11. I am also indebted to a South African colleague for a more general background to the medical aspects of apartheid.

II.

The Politics of Sexuality

Chapter 2.1

Political Sex: Monogamy and Racialism

Sex is a vital part of the life of an individual. Politics is often a vital aspect of the life of a society. Since society consists of individuals, to what extent does the sex-life of the individual, and his ideas about sex, intrude into the politics of his society? The question is much too big to be attempted in a short article, but it needs to be asked in order to provide the context within which this small venture is to be placed.

The ambition of this short piece is not, however, all that modest. It seeks to draw attention to a possible correlation between the ethic of monogamy and the politics of racialism. The extreme antithesis of monogamy is sexual communism. After all, monogamy is an ethic of sexual monopoly—and communism in this sphere would seek to ensure that no one man either monopolizes or is monopolized by any woman. Before we come to grips with the racial and political consequences of sexual monopoly, let us therefore first digress to view its ultimate antithesis as discussed within two major schools of communism.

PLATO, MARX AND SEX

Modern Western civilization has essentially two fountains from which it flows—the fountain of pagan Greece and the fountain of Christianity. It was Christianity which came to emphasize the principle of monogamy—and neither Marx nor the Soviet Russians ever managed to escape the consequences of being post-Christian.¹ They never quite managed to repudiate the principle of monopoly as the ethical base of sex. Pre-Christian Plato, however, had fewer inhibitions in his revolutionary fervor.

Plato has bequeathed to Western thought a particular concept of love—the concept of “Platonic love.” The idea of Platonic love encompasses a number of attributes. What should concern us here is, however, a negative attribute—Platonic love is love without sex. But there is such a thing as “Platonic sex” as well as sex without love. For this latter concept one looks not to the *Phaedrus* of

Plato but to *The Republic*. The love that comes with sex is an enemy to justice—for it has a tendency to impair one's capacity for impartiality. Sexual possessiveness militates against objectivity. And so the rulers of the Republic are to have wives in common.

One point that arises here is whether in a situation where no woman belongs to a single man and no man to a single woman, the language of “wife” and “husband” is applicable at all. Societies that are not monogamous are normally upholders of either polygamy (several wives to a husband) or polyandry (several husbands to a wife). But in a society like Plato's that combines both, poses the question whether the term “marriage” is a meaningful concept at all. Double polygamy is perhaps not “*gamos*” at all.

Be that as it may, the idea of sexual communism as prescribed by Plato remains the most daring philosophical attempt ever made to come to grips with some of the political implications of sex.² Many centuries later Karl Marx and his followers were to be accused of having embraced the principle of sexual communism and included it in their ideology. The *Communist Manifesto*'s denial of this charge is not without equivocation. The *Manifesto* says that the whole bourgeoisie in chorus screams, “But you communists would introduce community of women!”

In reply the *Manifesto* sarcastically says that the bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common. He can therefore come to no other conclusion than that the women are to be exploited in common. The *Manifesto* declares: “The communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed from time immemorial. . . . Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women.” Here we think we are back to a Platonic communism of sex. But the Marxist *Manifesto* goes on to say: “. . . it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system—i.e., prostitution, both public and private.”³

Plato had envisaged sexual communism as a way of ensuring that the rulers were just. But Marx sees a kind of sexual communism in bourgeois society itself—and takes it simply for one more symptom that the rulers are depraved and unjust. The Russian Revolution was later to see itself as the agent not only of an economic transformation but also of a revolution in sexual life. A very intelligent Russian post-graduate student that I knew in Oxford was sincerely convinced that communism had wiped out prostitution in his country. But an eminent Soviet physician, Dr. T. S. Atarov, has apparently pointed out elsewhere that it would be a mistake to imagine that the transformation of the sexual ethics of the Soviet Union had as yet been completed. The Russian doctor is quoted as saying:

There are still in our present society plenty of old ideological survivals. Many of our men still think nothing of being unfaithful to their wives ... Worse still, among our young people, there are some who tend to reduce their relations with the opposite sex to a mere satisfaction of their physical urge without any spiritual or moral connection with the person concerned.⁴

Dr. Atarov's book then refers to a "peculiar" philosophy that was discernible in some quarters. This is the claim that promiscuity is an inevitable substitute for the prostitution that communism had abolished. Monogamy, according to this school of Russian sexual thought, is an artificial restraint on man's natural impulses. Dr. Atarov's rejoinder is that this school is wholly contrary to Lenin's view that "free love" is *not* among the freedoms of a socialist society.⁵

As for sexual perversions, a Soviet textbook on psychiatry has been quoted as saying that "phenomena like homosexuality (which are acquired and not innate) have nothing in our environment to encourage them." The book goes on to say that in pre-war Berlin there were three newspapers for homosexuals, and 120 widely advertised clubs, besides numerous cafes where people sharing this tendency met. The Soviet book asserts:

The healthy atmosphere in which Soviet youth is brought up provides no conditions which would encourage the development of such perversions.⁶

The proletarian revolution had apparently reasserted Russian manhood all over. And neither Socrates nor Plato is permitted to compromise the heterosexuality of the toiling youth.

MONOGAMY AND RACIALISM

It is not merely with sexual communism and homosexual love that Plato's name is associated. It is also linked with ideas about the division of humanity into natural rulers and natural subjects—and the application of rational principles of breeding to human reproduction. "God . . . has put gold into those who are capable of ruling, silver into the auxiliaries, and iron and copper into the peasants and other producing classes."⁷

In essence, Plato's division is a class division. But because he links it to biological characteristics, a theory of class prejudice expands into a theory of racial prejudice. And a warning against miscegenation is formulated. "The first and chief injunction laid by heaven upon the Rulers is that, among all the things of which they must show themselves good guardians, there is none that needs to be so carefully watched as the mixture of metals in the souls of the children."⁸

Starting from these Platonic notions one sometimes discerns a curious relationship between the horror of miscegenation and the ethic of monogamy. The horror of miscegenation can sometimes destroy the ethic of monogamy or be indifferent to its demands. This is certainly the case when appeal is made to eugenics in order to avert miscegenation. Hitler's Germany and Plato's *Republic* share a common adventure in the application of the principles of animal breed-

ing to experimental human reproduction. Such an application cannot be consistent with the implicit precepts of Christian monogamy.

But there are times when Christian monogamy itself can be a breeding ground of racialism in relations between the sexes. This has a lot to do with the *spiritualization of sex* in Christianity. Extra-marital sexual relations are regarded as sin. This is not unusual—it is common to many other religions and codes of conduct as well, but Christians who regard extra-marital relations as sinful do not have to go to the extent of regarding *marital* sexual relations as sacred. Yet, Christians in history have tended to do precisely this, though not always consistently. In general, the Christians have not been satisfied with saying that marriage is a device for avoiding sin. They had gone further and invested the institution with sacredness. The sexual act within marriage is sometimes too closely identified with the fulfillment of God's will.

What is God to the Christian? God is a good many things—but God is also Love. And an unconscious equation emerges within the universe of the Christian mind: "Sex is Sacred; God is Love; Sex is Love." For Christianity itself the sex that is sacred is, of course, sex within marriage. Although the hold of Christianity has been loosening in the Western world, its influence on Western ways of thought and modes of behavior is stronger than might appear from statistics about Church attendance in Europe. The influence of Christianity is not always manifested in ways which Christianity itself would approve. The equation between sex and love gets extended in the West beyond the sacred boundaries of Christian marriage. So intimate becomes the logical relationship between the *idea* of sex and the *idea* of love in the Western mind that the sexual act itself becomes characterized as an act of "making love."

Why should sex and love be wedded together in this way? If you ran into a couple in a sexual embrace, and your mind was using Western concepts, the conclusion you are likely to reach is that these two strangers are two "lovers" enjoying themselves. It would certainly be odd if you started off with the hypothesis that the two figures engaged in a sexual act were not "lovers" but mutual "haters."

To a certain extent, all this is not peculiar to a Western frame of reasoning. Whatever the frame of reasoning, love and lust are both emotions of *attraction* serving to draw people together in the typical course of their inherent tendencies. Hate, on the other hand, is usually an emotion of *repulsion*—serving to keep people apart. We therefore do not consider it normal that two people who are repelled by mutual hate should at the same time be brought together by mutual sexual desire. Normal human behaviour does not make us think of "hate" when we stumble onto a couple in a sexual embrace.

But if it was true of any human society that sex and hate would normally make very strange bedfellows, why then did we single out the Euro-Christian frame of reference? The reason is that the Euro-Christian frame of reference not only dissociates hate from sex but goes a step further and associates spiritualized love with sex. The idea of sex as an act of love is by no means universal. There are societies that regard the sexual act essentially as an act of masculine asser-

tion; or as nature's way of saying that the male of the species is superior and ought normally to be "on top." Or a society might just regard sex as nature's insurance against perpetual boredom—one additional method of breaking the monotony and having a bit of fun. None of these attitudes toward sex equate it with love. And none of them would be readily acceptable to the typical Westerner.

But what has all this specifically to do with Christian monogamy as such? The answer lies in the fact that Euro-Christian culture has tried to spiritualize "physical love" by *dualizing* it. God can love all his creatures; a mother can love all her children—but "a man *can* really love only one woman." Love between a man and a woman, in their capacities as such, must be *dual* if it is to be "love" at all.

Duality as part of the definition of "love" encourages more than ever love's equation with sex within the Western frame of reference. Such an equation would be untenable within a polygamous society. Love and sexual desire can indeed coincide in a relationship between two people—but the two feelings do not entail each other. A person from a polygamous society might therefore say to a Westerner: "You surely must know from concrete experience that you can desire a woman and not love her; love her and not desire her; both love and desire her—or be completely indifferent towards her. Surely even in your own Western society, if you were to stumble on to two people in a sexual embrace, the statistical chances would be that they were *not* in love. All that the act would tell you is that at least one of the two figures before you was engaged in a quest for sexual satisfaction. If your experience confirms this, why does your theory insist on maintaining a logical intimacy between the concept of love and the idea of sex?"

If love is dual, and sex is plural or promiscuous in a polygamous society, then sex does not even logically imply love in such a society. A polygamous society might therefore be said to recognize in logic what even a Western society knows in practice—that only in a minority of cases is the sexual act an expression of love. But does it matter what the different words imply in different languages? The answer must be that it *does*—because entire multiple associations of words are an important factor in the way people's attitudes are conditioned. And people's attitudes toward sex or marriage might have important implications in wider social and political terms. By definition, a polygamous attitude towards marriage is significantly different from a monogamous one. What are apt to be overlooked are indeed those wider social and political consequences of this simple difference.

One area of life that can all too easily be affected by this difference is the area of race relations. The classic case of a polygamous "race" which is at the same time culturally homogeneous is perhaps the Arab race. And the Arabs also "happened to be" that most mongrel race on earth. In skin-color the range is from the White Arabs of Syria and Lebanon, the Brown Arabs of the Hadhramout and the Yemen to the Black Arabs of parts of Saudi Arabia, Oman and, of course, Sudan. If the father is Arab, the offspring is Arab without qualification—the idea of a half-caste being virtually alien to the relational universe of

this mongrel race. We see those Arabs scattered across both sides of the Red Sea, neither completely African nor completely Asian—and certainly impossible to classify neatly in pigmentation. Historically they were sexually promiscuous—and out of promiscuity grew relative toleration of mixed marriages and a complete absence of horror at the idea of miscegenation. What, after all, is the Arab race but miscegenation incarnates?

But does this really mean that Arabs are less racialistic than others? Not necessarily. It might merely mean that their particular brand of racialism does not express itself in attitudes to intermarriage. It might indeed be true that Arabs are more tolerant of mixed marriages than Europeans have tended to be. And yet this might *not* be because the Arabs think more highly of other races. The real reason might be that they think less highly of the institution of marriage. The Arabs made marriage less of a sacred mission and more of a simple social convention; and they made sex within marriage less divine and more human. By thus reducing the spirituality of marriage, they made *inter-marriage* less of an issue. An Arab has, in history been known to say: “My second wife is Turkish. She is a good wife. For how long are we Arabs going to tolerate the arrogant tyranny of those Turkish dogs?” His domestic contentment was untouched by the racial prejudices of his politics. He had married across the race boundary not because he thought more highly of the Turks, but because he thought differently of marriage.

Yet there is an element of oversimplification in all this. To remove intermarriage from the sphere of racial prejudice is, in a sense, to reduce the area of prejudice itself. Sex can be the most sensitive issue in race relations. To reduce the scope of sexual prejudice is perhaps a major mitigation of racial tension in its own right. It might even be true after all that polygamous attitudes to marriage tend to promote greater racial intercourse and greater tolerance at-large.

The experience of the two Americas offers tempting conclusions in this respect. If the White citizens of the United States had, in fact, been Arab, most of the colored citizens would have become Arab, too. It has been estimated that over 70 percent of the Negro population in the United States has some “White” blood. And the “White” blood was much more often than not, derived from a White *father*. Now, given the Arab principle that if the father is Arab the child is Arab, most of the Negroes of the United States would have been Arab and the White people of America would have been Arab, too. However, the White Americans are Caucasians and the dominant culture is Germanic. And so if either of the parents is non-Germanic, the offspring cannot be Germanic either. In fact, the law of White-dominated Florida defines a Negro as a person with “one eighth or more of African or Negro blood.” And the laws of Florida, like the laws of eighteen other states in the American Union, specifically prohibit “miscegenation.”⁹

To complicate the situation further, the old Western equation of love and sex becomes all mixed up with such prejudices in the United States. And the phrase “Nigger-Lover” becomes an expression of racial *hatred*.

THE AESTHETICS OF SEX

The United States is part of a whole hemispheric melting pot of race. It has been estimated that one sixth of the population of the new world consists of "half-castes"—different "mixtures" of White, Indian and Negro. In Paraguay up to 97 percent of the population is Mestizo; in Venezuela from 70 percent to 90 percent of the population is mixed.¹⁰ The population of Negroes in Brazil is about the size of the entire population of Uganda as a whole. They constitute eleven percent of the population of Brazil. The Brown sector of Brazil is 27 percent, and the White or "of White descent" is 62 percent.¹¹

But is there no form of race prejudice in Latin America? That would be an absurd claim. There is indeed a good deal of prejudice—but the Germanic horror of "mixing blood" is nowhere as acute. Here we must, in fact, distinguish between race prejudice and color prejudice. Very often the two coincide, but they need not. And even where they coincide, a difference in emphasis can sometimes be discerned. One might even distinguish between a race prejudice that is essentially based on color and a race prejudice that is obsessed with the myth of blood. Among North American Whites the emphasis is on purity of blood. A person might have a skin that is indisputably White. But if the legal calculators of Florida were to discover that one eighth of this White man's blood was "African or Negro blood," the white-skinned man becomes classified as a Negro. The prejudice of Latin America, however, seems to be based ultimately on color. Class stratification in Brazil follows faithfully the shades of skin-color—the fairer your child is the better are its chances of social success in the future.

If we go back north and look at canons of social evaluation among the Afro-Americans themselves we might again discern differences in social status according to shade of skin-color. That is to say, American Negroes between themselves are like Latin Americans—they sometimes classify each other socially on a basis of varying pigmentation. Until fairly recently it was a case of rising in respectability the paler you became. But now there is a distinct school of Afro-American aesthetic thought that would award you more credit points if you manage to get any darker. Sociologically all this is essentially an example of color prejudice without race prejudice—assuming that you accept the thesis that the Negroes of the United States constitute a single race. One thing ought to be emphasized—that color prejudice within the American Negro community itself is of limited significance. On the one hand, it is an effect of White racism in the country. On the other hand, it is now being squeezed out of existence by that very racism of the entire White sector of America—as the Negroes acquire a greater sense of common purpose; a greater consciousness of a shared predicament.

A more significant case of color prejudice without race prejudice is to be found in India. Between Indians themselves this can be a straightforward problem of the aesthetics of sex—whereby fairness of skin is deemed more attractive than darkness of skin. The color-criterion of beauty is, I understand, an impor-

tant factor in the sociology of marital selectivity in India, but this is not entirely unrelated to the multifarious implications of the caste-system itself. India is a monogamous sub-continent independently of the Christian tradition. But Indian monogamy is certainly no more tolerant of mixed marriages than is the extreme Germanic expression of Euro-Christian sexual monopoly. The caste-boundary, sometimes even the linguistic one, is India's equivalent of the race-barrier in marriage.

CONCLUSION

There is something about monogamy that encourages endogamy—that is the persistent intimation we get from looking at these different groups. This endogamous tendency does not always prevail—it might be diluted by other considerations or even be completely neutralized. But as a generalization we can say that an attitude which permits a person to acquire a number of wives is at the same time an attitude which permits him to look beyond his own group for some of those wives. This permissive attitude towards polygamous intermarriages is then extended to the phenomenon of intermarriage generally. Only a small minority of Arabs in the world do, in fact, have more than one wife. When we refer to them as “polygamous,” we are referring to their *toleration* of polygamy rather than their practice of it. It is the attitude which is crucial in this analysis. And the attitude that is tolerant of polygamy has a *tendency* to tolerate exogamous adventures as well.

However, the relationship of this marital toleration to racial tolerance at-large is by no means a neat one. A complete acceptance of intermarriage does not necessarily denote a complete absence of racial prejudice. The Arabs are not without racial dislikes in spite of their exogamous broadmindedness. Similarly the Latin Americans are not without color prejudice, in spite of their assimilationist achievements and promiscuous liberalism.

But untidy as the correlation might be between intermarriage and racial tolerance at-large, there can be no doubt that a connection exists. Sex—in or out of wedlock—is a major area of possible inter-group tension. Inter-group relations are bound to be less emotionally charged where this area of tension is narrowed. The politics of sexual inhibitions and sexual rivalry bedevil many a plural society, openly or at the level of the subconscious. And the very idea of sex becomes not only divorced from love but also actually tied to the keg of communal hate. Need we ask for whom those wedding bells toll?

NOTES

1. Marx himself was, of course, Jewish by racial extraction. He was born a Jew by religion as well, but his parents were converted to Christianity while Marx was still a child. Marx himself was later to take a Hegelian route to atheism, but some Judeo-Christian inhibitions remained with him.

2. For a critical analysis of the implications of Plato's position, see K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. 1, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962 edition), especially chapters 4 and 8.

3. *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848). The edition consulted is the one in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*. L. S. Feuer, (ed.), (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 24–26.

4. *Problems of Sexual Education*, (Moscow, 1959). Cited in *Russia under Khrushchev*, by Alexander Worth, (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1962), p. 147. The official title of Dr. T. S. Atarov was Physician of Merit of the RSFSR, coupled with the high academic degree of Candidate of Medical Sciences.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 147–148.

6. *Uchebnik Psichiatriyi*, by O. V. Kerbikov et al., (Moscow, 1958), p. 313. Cited in Alexander Werth, *ibid.*, p. 162.

7. *Republic*, 415a.

8. *Republic*, 546a. Also related is 434c.

9. For quite awhile the United States Supreme Court had avoided a direct ruling on the Constitutionality of laws, which forbade mixed marriage. But such a ruling by the Court is now being demanded. For a useful background article see Arthur Krock, "Miscegenation Debate," *The New York Times* (Review of the Week), September 8, 1963. See also the more recent article by Charlotte G. Moulton published in *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), November 11, 1964.

10. These estimates were given by Charles Winick in his *Dictionary of Anthropology*. (London: Peter Owen Ltd., 1957). The percentages are not likely to have changed significantly.

11. See Florence Elliott and Michael Summerskill, *A Dictionary of Politics*, (Penguin, 1959), p. 43.

Chapter 2.2

Monogamy and Descent in Black-White Relations

Any scheme to restructure the political universe has to take cognizance of the problem of sexual mating as a world order issue. Sex is at once a profoundly private experience and a deeply social phenomenon. Some of the most far-reaching impulses and inhibitions in the human person as a social being are related to those aspects of intimacy between the sexes.

Formerly sexual issues impinged more directly on diplomacy. England's break with the Roman Catholic Church under Henry VIII was the outcome of an interaction among politics, religion, and sexual appetites. Indeed, the whole institution of dynastic marriages through the ages was a utilization of personal mating for international and diplomatic purposes. In our own age sexual issues enter world politics less through the marriage arrangements of monarchs than through the dynamics of race relations. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the nature and implications of interracial mating and interracial systems of descent as part of our attempt to diagnose the defective world order that faces us. In this chapter, we propose to examine, first, the relationship between monogamy and racism and, second, the impact of differential miscegenation on systems of descent.

Because of the nature of this analysis, a wide comparative approach is essential. In order to understand the effect of Christian monogamy on Black-White relations we shall also examine the impact of Islamic polygamy on Black-Arab relations. The kinship culture of Islamic civilization has to serve as a foil to the kinship culture of the Christian heritage.¹

SEXUAL PURITANISM AND RACIAL INTOLERANCE

Would it be true to say that polygamy is more conducive to toleration of mixed marriages than is monogamy? The Germanic Europeans are among the most

monogamous of the westerners. In the more literal meaning of the word, all westerners are, of course, monogamous: the laws of their countries do not permit more than one wife. But when we discuss monogamous attitudes, we are referring to inclinations even outside marriage. We see polygamy and monogamy as two points on a continuum. In general, the Germanic-speaking Europeans are more monogamous in their sexual moralism than the Latin-speakers are known to be. The French, Italians, and the Latin-Americans, are, in other words, less moralistic in their attitude to promiscuity than are Teutons and Anglo-Saxons. The case of the Iberian Peninsula is complicated by the direct, massive influence of the Catholic Church. Where the church is as weak in the peninsula as it is in, say, France, it is probable that Spain and Portugal would have shared the sexual broadmindedness of their fellow Latins.

Given then that the Germanic peoples are more monogamous in their attitudes, is it merely a coincidence that they also happen to be more racialistic in their attitudes to intermarriage? Perhaps no Latin country could have produced a racist maniac like Hitler dedicated to "the purity of the blood." Perhaps only the Germans proper could have worked themselves up into such a frenzy about miscegenation. But theirs was an extreme case of something shared by other Germanic peoples. As Dame Margery Perham put it in her Reith Lectures:

The Germanic-speaking Europeans—the British, the Germans, the Americans, the Dutch—share a deep bias against intermarriage with the Negro race. . . . This conscious, or sometimes subconscious, fear of race mixture accounts both for the [Germanic] White man's innermost ring of defence and also for all his outer ring of political, social and economic ramparts.²

Dame Margery does not go on to say it, but it is not entirely a coincidence that both Hitlerism and apartheid are outgrowths of Germanic kinship cultures.

What is being suggested here is that there is something about monogamy that probably encourages endogamy. On the other hand, we might say as a generalization that an attitude which permits a person to acquire a number of wives permits him at the same time to look beyond his own group for at least some of those wives. Monogamy as a limitation of matrimonial choice encourages group protectiveness, and seeks to assure that the girls in that particular society have adequate opportunities for honorable marriages with their own kind. But where a man is permitted to have more than one wife, the matrimonial opportunities of the women of his own society need not be imperiled, and the inner defensiveness in kinship relations is relaxed.

Of course intermarriage can be accepted without two societies really regarding each other as equals, with total racial toleration and reciprocal esteem. But it does mean that one important dimension of intergroup relations is, at least partially, depoliticized. This is also connected with the basis of descent for the offspring of mixed marriages. To which of the parents does a child of racial mixture belong? Does it belong to the mother regardless of her race, or to the father

irrespective of who the mother is? Or is descent determined by which of the two groups is higher or lower in the stratification of the given social situation?

Underlying this whole web of relationships is a connection between sexual puritanism and racial intolerance. Christianity played an important part in forging this connection. "Primitiveness" became partly defined in terms of sexual laxity. The White man's burden as understood by the missionaries included the ambition to tame the sexual appetites of "less civilized peoples." From this point of view, the Christian impact on Africa has to be seen as two-pronged. Africa witnessed what might be called the Christianization of sexual relations; and Africa also witnessed the politicization of Christianity. The Christianization of the world of sex prepared the ground for moral puritanism; the politicization of Christianity in Africa initiated the theocratic process by which imperialism ruled the continent in the name of the Christian God.

The Christianization of sexual relations arose out of the widespread belief among the early missionaries that the world of sex in African societies was a little too loose; that inadequate discipline was exercised over sexual appetites. The missionaries were bringing the Gospel to "heathen communities" steeped not only in superstition but also in sinful desires. The first behavioral imperative therefore was to control those areas of African life, which helped to whet those appetites and desires. Discipline was of the first order, and a new regularity needed to be imposed. Even when the missionaries accomplished successfully the excellent mission of rescuing victims of slave-traders, and establishing settlements for them pending their rehabilitation, they took the opportunity to transform the moral ways of these liberated victims. In the words of the British historian, Roland Oliver:

Within the enclaves there was no social ostracism to be endured for Christ's sake. . . . There were no sexual initiation rites and no ceremonial debauches to enflame the passions beyond their normal vigour. Instead, there was a new social solidarity calculated to support the ethical doctrines of Christianity. Monogamy, the greatest stumbling block, was a condition of residence (in these enclaves), and polygyny in the new economic conditions lost much of its significance as the only means to wealth and power.³

The new schools which came into being proceeded to discourage important areas of African cultural life, on the assumption that these contributed to moral laxity and sinful appetites. Africa experienced its own interrupted symphony—the interruption of certain kinds of dance, music, and drama as these were banned by missionary intervention.

A moral liberal and deeply Afrophile modern missionary who worked in Uganda, F. B. Welbourn, cited the lament of a pious Christian English woman: "We are told to make friends with Africans and to invite them to our houses. But I cannot bring myself to regard as social equals men who are polygamists. Perhaps I'm out of date and ought to go back to England for good." Trying to understand both sides, Welbourn attempted to define the dilemma for the Church

in Africa, arising from the clash between Western Christianity and firmly rooted African customs. In the words of Welbourn:

The first missionaries . . . found a society that was polygamous by conviction. Bride wealth was an important aid to the stability of marriage. . . . They found a society where drunkenness was rife. Dances not only were an essential contribution to social well-being but often ended in unrestrained sexual promiscuity. . . . The first impact of Christianity on Buganda led to the banning of all traditional dances as potentially obscene. All African music was felt, in some way or other, to be connected with paganism and were therefore 'of the devil.'⁴

The banning of certain traditional forms of dancing and music has remained in many East African schools to the present day. Some changes have indeed taken place in some respects. Increasingly, attention is given to the possibility of using some traditional music for church services. Welbourn referred to the adoption of the traditional Royal Dance of Acholi, with suitable modifications, for use at Christian festivals. Today it is possible to see, on Uganda Television, Acholi dancing by Acholi girls from schools, which bear names like "The Immaculate Virgin." Of course, the girls are covered from neck to toe quite often, and not just across their breasts and between navel and knee. But the movements of the traditional dance are now actually being permitted, duly covered up, on television under the sponsorship of a religious school.

And yet it was an Acholi poet, Okot p'Bitek, who put into the words of Lawino the lament concerning Africa's interrupted dances. Okot captured the clash of interpretations concerning what kind of dancing was obscene. Ocol, a westernized Acholi husband, apparently Christianized in his inhibitions, denounced to his wife, Lawino, traditional dances as "mortal sins." Lawino's own description of these dances does reveal why missionaries had reservations about them. The dances, according to Lawino, are held in broad daylight so that things can be seen openly. Lawino then moves on to indicate how the ballroom dancing which her Christian husband approves of is to her more shameful than anything performed in a traditional Acholi arena.

What we have here are competing Acholi and Western interpretations of obscenity. We also have in this section of the imperial experience, recurrent examples of the link between Christian versions of puritanism and European racial intolerance. The Africans were held in contempt partly because the styles of their sexual life offended the monogamous ideals of Christian morality. The fact that many White immigrants into Africa were at least as promiscuous as their native subjects did not make the White man more humble. A slave owner in the United States complained about the sexual looseness of the "Niggers" as he undressed to go to bed with one of his own slave girls. The monogamous theme in this case took the form of highly idealized morality. The White man's self-image fell short of self-recognition.

We must not make the mistake of many students of race relations and forget that the sexual act is a process of impregnation as well as of pleasure. We do not

accept that inhibitions about intercourse itself across the racial boundary are the central variable relevant to the understanding of race relations. In this chapter we now proceed to emphasize the status of the child, rather than the nature of the act between the parents. It may well be true that the source of inhibitions may ultimately lie in the attitude toward the offspring of mixed marriages, rather than the attitude toward interracial intercourse. Residual disapproval of sexual intimacy across the racial boundary may still be compatible with a significant elevation of the status of the children of mixed marriages. And since descent is a matter of longer-term generational consequences than copulation, the central issue for cultural modification is the issue of miscegenation.

This inevitably brings into play additional factors of kinship culture, with all the conditioning of custom and religion. Interracial mating becomes in part an intercultural transaction. The principle of tolerance becomes inseparable from the mode of acculturation that is operating in a given situation.

In discussing the spread of Islam in the Nuba Mountains of the Republic of Sudan, R. C. Stevenson referred to two parallel processes of social change: "one linguistic and cultural, by which the people of the land acquired Arabic as their language and certain Islamic cultural conceptions and became connected with the Arab tribal system; and the other race, by which the incoming Arab stock was absorbed in varying degrees, so that today a modicum of Arab blood flows in their veins."⁵

It is this combination of acculturation and intermingling between races, which might be called a process of biocultural assimilation. Some degrees of integration between groups is achieved by the process of mixing blood and fusing cultural patterns.

SYMMETRY IN BIOCULTURAL ASSIMILATION

Two concepts need to be further refined: symmetrical acculturation and symmetrical miscegenation. Symmetrical acculturation arises when a dominant group not only passes on its culture to the groups it dominates but is also significantly receptive to the cultural influence of its subjects or captives, that is, when cultural transmission is a two-way affair. Complete symmetry is impossible to achieve, and even if achieved, would be impossible to measure. What needs to be approximated is a significant reciprocal influence.

There have been occasions in history when acculturation has been asymmetrical, and yet the receiving group has been the politically dominant. The classic example is that of the Greek influence on the Roman conquerors. After the decline of Greece and the rise of Rome, Greek subjects succeeded in partially Hellenizing the Roman conquerors.⁶ A more common example is the kind of asymmetry in which the politically dominant culture transmits itself to its subjects and captives and receives little in return. The British cultural influence in much of Africa has been of this type. We might call this descending asymmetry, and call the Greco-Roman example a model of ascending asymmetry.

Symmetrical miscegenation would arise in a situation where two racial communities intermarry and produce a comparable number of both men and women who crossed the racial boundary to seek partners from another community. In very isolated circumstances, and even there with some qualifications, such symmetry is conceivable. It may be conceivable in a situation where one race or ethnic group is patrilineal and the other is matrilineal. The matrilineal group might not mind its women crossing the border and marrying men from the other country. The patrilineal group, in like manner, might permit the men to be exogamous. But in such situations claims as to whether the mother or the father has priority in rearing the children, and how descent is to be determined, might become issues as soon as the married couple appear to be on the verge of separating. For as long as they are together, it is conceivable for a child to enjoy dual racial citizenship. To the matrilineal race, the child is regarded as sharing the race of its mother; while the patrilineal wing recognizes the child's racial affinity to its father. Tensions in such situations are conceivable, precisely in the duality of citizenship and the pulls of potentially conflicting loyalties. Symmetrical miscegenation in such an instance could indeed be approximated.

A much more prevalent phenomenon is that of asymmetrical miscegenation. Certainly, in the great majority of cases where Black people have intermarried with non-Black people, lack of symmetry has been a continuing characteristic.

Although in this chapter we are paying special attention to racial mixture as between White and Black races, we are doing this in a broad comparative perspective, relating the issue to the Afro-Arab experience as well as to the different histories of racial mixture in the United States, Latin America, and South Africa. These latter three, when combined with the Afro-Arab model, provide four distinct patterns of the relationship between miscegenation and social structure.⁷ And the types of miscegenation correlate closely to different nuances of monogamous culture.

All four models of miscegenation are asymmetrical, but in significantly different ways. In each case the dominant ethnic group has produced many more husbands than wives in the racial mixture. Seventy-five percent of the so-called Black population of the United States has White blood, but overwhelmingly the White blood has come through White males rather than White females. Until recently, mating between Whites and Blacks in North America usually meant White men and Black women.

The Latin American model is less straightforward, but it is still basically asymmetrical. It is the fairer-skinned males who have easy access to darker-skinned females, rather than the other way round. A factor which has in some respects accentuated the asymmetry in Brazil is the sexual prestige of the mulatto girl among White Portuguese:

Gilberto Freyre has written that prolonged contact with the Saracens led to the idealization among the Portuguese of the type of the 'enchanting Mooress,' a seductive ideal with dark eyes, enveloped in sexual mysticism. . . . Freyre sug-

gests that dark-skinned women were preferred by the Portuguese for love, or at least for physical love.⁸

Within the African continent the asymmetry in miscegenation originated partly in the phenomenon of slavery itself. Both in South Africa and in Arabized Black Africa, slavery was the breeding ground of asymmetrical miscegenation. The Boers in the Cape, and the Arabs in Zanzibar and Sudan, helped themselves to female African slaves and produced children. The transmission of Afrikaner blood in South Africa and of Arab blood in Zanzibar and Sudan was definitely through the dominant Afrikaner or Arab male.

In spite of the fact that all the four models of race relations that we are going to discuss are based on asymmetrical miscegenation, the fate of the children varies in fundamental ways among those four models. Do the children of a mixed marriage between a dominant race and an underprivileged race follow the father into the amenities of dominance or do they follow the mother into the handicaps of underprivilege? Or do they in fact become a class apart?

The answers to these questions are different in each case, depending on whether we are looking at the North American, the Latin American, the South African, or the Afro-Arab models. The precise fate of children in mixed unions has a great deal of relevance for the whole issue of a biological approach to national integration. Does racial mixture reduce cleavages between groups and in what way? The answers differ in the four models, and their pertinence to the integrative process has to be correspondingly differentiated.

MISCEGENATION: DESCENDING, AMBIVALENT AND DIVERGENT

We must again remind ourselves that acculturation and intermarriage do not necessarily result in social intermingling between the races or even in a system of desegregation. It very much depends upon the precise systems of descent observed by the race in question, and the general racial attitudes of the dominant race in a particular society.

One might say that there are four active models of relationship between blood mixture and social structure at-large. One is the North American model. Within this model, whenever there is mating between a White person and a Black person, the offspring is invariably "Black." We may call this the model of descending miscegenation. Over three-quarters of Black Americans have Caucasian blood flowing in their veins, and yet they are categorized as Negroes or Blacks. Some states in the United States presumed to characterize a person's race by a calculation of how much Negro blood the person had. As recently as the 1960s, the law of White-dominated Florida defined a Negro as a person with "one-eighth or more of African or Negro blood." Furthermore, the laws of Florida, like the laws of eighteen other states in the American union in 1963, specifically prohibited "miscegenation."⁹ The correlation with monogamous puritanism was strong here. American rhetoric was full of the virtues of the happy family defined in terms of strict sexual faithfulness—though American practice fell short of that.

The second model, ambivalent miscegenation, is that of Latin America. In Brazil especially, the mating of a Black person and a White person produces a mulatto or mestizo. Depending partly on the actual color he inherited from his parents, the mestizo could either enjoy the same rights as the White person or the same handicaps as the Black person. In other words, much of the prejudice in Latin America is color prejudice rather than race prejudice. Class stratification in Brazil does correlate substantially with the shades of skin color, the fairer the child, the better its chances of social success in the future.

The picture as a whole contrasts with the North American model in levels of puritanism, as well as in other respects. The idea of a married man having a mistress is treated with greater indulgence in Brazil than in the United States. That same toleration of extra-marital lapses among the Latins is extended to interracial "lapses."

The North American model of descent puts an emphasis on purity of blood, regardless of how fair the child is. Indeed, a person might have indisputably white skin, but if the legal calculators of blood in Florida were to discover that one-eighth of this White man's blood was "Negro blood," the white-skinned person would be reclassified as a Black man. What this line of reasoning implies was disapproval of racial mixture as mixture. All one has to prove is that the child is of mixed parentage—and promptly the child descends to the status of the less privileged group. The Brazilian model by contrast does not condemn mixture as mixture. It may be indisputable that a child is of mixed parentage—but if the child is relatively fair its chances in life are improved accordingly. The Brazilian model is a purer case of color prejudice—a man is judged by his own skin color and not by the sexual tastes of his parents.¹⁰

During the colonial phase of Brazil's history, Francisco Manuel de Melo noted that "Brazil is the Inferno of Negroes, the Purgatory of White Men, and the Paradise of Mulattoes of both sexes."¹¹ It is unlikely that de Melo was ever right in this formulation. Brazil might indeed have been, and to some extent still remains, an inferno for Negroes. But it is clearly the White men that are in paradise, and the mulattoes that are in purgatory. The mulatto, a person of mixed parentage, could either find himself in the hell of Black people or in the paradise of White people, depending upon the precise shade of his color.

Census figures in Brazil have tended to adopt the three categories of Whites, Negroes, and "mestizos," the mixed group that allows also for the inclusion of Indian blood. But Brazilian census figures in these terms have always been bedeviled precisely by this phenomenon of racial mobility—the capacity of a person to move upward in race classification if his physical features and skin-color permitted it. Many light mulattoes—refined, educated, and of good appearance—must appear to be White. Mestizos appearing to be White are included as White, contrary to the practice in the United States, where one-eighth of Negro blood classifies one as Negro.¹²

This important distinction has struck other writers too. Donald Pierson has noted that while the American criterion was based on racial descent, the Brazili-

an was based on physical appearance. Pierson draws attention to the phenomenon of many Negro grandparents having grandchildren who are "White."

It is this consideration which leads to the conclusion that while in the United States the progeny of mixed marriages is classified as belonging to the less privileged group, the progeny of mixed marriages in Brazil could be classified either with the privileged or with the underprivileged, depending upon physical features and color of skin:

In the White group, then, one finds not only true Whites but also White phenotypes, that is, Afro-White and Indian-White mestizos reverting to White type. In the Negro group there are Negroes and Negro-phenotypes, mulattoes and *cafuzos* [Indian-Negro] reverting to Negro type. Finally, the mestizo classification shows the greatest lack of precision, for mulattoes, mixtures of Negro and White, are not distinguished from *caboclos*, mixtures of Indian and White.¹³

In South Africa we see a third category in which the progeny of mixed marriages between White and Black are neither automatically Black, as they are in the United States, nor entitled to upward mobility if physical features permit, as they are in Brazil. The South African model decrees that the progeny of a mixed marriage between White and Black belongs to a group apart: the Coloreds. We might call this the model of *divergent miscegenation*. Like descending miscegenation, this third model is characteristic of conditions of sexual puritanism and racial bigotry.

Over three-quarters of the Colored population of South Africa live in the Cape. The concentration of this mixed population coincides roughly with the settled districts of the western Cape during the slave period. The Coloreds have been defined as "the product of a dual process of westernization and miscegenation between Whites, Hottentots, and slaves."

The puritanical streak again correlates with racial intolerance. The particular Christian denomination of South African Afrikanerdom, the Dutch Reform Church, is basically more puritanical than the major religious denominations of the United States. South Africa's dominant political culture bears the stamp of the Dutch Reform Church—and sexual intolerance within that culture intermingles with racial intolerance. The Immorality Laws of South Africa—forbidding sexual mating across racial boundaries—constitute a legal monument to this dual intolerance. Yet, as in the case of the American slave owner, monogamous ideals did not always result in monogamous behavior. And the very offspring was often relegated to the ranks of the underprivileged. The total subordination of the woman slave to the whims of her master, and the interest of the master in producing highly prized mulatto slaves, promoted a good deal of racial intermingling. In culture, the bulk of the Colored population is a sub-group of the Afrikaner culture. Indeed, the great majority are native Afrikaans-speakers.

In the United States, the Coloreds would have belonged more firmly to the "Black" population, since any mixture of blood follows the line of less privilege. Under Latin American conditions the Colored population of South Africa would

have been divided between the Blacks and the Whites, according to physical features inherited from the parental groups. Some Coloreds would definitely have been accepted fully as part of the Afrikaner population. But since South Africa is neither the United States nor Latin America, the Coloreds have remained a group apart, distinct both from the pinnacle of racial privilege and from the base at the bottom of that pyramid.¹⁴

ASCENDING MISCEGENATION

Our fourth model of the Afro-Arab polygamous culture can be studied in places like Sudan and Zanzibar. The population of Sudan as estimated on January 17, 1956, was 10,262,536, of which 39 percent was deemed to be racially Arab. The racial definition of Arab was in terms of membership, or claimed membership, of an Arab tribe. This constituted biological intermingling between the races, real or claimed.

But in a country like Sudan there is also the linguistic definition of Arab to be taken into account, that is, a person is an Arab if his mother tongue is Arabic. Muddathir Abdul Rahim has estimated that 51 percent of the Sudanese speak Arabic as their first language and must, according to the census figures, be deemed to be Arabs. The linguistic definition hinges not on biological integration but on cultural or linguistic assimilation.

Although Abdul Rahim emphasizes the linguistic definition of Arab, he also draws attention to the remarkable racial intermingling in many parts of the Sudan. The two southern provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal and the Upper Nile are almost exclusively populated by Nilotics. There are also relatively unmixed communities, in the biological sense, in parts of northern Sudan. The central parts of the country illustrate considerable genetic mixture:

Although Arab tribes predominate in the provinces of Khartoum, Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Northern Province, the Beja in Kasala, Westerners in Darfur, and the Nilo-Hamites in Equatoria, it is obvious that considerable racial mixing has taken place, particularly in the central parts of the country. A clear indication of this is the wide range of colours and features among the Sudanese Arabs (over half of the total population) who are, on the whole, much darker than other Arabic speaking peoples north of the Sahara and across the sea in Arabia.¹⁵

If, in Sudan, the utilization of the linguistic definition of Arab increases the number of Arabs from 39 percent to 51 percent of the population, in revolutionary Zanzibar a linguistic definition of Arab would have nearly halved the Arab population. In other words, while the Sudan has more native Arabic speakers than it has people with Arab blood, pre-Revolutionary Zanzibar had more people with Arab blood than it had native Arabic speakers. Many Arabs in pre-revolutionary Zanzibar were native speakers of Swahili, a Bantu language.

These differences indicate that the distinction between Arabs and Black Africans is not dichotomous but has the complexity of a continuum. That was one reason why the Organization of African Unity was born as a multi-pigmen-

tational enterprise. The Arabs as a race defy straight pigmentational classification, as we noted earlier. Within Africa itself the range of color among the Arabs runs indeed from White to Black; even within Egypt, the range of color is virtually as wide as it is in the Arab world as a whole.

Afro-Arab intermingling contrasts sharply with the model of Afro-Saxon intermingling in the United States, Afro-Latin intermingling in Brazil, and Afro-Afrikaner intermingling in South Africa. To the Arabs the idea of “half-caste” is relatively alien. If the father is Arab, the child is Arab without reservation. If we visualize an Arab marrying a Nilotic woman in the fourteenth century and producing a son, the son would be Arab. If we imagined in turn that the son again married a Nilotic woman who bore a son—this son, too, would be an Arab. If we then assumed the process repeated, generation after generation, until a child is born in the second half of the twentieth century with only a drop of his blood still ostensibly of Arab derivation and the rest of his blood indubitably Nilotic, that twentieth-century child would still be an Arab.¹⁶

It is this phenomenon which has saved the Arab-Negro division in Africa from being a dichotomous gulf—and converted it instead into a racial continuum of merging relationships.

In Pan-African literature it has been more the Afro-Americans than either the Arabs or the Black Africans who have grasped this fact of the racial continuum. Edward Blyden, the nineteenth-century Liberian intellectual of West Indian birth, put it in the following terms:

With every wish, no doubt, to the contrary, the European seldom or never gets over the feeling of distance, if not of repulsion, which he experiences on first seeing the Negro. . . . The Arab missionary, on the other hand, often of the same complexion as his hearer, does not ‘require any long habit to reconcile the eye to him.’ He takes up his abode in Negroland, often for life, and, mingling his blood with that of the inhabitants, succeeds in the most natural manner, in engrafting Mohammedan religion and learning upon the ignorance and simplicity of the people.¹⁷

Blyden here captures the paternalism, which characterized missionary work both by Arabs and by Europeans. Nevertheless, the social distance purposefully created by European missionaries in the areas in which they worked contrasts with the more integrative approach to proselytism adopted by Muslim missionaries. The Christian missionary even today may indeed walk among the people to comfort the sick, educate the ignorant, convert the heathen, and reform the sinner, but he does not mix his blood with them. If he is a Catholic, and has already been ordained, then he has taken the vow of celibacy. If he is a Protestant, and has been ordained, he has probably taken the precaution of getting himself a wife from home prior to coming to Africa.

By contrast, Muslim missionaries did not have to be monogamous, and were hardly ever celibate. Nor did they regard it as necessary to arm themselves with a wife from their own community before venturing into the darkness of

Africa. In the words of Blyden: "The Muslim missionary often brought to the aid of his preaching the influence of social and domestic relationships—an influence which in all efforts to convert a people is not to be entirely ignored."¹⁸ What Blyden here is suggesting is the efficacy of biological integration as a method of cultural assimilation. He even quotes Dean Stanley's assertion: "The conversion of the Russian nation was effected, not by the preaching of the Byzantine clergy, but by the marriage of a Byzantine princess."¹⁹

It is arguable that the three most important ways of spreading a culture to other lands are, first, by purposeful cultural transmission and proselytization; second, by the flow of trade and its incidental consequences in the field of culture contact; and third, by actual migration of people from one land to settle in another. Imperialism is a means towards an end, helping to determine the magnitude of trade, cultural transmission, or migration.

TRADERS, FARMERS AND MARRIAGE

Special emphasis needs to be placed on the phenomenon of trade and the incidence of cultural contact caused by trade. In the impact of Europe on Africa, the missionary and the trader were distinct specimens, though often in alliance. But in the case of the impact of Islam and Arab civilization on Africa, the missionary and the trader were often the same person.

Islam very often spread casually as a result of contact between individuals, and as a result of ordinary social intermingling between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. The Arab shopkeeper in a small town in Tanzania or Sudan could converse about Islam to his animistic customers, and sometimes influence them toward conversion. The Arab shopkeeper may marry among the same alien people he served commercially, and through the influence of kinship and marriage he may at the same time unofficially proselytize for Islam. Or the Arab trader may be a nomadic businessman, moving from town to town selling his wares, while functioning also as a mobile mission for Islam. In the European penetration of Africa the missionary tended to precede the trader, and both in turn helped to prepare the way for the flag.

William C. McLeod, discussing the trader and intermarriage in colonial North America, put forward the hypothesis that a trading man was more ready than a settler to marry into groups other than his own. Concurrently, he disputed the theory that there were differing "Latin" and "Germanic" attitudes about interracial marriage:

In contrasting the French and the English, [popular writers] make the cardinal error of comparing French traders not with British traders but with British agriculturists; and the needs of a French colonial regime which never developed to the point where the trading interests lost control with the needs of dominantly agricultural British settlements. French and British traders alike married Indian women and gave rise to numbers of half-breeds; and both groups were able to adapt themselves to Indian ways of life and the Indian manner of thinking.²⁰

The Spaniards and the Portuguese, McLeod asserts, are indeed capable of intense racial prejudice. But their attachment to religion has tended to make the religious differences a greater barrier to adequate social intercourse than racial differences. The Moor and the Jew in Spain and Portugal were hated only so long as they refused to become Christians; Christianized they were racially absorbed by both the aristocratic and the commoner strata of the population.²¹

McLeod is here exaggerating the Iberian tolerance of Christianized Moors and Jews. And yet, in conceding the relevance of Iberian Christianity to their racial attitudes, McLeod was beginning to concede the relevance of Latin culture at-large for differential behavior as between the Latin and the Germanic peoples. McLeod emphasized the relevance of those aspects of culture that have to do with cooking, keeping house, and making general domestic arrangements. He insisted that these very mundane aspects of culture, often determined by whether the man has settled in one place for good or regards himself as a transient, have been far more important in determining racial orientations in matrimonial matters than the wider concepts of culture concerned with God and values:

Farmers needed wives who knew the ways of European housekeeping and husbandry, who knew how to milk cows, fry eggs, and so on. Indian women would not do. The farmer, even in Virginia, so late as 1632, often preferred to pay the expense of importing women of questionable repute from the European cities, at considerable cost, than to take Indian women who would be helpless on a farmer's homestead. Champlain offered one hundred and fifty francs as a dowry to each French-Canadian farmer who would marry an Indian girl, but his offer was in vain.²²

Herbert Moller, writing more than a decade later, reaffirmed McLeod's thesis. Moller took the position that the greater extent of interracial mingling in Spanish and Portuguese America could not be attributed to an inherently different attitude on the part of the Latin peoples in their relations with "the natives." The history of race relations in New France would, according to Moller, be an effective witness against such a position. During the second half of the seventeenth century, when the early French colonists were mostly males, there was no prejudice against alliances with Indian women. Only four marriages between French men and Indians were recorded at the time, but "left-handed marriages are known to have been frequent." But by the turn of the century, the sex ratio in the eastern parts of Canada was beginning to be fairly balanced, partly because the number of males was not radically increased by new immigration. With the balance came a decline in mixed marriages in Canada. On the other hand, the western parts of Canada still remained strongly masculine, and so did Louisiana. As such, concubinage with young Indian squaws was the rule through the eighteenth century in Canada.

Similarly, argues Moller, British colonists had relatively easy ideas about miscegenation for as long as there was a great shortage of White women, and moral attitudes had not been deeply influenced by White women. In addition,

Moller suggests that the predicament of the new North American colonists, still unsure of the future and even of survival in very strange new circumstances, is sociologically comparable to the position of the trader settling in a village and being guided by the likely impermanence of his abode.

Once the agricultural pattern of life began to gain roots and the people were at last settlers, the aversion to mixed marriages began to rise perceptibly among North American colonists. Moller asserts that the kind of racial prejudices, which grew up in North America, were not imported from Europe. Such antipathies were, according to the writer, virtually nonexistent in the Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Racial aversions of the form, which was found in subsequent decades of North American history, were, so to speak, native to the American experience:

The most plausible explanation, so far, for the increasing avoidance of interracial marriage in the British colonies has been the need of agriculturalists and tradesmen for wives 'who know the ways of European housekeeping and husbandry'; whereas traders, both French and British could afford to marry Indian women.²³

Moller's own important contribution to the debate was his thesis regarding the influence of the White women on racial attitudes. Usually, the emphasis was on sexual insecurity in the White male as a major reason for his aggressive response to any suggestion of interaction between a Black man and a White woman. Moller, on the other hand, argues that it was to some extent the sexual insecurity of the White woman combined with fears of unknown worlds of interracial sexuality, which sharpened racial repugnance among certain sections of White colonists in North America. He also argued that women as a rule refrain from matrimonial and social relations with men of a lower social class or stratum than their own—female hypogamy. The majority of women persist in this attitude even if the price is life as an old maid and complete celibacy. Significant here is the tendency of women to identify themselves completely with their husbands or lovers, while men do not share this urge to any comparable degree. Hypogamy, as marriage beneath one's station, is considered with greater aversion by women than by men:

Whereas in Europe this feminine attitude prevented women from marrying beneath their social status, it worked in America against their marrying into culturally socially inferior races. Moreover, through their enhanced influence on family and community life, women became more or less unintentionally the foremost agents in the establishment of racial barriers. Thus the development of aversion to racial miscegenation in the thirteen colonies can be traced to the invasion of feminine sentiments into colonial society.²⁴

Valuable as McLeod's and Moller's contributions to theories of race relations might be, they both overemphasized White attitudes to the relations between men and women and did not pay enough attention to White attitudes to the *off-*

spring of mixed mating. It is true that disapproval of mixed marriage profoundly conditions subsequent attitudes to the children produced by mixed marriages. But that very attitude to the children is itself a changing phenomenon and has to some extent to be treated as an important additional variable in its own right.

It may be true that traders are more tolerant of mixed marriages than settled agriculturalists. It may also be true that much of the initial success of mixed marriages between Arabs and Black Africans was partly attributable to the fact that the Arabs were structurally nomadic in the sense of being engaged in trade in eastern Africa and Sudan. Yet this is not the whole story. Many Arabs settled in Zanzibar permanently, and still intermingled biologically with the Black societies among whom they had established residence.

Similarly, in Sudan, migrations of Arab tribesmen often resulted in Arab settlements, and involvement in trades and agriculture rather than commerce as such. There was a significant process of migration with whole populations settling in new areas. Fadl Hasan has even suggested that until the end of the fifteenth century the processes of Arabization and Islamization were "almost entirely accomplished by tribal migration." Inhabitants of the Sudan became Arabized and assimilated into the Arab tribal system:

... the dominance of Arabic culture suggests, among other factors, that the Arab invaders arrived in large numbers and came to exercise a considerable influence over the life of the local population. Indeed, when Bruce traveled the country of the Ja'aliyyin towards the end of the eighteenth century, he saw no distinction between the indigenous population, who were already Arabized, and the Arabs (probably meaning nomads), except that the former continued to live in mud houses beside the river bank, while the latter lived in tents.²⁵

Not all those who claimed Arab descent, or who included themselves more specifically in a particular tribal genealogy, did in fact have Arab blood flowing in their veins. The fluidity of genealogies and tribal affiliations exaggerated the degree of biological Arabization. What is clear is that the distinction which McLeod and Moller made between attitudes to miscegenation among agriculturalist settlers and such attitudes among traders was much less vindicated in the field of Afro-Arab relations than it might have been in North America.

An important differentiating characteristic is the much stronger patrilineal principle in Islam and Arab culture as contrasted with the culture of the Germanic peoples. The idea that the father determined the tribal affiliation of the descendants was the critical difference between the Afro-Arab model of ascending miscegenation and the North American tendency to regard the offspring of mixed marriages as belonging to the race of the underprivileged—that is, descending miscegenation.

BLACK SLAVES AND WHITE MASTERS

Critical in the comparative histories of our models is the attitude to the offspring of slave girls mated to their masters. In the case of the American experience, the

law in the slave states asserted that if one of the parents was a slave, the offspring would follow the status of the mother rather than the father. The American historian Herbert Aptheker adds the following: "Generally, of course, where the parents were slaves and free, the mother was a slave and the father was a White man, often a slave owner, who, thus in accordance with the law had both pleasure and profit."²⁶ In his book, *Black Reconstruction in America*, W. E. B. Du Bois refers, in parenthesis, to the consequences of that law in more vivid terms: "The law declares that the children of slaves are to follow the fortunes of their mother. Hence the practice of planters selling and bequeathing their own children."²⁷

Perhaps because they knew of this rigid prejudice against miscegenation in the Germanic section of the New World (our first model), Black Americans who went to Africa were impressed by the Afro-Arab racial continuum. In the United States, if the divide was dichotomous it was between White men and Negroes. And a person could not pass as "White" if he was mixed enough to be "Brown." In Africa, however, the division was between Arabs and Black Africans—and yet there were many Arabs who were as black as Black Africans. And so W.E.B. Du Bois could make the following observation:

Anyone who has traveled in the Sudan knows that most of the 'Arabs' he has met are dark-skinned, sometimes practically black, often have negroid features, and hair that may be almost Negro in quality. It is then obvious that in Africa the term 'Arab' . . . is often misleading. The Arabs were too nearly akin to Negroes to draw an absolute color line.²⁸

Religion again played a part. Because Islam was polygamous, it was easy to legitimize concubinage and the offspring of such a union. A Christian slave owner, on the other hand, subscribed to a religion, which permitted him the sexual services of only his single lawfully wedded wife. Concubinage, though practiced, was stigmatized as immoral and the resulting children, illegitimate. Against the background of pre-twentieth century prejudices, it was a short step from illegitimacy to exploitable orphanhood. The children of a White master were not necessarily his descendants.

Slavery helped create the mixed populations in Sudan, Zanzibar, South Africa, Latin America, as well as the United States. But there was this persistent and fundamental difference between the mating of Black slaves to White masters, and the mating of Black slaves to Arab masters. Within our first model of descending miscegenation based on experience in North America, we have already discussed the phenomenon of White masters having sexual intercourse with their slave girls, partly with a view to improving the quality of the offspring so that their own children may later be sold at a higher price. After all, lighter colored slaves often fetched a better price than very black ones.

Experience in Latin America, with special reference to Brazil, was somewhat less straightforward. It varied to some extent historically, depending partly upon the decrees of the government of the day. At certain times some families

accepted the offspring derived from the mating of slave girls to White masters into the very body of the family, to be brought up as members thereof. But there was always an important section of opinion, sometimes triumphant in the legal process, which regarded the practice of accepting mixed children as members of White families as erosive of the essential basis of the caste society. In the words of Florestan Fernandes:

The incorporation of the element of color in the legal nucleus of a great family would bring with it the formal recognition of social equality between the *White man* and the *Negro* or *mulatto*. In order to avoid this, petitions were drawn up opposing intermarriage and subordinating marital relations to endogamic standards. . . . The prohibitions did not affect sexual relations but only marital relations. Not only were the slave sex partners not elevated to the social position of the masters, but children born of these unions remained in the same condition as their mothers.²⁹

Through much of the colonial period of Brazil, the Crown disapproved of concubinage, and the Brazilian church declared itself against such practices. Yet concubinage in Brazil remained alive for a long time, and was practiced not only by masters but sometimes even by priests. Also widespread was a situation whereby children born of such unions assumed the status of their bonded mothers. For as long as slavery continued there was a strong tendency in Latin America, as in North America, toward descending miscegenation.

In this respect, the experience of South Africa was similar. A slave woman who won the favor of her master in bed, and produced fair-skinned children, could indeed quite often improve her own status and the status of her children. But this would be an improvement within the slave system, being relieved of some chores, enjoying extra privileges, and perhaps even having supervisory power over other slaves. The children also perhaps were better fed than the children produced of unions of slave with slave. But the persistent pattern in South Africa, as elsewhere in the world of White slave-ownership, was to regard the children of slave girls as being themselves slaves, regardless of whether the father was free or not. Descending miscegenation continued to be the rule in conditions of slave-ownership. As van den Berghe put it in relation to South Africa's experience:

The close symbiosis of masters and slaves, and the total subordination of the female slave to her male owners made for extensive intermixture. Other incentives accelerated the process. Through miscegenation the female slave could improve her condition and the status of her children. The White Master, on his side, had, apart from sexual gratification, an economic interest in increasing and 'improving' his human stock by producing highly priced mulatto slaves.³⁰

Later on, when slavery was abolished, the idea of colored people in South Africa being a group apart both from Whites and Blacks began to consolidate itself. Divergent miscegenation became the new pattern. But in the background was

the whole experience of regarding children born of a union between a master and a slave girl as being themselves slaves.

BLACK SLAVES AND ARAB MASTERS

The differences between this phenomenon of slavery in the White world and in the Arab world have had important consequences for the status of the children of mixed mating. In Islam any child born to a slave girl by her master is legitimate: the legitimacy in this case confers upon the child descent from his father, including the status of a free-born and rights of inheritance; and this descent confers upon the child links with the father's tribe. In slave conditions, Islam insists on ascending miscegenation. If the father is Arab the child is Arab, regardless of whether the mother is a wife or concubine, and regardless of the nationality of the mother.

If a similar system of descent had been operative in the United States, the majority of those who are now called "Blacks" would, in fact, have belonged to the "White" community. They would have acquired this paternal descent simply because most of the children of mixed unions in the United States have issued from White fathers and Black mothers. If the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon cultures had had as sharp a principle of paternal descent as the Arabs, the population of underprivileged Black people in the United States today would have been much smaller. The bulk would have been assimilated upward into the dominant and privileged community.

In South Africa, the application of the Arab principle that the father's tribe determines the child's tribe would have tilted the balance of population as between English-speaking Whites and Afrikaans-speaking Whites, as well as affecting attitudes to gradation of color within the system as a whole:

The racial prejudice of the Whites is solely responsible for the social existence of a distinct Cape Colored group, a fact recognized by many 'moderate' Afrikaners today, and indeed by some Hertzogites as early as the twenties. Except for the concern with color of South African 'Whites' (many of whom have themselves 'Colored blood'), Afrikanerdom would be nearly twice as large as it is today, and would outnumber the English-speaking Whites by well over two-to-one. For every six White Afrikaners there are approximately five Colored Afrikaners and four English-speaking Whites. In the entire population there are four non-Whites to one White, if color is the criterion; but, if the mother tongue is taken as the criterion, there are only two non-Europeans to one European.³¹

In the Latin American model of racial mixture the application of the Arab principle of paternity would have made another kind of difference—it would have obliterated to some extent the categories of *mestizo* and *mulatto*. Given that the child follows the father in tribal or racial affiliation, the so-called White population would have become more varied in skin color; and conceivably the non-White would also have had a variety of colors. But the balance between the groups—White, Black, and Indian would have had a different basis. Variations

in color would still have been significant but the relative populations of the different groups would have been substantially changed, reducing in the process the number of those who were relatively underprivileged.

In Islam, however, the color of the offspring is certainly no reason for denying its paternity and descent, even in a situation where the mother is a fair-skinned Arab and so is the father. Reuben Levy, a Cambridge professor, draws our attention to the following hadith: "The extreme case is quoted, or invented, of a Bedouin Arab who came to the Prophet declaring that his wife had given birth to a negro child, and hinting that he wished to repudiate it. Muhammad, however, refused him permission to do so. . . ."³²

Levy also draws our attention both to the legitimacy of children born in concubinage and to the concern of the tribe as a whole in ascertaining the paternal link with the tribe:

In Islam it is sufficient for the father to acknowledge cohabitation with his wife or slave to establish the legitimacy of the child. . . . Seeing that concubinage is lawful in Islam, it is not necessary for the mother of a child to be married to its father in order for it to be declared legitimate. . . . The powers of the father over his children are very great [but] he cannot sell them into slavery . . . [Normally], indeed, the legitimacy of a boy is a matter of some concern to the father's family or tribe. . . .³³

Arab patrilinealism in Zanzibar, reinforced by Islamic prescriptions, resulted on the one hand in the cultural assimilation of the Africans into Islam, and on the other into the biological Africanization of the Arab immigrants. The local indigenous populations imbibed imported culture to a considerable extent, while the future composition of the Arab population in the island absorbed genetically important African strains.

When, in addition, the racial intermingling led to the emergence and consolidation of the Swahili language as the national language of Zanzibar, problems of differentiating Arab from non-Arab became compounded. The result was considerable ethnic fluidity. We know that social mobility is the capacity of a person to move from one class to another; but Zanzibar had in addition racial mobility in the sense of the capacity of a person or even whole subgroups to move from one racial category into another.

Before the revolution, the Arab minority in Zanzibar was described as "Sub-Saharan Africa's second largest alien oligarchic minority"—in proportional size second only to the White community of South Africa. But if the South African method of descent had been applied to Zanzibar, and the Zanzibari method of descent had been applied to South Africa, South Africa's proportion of Whites would have been greater than it is today, and Zanzibar's proportion of Arabs would have been much smaller than it was at the time of the revolution.

The substantial issue to be borne in mind is precisely the ethnic fluidity which was characteristic of Zanzibar's racial situation. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Arab population in Zanzibar increased significantly, neither because new

immigrants had arrived from the Persian Gulf, nor because the Arabs' natural rate of reproduction had suddenly taken a sharp upward turn. In 1924 the Arabs constituted 8.7 percent of the total population of Zanzibar, by 1948 the Arabs were up to 16.9 percent:

A small fraction of this increase was doubtless Arab. But the vast bulk of the increase in the Arab population had to come from within Zanzibar society, from among segments of the population which had previously opted for categories of self-description other than Arab. Between 1924 and 1931 large numbers of former non-Arabs changed their minds, as it were, about the ethnic category most suited to their own descent and decided to 'join' the Arab community.³⁴

On the coast of Kenya during the colonial period similar shifts in racial categorization took place. The Arab population of the coast of Kenya was barely 20,000 by the 1948 census. The population rose by a few thousand in the early 1950s simply because groups of Arabized coastal tribes, previously designated as non-Arabs, were at last given recognition by the British colonial authorities as Arabs. They had themselves been pressing for such recognition from the British colonial authorities, though their credentials were challenged by those who were already recognized as Arabs. The British colonial authorities, perhaps partly influenced by the bewildering fluidity of intermingling between Arabs and Africans, decided to confer the more prestigious title of Arab upon the new claimants from the coast.

The advantages which Kenya coastal Arabs enjoyed as against Kenya coastal Africans were sometimes more than just prestige. Terms of service for jobs were, during the period, categorized as EuropeanAsian, and African terms of service, in descending wage levels. The Arab sector, by its racial ambivalence, was sometimes eligible for the Asian terms of service, and sometimes not. Certain banks in Mombasa classified all Arabs as Africans, and paid them accordingly. East African Railways and Harbours also classified many Arabs as Africans and paid them accordingly. And yet in much of the civil service within Kenya, Arab civil servants were often regarded as being eligible for Asian terms of service. The pigmentational and racial ambivalence of the Arabs converted them into marginal men.

In the entertainment world there were also differentials in privileges among the groups. A symbolic differential concerned films which were given the grade of X by the censors in colonial Kenya. X-films in Kenya meant "Not to be shown to Africans and children under sixteen." The term "African" at the initial introduction of the censorship law encompassed Arabs, and so they too for a while were kept out of film shows rated X. It took a demonstration organized by a prominent Mombasa Arab, Shariff Abdulla Salim, to force the Majestic Cinema in Mombasa to admit a group of militantly defiant local Arabs. Once the breach was made at the Majestic Cinema, gradually the term X as a category of censored film excluded only Africans and children under sixteen, but accepted the Arabs.

This resulted in conferring significant powers of racial categorization on the gatekeepers and ticket-sellers at the cinemas. An African could indeed acquire the privilege of seeing an exciting sex film, or a film involving violence, if he could convince the booking-office clerk or the gatekeeper at the Regal Cinema that he was an Arab and not an African. On the other hand, a Black Arab might have to argue his way, or even bribe his way into the cinema, if the clerk insisted in regarding him as an African.

In Sudan, ethnic fluidity has also been a persistent feature of the whole process of acculturation. It is true that the initial impetus toward Arabization was given by the coming of large numbers of Arabs and Arab immigration continued in varying volume over many years. But Sudanese Arabs themselves often grossly exaggerated the numbers of Arabs who came in. Much of the population of northern Sudan is a population of Arabized Africans, rather than Arabs as such. Whole groups began to identify with particular Arab tribal names, and genealogies grew up, of varying authenticity, establishing the Arabness of the different groups:

Unfortunately we know remarkably little of the way in which Arabization was accomplished. The whole of our knowledge is derived from two different types of sources: the first, a limited number of contemporary medieval Arabic writings and the second, a large body of Sudanese genealogical traditions which in their present form were compiled at a much later date.³⁵

Fadl Hasan admits that the genealogical traditions that are at the moment current in the northern Sudan indicate a high degree of Arabization. But he warns: "However, any conclusions that are drawn from these genealogies as to tribal origin, must be accepted with some reserve."³⁶

The sheer fluidity of ethnic affiliations, and the cultural pull of the dominant identity, have resulted in a high degree of integration in northern Sudan. Denominational differences in religion assumed a greater political significance in Sudan than the racial categories of the northern population. Disputes as to whether such and such a family is really Arab by descent or not, and evaluations of family prestige partly in terms of lighter shades of color, have all remained an important part of the texture of Sudanese life in the north. Prejudices based on color have by no means disappeared. There are Black Arabs, deeply black, whose credentials are fully respected in relation to their Arab genealogies. There are others who may be a shade lighter, and yet have their Arab credentials disputed by at least some families. The political sociology of shades of color remains a part of the Sudanese scene; but the phenomena of intermarriage and miscegenation on the basis of patrilineal descent have resulted in a more integrated model of racial mixture than that afforded by either the North American, the Latin American, or the South African experience.

ARAB ARROGANCE AND WHITE APARTHEID

The gradual conversion of Sudan today to Arabism and its culture is in part a repetition of what went on in Egypt earlier. The Sudanese process appears noticeable partly because the majority of Arabs in the world are fairer than Black Africans. What is often overlooked is that Egypt was conquered by the Arabs from the deserts of the Peninsula who were darker than the Egyptians they subjected. The Arabs from the Peninsula were also darker than the Syrians whom they converted to Islam in that first wave of conquest. The Fertile Crescent and Egypt, partly because of their diplomatic prominence over the centuries, began to be identified with the leadership of the Arab world. Because their inhabitants were fair, it was assumed that the very origins of Arabness implied light Mediterranean skin. If the Sudanese Arabs are dark, so are many of the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina. They may not be as dark as the Sudanese, though some of them are. The Arabs of Mecca and Medina are a blend of Asia and Africa, while the Lebanese and Syrians, for example, are a blend of Europe and Asia.

In their expansionism the Arabs have insisted on asymmetry both in culture and in miscegenation. This is the essence of Arab arrogance. It is certainly true also with regard to the Arab impact on Sudan. Arabic is a conquering language, sometimes absorbing a little of the local languages, but in its very pride tending toward ultimate triumph. Patrilinealism, as we shall indicate, operates in terms of permitting and even encouraging Arab men to marry women from other communities, but forbidding or discouraging Arab women from similar unions.

The example of Zanzibar, on the other hand, is distinct. The Arabs in Zanzibar stood for asymmetrical miscegenation, but they also stood for symmetrical acculturation. The Arabic language was not an irresistible conqueror, flattening out local linguistic opponents. On the contrary, many Arabs of Zanzibar actually ceased to be Arabic speakers, and became instead native speakers of Swahili, a basically Bantu language. The Arabs of Zanzibar had allowed themselves to become less "Arab" than the Egyptians and Sudanese had done—and yet at the time of the revolution, the Zanzibar Arabs were regarded as less native to their part of Africa than northern Sudanese were to theirs.

The passionate hatred of the Arabs at the time of the revolution within Zanzibar was, in some ways, one of the most remarkable anomalies in contemporary African history. There seems to have been more passionate hatred of the Arabs in Zanzibar than there was hatred of the White man in Tanganyika. It is true that there were differences in situations. Some of the worst brutalities committed by White people against local Tanganyikans were committed by the Germans, before the British assumed control after the World War I. The British, the new rulers, were also exclusive in their social habits, but they were not as arrogant or as cruel as the Germans in Tanganyika. Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that the British were a small minority of people, conferring privileges on local Indians and local Europeans, exercising considerable hegemony over Africans, and clearly demanding separate treatment.

The Arab oligarchy in Zanzibar, on the other hand, mixed socially with the Africans, called many Africans uncle or cousin, shared the same religion with them, prayed shoulder to shoulder in mosques, appreciated the same jokes, and sometimes frequented the same brothels. Yet, by 1958, it was already clear that a deep anti-Arab animosity had consolidated itself in large sectors of the African population in Zanzibar. When race riots erupted in 1961, there was no doubt that all the years of mixed marriages and reciprocal acculturation had not resulted in minimizing hostility.

The question which arises is whether that hostility may have been partly due to the very interpenetration that had taken place between the groups. Had the British, by keeping themselves completely apart, averted in the short run those depths of feeling? It is true that in Kenya there was sufficient anti-British hostility to erupt into a Mau Mau insurrection, but again was it significant that the Mau Mau movement took place among the Kikuyu, the most acculturated of Kenya's peoples at that time, partly because of their very nearness to the British authorities? Elsewhere in Kenya there was resentment of the White man, but nothing of the depth manifested against the Arabs on that tragic island of Zanzibar in January 1964. The problem that this raises is whether tension and hostility increases rather than diminishes when the dominant group narrows the cultural gap between itself and the underprivileged group.

According to this thesis, the Arabs of Zanzibar expedited their vulnerability to African challenge as they themselves became more culturally African. Were the Arabs not arrogant enough? The adoption of the Swahili language as the dominant language of Zanzibar, and the decline of Arabic, except in a section of the Arab population, was, in some ways, an establishment of cultural parity between Arabian culture and the Bantu linguistic cultures. But did this bring the revolution nearer? Are there occasions when economic imbalance is indeed stabilized precisely by cultural compartmentalization? Where a dominant group looks and speaks differently, and displays a very different way of life, it may perhaps have to face less of a challenge than if it mixes more fully with the population and reduces the social and cultural distance. In the latter situation where the cultural differences are fading, the economic imbalance becomes more conspicuous. By becoming almost the only residual difference between the privileged and the underprivileged, the economic disparity becomes the more exposed.

It might, therefore, be said that those who worked out the philosophy of apartheid were basing their experiment, at least in the short run, on sound sociological grounds. If the economic imbalance between the Whites and the non-Whites was to be stabilized for a while, it made sense to attempt to keep the cultures apart. Yet such stability can only be a short-term achievement. It is true that Zanzibar remains a tragic case of biocultural assimilation. The population was becoming a relatively homogeneous Swahili-speaking people, sharing the same religion as well as the same language. It may also be true that the situation became revolutionary precisely because an economic imbalance based largely on land-ownership persisted in spite of cultural homogenization.

However, the tragedy of Zanzibar may have been the tragedy of a premature racial revolution. Sudan may remain unsure as to whether it is part of the Arab world or Black Africa, but independent Zanzibar could not have sustained its Arab identity for much longer. The mixture of the population internally, the retreat of the Arabic language, the emergence of a Swahili culture, and the links which this forged between the island and the Black East African mainland, were almost bound to accelerate the de-Arabization of Zanzibar. Indeed, the anti-colonial movement itself had already divided the Arab community between those who continued to take pride in their Arab descent and those who were emphasizing their Zanzibari identity. By the year of independence it was the latter who were winning. Independent Zanzibar would have been the most culturally integrated of all countries south of the Sahara, with the possible exception of Swaziland, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia. Just as many Africans in colonial Zanzibar had found it expedient to claim Arab descent, so many Arabs after independence would have found it expedient to emphasize their African descent.

It should not be forgotten that the “minority” government which was overthrown in January 1964 had obtained 46 percent of the popular vote only a few months earlier—by no means a “small” minority. In an election seven years before that (in 1957), the school of thought represented by this minority government—“ours is Zanzibar nationalism”—won less than a quarter of this support. In other words, support for this concept of the Zanzibar nation was growing rather than diminishing when the revolution took place. But these trends were never tested under conditions of independence since the Zanzibar revolution took place within less than four weeks of the attainment of independence.

But what if Arabism had remained strong in Zanzibar in spite of independence? In such a case the long-term solution would have had to lie in the ascending nature of Afro-Arab miscegenation. Let us assume that the Arabs had remained dominant, had continued to intermarry, and had still recognized all children with Arab fathers as Arabs. In such circumstances, and given no sharp differences in fertility between Arabs and Africans, the proportion of local Arabs to local Africans could have continued to increase. It had certainly been increasing for the previous three generations, both because of ascending miscegenation and because the racial composition of Zanzibar was fluid enough to make it possible for some unmixed Africans to claim Arab descent.

It is precisely this principle of ascending miscegenation that makes a fundamental difference between prospects for racial mixture in Sudan today as against such prospects in southern Africa. Claims that Sudan and southern Africa afford examples of similar racial situations are at best naive, or more likely propagandist. The Portuguese territories in southern Africa are an imperfect illustration of the ambivalent miscegenation of Brazil, but with greater discouragement of mixed unions than is now characteristic of Brazil.³⁷

Rhodesia, now called Zimbabwe, with its Anglo-Saxon background, started with descending miscegenation. The population of Euro-Africans had been increasing. They were the offspring of European fathers and African mothers. In

the villages they were accepted in the communal way of life and brought up according to the custom and language of the mother. But the disintegration of village life, and the drift toward the cities, had brought to the surface the problem of these racially mixed people. While fellow Africans in the villages had readily assimilated the "half-castes," the Africans in the cities had shown greater distrust of these lighter-colored members of the lumpen proletariat.

The Euro-African has also had problems with European employers. As one observer put it some years ago: "He goes to a prospective employer, but owing to his light skin the White man expects him to know English (as all 'Coloreds' do) and generally be more sophisticated than an African straight from the kraal, which is all he feels himself to be." He is again rejected.³⁸ But how many Euro-Africans are there in Rhodesia? The exact numbers are as obscure as they were when the following observation was made: "... the total Euro-Africans in the Native Reserves can scarcely be less than 10,000; it might be even ten times that number. Nobody knows. But it is growing faster than ever."³⁹

But even at that stage the situation showed signs of future transformation from descending miscegenation (as in North America) to divergent miscegenation (of the South African "Colored" Model). Euro-Africans in Salisbury had begun to appeal to the government for recognition as a distinct community, for compulsory registration as such, and for rights of compulsory education.⁴⁰

Since its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the chances have increased for Rhodesia to drift toward the South African system of apartheid, complete with divergent miscegenation. Ian Smith's own views about Africans displayed early symptoms of sexual repugnance and racial stereotyping. He told 200 journalists at a news conference in London on the eve of U. D. I. that he had regular confidential reports of the "sordid happenings" in some countries in Africa with Black governments. In some places, Mr. Smith asserted, European parents dared not let their daughters go to school without escorts. "This is the kind of conduct which Rhodesia is resisting!"

When asked if Africans in Rhodesia should be denied universal franchise because one minister in a Black African state had tried to seduce a stenographer, Mr. Smith retorted angrily: "It was not a case of seduction. It was attempted rape. How would you feel if that had happened to your wife or daughter?"⁴¹ It seems doubtful that Rhodesia will succeed in working out an apartheid system, which will go to the extent of creating Bantustans. What is more likely is that Rhodesia is evolving a system intermediate between the old American model of descending racial mixture and the current South African model of more rigid compartmentalization.

This contrasts sharply with the problem of southern Sudan. The war in the south flared up precisely because the Khartoum Government was opposed to the idea of maintaining the south as a separate Bantustan. For as long as the south was kept separate, and assumed that it would remain separate, tension was minimized. But the very attainment of independence in Sudan created fears among southerners that they would no longer be left alone, and subsequent policies of deliberate cultural assimilation increased those anxieties. Again, precisely be-

cause Sudan does not practice apartheid, the danger of tensions between groups is coming sooner. Converting the south into a Bantustan, as the missionaries had done, delayed for quite a while the outbreak of hostility, though memories of prior interaction and slave-raiding remained vivid. As the Sudanese now intermarry, and as Arabic acculturation gathers momentum, the price, which will be paid, will be in terms of increased social tension, at least for a while.

It is unlikely that asymmetrical miscegenation in Sudan will ever come to an end. The Sudanese, as well as Black Africans like the Dinka, are too patrilineal to evolve a system where both men and women may marry as they wish across racial boundaries without incurring certain social reservations. But the system of ascending miscegenation guarantees a form of upward mobility which has no equivalent in any other type of racial mixture.

Symmetry in acculturation is more feasible in Sudan than elsewhere in the Arab world, and has, to some extent, already taken place. The recency of cultural contact has produced varieties of Arabic in Sudan which bear the strong imprint of non-Arabic African languages. The cultural symmetry in the Sudan is not quite of the level attained in Zanzibar or Persia where the local subjugated group profoundly influenced the conqueror culturally, as well as permitted itself to be influenced thereby. Nevertheless, the degree of reciprocity in the Sudan is greater than farther down the Nile, or elsewhere in the Arab world now that Zanzibar is no longer part of it.

The most stable of all interactions is, however, a combination of cultural symmetry and economic balance. Where the groups learn from each other as well as teach each other, without creating a society of vast disproportion in economic advantages, the prospects for a stable society are good.

The emergence of socialist ideas in Sudan may reinforce the leveling tendencies of race mixture. The Sudanese Communist Party is certainly the largest in independent Africa and one of the oldest south of the Mediterranean African countries. The party's political fortunes have varied from regime to regime, but it has played a part in disseminating more moderate socialist values to other groups in the Sudan which are less explicitly Marxist.

The triumph of an egalitarian ethic seems likely in Sudan in the long run. Northern Sudanese intellectuals are disproportionately left of center, however anticommunist some of them may be. If the country survives intact, the Sudan may be the first modern nation in Africa to have creatively used a combination of socialism and sex for national integration. It remains to be seen whether the polygamous origins of both Arab and African cultures of Sudan would add an additional relevant ingredient to that exciting political chemistry.

CONCLUSION

In our attempt to demonstrate the relevance of kinship culture to world order problems, we have examined in this chapter the political sociology of patterns of matrimony and descent across racial boundaries. Afro-Arab relations were used

as a foil to Afro-European relations in exploring this domain of human experience.

We sought to demonstrate that strict monogamous attitudes correlated with other forms of intolerance. Those who are sexually puritanical tend also to be contemptuous of cultures that are more promiscuous. A Germanic White man may tolerate an individual member of his own society who is sexually lax—but would find it difficult to respect a foreign culture he suspects of honoring permissiveness. Strict monogamous puritanism tends to correlate with racial intolerance, including a disapproval of racial mixture at-large.

Indigenous Black African cultures are on the whole polygamous. Attitudes to those cultures among early Christian missionaries were strongly conditioned by a sexual premise. Civilizations that were polygamous were, *ipso facto*, “primitive.” Christianity in Africa was therefore more culturally arrogant in its attitude to native custom than Islam had been. But the real importance of interracial mating from a sociological point of view is less in the sexual divide and more in the ranking of the children. It is because of this that we categorized miscegenation as ascending, descending, ambivalent, and divergent.

The beginnings of social treatment must lie in social diagnosis. Man must understand himself before he can attempt to cure himself. The issue of racial gradation is a fundamental world order problem. An understanding of the kinship cultures involved in that gradation must therefore be deemed to be a precondition of success in man’s most formidable task—autotherapy in the political domain.

From our analysis, ascending miscegenation has emerged as a particularly promising approach to the long-term difficulties of racial cleavage. But even this approach—though still better than the other three—falls far short of equity and parity of esteem between races. The very qualification, “ascending,” signifies a hierarchy of relationships. But whatever solution may emerge in an ideal federation of cultures on this issue of sexual compromise, the federal pool of values in such a federation would do well to borrow more from the experience of ascending cultures than from the other systems of cultural constraints on sexual behavior.

What ought to be maintained is the quest for symmetry in biocultural assimilation for the sake of both equality between races and parity between the sexes in the years ahead.

NOTES

1. In this chapter, we shall limit ourselves to polygyny, but we prefer the word “polygamy” because of its more general familiarity.

2. *The Colonial Reckoning* (Collins Fontana Library, 1963), pp. 64–65. Consult also Ali. A. Mazrui, “Political Sex,” *Transition*, No. 17, 1964.

3. *The Missionary Factor in East Africa*, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, 1965), p. 64.

4. *East African Christian* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 104–105; 114–115.

5. "Some Aspects of the Spread of Islam in the Nuba Mountains (Kordofan Province, Republic of the Sudan)," in I. M. Lewis, (ed.), *Islam in Tropical Africa* (London: International African Institute, 1966), p. 209.

6. Consult, for example, H. Bamford-Parkes, *Gods and Men: The Origins of Western Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), Section 3; William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), especially Chapter VI.

7. In this chapter we use the word "miscegenation" in the full realization that its origins are racialistic. The whole concept implied by it is based on a disapproval of racial mixture. Our own use of it is, in spite of the origins of the word, intended to be value-free. By miscegenation we mean mating between different races, in or out of wedlock, resulting in children of mixed parentage.

8. *Casa Grande E. Senzala*, 9th ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1958), pp. 12–13. Cited by Jose Monorio Rodrigues, *Brazil and Africa*, in Richard A. Mazzara and Sam Hileman, (trans.), (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 55.

9. For quite a while, the United States Supreme Court had avoided a direct ruling on the constitutionality of laws that forbade mixed marriage. But those laws began to disappear in the 1960s in spite of the Supreme Court's inhibition. Enough changes were emerging from the political scene to make reforms in this direction inevitable. For a useful background article see Arthur Krock, "Miscegenation Debate," *The New York Times* (Review of the Week), September 8, 1963. See also the article by Charlotte G. Moulton, published in *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), November 11, 1964.

10. This distinction between race prejudice based on color, and race prejudice based on purity of blood, is also discussed in Mazrui, "Political Sex," *Transition*. The article is reprinted as Chapter 15 in Mazrui, *Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tension in Africa* (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 306–318.

11. See Rodrigues, *Brazil and Africa*, p. 64.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

13. *Ibid.* Consult also Donald Pierson, *Broncos e Protos ma Bahia* (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1945), pp. 186, 188–189.

14. See Pierre Van den Berghe, *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 39–40.

15. Muddathir Abdel Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 4–5. See also the Republic of the Sudan, Ministry for Social Welfare, *First Population Census of the Sudan: Twenty-One Facts about the Sudanese* (1958), pp. 13, 23.

16. This point is discussed in similar terms in Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (London and Chicago: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 113. See also Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The Arabs and the Sudan: From the Seventh to the Early Sixteenth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967), especially chapter 5, pp. 135–176.

17. *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (London, 1888) reprinted in the African Heritage Books, George Shepperson and Christopher Fyfe, (eds.), (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967), pp. 24–25.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

19. Dean Stanley, *Eastern Church*, p. 34. Cited by Blyden, *ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

20. William C. McLeod, *The American Indian Frontier* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1928), pp. 359–361.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. Herbert Moller, "Sex Composition and Correlated Culture Patterns of Colonial America," *The William and Mary College Quarterly*, Vol. II (April 1945), pp. 131–133; 136–137.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

25. Hasan, *The Arabs and the Sudan*, p. 175.

26. Herbert Aptheker, (ed.), *One Continual Cry: David Walker's Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World, 1829–1830* (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 41.

27. *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880* (first published 1935) (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962), p. 35.

28. Du Bois, *The World and Africa* (first published 1946) (New York: International Publishers, 1965) enlarged edition, p. 184.

29. See *Ordenacoes Filipinas*, Book 5, Titles XXIII to XXX. Cited by Rodrigues, *Brazil and Africa*, p. 61.

30. *South Africa: A Study in Conflict*, p. 41.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

32. *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 137.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 143 and 138. Consult also Asaf A. A. Fyzee, *Outlines of Muhammadan Law* (London: Oxford University Press 1964 Edition), especially chapters 2 and 5.

34. Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 73–75.

35. Hasan, *The Arabs and the Sudan*, p. 135.

36. *Ibid.*

37. For a general historical background see C. R. Boxer, *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). See also Rodrigues, "Influence of Africa on Brazil," *Journal of African History*, Vol. III, No. 1 (1962); Institute of Race Relations, *Angola: A Symposium* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

38. See *Manchester Guardian*, April 28, 1956.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Africa Digest*, Vol. III, No. 8 (May–June, 1956), pp. 38–39.

41. *East Africa and Rhodesia* (London, October 14, 1965), p. 95. Disapproval of mixed marriages in Rhodesia is even stronger than disapproval of casual mating between the races. A distinguished United Nations official was once denied a job at the University College in Salisbury because he had a White wife. The man was himself a Black Rhodesian.

Chapter 2.3

Suttee and Levirate in Black-Brown Relations

In August 1972 General Idi Amin Dada, President of Uganda, staggered the world with a series of measures designed to remove or drastically reduce the Asian presence in Uganda. The term “Asian” in this context referred to people who came from the Indian sub-continent as a whole, from Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well as from the Indian Republic. What was involved was the ethnic or racial identity of a relatively prosperous minority group in Africa.

Both kinship culture and economic culture are involved in the issue of the Indian presence in Africa as a whole. There are significant Indian communities in southern Africa and central Africa as well as eastern Africa. The Ugandan experience dramatized an issue, which was bigger than Uganda itself, and more widespread than might have been realized.

In international affairs, Asians and Africans have had moments of solidarity. Milton Obote, the former President of Uganda, has described the late Jawaharlal Nehru as “the founder of nonalignment”; and nonalignment has formed the cornerstone of the foreign policies of most African states. A number of African leaders have been influenced by both Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana and himself a major figure in African history, said: “We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember in tribute to him that it was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-cooperation was first practiced.”¹

There is no doubt that Africa was partly apprenticed to India in the arts of nationalist agitation before independence and the arts of diplomacy afterwards. The Black and the Brown men formed an alliance to fight the arrogance of the White man. And yet why could they not live together themselves? How symptomatic of a deeper global malaise was the behavior of that African soldier in Uganda in 1972 against an Asian minority in his country?

We shall address ourselves in this chapter to aspects of kinship culture insofar as they conditioned the dynamics of Indo-African relations in that particular East African society. We shall later also examine economic culture and differences in performance between Africans and Asians. But first, a brief word about the historical background of the Asian presence in East Africa.

Asians became significant in mainland East Africa in the eighteenth century, but their influence was limited to the coastal areas until the end of the nineteenth century. Their numbers and impact on the East African economy were consolidated more slowly. They did indeed help in building the railway line from Mombasa to the lake in the interior, but contrary to popular belief, the bulk of the Indians are not descended from those railway builders. On the contrary, a sizeable section of those who helped build the railway returned to India, and much larger numbers of immigrants who had nothing to do with the railway line settled in East Africa over the years.

In Uganda, as in Kenya, measures were taken by the colonial authorities to keep the Asian immigrants off the land and encourage them to enter the commercial world, the liberal professions, and the clerical, managerial, and administrative areas of specialization. They became successful—perhaps too successful for their own safety in the long run. Certainly not long after independence, measures were being considered by the new African government of Uganda to reduce the Asian factor in the national economy.

It soon became clear that three distinct elements were involved in this entire endeavor. First, there was the deep race consciousness which had been building up for half a century, and which emphasized people's awareness of each other's color of skin; second, the fragile but growing territorial nationalism attached to the new states of Kenya and Uganda; and third, a genuine desire to create an effective African entrepreneurial culture and a successful African business class.

The race consciousness made Asians vulnerable, whether or not they adopted local citizenship. The territorial nationalism exposed Black Africans from neighboring countries working in Uganda, while at the same time protecting those Asians who had adopted citizenship. In other words, when Ugandans adopt policies based on territorial nationalism, Rwandese, Kenyans, and Tanzanians, however black they may be, are more exposed than Asians who have adopted local citizenship. This was certainly the case in the last eighteen months of Obote's rule, when his new labor policies resulted in a large exodus of Black Kenyans, many of whom had lived and worked in Uganda for many years. President Obote seemed to be embarking on policies similar to those that had been adopted by Busia when he was Prime Minister of Ghana. Busia in 1969 and 1970 initiated a series of measures that resulted in the expulsion of thousands of Nigerians and other non-Ghanaian West Africans, who trekked forth, uprooted from their normal areas of residence, often impoverished in the very act of removing themselves from Ghana. Similarly, in Uganda under Obote, cooks, porters, and houseboys, large numbers of whom were from Kisumu and surrounding areas in Kenya, were forced out of the country, while the future of Asians who were citizens remained secure for the time being.

The third factor in this entire Asian question is the ambition to create a local entrepreneurial system. Independence had brought very effective African participation in government, administration, university life, managerial work, clerical professions, law and, increasingly, medicine and other professions. But African participation in the higher reaches of the commercial life of the country was still modest. Again Obote's government, partly following Kenya's lead, initiated a series of measures to promote the Africanization of commerce in Uganda, ranging from special loans to enable Africans to enter the commercial world, to a request by the Uganda government to Makerere University that a School of Business be established as quickly as possible. In 1969 the Trade Licensing Act and a new Immigration Act were passed under Obote's government, both of which were designed to contain and circumscribe the Asian presence in business, and to promote more rigorously an effective African entry into this area of national endeavor. In short, General Amin's measures to expel Asian citizens of Britain, Pakistan, and Bangladesh within 90 days from August 9th, 1972, was an acceleration of the policies of his predecessor Milton Obote, and a dramatization of somewhat similar policies in Kenya and Zambia.

Lesser political figures in East Africa since independence have certainly expressed strong opinions about Asians, both as to their relative social exclusiveness and their relative economic prosperity. But the top man in each of the three countries of East Africa had, on the whole, refrained from direct denunciation of the Asian community. In some cases, the top man had even gone as far as to counter the wave of racism inherent elsewhere, in an attempt to guard the interests of the immigrant communities. But General Amin opted for a policy of confrontation with the Asian question, sometimes laying even greater stress on problems of social exclusiveness than on problems of economic preeminence.

Within the issue of racial exclusiveness lies no less a subject than sex itself. The eternal worry concerning sex across racial boundaries received presidential articulation in the first year of Uganda's Second Republic. Asians were accused of being excessively concerned about the purity of their blood, inclined to protect their sons and more militantly their daughters from sexual or matrimonial attentions across the racial divide. The number of Uganda Asians who had ever married Africans was somehow discovered. It was pitifully below a dozen, and the majority of those preferred to live abroad for as long as possible. President Amin also received personal communications from other Indo-African lovers under a cloud of persecution from the Indian side of the racial divide.

A number of questions arose out of the debate concerning the endogamous tendencies of the Indian community in Uganda and the response of Africans toward it. From an academic point of view we could even ask whether the real issue was Freudian or Marxian. Was the debate concerning the place of sex in racial integration, a manifestation of class struggle in Uganda, however disguised, or was it a manifestation of primeval forces concerning identity and sex? If the ultimate issue lays in the economic prosperity of Asians and their dominance in the exchange and commercial sectors of the economy, then it is Karl Marx rather than Sigmund Freud to whom we should turn for guidance. But if the sex-

ual issue has had an independent political significance in its own right, then we must look further than the Indian *duka* for a clarification of the deeper issues. For our purposes here, Freud poses issues of kinship culture; Marx poses questions of economic culture.

A major premise of this chapter is that sex is a distinctive variable in its own right in race relations. As we have already tried to show, sex is not merely a disguised rationalization of class struggle and economic motivation. This is partly because sex, with all its taboos and prescriptions, remains central to many of the mores and values of the different cultures of the world. If race relations are not merely a matter of economic relations but are also a matter of cultural differences, then sex cannot be divorced from racial tensions. Much of culture is derived from the mores acquired in family life, and the central aspect of family life is indeed sex, and the values governing it.

In approaching the question of sex and Indophobia in East Africa, we must therefore first take a broader social and philosophical view. We should indeed place General Idi Amin in a broad context that touches other continents, and involves culture and literature as well as politics. We shall then return to focus more explicitly on the East African scene.

SUTTEE VERSUS LEVIRATE

In the year 1829, the British in India banned the practice of suttee, the cremation of the wife on her husband's funeral pyre. Across the Indian Ocean within the continent of Africa an alternative practice, in some ways fundamentally different, continued to hold sway. This was the custom of levirate, in which a wife was inherited by her husband's brother upon the death of her husband. It is a basic premise of this chapter that the difference between suttee and levirate is to some extent at the heart of the debate on sex and Indophobia in Uganda in the 1970s.

The records would seem to show that suttee began in the fourth century B.C. as an *ad hoc* sacrifice undertaken by a disconsolate widow who could not bear the thought of being left behind by her husband. The word indicated a kind of virtuous renunciation by the woman. By the sixth century C.E. suttee had received religious approval in Hinduism. The woman attained sainthood by burning herself with the corpse of her husband. She also helped to cleanse her own family and the family of her husband of evil.

Suttee became absorbed into the general mores governing the Indian caste system as a whole. The preservation of the purity of caste became a central aspect of Hindu social organization. The higher the caste the stricter were the rules governing the chastity of women. Child marriage developed as part of this quest for the preservation of caste and the protection of chastity. But what if the husband of the child died? Remarriage of the widow rapidly became untenable, even if the widow was an infant. The extreme method of avoiding this acquisition of a new husband was precisely the burning of the widow—suttee.

In theory, the practice was a voluntary expression of devotion by the widow to her husband—the husband having been, in orthodox Hinduism, a god to his wife. She was now going to join her husband partly because it was through her sins that he had died at all. But in reality by the beginning of the nineteenth century, suttee was no longer a voluntary exercise. Relatives of the widow—or of her late husband—exerted considerable pressure on the woman to burn herself on the funeral pyre. The Brahmins in the Ganges Valley, especially Bengal, led the way numerically in this custom. The British recorded several hundred burnings every year up to the year 1828. The practice was also extensive among the Rajputs, particularly in Rajasthan, and also in the Punjab. In South India it had been largely suppressed by Muslim rulers before the British took control.

From the point of view of our analysis, the significance of suttee lies simply in the fact that it was an extreme form of a custom that is still deeply embedded in Indian psychology—that a wife was not inherited, that a widow could not remarry.

The impact of British and of Western culture generally has tended to modify this strong aversion toward female remarriage. But basically the underlying value-pattern that tied the woman so closely to the man she married has proved to be a resilient aspect of Indian culture,² even among those people of Indian origin who have been converted to Islam.

In contrast to this rigid discouragement of female remarriage in Hindu custom, especially among the upper castes, is the widespread custom of levirate in Africa. In many societies a widow is indeed inherited by the brother of the deceased. But what if the deceased has no brother? Professor John S. Mbiti reminds us that such a situation is unlikely:

By brother it should be understood to mean not only the son of one's mother but any other close relative. We pointed out earlier on that a person has literally 'hundreds' of brothers, due to the extensive kinship system found in most African societies. The brother, who inherits the wife and children of his deceased relative, performs all the duties of the husband and father. The children born after this inheritance generally belong to the deceased man, though in some societies they are the children of the 'new' father.³

Mbiti tells us that in some societies in Africa if a son dies before he has been married, the parents arrange for him to get married in absentia, so that the dead man is not cut off "from the chain of life." Leaving children behind is the path to immortality, and procreation by proxy is feasible in some societies.

All these factors concern a situation where a young man has already died. But occasionally one finds traces of anticipatory levirate, whereby a husband permits his younger brother limited sexual privileges with his wife, simply in view of the fact that the younger brother might well inherit her eventually.

Although suttee was unique to India, the levirate has by no means been unique to Africa. The idea of widows being inherited by a brother or other close male relative is discernible in societies outside the African continent. The levi-

rate marriage is still strong in Africa but it is being slowly undermined by Euro-Christian influences.

LEADERSHIP AND LEVIRATE

Although the levirate is mentioned in the Bible as part of the culture of the ancient Hebrews, its attraction in Africa is being eroded by the impact of Christianity. Western religion has gradually undermined certain areas of African sexual spontaneity. If we took Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam as three distinct religious intrusions into Africa, we might say that Islam interfered least and Catholicism most with the sexual aspects of the African cultural universe. In between Islam and Catholicism lay the different schools of Protestantism.

These factors impinged on the lives of individual African leaders. The meeting point among matrimony, sex and politics was influenced by the religious denomination of Africans in positions of authority after independence. And some of the influences at play antedated independence by several decades, going back to formative periods in the lives of these leaders. An interesting example in this regard is Kwame Nkrumah and his early sexual inhibitions.

In his autobiography, Nkrumah refers to the terror he had of women in his younger days. He talks about a young girl who was apparently in love with him, and who used to wait for hours in a lane near his home. Whenever she tried to start a conversation with him as he passed her in the lane, he would look at her like a frightened animal. One day the girl gathered up enough courage to whisper into his ear "I love you." Nkrumah's religious sensibilities were horrified. He ran into his mother's house and complained about the wickedness of the girl. Nkrumah's mother laughed and said: "You should be flattered, my boy, what is wrong with somebody being fond of you?"

Nkrumah's mother herself later became subject to the levirate customs of the tribe. Nkrumah's father died while the boy was still at school. Those traditions that had once governed the marriage customs of the Hebrews were still operative among the Nzima. As Nkrumah himself delicately, and perhaps euphemistically tells us: "According to our custom, when a man dies, his wife and children become the responsibility of his successor and they automatically move to the house of the deceased man's next of kin. And so my mother left Half Assini and went to live with my uncle at the mouth of the Ankrobra River."⁴ But although Nkrumah was a child of a levirate culture, the Roman Catholic Church had begun to blunt his own sexual spontaneity. Curiously enough, his first sexual test outside his country was encouraged by an Indian. It is often assumed that Indians are more sexually inhibited than Africans, and this may be the case in general. But the generalization does not hold with regard to that day in the 1930s when Nkrumah was venturing out of West Africa for the first time on his way to the United States. On board the ship he struck up a friendship with an Indian passenger. At the Canary Islands the Indian invited Nkrumah to accompany him ashore, and see the sights of Las Palmas, the capital. He accepted the invitation and they ventured forth into the town. Nkrumah knew nothing of life outside his

native country, so he followed him in all innocence into a building which looked like a hotel. Nkrumah and his friend sat at a table. Nkrumah himself had never drunk alcohol, but his Indian friend insisted on ordering beer. The beer arrived, followed soon after by "two elegant Spanish girls in negligées." Nkrumah was at once morally horrified and psychologically terrified. He kept his eyes glued to the legs of the table.

He prayed to the Virgin Mary that these two specimens of womanhood should vanish as quickly as they had come:

But to my utter horror and embarrassment one of them came over, planted herself on my knee and began stroking my hair and generally enveloping me with her limbs. I had only seen White women from a distance and the fact that one of them should approach me at such uncomfortably close quarters completely unnerved me. I uttered a cry, jumped up, spilling both the woman and the beer onto the floor and ran as fast as my trembling legs would carry me back to the ship.⁵

For the rest of the trip Nkrumah's Indian friend would not let him forget the episode. He laughed and laughed at the other's sexual naïveté. Two young people, one drawn from a levirate culture in Ghana and the other from the land of the suttee, were cast briefly in an amusing episode on the Canary Islands on their way to Liverpool. A moment of sexual mirth was the meaning of the episode to the Indian; but to the young African it was at once a moment of sexual terror and a phase in his racial maturation. The sheer availability of White women had one kind of pull on an African from colonial conditions; and yet the fear of sin was itself a consequence of imperial Christianity at a particular moment in history. In Nkrumah's own words:

Probably it was the same fear that my aspirations might be held in check by the Roman Catholic Church that made me afraid of getting myself tied up with women. In those days my fear of women was beyond all understanding. . . I have never outgrown that feeling towards women. It is not fear today, but something deeper.⁶

Nkrumah himself never seemed to have fully understood the ramifications of these inhibitions. In later life he thought it was perhaps a dread of being trapped, of having his freedom taken away, of being overpowered. And yet even these rationalizations did not seem to be fully convincing to him. The secret laid in the interaction between Christian teaching and personal psychology as they worked themselves out in the growing personality of Kwame Nkrumah at a formative period in his life.

POLLUTION VERSUS OBLIVION

What are the wider cultural and spiritual ramifications of the suttee syndrome and the levirate complex? In what way does the prohibition of female remarriage differ in its significance from the idea of inheriting wives? In the ultimate analy-

sis the distinction may lie in what differentiates fear of pollution from fear of oblivion. At the heart of Hindu cultures lies the Laws of Manu governing caste. And at the heart of the caste system lies the fear of pollution. The idea of spiritual cleanliness in Hinduism is inseparable from the physical idea of touching and not touching. An elaborate system governing food that may or may not be touched by others, utensils that may or may not be touched, and hands that may not be shaken, grew up as part of the entire apparatus of protection against pollution.

The link between this Brahminic fear of pollution on the one hand and the color black on the other seems to have matured among the Indus peoples when fair minorities met very dark majorities for the first time in urban centers. The *Brahmin*, the priests and teachers, became identified as White. The *Kshatriya*, the secular rulers and fighters, acquired the symbolic color of *red*. The *Vaishya*, the cultivators, traders, and artisans, found an identity in the symbolic color of *yellow*. But black was the color symbolically reserved for the *Sudra*, the servants, slaves, and menial workers.

There seems to be little doubt that these associations of color exerted some influence on Indian attitudes to Black Africans. The rules governing relations between colors in the Indian caste system were, in their very essence, inegalitarian. "A Brahmin White might kill a Sudra Black for the cost of a cat. The reverse offence would entail immediate as well as eternal punishment."⁷

What should be remembered is that Indian color prejudice started as a prejudice of one Indian against another, and should not therefore be confused with pure racial prejudice. To regard the black color as less attractive than fairer shades is by no means unknown among Africans themselves. Some African societies mistook the first White men to arrive in the last century for gods simply because their belief systems had already lent divine qualities to the color white in certain circumstances. In Uganda, for example, certain aspects of anti-Nilotic feeling among Bantu people are connected with the simple fact that the Nilotes tend to be significantly blacker than the average Bantu.

Color prejudice within Indian society is definitely more elaborate than prejudice among African peoples. All that we are seeking to establish here is that *varna*, or the system of symbolic colors in social relations in India, is a form of color prejudice that should not be directly equated with racial prejudice. But it has had consequences for the system of marriage in India and for patterns of descent, and leads us back to the phenomenon of suttee and the militant possessiveness it implies. The Laws of Manu have enforced breeding within each caste, and have forbidden breeding or marriage between castes. Thus, endogamy has been at the heart of the status of women in Indian society, helping to encourage child marriage and a form of purdah after marriage, and the principle of eternal widowhood upon the death of the spouse.

In reality, it is not simply the prohibition of literal suttee that has affected the situation. Processes of westernization and modernization have also helped to relax some of these Laws of Manu and their consequences. The idea of a second marriage for widows is slowly gaining acceptance, though not respectability.

But the ghost of suttee continues to exert its influence on the matrimonial and social values of Indian society.

Nor is it only the Hindus who show these inclinations. Indian Muslims are as much Indian as they are Muslims. Many of the pre-Islamic norms of Indian culture have remained resilient among Islamized Indians in spite of the passage of time. Among the more resilient are precisely norms governing family relations and attitudes to marriage.

The principle of suttee as compared with the principle of levirate emphasizes some of the differences between the system of matrimonial values that Indians brought to Africa, and the system of matrimonial values that seemed dominant among the indigenous majorities they encountered there. Suttee as a matrimonial principle is spouse-oriented. If the spouse is a wrong spouse, then the children are dishonored. The very idea of a half-caste in Kiswahili, for example, is directly borrowed from the Indians. The Indians came with the concept of *chotara*, half-caste, to denote in that instance a progeny of a racially mixed marriage. And *chotara*, when one of the parents was Indian, were basically children dishonored because a parent was disgraced. The levirate is progeny-oriented, rather than spouse-oriented. Instead of children being disgraced because the mother belonged to the wrong caste or wrong race, the levirate permits a mother to be honored because she was the mother of her husband's children. Suttee as a prohibition of female remarriage was an extreme form of monogamy. A woman once married was never to marry again, even if her husband died. The levirate, on the other hand, was a fusion of polygamy and reincarnation. A dead brother's widow could join the household of the living brother, even if the living brother already had several wives.

Both suttee and the levirate implicitly deny the Christian matrimonial principle of "Til Death Do Us Part." In both the Hindu and the indigenous African systems, death need not nullify the bonds of matrimony. In the case of suttee, continued widowhood was continued matrimonial commitment beyond the hour of death. In the case of the levirate, we have also an affirmation that marriage is a bond between the living, the dead, and those who are yet to be born. The widow passes on to the next of kin.

While both suttee and levirate imply an indissolubility, there is a fundamental difference between them. Suttee is a denial that the husband can be represented by another, least of all a close kinsman. Suttee in its distrust of incest converts levirate into a double sin. The husband is not only represented, which is bad enough, but also is represented by a brother or other close relative, which adds incest to injury. Levirate by contrast is an affirmation of the representability of a matrimonial partner. In some African societies the representability is feasible even while the husband lives, provided it has the husband's permission.

Nor must it be forgotten that African marriages are not indissoluble in either the Christian or the Hindu sense. An African marriage is indissoluble by death because neither the man nor the woman has assented to such dissolution. The bond can therefore be deemed to continue for as long as there are kinsmen to inherit the widow. But a marriage can be ended by an act of will on the part of

either partner. Certainly an act of will by the man can terminate the partnership. But in many African societies the woman also has at least the ultimate resort of walking out and going back to her parents. The divorce, if willed by the woman rather than the man, may then simply necessitate suitable compensation for the man. While African societies often deny death the power of terminating what was entered into by the living, the living themselves may readjust certain arrangements as they deem fit.

Finally, there is a fundamental distinction in the very fact that suttee is ultimately individualistic, while levirate is basically a collective bond. Suttee as a form of female commitment to the individual man she has married, focuses the bond directly between the particular woman and the particular man. Of course relatives are involved on both sides, but the matrimonial loyalty is between two individuals. Levirate, on the other hand, is a collectivization of the marriage principle in the face of death itself. Brother can represent brother, and the widow retains sexual rights, as well as economic subsistence rights, within the family.

Behind it all there continues to be a distinction between the fear of pollution and the fear of oblivion. The fear of pollution generates complexes regarding endogamy, and stiffens into possessiveness about women, and distrust of those who are descended from a mixed mating across caste or racial boundaries.

The fear of oblivion on the other hand lies at the heart of the levirate institution. In that institution we see, as John Mbiti has reminded us:

The philosophical awareness of the individual that 'I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.' The existence of the individual is the existence of the corporate; and where the individual may physically die, this does *not* relinquish his social-legal existence since the 'we' continues to exist for the 'I' . . . viewed in this light, the elaborate kinship system acts like an insurance policy covering both the physical and the metaphysical dimensions of human life.⁸

We have then both in suttee and in the levirate, principles that are connected respectively with the Hindu and the African conceptions of immortality. And for the Hindu the struggle toward perfection and immortality includes avoidance of pollution; whereas for the African that struggle includes escape from the danger of oblivion. Their respective attitudes to sex and procreation become part of an entire metaphysical system of thought. Their attitudes to mixed marriages are in turn profoundly conditioned by those metaphysically derived norms.

POWER AND TRANS-ETHNIC MARRIAGE

The norms that govern family relations are profoundly relevant for intergroup relations. It follows therefore that the norms governing marriage itself have a bearing on attitudes to other races. The premise is relevant in comparing attitudes to marriage among Indians and Africans. Indians spiritualized marriage so much, making it so inseparable from the Laws of Manu, that marriage across caste and race was bedeviled by religious considerations. The militant matrimonial possessiveness implied by suttee, with all its connotations of monogamous

extremism, at least below the Brahmin class, was also bound to reduce the toleration of racial exogamy.

By contrast, in spite of the levirate, marriage is a less sacred institution among Africans than among Indians. Even the coming of Christianity in Africa has not as yet sacralized marriage sufficiently to result in a cult of monogamy or fanatical indissolubility. Because marriage is less sacred in the attitudes of ordinary Africans, intermarriage is in turn less of an issue for them.

In the recent political history of Africa there has been a high incidence of trans-ethnic marriages, which cut across either a racial or a clear tribal boundary, among the African elite. Black-White intermarriage includes Kenyatta's marriage to Edna Clarke during World War II. Kenyatta's Cambridge-educated son, Peter, is descended from that union. Another prominent African who married across the divide between Black and White is President Léopold Senghor of Senegal. Afro-Arab or trans-Saharan marriages include the marriage of Kwame Nkrumah to Fathiyya. Nkrumah had children with this Egyptian wife. Also among Afro-Arab or Afro-Iranian marriages must be included the matrimonial experiments of Sheikh Abeid Karume, the First Vice-President of Tanzania and Chairman of The Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar.

Marriage across the tribal boundary would have to include the marriage of Milton Obote, a Langi, to Miria, a Muganda. In the Ugandan context the marriage was bound to have political connotations, implying commitment to national integration through encouragement of trans-ethnic marriages. Just as European kings had once sought to promote interstate alliances through intermarriage, so could Obote's marriage to Miria be interpreted as an attempt to promote inter-ethnic fusion through a tribally mixed marriage.

Another trans-ethnic, if fluctuating marriage, was that of Idi Amin, the man who succeeded Milton Obote as President of Uganda. Not long after his coup, Idi Amin referred to his choice of wives as a clear indication that he was not a tribalist. Though himself a Kakwa, he had one Lugbara wife, one Langi wife, one Musoga wife, and one Muganda wife. Amin explicitly supported the idea that national integration is connected with the biological mixture of tribal or racial stock. In the case of his Langi wife, Amin explained after the coup that he married her on the recommendation of his former boss, the then-President Obote. Obote was himself a Langi, and sought to consolidate his relations with Amin by recommending a Langi wife.

In Amin's choice of wives we may also have a clue to understanding his image of Asians as a group unwilling to cross the racial boundary in marriage. Both Amin and the late Chairman Karume in Zanzibar did, in their own very direct and sometimes rather simplified ways, grasped the real relevance of marriage as an institution for processes of national integration. Both sought to demonstrate that there is a link between the boudoir and the nation, between political alliance and marriage partnership, between national fraternity and literal brotherhood. Part of the explanation of Amin's views on the Indian question may lie in the political concept that influenced his own choice of wives.

Of course, relations between groups are not consolidated on the basis of a single wife. But the idea of encouraging biological intermingling as an approach to national integration has a certain core of hard-headed practical calculation within it. It is true that in history nations have grown partly through literal interpenetration of kinship.⁹

We have tried to show that the idea of relating kinship to nationhood is only an extension of the principles of tribal cohesion. A tribe is sometimes defined almost in terms of being descended from the same parents. The Baganda have derived part of their sense of shared identity out of a system of myths whose center is the principle of shared descent. Kintu becomes the grandfather of all those who claim to be real Baganda, although a large proportion of them are Baganda by assimilation rather than biological descent. In his *Facing Mount Kenya*, Kenyatta analyzes the myths surrounding Kikuyu identity, with the centrality of the man Gikuyu, the “founder of the tribe.”¹⁰

In many of these mythologies of tribal origin, problems regarding heirs, questions affecting the choice of wives, and worries concerning the fertility of the founder of the community become intertwined with the ancestry of collective identity. The principle of shared parenthood is so deeply embedded that family relations and tribal self-consciousness become almost indistinguishable.

The move from the idea that the tribe is descended from a shared father to the idea that the nation should build itself on a pattern of penetrating kinship relations is not such a big logical jump. General Amin’s concept of the politics of intermarriage, as was that of Sheikh Karume, are in a sense profoundly African. They are an attempt to deduce principles of nationhood from principles of tribalism.

SEX, SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP

In July 1962—seven years almost to the day before his assassination—Tom Mboya of Kenya had this to say to the Kenya Indian Congress: “Cocktail integration is not enough. You must be prepared to revise some of your long-established conceptions. For instance, an integrated community can lead to intermarriage between the members of that community—and why not?”¹¹

The remark, simple in its own way, started widespread discussion in colonial Kenya. Mboya himself was glad of the controversy because he believed that trans-ethnic marriages—across both tribal and racial boundaries—were destined to increase dramatically in the following twenty years of Kenya’s history. Mboya also believed that part of the problem had been precisely a deep unwillingness to discuss publicly the question of racial intermarriage derived in part from a sense of embarrassment. It is true that different groups of people were indeed different partly because of cultural variation. It was also true that such cultural variation needed to be respected as far as possible. But if people had to live together in the same country, Mboya felt, they might need to speak more openly about those aspects of culture that could bedevil relations between different groups. In Mboya’s own words:

The more people speak publicly about such matters, the better. There will be more inter-marriage during the next twenty years or so, and I welcome the prospect. We helped to break the myth that there is something wrong with the different races marrying each other, that inter-marriage leads to an extinction of values and civilized standards. The example of the West Indies should be enough to convince us that this is a false argument.¹²

Mboya felt, even at that stage, that while relations between Europeans and Africans, between White and Black, had already been subject to long-standing probing and analysis, what still remained behind a shroud of mystery and embarrassed inhibition were relations between Black and Brown. The Asians too needed to find ways of accommodating themselves to a change of conditions in the African continent. In Mboya's formulation:

The Asian community which, in Kenya, is twice the size of the European and in Uganda and Tanganyika many times the size, does not receive the same agonizing appraisal from newspapers, presumably because the newspapers are mostly European-owned and the administrations have been subject to European influence. But their need to integrate swiftly and wipe out the memory of discrimination is probably greater than among Europeans, many of whom can leave East Africa if they cannot adapt to change. The majority of Asians here have no other home.¹³

Mboya was right in his assertion that relations between Black and Brown had received far less comment than relations between Black and White; and that there was therefore a case for extra candor on the Asian question.

When General Idi Amin Dada took over power in Uganda nearly a decade later, and reopened discussion on the Asian question, he was in fact carrying the late Mboya's mission a little further. Perhaps the leadership in the debate in Uganda on the Asian question should not have been taken by the President himself, but by one of his ministers. Just as in Kenya, controversial issues were sometimes brought to the forefront by Mboya, rather than by Mzee Kenyatta himself, so a similar policy in Uganda in the Second Republic should have been followed. On matters affecting profound areas of concern for some small group of citizens, the President should have remained in the background as the court of last appeal. A President should indeed help to promote certain policies if these are deemed to be in the national interest, but groups of citizens who find themselves under attack by the President himself tend to feel deprived of the right of appeal. It would have been in Uganda's interest for the debate on the Asian question to have been initiated by one of the ministers, and for the President to have lent a sympathetic ear to the Asian response without implying disloyalty to his own minister. But Amin's entire conception of citizenship was so bound up with the Asian question that he felt driven to take active leadership.

The real tragedy of the situation concerned precisely those Asians who took the plunge and applied for Uganda citizenship in good time. World sympathies in 1972 tended to focus on those Asians who decided to "go British." Time and

again well-meaning Western liberals before 1972 have blamed the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act of Great Britain on East African racial intolerance. They have failed to see that if the British government decided to allow one class of citizens unrestricted entry to Britain and apply a quota system to another class, then the government had itself diluted the concept of citizenship with racism.

But could anyone blame those Asians who took British citizenship on the eve of East African independence? After all, the future in East Africa was very uncertain. Those Asians who opted for British citizenship were opting for an insurance policy, based on the assumption that the British passport was a surer guarantee of justice than an East African passport.

One must concede that independence for East Africa was indeed an ominous question mark. But it was a question mark that had to be confronted, for better or worse. The Asians who opted to take British citizenship had, in reality, three options at that time—they could remain in East Africa if all was well, they could migrate to England if that was more profitable, or they could ultimately return to the Indian sub-continent if the worst happened.

The British Asians, receiving such special treatment, were better off than the majority of Africans in East Africa. It is true that independence was a gamble, but there was no insurance policy for the great majority of Africans. Who gave the Baganda an insurance policy that if things went wrong under Obote's regime they could claim citizenship of either Britain or some third country? Or the Ibo against things going wrong in the First Republic of Nigeria? Or the Luo of Kenya against the hazards of 1969? Or the Langi and Acholi of Uganda against the changing fortunes of the Second Republic? In others words, there are groups in Africa who have suffered more brutal victimization since independence than the Asians have sustained. And these groups had no British High Commission to run back to, no India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan as ultimate homes of retreat.

It is because of these considerations that the tragedy of the British Asians is a lesser tragedy than that of Asians who were African citizens. The latter made up their minds to establish roots in East Africa and apply for citizenship in good time. Those were the Asians who saw that ominous question mark hanging over their heads, but decided nevertheless to risk it all with Black East Africans. Theirs was an act of faith—and it needed to be rewarded with reciprocal trust. And yet they got the backlash of the more general hostility to British Asians.

From the point of view of world order values, something can still be saved. It is important that those Asians who had opted for Ugandan or Kenyan citizenship should be classified simply as another Ugandan or Kenyan tribe. It is true that they have a disproportionate influence over commercial activity in the country, but then the Baganda have a disproportionate share of jobs in the Uganda Higher Civil Service; and northerners have a disproportionate presence in the Uganda armed forces as have the Kamba in the Kenyan armed forces and the Kikuyu in the higher ranks of the Kenya Civil Service. All these anomalies may

have to be rectified. The Baganda share in the Civil Service and in the best schools of Uganda and needs, in a humane fashion, to be made more proportional. The distribution of educational facilities in the country as a whole should become more equitable. The armed forces should become ethnically more representative both in Kenya and in Uganda. Commerce and shopkeeping should become ethnically balanced.

From the point of view of economic and political reorganization, the Asian question should be seen in the context of this accidental disproportion in the distribution of advantages among the different ethnic groups in the country. But in this case we are thinking of those Asians who are indeed citizens. The answer to such ethnic imbalances does not lie in blatant victimization. It lies in persuading citizens from other areas and other ethnic groups gradually to build up a share in these different spheres of national endeavor.

CONCLUSION

General Amin announced soon after the coup that the Uganda army was going to recruit more systematically from areas other than the north, so as to restore a balance in the ethnic composition of the security forces. General Amin's conception of the second university of Uganda, with campuses in less developed areas of the country, seemed also inspired by a desire to reduce the educational advantages enjoyed by some ethnic groups in Uganda. These two ambitions of Amin have yet to be realized, but they would be exercises in ethnic balance if they were.

The Asians should be treated as a tribe and in a similar way in each African country. There should be systematic attempts to Africanize commerce, but not in a manner that blatantly victimizes Asians. Just as educational advantages in Uganda could be distributed to communities outside Buganda more equitably without blatant injustice to the Baganda, so commercial activity could be made ethnically more representative without the risk of racialistic inequities against the Asians.

But differences in kinship culture between Asians and Africans may prove to be a more obstinate problem. Certainly the problem of inter-marriage may have to await future effort after a long period of dialogue and reciprocal evaluation. The sexual habits of Africans may win the contempt of Indians; the sexual habits of Indians may reinforce African resentment. Indophobia is the tendency to react negatively toward Indians as a group. Cultural Indophobia is a reaction against certain aspects of Indian culture, of which the values and taboos surrounding sex may be an important component. Economic Indophobia derives sustenance from a real or presumed economic preeminence enjoyed by the Indians in situations like those in Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Rhodesia, South Africa and other African countries with Indian minorities.

Economic Indophobia, although seemingly more important at the moment, may indeed be more transient. As African businessmen reduce the Asian predominance in commerce and trade, the African resentment of Indians on eco-

nomic grounds may gradually decline. But the resentment of Indians based on their presumed social exclusiveness and other aspects of their culture may endure much longer in Africa, even if Africans extended to their Asian compatriots the full status of an African tribe.

The ghosts of cremated Indian widows of yesteryears, and the jealousies of dead Africans whose wives had been inherited by others, may continue to haunt Indo-African relations for generations to come.

NOTES

1. "Positive Action in Africa," *Africa Speaks*, J. Duffy and R. A. Manner, (eds.), (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 50.
2. Consult Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), especially Chapters XX and XXIII. See also C. D. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man and Society* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), especially pp. 357–362.
3. *African Religions and Philosophy* (London: Heinemann, 1969), pp. 144–145.
4. *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Nelson, 1965), pp. 10–11.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
7. C. D. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man and Society*, p. 359.
8. *African Religions and Philosophy*, pp. 144–145.
9. This sexual approach to national integration is discussed more comprehensively, and with special reference to the Sudan, in my paper "The Black Arabs in Comparative Perspective: The Political Sociology of Race Mixture" (mimeo). A shorter version of this paper is published under the title of "The Arabs of Africa: Political Sociology of Race Mixture," *Patterns of Prejudice, Journal of the Institute of Jewish Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (London, January–February 1972).
10. Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1959 Edition), pp. 2–5.
11. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963), p. 111.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 111–112.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Chapter 2.4

Africa's Triple Heritage of Play: Reflections on the Gender Gap

Sport is always linked to broader cultural and sociological forces. In Africa the links are to indigenous culture on the one hand, and to imported culture on the other. Race, class, and religion have all influenced African sport. So have sex and gender. But underlying all these factors is Africa's triple heritage of cultures. Indigenous traditions, Islamic ways, and Western practices have worked in tandem to shape the history of sport in Africa.

The Arabs once served to transmit the civilization of ancient Greece to medieval Europe. The works of scholars were translated into Arabic and studied in the academies of the Muslim world—from Damascus to Timbuktu, from the courts of the Moghul emperors in India to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, from Baghdad in Iraq to Al-Hambra in Spain. The rest of Europe paid some attention and learned about Plato and Socrates from Arab scholars. One aspect of ancient Greece that the Arabs did little to promote or transmit, however, was the field of sports and athletics—the legacy of the Olympic games.

Islamic civilization was too earnest to incorporate a subculture of leisure. The arts of relaxation and entertainment have survived in spite of Islam rather than because of it. In the Arab world, love songs and romantic music are barely tolerated. Moreover, the stringent Islamic rules of dress even for men, let alone for women, have hampered the development of athletics in much of the Muslim world. Exposed knees are considered a form of nakedness, and wearing shorts in a public arena is a violation of the moral code of dress. The code for female attire is even stricter, making the training of sportswomen or female athletes exceptionally difficult in much of the Muslim world.

Another Islamic factor that has militated against the development of sports is opposition to *maysir*, or games of chance. The commercialization of sports in Islam has been hindered by the *Shari'a*'s discouragement of profit-making on

the basis of chance and speculation. At first the *Shari'a* (Islamic law) outlawed betting on races and other sports traditionally associated with gambling. But even less obvious forms of "speculation" such as rewarding a victor in a boxing bout have been frowned upon by Islamic law. This has slowed down the expansion of sports by curtailing their commercialization and has reduced the resources available for training, promotion, attraction of new talent, and general enhancement of sports as a social activity. Even the winning of prizes in a game can come close to being *maysir*.

Another debilitating factor is the nature of Islamic education, which in most Muslim societies refrains from mixing athletic training with organized leisure. The idea of school or college sports programs does not sit comfortably with the concept of a Qur'anic school or Muslim academy. Muslim children attending Islamic institutions have to regard the school as something entirely different from leisure. Muslim schools are centers for the promotion of morality, versatility in reciting the *Qur'an*, and general competence in religious studies. School sports are part of the Western tradition, not of the Qur'anic legacy.

The fast of Ramadan is yet another feature of Islam working against systematic training in sports. On the one hand, the fast is a discipline in consumption—an abstinence from food, liquid, smoking, and sex from before dawn until sunset each day during the whole month of Ramadan—that makes for fitness as well as restraint. In terms of weight management, most Muslims emerge slimmer from Ramadan than when they entered the fast, potentially more fit for sporting effectiveness. What is dysfunctional is its debilitating impact while it is actually going on. With neither food or water many Muslims feel drained and short of energy during the whole of Ramadan. "*Leo saumu ni kali kweli kweli*" ("Today the fast is truly ferocious"). This is a common topic of conversation during Ramadan in the Swahili world. How draining is today's fast as compared with yesterday's! While general productivity declines, tempers usually run short.

Fatigue and irritability engendered by the fast are debilitating factors in competitive sports. Moreover, as Islamic believers are required to spend more time in mosques during Ramadan, and to avoid "frivolous" pastimes during the day, there is a basic incompatibility between the demands of the fast and the requirements of sporting effectiveness. As a result, most daytime sports cease during Ramadan.

Yet some minor nighttime games do flourish in parts of Muslim Africa during the fasting month. Certain games of cards prosper along the East African coast from about 10:00 P.M. to midnight. The games are played in teams, with no betting allowed. *Maysir* is more taboo than ever during Ramadan. Competitive card-playing is therefore purely for pleasure and not for gain—to kill time while believers await the last meal of the night after midnight following the last prayer during Ramadan, *tarawih*. The card games along the East African coast are a triple heritage *par excellence*. The cards are the usual imported Western packs. The games are primarily indigenous to the East African coast. The season for these particular games is almost exclusively the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan in the evening.

In the rest of the Muslim calendar there are more substantive sports, which Islam has helped to foster in Africa. The most colorful are connected with animals. In northern Nigeria the horse is used not only as a beast of burden but also as a sporting animal. Polo is a highly developed sport among the Islamic emirates of the north. In the Horn of Africa the camel is used not only for milk and transportation but also for some kinds of entertainment, including informal camel races. In summary, however, the Islamic impact on sport has often been negative or ambiguous at best.

Nor has the Western impact on African sport and play been homogeneous or monolithic. Some games are specific to particular colonial powers. Cricket, for example, is almost exclusively associated with countries once ruled by Great Britain. What is more, Africa's cricket is also race-specific. It has failed to capture the imagination of Black Africans, while immigrant Asians as well as immigrant Whites, have embraced it as one of their favorite sports. Also race-specific is the game of hockey in Africa. Where it is played at all, it tends to be dominated by citizens of southern Asian ancestry (the Indian subcontinent).

Some games are class-specific. Lawn tennis and golf are monopolized by the new middle classes of Africa, regardless of race. But class in Africa is sometimes culturally rather than economically defined. Immersion into the new conquering culture of the West can change a person's status and class affiliation. Some imported sports are *culture-intensive*. One has to be substantially Westernized before one can be attracted to the sport of lawn tennis, for example. Soccer, on the other hand, is largely *culture-neutral*. The majority of African soccer players are minimally or not at all Westernized. Rugby seems to demand much greater Westernization than soccer.

Some colonial powers emphasized acculturation more than others. France especially pursued policies of intensive assimilation of colonial subjects. In the French-speaking part of Cameroon the elite is more attracted to culture-intensive games than in English-speaking Cameroon.

Sports generally have a more institutionalized place in British-style educational establishments than they have in French-style schools. One possible result is the greater Anglophone African success in the Olympic games, particularly when compared to Francophone Africans from south of the Sahara. The great African Olympic heroes have come disproportionately from countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and (only partially Anglophone) Ethiopia. The 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles produced less impressive African results than in the past, but even at Los Angeles it was primarily to Anglophone Africans that the black continent looked anxiously for one or two triumphs.

Linked to this issue of comparative colonial legacies in sport is the fact that the Francophone world has no real equivalent of the Commonwealth Games, those large-scale gatherings in which countries previously ruled by Britain test out each others' athletic skills. The Commonwealth Games are often a kind of rehearsal for the Olympic Games. Unfortunately, from this point of view, the French Empire was not as large or diverse as the British Empire. Francophone Africans are therefore not afforded a comparable preparation for the Olympics,

although all independent African countries do participate in the inter-African games.

French-speaking Africans north of the Sahara have a different history, uniquely affected by both Islam and the Mediterranean world across the centuries. Morocco even managed to produce a woman gold medal winner in Los Angeles in 1984, despite the normally inhibiting effect of Islam on public performance by women.

In Africa as a whole, women are underrepresented both in culture-intensive imported sports such as lawn tennis and golf and in culture-neutral sports such as sprinting, long-distance running, and high jumping. The reasons for female under-representation in the two types of activities overlap but are not identical. The culture-intensive imported sports are elite-specific. Some African women are Westernized, of course, but in general the level of Westernization is still more pronounced among African males than among females. Culture-neutral games, on the other hand, are affected by the comparative degrees of competitiveness among African men and women. In order to explain these differences—and to consider the larger question of why African women have been almost as underrepresented in public sporting activities as have their Muslim counterparts elsewhere in the world—we need to look first at the relationship between sports and work, then at sports and sexuality, and finally at sports and war.

There is an assumption that the chivalry that protects women from heavy physical labor also prevents them from developing physical skills for sports. This assumption may make some sense in the Muslim world where, comparatively speaking, women are both spared physical labor and denied physical skills. But in much of Black Africa this is simply not true. Black African women often do more physical work than their men. In some African societies women walk longer distances, carry heavier loads, and have to learn a greater variety of balancing skills than their men. So if the culture of work does indeed help to condition the culture of sports, and if African women can be so “physical” in their economic activities on the land, then why have they been so slow in excelling in the physical world of sports?

One reason may be that decision makers in Africa have been encouraging the wrong kind of sports. Perhaps more attention should be paid to the possibility of promoting marathon walks as a major sporting activity in Africa. Children begin to walk long distances to school quite early, and women have been walking longer and longer distances for diminishing supplies of firewood and water. The whole tradition of long-distance walking could be used to detect talent and to structure new patterns of competitive sports. The very chores of collecting firewood could be given a new enthusiasm and liveliness as they are purposefully linked to training young girls for competitive walking.

Weight-lifting could also be more systematically promoted among African women as well as men. In rural Africa one continues to be astonished by the enormous bundles of firewood on the backs of women walking long distances. Huge baskets of farm produce may be balanced on their heads at the same time. Such women are, of course, too busy to enter into sports. But rural culture would

find new levels of animation if these simple chores were given greater value—and prizes were awarded to young men and women who excelled in purposeful weight lifting and graceful carriage.

Indeed, graceful carriage and balancing skills could be developed into more than one sport. Familiar is the sight of an African woman with a sleeping baby tied securely on her back, a big basinful of water balanced on her head, and both hands busy elsewhere carrying baskets of fruit or cassava. She walks toward home with a deceptive sense of ease. Again those skills could be rewarded in leisure as well as exploited in labor, thus to be developed and integrated within a sporting culture.

But the purpose of this integration of work culture and sport culture could not simply be to give women greater access to new competitive games. The purpose should also be to encourage men to share the chores that were previously reserved exclusively for women. Skills of collecting, bundling, lifting, and carrying firewood gracefully should be cultivated among young men as well as young women. Turning these skills into proud competitive feats of triumph and honor would help to give them greater respectability as forms of work as well as forms of play. These new games of weight lifting, purposeful and balanced carriage, and long-distance walking could simultaneously turn women into proud champions and lead men into honorable chores.¹

As for the linkage between work culture and sporting culture, it could itself become an honorable form of professionalization. The Olympic movement has long resisted—perhaps understandably—the idea of turning sports into a profession. The proposed new rural games for Africa are, in a sense, intended to turn rural professions into sports—an inversion of this position. The rural necessities of farming, herding, collecting firewood, and long-distance walking for pasture or water are all potential material for imaginative minds to help relieve the tedium of labor and to androgynize the heritage of sports. While the Olympic movement continues to frown upon the idea of turning sports into a livelihood, what is recommended here is the inverse process of turning work into sport—and narrowing the gender gap in both work and play as a result.

In addition to work, the aesthetics of sexuality relates to the question of African women in sports. What makes a woman physically attractive to men in Africa? If the measure of sexual attractiveness is fatness and the measure of fitness is slimness, then we have a wide *sexercise gap*. The sexercise gap is the gulf between criteria of sexual beauty and criteria of sporting competence.

In most traditional African societies, the sexercise gap for women was wide. Putting on weight was part of the process of acquiring elegance and poise. For example, among the Fante of southeastern Ghana and among the people of the Rivers State of Nigeria, an institution called the “fattening ceremony” has traditionally been specifically designed to enlarge the female’s hips and behind. Paul Crispin reminds us of the issue in the past tense, but in fact these aesthetics are still very much alive. Says Crispin:

Body adornment in Africa has gained varying emphasis depending on the ethnic symbols or aesthetic dimensions of the people. . . It is particularly fascinating that the muscular development of the whole body is a sign of health and wealth . . . Many years ago, before it became the fashion to trim down to scientific streamlining like 36-26-36 or 25-20-25, it used to be the pride of a man in the village to exhibit his 'fat' stately, elegant wife who responded to the admiration of visitors by gorgeous royal slow steps delicately shifting the behind rhythmically from left to right with supple, well-nourished hands flexibly swaying from side to side to complete the picture of 'the wife of a well-to-do man.'²

In spite of his own claim that "those times have virtually passed," Crispin goes on to tell us about the "fattening ceremony" that is still practiced by the people of Calabar in eastern Nigeria. There the fattening process occurs in December or January and can last for a whole year or a year and a half. The ceremony is for adolescent girls between fifteen and eighteen years of age. Apart from getting a special diet, they are also taught traditional etiquette, manners, and the sex roles of the society.

In addition to these fattening ceremonies before marriage, Crispin tells us about a special type of fattening for girls who are regarded as "sickly or feeble." This ceremony is called the *Nkuho-Eket*. The girls' peers, fellow female teenagers, serve her certain foods in her special secluded room under the supervision of an elderly woman. The feebleness is supposedly conquered when the girl shows signs of responding positively to the "fattening process."³

The principle of big buttocks as a sexual asset for a woman is more widespread than just in Calabar. It is a standard preference in most parts of Black Africa. In Nigerian humor, the term bottom power refers to the sexual tricks that a woman can play to get her own way. Sometimes the idea of bottom power is virtually the equivalent of a woman's sex appeal.

The demands of athletic prowess require a trimming down of bottom power and a more commensurate balance between weight and height. The athletics of weight are in conflict with the aesthetics of sex, and the resulting *sexercise ratio* is wide.

Islam has had a similar effect on the sexercise ratio, but less directly. By separating women from hard physical labor and confining most of them to the home, conservative versions of Islam have encouraged *de facto* fattening of women from an early age. Although bottom power might not be an aspect of Islamic aesthetics *per se*, the limited exposure of conservative Muslim women to either physical exercise or physical labor has resulted in declining standards of fitness among them.

Only in the third—Western—legacy of our triple heritage is the sexercise gap narrowed. In the Western tradition, slimness is a measure of both sexual appeal and physical fitness. The struggle to be athletically fit does not contradict the struggle to be sexually attractive. Athletics and aesthetics are fused; the vital statistics of the Olympiad are compatible with those of Venus.

In reality, Westernized African women are less likely to be involved in hard physical labor than women in traditional indigenous roles. Traditional women are more likely to walk long distances for water and firewood and are more likely to be involved in digging and tilling. Yet Westernized women watch their weight a little more closely and are more likely to mix with Westernized men, whose aesthetics of sex have been modified by European values of slimness. Traditional rural women are probably more fit in terms of daily exercise than are their urbanized sisters, but rural folk are less informed about hygiene and have less access to modern medicine than do the Westernized sophisticates.

So the contradictions of the triple heritage continue to play havoc with both aesthetic standards and athletic measurements, with the lure of beauty and the temptations of sporting achievement, with the dialectic between the gold medal of sports and the gold bangle of adornment. In Africa these contradictions have tended largely to exclude women from competitive sports.

Even more fundamental in the marginalization of women in African sports is the divorce between women and both the warrior tradition of indigenous Africa and the *jihad* tradition of Islam. Perhaps more brilliantly than anyone else, the Dutch historian and philologist Johan Huizinga linked play with warfare in human history and regarded the play element as the dominant force in human culture. Like most theorists who focus on a dominant theme as an explanation of the direction of world history, Huizinga exposed himself to the inevitable charge of reductionism. In that he was in the company of Karl Marx, with his focus on economics, Jeremy Bentham with his avoidance-of-pain principle, and Sigmund Freud with his emphasis on sex. But like his fellow reductionists, Huizinga put his finger on an important factor in human behavior. There is indeed a significant historical and cultural link between play, warfare, and civilization itself.⁴

According to Huizinga, civilization has advanced through struggle, and that struggle has had to be subjected, in time, to certain "rules of the game." The history of the duel in Western culture and of the samurai in Japanese culture might be closely linked both to the history of boxing in twentieth-century sports and to the Geneva Convention's code concerning the treatment of prisoners of war:

Most of the tales we hear of noble battles in beautiful styles are based . . . [on] heroic and romantic fiction. . . . Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that this ennobling of war by viewing it in the light of ethics and aesthetics is but a 'fair seeming,' or cruelty in disguise. Even if it were no more than fiction, these fancies of war as a noble game of honour and virtue have still played an important part in developing civilization, for it is from them that the idea of chivalry became one of the great stimulants of medieval civilization, and however constantly the ideal was belied in reality, it served as the basis for international law, which is one of the indispensable safeguards for the community of mankind.⁵

But the rules of war quite early began to treat women as fundamentally different from men. Indeed, medieval chivalry in Europe idealized the woman as an

object for gallant protection and honorable defense. The origins of sexism in culture go back farther than the days of European knights in armor, but the fundamental cause of sexism may still be linked to the division of labor, which armed men and turned women into objects for gallant protection by them. Huizinga detected a partially equalizing trend in the history of war and in the evolution of the rules of combat:

We can only speak of war as a cultural function so long as it is waged within a sphere whose members regard each other as equals or antagonists with equal rights; in other words, its cultural function depends on its play-quality. This condition changes as soon as war is waged outside the sphere of equals, against groups not recognized as human beings and thus deprived of human rights—barbarians, devils, heathens, heretics and ‘lesser breeds without the law.’⁶

Huizinga was correct as far as he went. European colonization of India, Algeria, or Swaziland was not regarded as “aggression”—but Hitler’s invasion of Poland was. As the great Victorian liberal, John Stuart Mill, once put it:

... there is a great difference between the case in which nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a very low, grade of social improvement . . . To characterize any conduct towards the barbarous people as a violation of the Law of Nations only shows that he who speaks has never considered the subject.⁷

War and its rules did indeed create a measure of egalitarianism among European members of the community of nations, but the equality did not extend to the “barbarians” of Asia and Africa. What Huizinga, and to some extent Mill, inadequately considered was the disequalizing tendency of war in male-female relations even within European societies themselves. The ethos of armed men and protected women was the most persistent and most primordial of all forms of stratification. Women became marginalized not because they lost control of the means of production but because they were excluded from the means of destruction. Nothing in human history has been more responsible for the political subordination of women than their demilitarization.

In Africa and the Muslim world, that demilitarization took the form of exclusion from the warrior and *jihad* traditions. In one society after another, the fighters were the sons—and almost never the daughters. Given the link between sports and warfare, and given the separation of women from warfare, it stood to reason that women should also be excluded from the more demanding sporting endeavors. The absence of women on the battlefield meant the absence of women in the gladiator’s arena, resulting in the diminution of womanhood as sporting material generally. The taxing physical exertions of war were supposed to be partially reproduced in the physical exertions of sporting combat. If women were ineligible for the former, why should they be fit for the latter? In Britain,

such calculations led to the exclusion of women from rugby, soccer, and even cricket. In the United States, it kept women out of football as well as baseball.

Similar trends have been present throughout African history. Apart from occasional exceptions such as pre-colonial Dahomey with its Brigade of Amazons, the warrior tradition in Africa has been heavily masculine. Young boys have been initiated into warrior virtues of valor and endurance. In many cultures initiation into manhood and initiation into warrior status have been indistinguishable. The cultures that practice male circumcision have linked at times the symbolism of sexual prowess with the symbolism of the burning spear. The sexual virility of the male has been part of his armory of martial valor.

It is against this background of the masculinity of the warrior and *jihad* traditions that we have to understand the masculinity of the game of polo among the Hausa-Fulani in northern Nigeria, the masculinity of the bull-fight on Pemba Island off the coast of Tanzania, and the masculinity of *tigil*, the Ethiopian form of wrestling. Says one account:

In the countryside, the young males are paired off more or less according to age and strength; sometimes within a village, but more often one village against another. . . . Fights are usually held near a village after the harvest and the stacking of the grain, but before the threshing and winnowing . . . The contestants are clothed in white breeches and tunics, with bare feet.⁸

Even more colorful are Ethiopian games involving horse riding. Horses may have been imported into Ethiopia by the "Oromo tribes." Oromo successes eventually convinced highland Ethiopians of the military value of horses. In time horses in Ethiopia were used mainly for battle and more rarely as beasts of burden. Donkeys and mules served the latter purpose. The third major use of horses (after carriage and combat) was for sport and entertainment. Particularly colorful is the *Feres Gugs* game:

The game of gugs is based on warfare, but where a cavalryman carried two spears, a light one for throwing, and a heavier job for infighting, the gouks [gugs] player uses only light wood wands. The object is for members of one team to gallop off followed by the others who are supposed to hit them with their wands, either by hurling at them or by catching up and hitting them. Those being pursued are protected with traditional circular shields in hippo or rhinoceros hide, some covered with coloured velvet and decorated with gold and silver. As they tear away across the plain, they may dodge, hang off the horse or ward off with the shield. The riders are often in traditional costume, or at any rate the cloak and gold-fringed lion or baboon headdress!!⁹

Horse-riding games and skilled horsemanship in Ethiopia are forms of sport that carry heavy martial associations. Precisely because of that, they are also games of high masculine profile.

It is one of the more curious gaps in African sport that archery has not evolved into a major form of entertainment. One reason may be that bows and

arrows are still part of the technology of hunting and defense in parts of Africa, and people are self-conscious about converting them into skills of entertainment. The African Westernized elites are often embarrassed by the bow and arrow as an illustration of Africa's "primitive" technology. These elites frequently decide which sports should be promoted in their countries. Archery—though an activity in which Africans could excel internationally—is therefore carefully relegated to oblivion by the urban sophisticates.

Spear throwing, on the other hand, has managed to survive as a form of entertainment in countries like Congo and Uganda. The competition in spear throwing is not usually based on aim and marksmanship but on strength, velocity and distance of throw. The game is still highly localized and has yet to become pan-Africanized. Indeed, the chances of its becoming an international sport between African countries are slim. In any case, such games exude masculine exclusivity, partly because they are based on the metaphor of war.

Wrestling is a more institutionalized and more widespread game in Africa. Among Ethiopians and the Nubians of Upper Egypt and Sudan, the arts of wrestling are centuries old. More recently, wrestling has acquired a new value in the Gambia and Senegal, partly in response to tourist curiosity. But what has persisted throughout history and throughout much of Africa, with few exceptions, is the obstinate masculinity of wrestling.

Boxing came to Africa with colonization, linking with indigenous culture through the tradition of wrestling. Once again, since boxing was a *fight*, it was implicitly a bridge between the culture of war and the culture of play. No African has symbolized this connection better than Idi Amin. Long before he became Uganda's president, Amin reigned for nine years as the nation's heavyweight boxing champion. In his simultaneous rise to pugilistic fame and to prominence within the Kings' African Rifles under British rule, he certainly combined the skills of play with martial qualities. In the words of David Martin:

... he was the type of material the British officer liked in the ranks—physically large at six feet four inches and uneducated. The theory was that material of this type, responded better to orders, and were braver in battle. He endeared himself to his commanders by becoming the Ugandan heavyweight boxing champion ... and by taking up rugby, where even if his skills were limited, his weight as a second row forward was a valuable contribution.¹⁰

Boxing has remained at once an arena of triumph for Black people and an area of exclusion for all women. By helping Blacks to achieve wealth and admiration, boxing has been a weapon against racism. But by being also the most masculine and one of the most financially lucrative of all sports, boxing has been a brutal symbol of sexism. The cause of racial equality has gained through Black triumphs in the ring, but the cause of sexual equality has lost through the masculine orientation of this combative sport.

Recently, women have argued that much of their relative inferiority in sports is, as with other handicaps sustained by them, an outcome of conditioning

over a long period of time. If Black people excel in athletics and boxing partly because they have been socially underprivileged, women have rarely performed in athletics and perhaps never in boxing. The Black man has asserted superiority in select areas of athletic performance in response to handicaps in other domains; the woman has exhibited inferiority in some of those same areas partly out of a broader closure imposed by society on women's participation in those fields.

While the *jihad* legacy reinforces the warrior tradition of indigenous Africa, the continent's triple heritage of cultures works dialectically to improve the prospects of African sportswomen. Islam and African culture sometimes fuse and sometimes recoil from each other, only to turn around and confront the powerful sporting forces of the Western world in which women athletes are increasingly encouraged and honored. The whistle has sounded. The match between cultures has begun.

NOTES

1. The literature on women in Africa is now diverse and wide-ranging. Some of the more interesting works include Christine Obbo, *African Women* (London: Zed Press, 1980); Christine Oppong, (ed.), *Female and Male in West Africa* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); Marjorie Hall and Bakhita Amin Ismail, *Sisters Under the Sun: The Story of Sudanese Women* (Harlow, England: Longman, 1981); Stephanie Urdang, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Nina Emma Mba, *Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900–1965* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1982); H. J. Simons, *African Women* (London: C. Hurst, 1968); Nici Nelson, (ed.), *African Women in the Development Process* (London: Franc Cass, 1981); J. Goodwin, *Cry Amandla: South African Women and the Question of Power* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1984); Organization of Angolan Women, *Angolan Women: Building from National Liberation to Women's Emancipation* (London: Zed Press, 1984); A. Richards, *Chisungu: A Girl's Initiation Ceremony among the Bemba of Zambia* (London: Tavistock, 1982); Cherryl Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Onyx Press, 1982); C. C. Robertson, *Sharing the Same Bowl: A Socioeconomic History of Women and Class in Accra, Ghana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); and Margaret Strobel, *Muslim Women in Mombasa, 1890–1975* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

2. Paul Crispin, "The Essence of Fattening," *The Democrat Weekly*, Lagos, Nigeria, 29 July 1984.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

4. Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (1949; reprint London: Granada Publishing Ltd., 1971).

5. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–111.

7. J. S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. III, (London, 1967), pp. 153–158.

8. *Ethiopian Festivals* (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Tourism Commission, 1982), p. 15.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 8. This author was a member of a BBC television team that filmed *Feres Gugs* in Addis Ababa early in 1984.

10. David Martin, *General Amin* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 15.

Chapter 2.5

On Gender and Power: A Post-Colonial Sexual Equation

Since the colonial period Africa and Asia have witnessed significant changes in the roles and functions of men and women. In many traditional cultures there has been a belief that God made woman the custodian of fire, water, and earth. God himself took charge of the fourth element of the universe—the omnipresent air.

Custody of fire entailed responsibility for making energy available. And the greatest source of energy in rural Africa and parts of Asia is firewood. The rural women became disproportionately responsible for finding and carrying huge bundles of firewood, though quite often it was men who chopped down the big trees initially.

Custody of water involved a liquid, which was a symbol of both survival and cleanliness. The rural woman became responsible for ensuring that this critical substance was available for the family. She trekked long distances to fetch water. But where a well needed to be dug, it was often the men who did the digging.

The custody of earth has been part of a doctrine of dual fertility. Woman ensures the survival of this generation by maintaining a central role in cultivation—and preserving the fertility of the soil. Woman ensures the arrival of the next generation in her role as mother—the fertility of the womb. Dual fertility becomes an aspect of the triple custodial role of rural womanhood, though always in partnership with the rural man.¹ What has happened to this doctrine of triple custody in the period since the 1930s? Different elements of the colonial experience affected the roles of men and in Africa and Asia in different ways.

GENDER ROLES IN TRANSITION

In Africa among the factors that increased the woman's role on the land was wage labour for the men. Faced with an African population reluctant to work for low wages for somebody else, colonial rulers had already experimented with both forced labour and taxation as a way of inducing Africans (especially men) to join the colonial work force.

According to Margaret Jean Hay, wage labour for men took some time before it began to affect women's role on the land. Hay's own work was among Luo women in Kenya:

By 1930 a large number of men had left Kowe at least once for outside employment. . . . More than half of this group stayed away for periods of fifteen years or more. . . . This growing export of labour from the province might be thought to have increased the burden of agricultural work for women. . . . As early as 1910, administrators lamented the fact that Nyanza was becoming the labour pool of the entire colony. . . . Yet the short-term migrants of the 1920s were usually unmarried youths, who played a relatively minor role in the local economy beyond occasional herding and the conquest of cattle in war. Furthermore, the short-term labour migrants could and often did arrange to be away during the slack periods in the agricultural cycle. . . . Thus labour migration in the period before 1930 actually removed little labour from the local economy and did not significantly alter the sexual division of labour.²

Margaret Hay goes on to demonstrate how the Great Depression and World War II changed the situation as migrant labor and conscription of males took an increasing proportion of men away from the land. This was compounded by the growth of mining industries like the gold mining at Kowe from 1934 onwards:

The long-term absence of men had an impact on the sexual division of labour, with women and children assuming a greater share of agricultural work than ever before. . . . The thirties represent a transition with regard to the sexual division of labour, and it was clearly the women who bore the burden of the transition in rural areas.³

Women in this period, from the 1930s onwards, became more deeply involved as "custodians of the earth." In southern Africa the migrations of men to the mines became even more dramatic. By the 1950s a remarkable bifurcation was taking place in some South African societies—a division between a male proletariat (industrial working class) and a female peasantry. South Africa's regulations against families joining their husbands in the mines exacerbated this tendency towards gender apartheid, the segregation of the sexes. Many women in the frontline states had to fulfill their triple custodial role of fire, water, and earth in greater isolation than ever.

The wars of liberation in southern Africa from the 1960s took their own toll on family stability and traditional sexual division of labor. Some of the fighters did have their wives with them. Indeed, liberation armies like ZANLA and

ZIPRA in Zimbabwe and FRELIMO in Mozambique included a few female fighters. But on the whole, the impact of the wars was disruptive of family life and of the traditional sexual division of labour.

After independence there were counter-revolutionary wars in some of the front line states. The most artificial of the post-colonial wars was that initiated by the so-called Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO). The movement was originally created by reactionary white Rhodesians to punish Samora Machel of Mozambique for his support of Robert Mugabe's forces in Zimbabwe. After Zimbabwe's independence the Mozambique National Resistance became a surrogate army for reactionary Whites in the Republic of South Africa—committing a variety of acts of sabotage against the fragile post-colonial economy of distant villages of Mozambique.

It is not completely clear how this situation has affected the doctrine of “dual fertility” in relation to the role of the African women. One possibility is that the extra-long absences of the husbands have reduced fertility rates in some communities like Mozambique. The other scenario is that the pattern of migrant labor in southern Africa generally has initiated a tendency towards *de facto* polyandry. The woman who is left behind acquires over time a *de facto* extra husband. The two husbands take their turn over time with the woman. The migrant laborer from the mines has conjugal priority between mining contracts if he does manage to get to the village. He also has prior claim to the new babies unless agreed otherwise.⁴

If the more widespread pattern is that of declining fertility as a result of long absences of husbands, the principle of “dual fertility” has reduced the social functions of the fertility of the womb and increased the woman's involvement in matters pertaining to the fertility of the soil. On the other hand, if the more significant tendency in rural communities deprived of male migrant labor in southern Africa is towards *de facto* polyandry, a whole new nexus of social relationships may be in the making.⁵

GENDER, RELIGION AND WAR

It has been said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. In traditional Africa, war is sometimes the continuation of religion by other means. The same indigenous religion, which has tended to be relatively unpoliticized in peacetime, has sometimes been mobilized for combat purposes in war. Indigenous religions have been used in warfare not as part of a crusade to convert others but as sacred weapons for attack or sacred shields for defense. Indigenous religions have been a source of spiritual ammunition against “the enemy” or part of the fortress of invincibility.

Religion has sometimes been the bridge between conventional feminine virtues and masculine roles in combat. In cultures which are otherwise vastly different from each other, the military profession has been a man's preserve. Women as a rule have not been expected to kill for their country. They have not

even been expected to die for their country. Armed patriotism has usually been a masculine preserve.

But from time to time religion has played a part in militarizing women. In Uganda, 1987 was such a year. In that year there arose the aforementioned phenomenon of Alice Lakwena as a female warrior with supernatural powers, engaged in combat against the forces of Yoweri Museveni. As an instance of using traditional religion for military purposes, Alice Lakwena's approach was often reminiscent of the Maji Maji war against German rule in Tanzania in 1904–1905. Tanganyika warriors had immersed themselves in water in the expectation that sacred water was bullet-proof. Similarly, Alice Lakwena convinced many Acholi warriors in 1987 that carrying a particular leaf or artefact would make them bullet-proof. Both in Tanganyika at the beginning of the twentieth century and in Uganda in 1987–1988, this faith in the protection of indigenous religion against bullets proved disastrous for the warriors. The faithful died in large numbers.

Alice Lakwena's movement did not only illustrate a link between war and indigenous religion but also illustrated how religion can make it possible for a woman to break the male monopoly of military command. At the beginning of this century a Muslim holy war in the Horn of Africa included women crusaders against European invaders and their local allies. Somalia produced its own Joan of Arc, another African "Maid of Orleans." A statue stands in her honor in today's Mogadishu. Hawo Osman Tako was pierced by an enemy's arrow and still continued to fight. Her statue symbolizes armed patriotism with a female face, but her valor also symbolized religious inspiration at work in re-militarizing women. Such historical figures have played a role in breaking the male monopoly in skills of combat and disciplines of war. France's Joan of Arc, Somalia's Hawo Osman Tako, and Uganda's Alice Lakwena were all historic fusions of priestess and female warrior.

Religion elsewhere has fused priestess and politician from time to time. Another Alice, Alice Lenshina in Zambia, has been the leader of the Lumpa Church, which clashed with government authorities and its supporters from time to time. Strictly speaking, the Lumpa Church was anti-political from the outset and did not want its members to join any political party. But to be anti-political was itself a political statement. The clashes between the Lumpa Church and the ruling party of Zambia in the mid-1960s resulted in President Kenneth Kaunda's authorization of the security forces to "shoot to kill" in its efforts to control Lenshina's uprising of 1964–1965. The tradition of priestesses had in that period escalated into violence. Even a good Christian like Kaunda—self-consciously a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi—could be driven to a response of counter-violence ("shoot to kill").

But the confrontation between Alice Lenshina and Kenneth Kaunda had more symbolic contradictions as well. Alice was a woman who, by leading her men into violent political battle, seemed to have assumed a role normally associated with men. In his Gandhian days, on the other hand, Kenneth Kaunda was opposed to the use of violence in any of its forms—and seemed inclined towards

the softer virtues of modesty and compassionate tears normally associated with women.

Kenneth Kaunda in his younger days was close to this kind of ethics. To his critics from within Africa's warrior tradition, young Kenneth exemplified how Christianity had softened Africa's masculinity. Brought up in a highly devout Christian home Kenneth exhibited early his abhorrence of physical fist fights and the nearness of his tears of compassion. Critics saw this as part of the process of demasculation under Christian missionary tutelage. Although Head of State Kenneth Kaunda much later surrendered to Max Weber's definition of the state as institutionalized monopoly of physical force, Kaunda's tears of compassion persisted and came to embarrass many an international conference when (as President) he sometimes broke down in the middle of a speech.

Against this background Kaunda's confrontation with Alice Lenshina soon after independence was remarkable. Kaunda was a man with virtues normally associated with women. Alice was a woman with a leadership and combative role normally associated with men. In the mid-1960s either Alice had to retreat into feminine compassion and non-violence or Kaunda had to respond with *macho*-toughness. Kaunda decided to be ruthless. He declared that he did not care if he was called a "savage." Alice Lenshina's followers had started killing innocent citizens of independent Zambia. Kaunda decided that only an order to the security forces to "shoot to kill" would stop carnage by members of the Lumpa Church. Kaunda's Christian compassion had given way to the demands for "toughness." The exigencies of the state had remasculated him—to confront an Alice Lenshina already made "masculine" and de-feminized by the exigencies of her own Lumpa Church. Kaunda's state machinery prevailed.

GENDER, RACE AND GENERATION

In southern Africa as a whole, bridges need to be built not only between races, but also between genders and across generations. Relations between men and women have been disrupted by repression, by wars of liberation and by labor migration. Relations between the African youth and the older generations have been strained by the anger and radicalization generated by apartheid.

In the middle of these three sets of relations—gender, race and generation—came the crisis of Winnie Mandela late in the 1980s. As a woman whose husband (Nelson Mandela) had been in prison for more than a quarter of a century, Winnie Mandela had symbolized the strain of political struggle upon gender relations. As a woman who attempted to organize young activists for social roles, Winnie Mandela had been one of the bridge-builders across generations.

However, in 1988 and 1989, things went seriously wrong for Winnie—partly because of the activities of those very young people that she had tried to organize. The woman who had been a martyr to apartheid since her husband was sentenced to imprisonment in 1964, the woman who had herself suffered banning and restriction in a Black ghetto for long periods of time, had now become

a subject of denunciation and derision in some of the circles which once acclaimed her as “mother of the nation.”

Her very status had been part of the wider saga concerning gender relations in southern Africa. Repression and war have often created “widows of the revolution”—widows of martyrs to the liberation struggle. There have also been “cage widows”—wives of husbands put away in detention for life. Winnie Mandela had become the most internationally illustrious of the so-called “cage widows.” But what was the Winnie Mandela crisis of 1989? Mrs. Mandela was accused of complicity in the abduction and assault of a 14-year-old Black activist, Stompie Mokhele Seipei, whose decomposed body was found dumped in Soweto in January 1989. Winnie vigorously denied being at home at all when the teenager and four others were abducted to her house on 19 December 1988 by members of her so-called soccer team of young activists, known as the Mandela United. The team acted as her bodyguard.

Behind it all were some hard sociological trends. For the Black youth in southern Africa, new forms of initiation into warriorhood had emerged. Many teenagers had been enlisted into the liberation armies. In urban centers the new warriorhood sometimes took the form of confronting armed security forces in the streets of Soweto. Winnie Mandela’s experiment of a youthful soccer team with additional responsibilities of guarding her could have been a pilot scheme worth emulating. But it became an experiment that had gone wrong. Her soccer team had degenerated into a gang fighting other young people. Youthful gang warfare caught up with Winnie Mandela’s dreams.

Southern Africa has also created special kinds of divergence between gender and class. In South Africa’s mining communities, men have not been allowed to live with their wives. Gender apartheid has been added to racial apartheid. Women have often remained on the land as subsistence farmers—while their men have trekked thousands of miles for wages. The result has been the creation of a migrant male proletariat and a secondary female peasantry. As a wife separated from her husband by an unjust system, Winnie Mandela became a role model for the rural peasant woman as well.

In the struggle to build bridges across races, South Africa has produced two Black Nobel laureates for Peace—Albert Luthuli and Desmond Tutu. But there are no Nobel Prizes to be won in the struggle to build bridges between genders or bridges across generations. “Peace” in terms of the Nobel Prize is not yet defined by the yardstick of either fighting sexism or moderating generational conflict. Winnie Mandela did not stand a chance of becoming the first Black female to win the Nobel Prize even if her efforts across genders and generations had succeeded. But if she was not a laureate was she at least a martyr to those causes? Since Winnie’s political career is far from over, the final estimate of her contribution can only be computed by history itself in the fullness of time.

Women generally are martyrs to many types of pains, some biological, some cultural, and some economic. Basically they are “identity” martyrs. They are martyrs because of what they are, almost regardless of what they believe in. However, an interesting tendency has manifested itself in this last quarter of the

twentieth century, which is only the beginning of what I hope will be something better. Sometimes women succeed to supreme office, not on their own credentials, which is what it should be, but because of the martyrdom of a related male-female succession to male martyrdom, usually a male “belief” martyr, committed to a particular line of thought.

FROM SUTTEE TO STATE HOUSE

Particularly startling is the cultural trend in South Asia. There has developed in the region the phenomenon of female succession to male martyrdom. A heroic male figure is killed, and out of the blood and anguish emerges a new political activist. It is a woman who is related to the deceased martyr.

This tendency has gone further in South Asia than in any other part of the world. It began in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). Prime Minister Solomon W. R. D. Bandaranaike was killed in September 1959. Before long his widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, succeeded to the leadership of the party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. From then on Mrs. Bandaranaike became a major political force in the country—serving at times as prime minister.

India, Sri Lanka’s giant neighbor to the north, was also destined to be led by a woman. Indira Gandhi was the daughter of India’s founding Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. After a brief interlude under the premiership of Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Congress Party in India looked to Nehru’s daughter for at least formal leadership. The party pundits thought that the woman could be manipulated easily behind the scenes. That was one of their great miscalculations. Indira Gandhi turned out to be one of India’s toughest leaders. When she finally became so tough as to take on the Sikhs militarily at the Golden Temple—ordering an invasion of the temple to clear it of “terrorist fugitives”—she signed her own death warrant. She was subsequently assassinated by her own Sikh bodyguards in 1984.

We do not know yet whether another South Asian woman leader in neighboring Pakistan will turn out to be as tough as Indira Gandhi. But at any rate Benazir Bhutto was elected leader of the largest party in Pakistan in 1988—and soon became the Muslim world’s first woman prime minister. She was successor to her own martyred father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was executed under the regime of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Just like her father, Benazir Bhutto was later assassinated in 2007.

Bangladesh, another South Asian nation, has already produced major women opposition leaders, Begum Khalida Zia and Begum Hassina. It may be only a matter of time before Bangladesh in turn is officially led by a woman. It will probably be the second Muslim society in modern history to produce a female prime minister.

The Philippines is just outside South Asia proper. There too a female successor to a male martyr has emerged. Benigno Aquino, a dissident when the country was ruled by Ferdinand Marcos, was assassinated in 1983 as he disembarked from a plane on his return home from exile in the United States. The

political shock of the assassination propelled his widow to national prominence. The momentum finally resulted in Corazón Aquino being swept into power as national president in 1986.

It is worth noting the different cultural backgrounds of these Asian women. Mrs. Bandaranaike was Buddhist; Mrs. Indira Gandhi was Hindu; Ms. Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan was Muslim; the two Begums of Bangladesh are Muslims, and Mrs. Aquino is Christian. There are significant cultural differences in their societies and yet all of them are Asian countries in relative proximity to each other. Is there an underlying cultural bond between them that has nevertheless contributed to this female succession to male martyrdom?

There is a civilization in that part of Asia that is older than Christianity and Islam. It is the culture that produced concepts like reincarnation. In the relationship between husband and wife this sometimes took the form of co-incarnation joint existence. In Hindu culture this resulted in the controversial institution of *suttee* (or *sati*). Christians conceived of marriage as a pledge until death; for Hindus, marriage was regarded as a pledge *beyond* death. Christians affirmed “till death do us part.” Hindus insisted that “Not even in death will we part.”

Christians affirmed a continuing loyalty between husband and wife “in sickness and health.” Hindus extended the allegiance to apply “in death as in life.” In reality the institution of *suttee* seemed to proclaim: “What God has joined together let no death put asunder.”

The question that arises is whether this underlying concept of co-incarnation in South Asian culture especially has now found a healthier resurgence in the phenomenon of female succession to male martyrdom. In the past, the widow accompanied the husband in his death. Today the widow becomes a political incarnation of her martyred husband or, by extension, her martyred father.

Historically, the institution of *suttee* persisted in India even among converts to Islam. During much of the Moghul period in India *suttee* worried the rulers. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were reform movements among Muslims in India committed to “purifying” Indian Islam and removing what were regarded as “Hindu accretions and superstitions.” The Moghul rulers Humayun and his son Akbar took decisive steps to prohibit widow burning. But it was not until British rule that the custom was more effectively outlawed. *Suttee* was abolished by the British Raj in 1829.

In reality, the custom of widow burning has not died out completely, even in post-colonial India. Incidents of widow burning continued to be reported among Hindus in India right into the 1980s. But what particularly concerns us in this chapter is how the culture which produced the custom of a widow burning herself upon her husband’s death was later inspired to produce a political culture of a widow rising from the ashes of her husband’s martyrdom to assume supreme office. Were the two cultural tendencies related? Was political succession to a martyred father a mere refinement of political succession to a martyred husband?

A related aspect of Hindu culture is the tendency to narrow the gap between hard masculine virtues (physical courage, endurance, purposeful ruthlessness)

and softer feminine virtues (humility, patience, modesty). The two most illustrious Gandhis in twentieth century India were Mahatma and Indira. Mahatma Gandhi was a man who behaved like a woman. Indira Gandhi was a woman who behaved like a man. Mahatma Gandhi reveled in the softer virtues of humility and patience. Indira Gandhi reveled in the harder virtues of power and ruthless courage. Mahatma gave India the spiritual concept of "soul force" (*satyagraha*). Indira gave India the military credentials of victory in war and nuclear status in regional politics. Mahatma came close to echoing the Christian dictum of turning the other cheek. Indira initiated a *de facto* policy of *pax Indiana* India's "right" to intervene in other South Asian countries for the sake of regional peace.

Mahatma was so keen to feminize himself that he behaved like a mother to a young woman relative. The young woman was later to write a book bearing the paradoxical title of *Bapu, My Mother* ("Bapu" being the affectionate title given to Gandhi as "father" of the new India). Mahatma even renounced sex with his wife in his quest for a truly androgynous existence. Erik Erikson, the psychiatrist, described Gandhi's quest as a case of "sublimated maternalism."⁶ Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, embodied sublimated patriarchy. The Soviets reserved for Mrs. Margaret Thatcher the term "the Iron Lady." But the Soviet concept was equally applicable to Indira Gandhi. The inevitable jokes erupted during Mrs. Gandhi's reign in power. Because of her toughness, it used to be said that "Indira is the only man in the Cabinet!" Yes, two people bearing the name of Gandhi have left their mark on twentieth century India. One was indeed a man who aspired to female modesty; the other was indeed a woman who aspired to masculine ruthlessness.

Although South Asia is a unique region from the point of view of female succession to male martyrdom, it is by no means the only part of the world that has produced powerful women in the twentieth century. Nor was Indira Gandhi the only woman who presided over the nuclearization of her own country. Of all the over one hundred and sixty countries in the world, it is astonishing that those which have gone nuclear include a disproportionate number of those which have produced female heads of government.

GENDER AND NUCLEAR POWER

Nuclear capability in the Third World has emerged disproportionately in countries which have also produced politically powerful women. Is there a link between the culture of potential nuclearization and a culture of political androgynization?

In China Mao's wife was powerful only while Mao lived. After Mao's death she was condemned as one of the "Gang of Four." Was China ready for the nuclearization, but not yet ready for androgynization? In India both trends reinforced each other. Indira Gandhi was a symbol of both the nuclearization of India and a female conquest of supreme power.

Israel is in Asia but not of Asia. Israeli culture did, however, bring into being both Prime Minister Golda Meir and Israel's nuclear bombs. Although Israel's nuclear programme started long before Golda Meir's reign, there is no doubt that her years in supreme office (1969 to 1974) were crucial in making Israel more independent as a nuclear power.

In Latin America the two leading contenders for nuclear status are Brazil and Argentina. Both are very *macho* societies. Nevertheless, one of them, Argentina, has had one woman head of state, President Isabella Perón. Potential nuclearization and potential androgynization have once again coincided, though Perón herself was far from being an "Iron Lady."

Sri Lanka produced a female leader but did not become part of the nuclear vanguard. And yet this dissociation was probably an accident of history. Sri Lanka did stand a chance of becoming the scientific Israel of South Asia. It had become *per capita* the best educated country in South Asia and stood a chance of a technological take-off. But potential nuclearization was aborted by the schism between the Tamils and Sinhalese. Civil conflict sucked away Sri Lanka's vigor both economically and in terms of education.

Although Benazir Bhutto only served twice as Pakistan's Prime Minister, Pakistan has already demonstrated that it is a culture which can produce a politically powerful woman. The world is also convinced that Pakistan is a culture that is capable of nuclear credentials. The Third World pattern of linkage between androgyny and the atom have at last come to the Muslim world.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was father not only of Benazir but also of nuclear Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru was not only father of Indira Gandhi, but also grandfather of nuclear India. Nehru presided over the Sino-Indian conflict and the conflict was in turn the midwife of the nuclearization of India. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once said: "There was a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now a Hindu bomb. Why not an Islamic bomb?" What Zulfikar did not live to say was the following: "There has been a Hindu woman leader, Indira Gandhi. A Buddhist woman leader, Mrs. Bandaranaike. A Jewish woman leader, Mrs. Golda Meir. More than one Christian woman leader, Mrs. Aquino and Mrs. Isabella Perón. This is quite apart from Christian Margaret Thatcher."

If Third World cultures which produce women leaders are also disproportionately cultures in the nuclear vanguard, are those cultures more militaristic? Not necessarily. Less machismo in a society could mean less militarism. But those Third World societies which have produced female leaders have been androgynous enough to produce female kings but not genuine queens, female Rajas rather than genuine Ranis, a female pharaoh like Hatshepsut, Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir or Margaret Thatcher.

In other words, the women who succeed in those societies have been those who have demonstrated hard masculine virtues of toughness, courage, physical endurance and even ruthlessness. Only the pinnacle of the pyramid of power has been androgynized in the head of government. But the rest of the pyramid is still a monument to masculine supremacy.

CONCLUSION

In Asia the interaction between religion and colonialism is a major factor behind the changing role of women. In Africa it is the interaction between race and colonialism which has transformed gender roles.

South Asia has been an important arena of interplay between religion and the politics of imperial legacy. It seems almost certain that if British India had not been partitioned, the phenomenon of a female Muslim head of government in the world would have been delayed by at least a generation. If British India had remained intact, Indira Gandhi could still have become Prime Minister. But there would have been no Muslim state in South Asia east of Afghanistan. In the absence of either a Pakistan or a Bangladesh, the chances of female political succession to a male Muslim martyr anywhere in the world would have been drastically reduced. After all, nowhere else in the Muslim world but in South Asia have there been any indications of a woman assuming the supreme political authority of the state.

Theoretically, an unpartitioned Indian subcontinent, though preponderantly Hindu, could one day have produced a Muslim woman prime minister. But that would have been most unlikely in the twentieth century. In any case, a Muslim female head of government of a preponderantly Hindu society would still not have been the same thing as a female premier in a preponderantly Muslim society. Benazir Bhutto as head of government was a product of many historical forces. But perhaps above all she was the product of the partition of British India.

Similarly, there would have been no nuclear race in South Asia this century without that partition. India's decision to become a nuclear power was inspired at least as much by rivalry with China, as by hostility towards Pakistan. But Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's initiative to nuclearize Pakistan was decidedly inspired by his country's adversarial relationship with India. The partition of the subcontinent must therefore be counted as one of the causes of both the androgynization and the nuclearization of Islam in South Asia.

The partition of Palestine is likewise one of the reasons why the region has already produced a woman prime minister. Had the Middle East remained almost exclusively Muslim, there would have been no equivalent of Golda Meir to assume the reins of any government in the region. It took the creation of Israel to introduce sufficient matriarchy in the region for the rise of Goldie Mabovitch to the position of Foreign Minister. Later (as Golda Meir), she rose to the rank of head of government (1969 to 1974).

Again, it was territorial partition that speeded up the nuclearization of the region. There is little doubt that Israel is already a nuclear power militarily. Without the creation of the Jewish state and the political and military tensions caused by that development, nuclear weapons in the Middle East would probably have been delayed by at least a generation. Just as in South Asia, territorial partition both androgynized and nuclearized Islam, so in the Middle East the partition of Palestine brought forward both the happy phenomenon of a woman prime minister in the region and the ominous phenomenon of nuclear arsenals in the Jewish

state. In South Asia the tension was between Islamic nationalism and Hindu nationalism. In the Middle East the tension has been between Zionism and Arab nationalism. Religion and the politics of the post-imperial era have indeed profoundly affected both military developments and gender relations.

In Africa nationalism has been linked more to race than to religion. The continent has not yet produced a likely woman head of government. Perhaps the closest candidate, for a while, was Winnie Mandela, although she was indeed damaged in credibility by the events of 1988 and 1989. She was, in any case, more admired internationally than at home.

It was a different kind of "partition" which produced Winnie Mandela. It was the ideology of "separate development" and the White man's obsession with separate ethnic and racial "homelands." Apartheid as an ideology of partition was the mother of both a nuclear South Africa and a potentially androgynous Black political movement. The White man's racial paranoia produced Africa's first nuclear power. The country's racism and gender apartheid in turn produced not only Winnie Mandela as a political figure, but also the complex patterns of male labor migration and female peasants in the economies of Southern Africa.

The triple custodial role of the African woman is still socially alive in much of the continent. The female of the species remains a trustee of fire, water, and earth in most African villages. But the consequences of racism and of colonial rule have taken their toll. The African woman today is sometimes more socially free than she once was, but she often pays the price of being less economically central than the ancestors intended her to be. The custodian of fire, water and earth sometimes finds herself trustee of the filing cabinet. The struggle must, therefore, continue. Africa is still groping for the optimum balance between ancient roles and modern rights in the destiny of womanhood.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to the late Okot p'Bitek, the Ugandan anthropologist and poet, for stimulation and information about myths of womanhood in northern Uganda. Okot and I also discussed similarities and differences between African concepts of matter and the ideas of Empedocles, the Greek philosopher of the 5th Century B.C. Consult also Okot p'Bitek, *African Religions in Western Scholarship* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1971).

2. Margaret Jean Hay, "Luo Women and Economic Change During the Colonial Period" in *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic Change*, Nancy J. Hafkin and Edna G. Bay, (eds.), (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 98–99. For a feminist perspective consult also Maria Rosa Cutrufelli, *Women of Africa: Roots of Oppression* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

3. Hay, *Ibid.*, p. 105.

4. There is no doubt such arrangements occur in Mozambique. What is not clear is how widespread *de facto* polyandry is becoming in Southern Africa.

5. I am indebted to the field research and interviews in Southern Africa which accompanied the BBC/WETA television project, "The Africans: A Triple Heritage" (1985–

1986). I am also grateful to the work associated with Vol. VIII of the *UNESCO General History of Africa*, Ali A. Mazrui, (ed.), forthcoming.

6. Ibid.

Chapter 2.6

Inter-Racial Mating and Cross-Racial Milestones: From Princess Diana to Barack Obama

Let us first distinguish between horizontal miscegenation (the mating of male and female across a racial divide) and vertical miscegenation (the production of a child of mixed race). A culture may become eventually tolerant of vertical miscegenation (offspring of inter-racial mating), and yet remain in disapproval of the original inter-racial sexual mating which produced the offspring.

Barack Obama as US presidential candidate was fortunate that it was his mother and not his wife who was White. The American electorate was probably less ready to accept a Black President with a White wife than a Black President whose mother was White. This was because the African American population was already overwhelmingly of mixed race. The race of Barack Obama's mother became irrelevant when American culture had already decided that her offspring with a Black husband inevitably produced a Black child.

It is safe to say that in the campaign for the US presidency, nobody in the US electorate (White or Black) regarded the fact that Obama's parents were of different races as a unique election handicap. On the other hand, if Barack Obama was married to a White woman, a section of the electorate would have been prepared to use that as negative propaganda at Obama's expense. Barack Obama would definitely have lost the votes of those White Americans who still disapproved of inter-racial mating, and who would have regarded even legally married inter-racial mating in the residential quarters of the White House as profane.

Candidate Barack Obama would also have lost millions of Black voters if Obama's wife was a White woman instead of Michelle. In November 2008, Barack Obama received some 90 percent of the Black votes cast. Some of those voters were enchanted by Michelle Obama as a prospective First Lady of the

country—the first Black First Lady in the history of the United States of America. Many Black women among the voters would have disapproved of the very fact that a highly eligible African-American male like Obama had actually chosen to propose marriage to a White woman—when clearly he must have had Black options.

Barack Obama's mother was a White woman from Kansas. Needless to say, Barack did not choose his own mother. No one has that kind of choice. Young Barack Obama was, however, in a position to choose his wife. Fortunately for Barack, he proposed marriage to Michelle, a highly attractive Black partner in life: Barack Obama had added to his eligibility as President of the United States by avoiding an inter-racial wedding for himself.

Another version of how the United States is closer to accepting “vertical miscegenation” was inadvertently articulated by the majority leader in the Senate of the United States in 2008. Senator Harry Reid had supported Obama's bid for the presidency from quite early in the race. The Senator also added that Barack Obama stood a good chance of being elected partly because his skin color was relatively light, and partly because his dialect and accent in speech were not “Negro.”

Senator Reid did not directly link Obama's lighter skin and command of standard English to the fact that Obama's mother was White, or that Obama had been brought up mainly by white Americans. In Obama's case, it was indeed true that he inherited his lighter skin and his standard English mainly from his mother and her own White parents.

Perhaps inadvertently, the Democratic Senator Reid from Nevada had grasped the paradox of the United States' racial culture—a fundamental disapproval of inter-racial mating (especially a Black male and a White female) but a readiness to accept the resulting offspring. Ironically, while the marriage was frowned upon because of the differences in color between the parents, the children gained by being lighter skinned than their Black parent.

Although Senator Harry Reid got a lot of criticism for his remark that Obama's presidential eligibility gained from his lighter complexion and his standard English accent, the Senator's remarks were not necessarily wrong factually. Many White American voters could have been put off if Barack Obama's physical features and shade of skin were indeed “Negroid,” or if his accent or dialect were overtly of African American origins.

ON DIANA AND DODI

Let us now turn to Diana, the late Princess of Wales, and her love affair with an Egyptian Muslim. Dodi was an African of the soil in the sense that Egypt was territorially and historically part of the African continent. However, the majority of Egyptians were not Africans of the blood, in the sense of being racially of the Black race.

This distinction has nothing to do with which Africans are more indigenous to the continent than which. The population of Egypt is overwhelmingly de-

scended from the Egypt of pharaohs. Egyptians are ancestrally and historically as indigenous to Africa as Nigerians are. But Egyptians are “Africans of the soil” because they are part of the African continent, while Nigerians are both “Africans of the soil” and “Africans of the blood” since Nigerians belong to both the African continent and the Black race.

Nevertheless, the love affair between Princess Diana and an African of the soil like Dodi Al-Fayed was fundamentally an inter-racial love affair. It was a case of “horizontal miscegenation.” However, here a different paradox emerges. If it is true that Diana and Dodi were on their way towards getting married (as seems probable), that would have given Diana’s children an African step-father. And if Diana and Dodi had children, a future King of England (Prince William) would have had half-brothers and half-sisters who were racially mixed.

There is reason to believe that the British Royal family would have been less embarrassed by the inter-racial marriage between Diana and Dodi (horizontal miscegenation) than by the inter-racial offspring produced by that marriage (vertical miscegenation). A British King with a half-brother who was partly Egyptian, would have been more of a challenge than a British King whose mother’s second husband was an Egyptian—even if without any offspring.

While the American electorate seemed more comfortable in choosing a President whose mother was White than it would have been with a Black presidential candidate with a White wife, British racial culture would probably have regarded racially mixed siblings of the monarch (King William) as a greater embarrassment than a Princess of Wales married to an Egyptian without children. While Americans accepted vertical miscegenation as an adequate comfort level (racially mixed children); British racial culture would have been more comfortable if Dodi and Diana married without children (horizontal miscegenation).

While slavery is a matter of hereditary servitude, royalty and the nobility are matters of hereditary privilege. In the 1990s the most globalized point of convergence between global Africa and internationalized royalty occurred during the brief love affair between Diana, Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al-Fayed. The international publicity which the brief and tragic love affair received was itself one of the high points of the Information Superhighway of the 1990s.

Then came the tragedy in Paris, early on August 31, 1997. A British princess and an African of the soil perished together in a road crash as they tried to race away from the frenzy of the Information Superhighway. Big issues began to formulate themselves in the minds of millions. Who mourned? That question was easy. Much of the world mourned. But who celebrated the death of the British Princess and her North African lover?

In the 1950s Imperial Britain would not allow an African King, Seretse Khama of Bechuanaland (now Botswana) to marry a White woman, Ruth. In the 1990s the question was whether Diana, the mother of a future King of England, would be married to an African Muslim. The issue was partly literal and partly metaphorical. We already knew from twentieth century African history that African Heads of State could have White First Ladies. This was true of Seretse

Khama when he finally became President of independent Botswana. It was also true of Léopold Senghor of Senegal, who had a French wife. What we have never had is a European or a White American Head of State with an African wife or African in-laws.

We also know from twentieth century African history that it is possible for an African whose parentage is half-White to be popularly elected President, perhaps even elected more than once. This has been true of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, who was freely elected President of Ghana both in 1992 and 1996. Jerry Rawlings' father was a Scotsman, his mother an African. The experience we had never had before Obama is for a Westerner who is half-Black, being elected President of a Western country, or having siblings who are part African.

The question which arose in 1997 before August 31 was whether William as a future King of England was going to have half-brothers and half-sisters who were essentially North African. Would a future King of England have a half-brother called Abdullah or perhaps even Nasser? Would he have a half-sister called Ayesha or Khadija? Even if the names "Saddam" or "Qaddafi" were unlikely to be borne by Diana's children, the other options were alarming enough to the British establishment.

Symbolically and metaphorically the love affair between the British Princess and the North African was posing the question of whether racial integration in the West was advanced enough to accept inter-racial mating at the very top. More literally, the event which killed Diana and Dodi posed more ominous questions.

In the face of those racial and cultural scenarios, how purely accidental was the death of Diana, Princess of Wales in August 1997? Is it conceivable that extreme right wing elements in Britain wanted to ensure that the mother of a future King of England did not get engaged to a North African Muslim? Conspiracy theories rapidly began. Were some of the paparazzi who disappeared from the scene hired specially to cause havoc?

Eighteen thousand Muslims, who were meeting in Chicago for the annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America in 1997, were stunned over the last weekend of August to learn of the sudden death of Princess Diana. I was present at the convention. We mourned the parting of Britain's most glittering ambassador to the human race.

Some of those eighteen thousand Muslims in Chicago included Egyptian or African born—as was Diana's companion in the tragic accident in Paris, Emad (Dodi) Al-Fayed. After the shock had subsided at the Chicago convention, the speculations began to take shape among a few of the participants. In Third World countries car accidents which kill public personalities are often regarded as disguised forms of political assassinations. Kenya and the Middle East are not unique in having had their share of such suspicious car crashes. Were such manipulated auto accidents unknown in the developed world?

On August 31st—the day Diana died—Britain's largest circulation newspaper, *News of the World*, had asserted that Dodi Al-Fayed was unfit to marry into

the British royal family. The newspaper claimed that Diana's 15-year-old boy, William, was "horrified" at the prospect of having Al-Fayed as a stepfather.

Diana, Princess of Wales, was widely regarded by part of the political establishment in England as a "loose cannon," capable of making unorthodox and socially alarming moves. Her most intimate interview for the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1995 was deliberately given to a man of colour—a Briton of Asian origin—to counterbalance Prince Charles' choice of Jonathan Dimbleby as interviewer. Dimbleby belonged to the elite of the elite among British television personalities.

It was during Diana's interview with a man of colour that she confessed to having been unfaithful (almost in retaliation to her husband's own confession of infidelity). Diana was establishing her credentials both as a modern woman and as a person who felt at ease in discussing intimate issues with a non-White interviewer before cameras.

When in July and August 1997 Diana's name began to be romantically associated with an Egyptian man from a Muslim family, her liberal attitude seemed to rise to a new level. It became conceivable that the mother of a future King of England would be married to a race which British imperialists once despised as "wogs." Would a future King of England have half-brothers called Abdul and Mahmoud; half-sisters called Salma and Ayesha?

What is more, the Islamic factor in the background of the Al-Fayed family added a further complication. The King or Queen of England is of necessity supposed to be the secular Head of the Church of England—the Supreme Governor of the Anglican tradition. Would the future King William (Diana's son) have a mother married to a Muslim? Would the British Royal Family have direct Muslim in-laws?

RACE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE

Curiously enough, Diana's former husband, Prince Charles, was already causing the Church of England some concern over what was perceived as a "disturbing tilt towards pro-Islamic sympathies." About a week before Diana's death the British Broadcasting Corporation, in a report about whether the Anglican Church should be de-linked from the British state, referred to this concern about whether Prince Charles was getting to be too ecumenical and too accommodationist towards Islam to be truly qualified for the British throne. The BBC Report was part of its programme called "Twenty-Four Hours" which was broadcast more than once in the week before Diana's death. Charles' pro-Islamic sympathies were sometimes traced to his 1991 lecture at Oxford University entitled "Islam and the West," which was a plea for greater effort by the West to understand Islam. The lecture has since been translated into various languages. The English and Arabic editions of the lecture are published by the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Oxford.

Prince Charles' ecumenical spirit was manifested even earlier when he recommended that one of the titles of the King of England (or reigning Queen) be

changed from “defender of the faith” (meaning the Anglican faith) to “defender of faith” (meaning defender of all religions in his kingdom). Devout Anglicans were shocked by this broadminded ecumenicalism. Prince Charles wanted the change made before he took the oath of office at his own Coronation one day. Was he recommending the disestablishment of the Church of England?

On the issue of religion, it is therefore arguable that both Prince Charles and Princess Diana were indeed ecumenical and personally tolerant. Under Charles’ influence the Royal family as a whole had started discussing in the mid-1990s whether lesser members of the Royal family should any longer be discouraged from marrying Roman Catholics if they so desired.

However, marrying a North African Muslim was not regarded as a viable option even for minor members of the family. And although upon her divorce Diana was stripped of the Royal title of “Her Royal Highness,” she was still Princess of Wales and, even more fundamental, she was the mother of a future King of England.

Dodi Al-Fayed was no more devout as a Muslim in terms of practice and ritual than Diana and Charles had been devout and disciplined Christians. If Dodi Al-Fayed and Princess Diana had lived to get married, it would have been like the marriage of Prince Aly Khan (father of the present Aga Khan IV) in 1948 to the American actress, Rita Hayworth. But in that case the Prince was the Muslim—the Westerner was the bride. In that earlier case the car crash was after the marriage rather than before. The car crash in Europe killed only Prince Aly Khan. Rita Hayworth was not with him in the car. The romance was over, and she was back in the movies as an actress in the United States. (I was privileged to meet Prince Aly Khan and Princess Rita Hayworth when the two visited Mombasa, in Kenya in 1950, not long after their marriage).

No foul play has been proven about the death of Prince Aly Khan in 1958. Similarly, no foul play may be proven about the death of Princess Diana and Mr. Dodi Al-Fayed. Indeed, in both cases, the suspicion of foul play is purely speculative. We know from eyewitnesses that there were more paparazzi in Paris than the seven who were arrested on lesser suspicions. Were the missing ones agents of death?

In Cairo the influential newspaper, *Al-Ahram*, published articles raising the possibility that Diana and Dodi were allegedly killed by sections of the British establishment to prevent their marriage (see for example *Al-Ahram*, September 1, 1997).

Why did the French police employ an anti-terrorist special force to deal with a road accident, however famous the casualties? Why did it take an hour-and-a-half after the accident for Diana’s body to be taken to a nearby hospital? Was it really because it took that long to release Diana’s body from the car wreckage? Or were there other reasons?

Accidents which appear convenient to the powerful will always provoke suspicion as to whether they were accidents at all. Diana’s and Dodi’s deaths may still be a simple case of an accident caused by a convergence of excessive speed, a driver under the influence of alcohol, and crazy photographers hound-

ing a lovely princess to her death. After all, in real life, accidents do happen—even to celebrities.

Maybe there is a more universal message in Diana's death than the dilemma between chance and design. In classical times there was Helen of Troy whose beauty "launched a thousand ships and burnt the topless towers of Ilium." In our own times there has been Diana, the Princess of Wales, whose compassionate beauty moved the world to tears upon her death.

Her Britannic ancestors included the eighteenth century poet, Alexander Pope, who observed:

All Nature is but Art unknown to thee,
All chance [is] Direction which thou cannot see,
All Discord Harmony not understood,
All partial Evil [is] universal good.

Diana's death was indeed a "Chance," but was it also "Direction"—a traffic indicator for humanity? Diana's death was a moment of "Discord"—but did it have the seeds of human harmony? Diana's "unintended homicide" was indeed a case of partial Evil—but was it also a beacon for universal Good? In 1997, upon Diana's death, the world experienced the globalization of grief. Was globalization beginning to wear a human face?

BETWEEN MISCEGENATION AND EUGENICS

Barack Obama's mother was a woman from Kansas, genetically related to George Bush's Vice-President, Dick Cheney (according to US Press reports). There has been speculation about whether both Obama's Kenyan father and his Euro-American mother were intellectually brilliant. Would that explain Barack's outstanding performance at Harvard Law School where he became the first African American President of the *Harvard Law Journal*, and graduated from Harvard at the top of his class? Barack Obama's intellectual brilliance may also have been crucial in his remarkable performance as a strategist and campaigner for the Democratic Party's 2008 nomination for the US presidency. Against all odds, he defeated the Clinton machine, which was campaigning for Hillary Clinton.

It is quite clear that having had a White American mother had not hurt Barack Obama in the primary campaign for Presidency of the United States. On the contrary, it is widely believed his White mother (deceased) and his White grandmother (who in October 2008 was still alive and very supportive) were among Obama's major assets.

But what if Barack Obama had had a White wife instead of a White mother? Let us repeat the issues at stake. Is American White opinion more comfortable with a Black man whose mother was White than with a Black man married to a White woman? Indeed, would African American voters have been more alienated from Barack Obama if his prospective First Lady for the White House had been a EuropeanAmerican?

Needless to say, both White and Black opinion in America is aware that nobody is ever in a position to choose his or her own biological mother! It was obvious to US voters that Barack had no say in the marriage between the White female student from Kansas studying at the University of Hawaii and the Luo student from Kenya studying at the same university. They were destined to be parents of a future President.

However, Barack's own choice of spouse was within his own volition. As we have argued, if Barack had indeed decided to propose to a White woman and married her, it is almost certain that his candidacy as a prospective President of the United States would have been more negatively affected by his own "wedded miscegenation" than it has been by his parents' intermarriage. We have analyzed this issue earlier.

But Barack Obama had his own special kind of "American dream." As a candidate, he aspired to play an important intermediate role towards the long-term dream of a post-racial America. Becoming the first Black President of the United States could indeed become an important stage towards ultimately attaining an America that was close to transcending racism.

It may now be appropriate to examine how far the United States has indeed come this far since the days when many states had laws against "miscegenation" [all inter-racial sexual mating and inter-racial marriages]. If we go even further back, many White Americans believed in purposeful selection breeding to produce both a mentally appropriate White ruling elite and a physically more marketable Black captive population. In 2008 Senator Harry Reid knew the value of a lighter shade of Blackness in the 2008 US election. But, on the slave plantations some two centuries earlier strong Black men were used as studs for breeding stronger or physically more attractive slaves. Indeed, sons of the White slave-owning families in America were sometimes encouraged to mate with their enslaved girls in order to produce fairer skinned descendants for the slave market.

Whether or not Barack Obama is eloquent and articulate partly because of the accidental inter-racial mating of two gifted parents, there is no doubt that he comes from an American society which earlier in the twentieth century still believed in "eugenics" as purposeful selective breeding to produce quality offspring. His parents were not part of that history of selective breeding, but his version of the American dream (post-racial) came with a historical baggage which once believed in eugenics.

Let us explore that earlier phase of American history, less to illuminate Barack's own family history, but to trace the distance which the country's racial history has traversed in a single century. The baggage of eugenics is part and parcel of that earlier history. In earlier American generations a lighter shade of Blackness was not a presidential qualification or eligibility for the White House. It was a method of producing more marketable slaves.

What persisted among White racists into the twentieth century was another sexual aberration—eugenics, or special breeding for human physical or mental "improvement." In a sense, the idea of eugenics in European civilization began with Plato's *Republic*, where an ideal society was portrayed as having an agenda

for improving human beings through selective breeding. But it was not until 1883 that the word eugenics itself was coined by the British scientist, Francis Galton, whose own book, *Hereditary Genius*, a few years earlier (1869) had recommended specially arranged marriages between brilliant men and rich women as a strategy of producing a talented and affluent race. This was of course, a century-and-a-half before Senator Harry Reid speculated about the politics of shades of color among African Americans.

In the history of trans-Atlantic slavery, eugenics was at first used not to create a better endowed ruling class mentally, or to cultivate presidential material, but to develop a better endowed labouring class physically. Selective breeding of slaves was sometimes invoked as a method of producing either stronger specimens or physically better looking ones. Black preeminence in physical sports in the United States in the twentieth century could, in part, be traced to special breeding under slavery, reinforced by other factors. Black fighters had dominated the boxing ring in America through much of the twentieth century. And tall and powerful Black players have continued to show dazzling physical prowess and mental calculation in American football and basketball, at least since the second half of the last century. In spite of poverty and undernourishment, the African American population since early in the twentieth century has produced a remarkable proportion of resilient and impressive physiques. How much of that physical Black heritage was, in part, a product of selective breeding under slavery?

The horrors of eugenic experiments under slavery included special inter-racial mating in order to produce lighter-skinned Blacks who were preferred for certain domestic duties. Lighter-skinned women slaves were also preferred sexually by their White masters. President Thomas Jefferson fathered dazzling lighter skinned descendants.

But who were the White mates who engaged in cross-breeding with slaves in order to produce lighter-skinned human merchandize? Sometimes it was the White members of the slave-owning family themselves who mated with their bonded Black victims—and then sold their own “half-cast” offspring. This is the Chicken-George syndrome. Alex Haley’s¹ great grandfather was the product of mating between the master himself—and one of his slave women. This did not stop the master from selling his own son to an overseas buyer, a resident in Scotland.

In the years between the two world wars the mission and research of the American Eugenics Society was partly discredited by the experimental horrors perpetrated in Germany by the Nazis, resulting in the extermination of Jews, Blacks, Gypsies and such sexual minorities as male homosexuals. Chicken-George’s lighter skin was apparently an asset to his marketability.

In Dodi Al-Fayed’s country, Egypt, “miscegenation” at the pinnacle of power was a repeated occurrence. Long before the love affair between Dodi and Diana, Egypt in the second half of the twentieth century had had two Heads of State who were racially mixed (Arab and Black). These Egyptian rulers of the 20th century were Presidents Muhammad Naguib and Anwar Sadat.

In Islam eugenics between masters and slaves as a method of producing “better” slaves was a legal abomination, totally inadmissible. However, eugenics in the United States persisted in other forms long after slavery was abolished. The American Eugenics Society was established in 1926, committed to the proposition that the privileges of the upper classes were justified by their superior genetic endowment.

American eugenic culture had moved from the task of breeding stronger slaves to the mission of breeding more intelligent rulers. Sterilizing even retarded White citizens of the United States, or White epileptics, or the insane, continued in parts of the United States into the 1950s. And yet, there was another America which was more decent and democratic. By 1967 the US Supreme Court was ready to declare as unconstitutional all state laws against miscegenation and mixed marriage. Legal matrimony between Black and White became the only approximation to legitimate “eugenics.” Barack Obama was barely eight years old when the Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws in the case appropriately known as “*Loving v the State of Virginia*.” Miscegenation was now destined to produce the first Black President of the United States of America.

DIANAPHILES AND OBAMAPHOBES: A CONCLUSION

We have examined in this paper the distinction between “vertical miscegenation” (the mating of a male and female across the racial divide) and “horizontal miscegenation” (the children born out of inter-racial mating). Diana was born less than five weeks before Barack. She was born the Honourable Diana Spencer on July 1, 1961. He was born Barack Hussein on August 4, 1961.

From the point of view of world history, it was fortunate that it was Barack Obama’s mother who was White, and not Obama’s wife. We have argued that the racial culture of the United States has learnt to be more comfortable with children who are racially mixed than with inter-racial marriage or inter-racial mating. Vertical inter-raciality (inter-racial parents) helped Barack Obama. However, if his own marriage had been inter-racial (horizontal inter-raciality) he would never have become President of the United States.

The race culture of British Royalty, on the other hand, has had a different scale of values. The love affair between Princess Diana, the Princess of Wales, and the Dodi Al-Fayed from Egypt, was a case of horizontal miscegenation. If Diana and Dodi had not been killed, but had gotten married instead, the British Royal family would no doubt have been outraged.

But a bigger outrage for the Royal family would have been any offspring out of that marriage. Since Diana’s children with Prince Charles were heirs to the British throne, Diana’s children with Dodi Al-Fayed would have been half-brothers of colour and half-sisters of colour to a future King of England. In this British case, vertical miscegenation (inter-racial offspring) was potentially more damaging than horizontal miscegenation (Diana married to Dodi but without children).

This chapter has also addressed the distinction between racism and colourism. American racial culture not only responds to the great divide between Black and White, but also to shades of blackness within the African American community. According to the Majority Leader in the US Senate (Harry Reid), one precondition for Obama's eligibility for election as President was his lighter blackness. His complexion was close to that of Dodi Al-Fayed.

On the other hand, if Obama had been as deeply black as a Dinka from Southern Sudan, or as a Luo from Kenya, he would have lost millions of votes in the US elections. He might not have made it at all if his speech was also with an African American accent. Colourism is alive and well even among African Americans themselves. Social standing and eligibility for marriage can be enhanced by a lighter shade of blackness.

Paradoxically some of the most famous African American cultural nationalists have been with very light skin colour indeed. These great "Black Icons" of the United States included W. E. B. Du Bois, the most distinguished African American intellectual of the twentieth century, and Malcolm X, the most articulate Black American Muslim (who later adopted the Muslim name Malik El-Shabazz). W. E. B. Du Bois was the first African American to obtain a doctorate in history from Harvard University. Yet his attachment to Black Africa was such that he changed his nationality to become a citizen of Ghana in his final years. He died in Ghana and was buried there. Ghanaians are among the most deeply Black of all West Africans.

If Du Bois was the first African American PhD in History from Harvard, Barack Obama more than seventy years later became the first African American President of the *Harvard Law Review*. Though almost White, Du Bois chose to spend his final years among deeply Black people in Black Africa. Obama's lighter skin helped to make him President of a White-majority superpower in America. Race and colourism have continued to play their paradoxical roles in the Black experience. Barack Obama, as President of the United States, became the most powerful Black individual in the entire history of civilization. Princess Diana, the Princess of Wales, became the most famous Princess in the second half of the twentieth century.

Finally, a word about the risk of assassination which accompanied both Obama's campaign for the presidency and the love affair between Diana and Dodi. The official level of security which was assigned to protect candidate Barack Obama was raised as his chances of winning improved. There was nevertheless considerable anxiety among African Americans and others that White racial extremists in the United States would be tempted to kill Barack Obama rather than permit him to be elected President of the United States.

Candidate Barack Obama was asked repeatedly in press interviews if he feared for his life in his bid for the US presidency. His wife Michelle was asked comparable questions about the safety of her husband. Their standard answer was that they had lived in Chicago, where a man could be killed on his way to the local grocery.

Official security for Diana, the Princess of Wales declined as she became more and more alienated from Buckingham Palace. Indeed, the emphasis shifted from protecting Diana's life with a bodyguard to protecting Diana from the paparazzi, the swarms of photographers and reporters who followed her around.

Once she started dating Dodi, Diana's security became a concern more for the Al-Fayed family than for Buckingham Palace. Indeed, Dodi's Egyptian family began to fear for Dodi's own life as right-wing British extremists' disapproval of the love affair became more and more manifest. Long before the road accident in Paris which killed the lovers, Dodi's billionaire father in London, the senior Al-Fayed, was reported to have expressed his anxiety about the security of Dodi and Diana to the British police.

After the tragic motor "accident," Dodi's father became more convinced that the British Royal Family was itself in some way implicated. Mr. Al-Fayed went public with his accusations against the British Royal family. Investigations were conducted in both Britain and France, but the final conclusion was that the car crash in Paris had indeed been an accident and not a case of homicide.

About ten years later Barack Obama was elected President of the United States. Anxiety about his personal safety increased, and was compounded when anti-Obama rallies sometimes included men openly carrying guns. Indeed, anti-Obama extremist rallies carried banners which accused President Obama of being the equivalent of Adolf Hitler or V. I. Lenin. Another potential threat of assassination came from those who claimed that since Obama was allegedly "born in Africa" he was not constitutionally qualified to be President of the United States. This sub-category of Obamaphobes were called "birthers" because they attempted to render Obama illegitimate by inventing a foreign place of birth. In reality Barack Obama was born in Hawaii on August 4, 1961. Proof of his birth in Hawaii was never in doubt during the election; and the birth certificate was readily available for public display if required.

The physical safety of Barack Obama and the security of the biracial lovers in Paris were compromised by racial vulnerabilities. Dodi and Diana did eventually perish, but more likely as a result of an accident than by a contrived assassination. Barack Obama is still alive and well, but there is no room for complacency about his safety. Being of a lighter complexion might have helped him become President, but Obama is still Black enough to be at risk among Negrophobe extremists:

The blood of experience meanders on,
In the vast expanse of the valley of time.
The new is come and the old is gone,
And life abides a changing clime.

NOTE

1. Alex Haley, *Roots* (Vanguard Press, 2007).

III.

The Politics of Gender

Chapter 3.1

The African Renaissance: A Triple Legacy of Skills, Values, and Gender

The African Renaissance in the twenty-first century has to start from the African balance-sheet in the twentieth century. Technological and environmental thoughts in Africa have come through three different civilizations—the indigenous, the Islamic and the Western. In the twentieth century, technological advancement was often at the expense of environmental preservation. Was the tension between technology and the environment peculiar to the Western legacy in Africa—or was the tension also characteristic of the African and Islamic legacies as well? Scientific conferences in Africa tend to show considerable technophilia (love of technology) and very little technophobia (fear and hate of technology). We have manifested some ecophilia (love of the ecology) and no ecophobia (fear of the ecology) in African, Islamic or Western worldviews operating in Africa. Have we gotten the balance right?

In the Africa of the twentieth century, the Western legacy of technology got increasingly powerful. Western versions of technological advancement were not always environment-friendly. Could Western technology be held ethically and environmentally accountable through the values of Africanity and Islam?

In the twenty-first century, Africa's triple heritage (Africanity, Islam and Westernism) may need to restore a healthier equilibrium on the two issues of technology and the environment in Africa's experience. That might have to be one of the starting points of the African Renaissance. The second starting point of the African Renaissance has a different triad—and involves three major revolutions in thought and attitudes. In this chapter, I shall pay special attention to this second triple configuration.

The African Renaissance requires three major revolutions: a revolution in skills, a revolution in values and a revolution in gender-relations, in relations

between men and women. The power of skills arises because by the end of the twentieth century international stratification and influence are based not on who owns what, but on who knows what.

In apartheid South Africa, relatively few Whites reduced a continent of five hundred million people to political impotence for nearly fifty years. The skills of Whites kept Blacks in subjugation for decades.

In the Middle East Israelis are outnumbered by the Arabs; they are out-spaced, out-wealthed and out-incomed. Because Israelis have out-skilled the Arabs, the Jewish state has been supreme. The Israelis have won virtually every Arab-Israeli war since 1948, not because 80 percent Israelis are Jews but because over 40 percent are European Jews—with the skills of European culture. If Israel had consisted of only Middle Eastern Jews, there would have been only one Arab-Israeli conflict—that of 1948—and the Arabs would have won it by sheer force of numbers. The skill differential between Middle Eastern Arab and Middle Eastern Jew was far less than between Arabs and European Jews.

Skills often need science and technology at different levels. How people respond to science and technology is ultimately conditioned by culture. If the African Renaissance would like to make Africa a more scientific and technologically responsive region of the world, attention has to be paid to the functions of culture in society. The very definitions of words like “development” and “modernization” are themselves rooted in values and norms.

Let us confront issues like culture, development modernization, and dependency frontally. What do they all mean? What is their significance for African societies? Let us first deal with the complex role of culture.

1. Culture is relevant for development because of the seven functions which culture plays in society. When culture functions as a lense of perception, it influences how people view themselves and their environment. How scientific are a people’s perception of life? For example, African cultural concepts of immortality have influenced attitudes regarding family-size and population growth. Many Africans believe that no person is really dead for as long as the person’s blood flows in the veins of the living. Having many children therefore improves a parent’s chances of immortality. Religion rather than science are at play.

Translated in modern terms, no person is really dead as long as the person’s genes are still among the living. It is therefore rational to maximize one’s genetic legacy by having many children. This conception of immortality has contributed towards making population growth in Africa the fastest in the world, with implications for development—for better or for worse. However, rapid population growth has environmental consequences. Africa has to balance love of children with concern for ecology.

2. Another function of culture is when it serves as a spring of motivation. What people respond to as incentives or disincentives for certain patterns of behavior is a phenomenon which is greatly influenced by culture. The pursuit of science by school children needs particular motivation. The work ethic is very often a product of such cultural configurations as Max Weber’s concept of “the

Protestant ethic” the more recent phenomenon of workaholic behavior among Japanese executives.¹

Is the work ethic in Africa cultivated or stifled by culture? Has the work ethic been damaged by the consequences of the colonial experience? Is the work ethic among African women stronger than among African men? Culturally, have African men been damaged more by colonialism than African women? Needless to say, the work ethic has enormous implications for development and the African Renaissance. In the final analysis, the work ethic is a cultural imperative. If science progresses by a lot of thought, technology advances by a lot of labor.

3. Culture also serves as a standard of Judgment. What is right or wrong, what is virtuous or evil, what is beautiful or ugly are all greatly conditioned by culture. What constitutes corruption? Why is taking a chicken to a Chief in traditional society acceptable as a form of salutation but rejected as bribery in modern society? Is the problem of corruption in Africa compounded by the clash of standards of judgment between the traditional and the modern?² Is moral fluidity itself a consequence of a clash of cultures? The African Renaissance has to address the problem of ethical standards, including corruption.

4. The fourth function of culture is in terms of its role as the basis of stratification. Rank, caste, and class are all profoundly conditioned by, if not created by, culture. How highly does the culture evaluate scientists and scholars? There is in addition traditional gender stratification. In most sub-Saharan traditional cultures, women were culturally supposed to have a triple custodial role—as custodians of fire, water, and earth.

As custodian of fire the sub-Saharan African woman finds herself in charge of rural Africa’s most important source of domestic energy—firewood. She treks long distances to collect it. As custodian of water, the African woman ensures water supply for the home and for the extended family. Again she often walks a mile or two to the lake or river (unless a well is more readily available).

As for the woman’s role as custodian of earth, this is linked to the concept of dual fertility—the fertility of the womb (woman as mother) and the fertility of the soil (woman as cultivator). In many African countries even today women are the majority of the farmers—as well as being major suppliers of domestic water and firewood.

What role does culture allocate to men? In societies of mixed husbandry, males (both boys and men) are in charge of the larger domestic animals like cattle or camels. Some cultures allocate responsibility for all domestic mammals (goats, sheep, etc.) to male—leaving only poultry in the hands of women. Men cut down trees so that women can use branches for firewood. Men go to cities or mines to work for wage-labor while their womenfolk remain on the farm.

A new division of labor emerged with some colonial economies—women cultivated food-crops like yam and maize while men took charge of cash crops like cocoa, cotton and coffee. But in places like Karicho in Kenya, it is still women who pick the tea-leaves at harvest time. It is considerations such as these which make cultural awareness indispensable for effective development plan-

ning. As Gottstein has put it, in another context, “We are pleading for a development policy that is socio-culturally informed.”³

5. The fifth function of culture serves as means of communication. Culture provides all sorts of nuances in communication and intimation. Above all, culture provides language in the literal sense of the legacy of words and lexicon. We shall return to this function of culture more fully in relation to the potential of indigenous African languages in development. Can any country approximate first rank economic development if it relies overwhelmingly on foreign languages for its discourse on development and transformation and in education?⁴ Will Africa ever effectively take off when it is held hostage so tightly to the languages of its former imperial powers? We shall return to this theme later in this analysis.

6. The sixth function of culture is precisely in defining production and consumption and influencing them. Cultures differ widely in productivity not only in the world as a whole but also within Africa. Are the Kikuyu in Kenya really more productive than the Maasai? Are the Igbo in Nigeria really more productive than the Tiv? Do cultures differ in how they take to science and technology? Are the differences within the values of the groups? Clearly development planners cannot ignore such considerations. In the United States, Korean Americans take to mathematics faster than even Euro-Americans.

7. This brings us to the final function of culture—which is culture as a basis of identity. Culture is crucial in defining the “we” and the “they” and marking the frontiers of solidarity. Indeed, what constitutes a Kikuyu or a Maasai, a Berber or an Arab, an Igbo or a Tiv, is preeminently a function of such cultural variables as lineage-systems, kinship and language. How can development tap into the fountains of identity to achieve results? And how do differences between men and women affect issues of identity?

These then are the seven functions of culture—as lenses of perception, spring of motivation, standard of judgment, basis of stratification, means of communication, patterns of production and consumption, and culture as a basis of identity. Whether development likes it or not, it is caught up in the complex configuration of those seven functions of culture.⁵ Therefore the African Renaissance in science and technology has to respond to them.

However, our conceptual problems are by no means over. We still have to grapple with what the process of development is all about. There are issues of definition, process, and goals involved. Let us look more closely.

BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

What is development? The African Renaissance has to deal with that. One possible answer is that development is modernization minus dependency. But what is modernization? One possible answer is that modernization is change, which is compatible with the present stage of human knowledge, which seeks to comprehend the legacy of the past, which is sensitive to the needs of the future, and

which is increasingly aware of its global context.⁶ This is the positive interpretation of modernization. Skills and values are at the core.

If development equals modernization minus dependency, and we have defined modernization, what then is dependency?⁷ Dependency could mean either surplus need or deficit control. Country B is dependent on country A if country B needs country A more than the other way around (surplus need). Another sense of dependency is deficit control. Country B is dependent on country A if country B has less control over their relationship than country A has.

Where does culture enter into this? If development equals modernization minus dependency, there is no doubt about the relevance of the African Renaissance in at least that part of the equation, which concerns “minus dependence.” African culture is central to this process of reducing dependency in the dialectic of modernization.

RENAISSANCE AND INDIGENIZATION

One strategy of transcending dependency is indigenization. This includes greater utilization of indigenous techniques, personnel, and approaches to purposeful change. Indigenized modernization would include greater use of African languages in the pursuit of scientific, economic, and constitutional change. As stated earlier, no country has ascended to a first rank technological and economic power by excessive dependence on foreign languages. Japan rose to dazzling industrial heights by scientifying the Japanese language and making it the medium of its own industrialization. Korea has approximately scientified the Korean language and made it the medium of its own technological takeoff. Can Africa ever takeoff technologically if it remains so overwhelmingly dependent on European languages for discourse in advanced learning?⁸ Can Africa look to the future if it is not adequately sensitive to the cultural past? Culture as communication and culture as production need to converge. Israel resurrected a dead language—Hebrew—and made it a language of modern efficiency.

When two Japanese physicists meet to discuss a problem in physics, it is now possible for them to discuss it in the Japanese language. When two African economists (let alone physicists) meet to discuss economics, even if they come from the same linguistic group in Africa, the chances are that they can only discuss advanced economics or physics in a European language. This lingo-cultural gap may be disastrous for reducing dependency in Africa’s experience. This gap may also delay the full maturation of Africa’s scientific genius.

In the twentieth century, no language is automatically a scientific language, but every language is automatically a poetic language. African languages need to be made purposefully more scientific. Just as with poetry, the focus should not be on the language of poetry but on the poets themselves—not on making the language artificially more poetic, but on making the poets more naturally productive and engaged. The two policies of scientification of African languages and support for African poets and writers have to be jointly pursued as part of long-term national development. Culture as communication and culture as iden-

tity should find a meeting point in literature. Languages rich in the metaphors of poetry are languages that can also stimulate the scientific mind. The imagination that innovates in science is related to the imagination that envisions in poetry.

Three Africans have won the Nobel Prize for literature since 1986. It was possible for an Egyptian Arab, Naguib Mahfuz, to win it for literature written in his native Arabic.⁹ It was possible for a South African White, Nadine Gordimer, to win the Nobel Prize for books written in her native European language.¹⁰ It was not, however, possible for the only Black laureate Wole Soyinka, to win the Nobel prize for literature written in his native Yoruba. Soyinka could only be in the running for the prize through the imperial language of the Other.¹¹ Europe's linguistic domination of sub-Saharan African cultures is more uncompromising than Europe's domination of, say, the Arab world. Is this a case of culture as stratification? Is this a rank order of races or a stratification of cultures?

A Japanese may win the Nobel Literary Prize for works written in Japanese; a South Asian for masterly use of Bengali, Urdu or Hindi; a Frenchman for the genius of the French language; and an Egyptian did win the prize for creative accomplishments in Arabic.

However, for the foreseeable future, the Nobel Prize for literature is unlikely to be awarded for brilliant use of an indigenous African language. Are we waiting for modernization to come? Or are we waiting for dependence to leave? In this domain, the linguistic *Other* has precluded the linguistic *Self* from ever being noticed as being of literary relevance. Is this "great chain of being" racial or cultural?

Rabindranath Tagore won the Nobel Prize in 1913 when India was still decidedly a British dependency. The works for which he won the Nobel Prize were in Indian languages, especially Bengali. He created literature from his linguistic womb. In Africa, the Euro-Other still inhabits the Afro-Self. When does race end and culture begin? They say African languages are not modernized enough. Or is this a case of Africa itself not being independent enough? In either case the full flowering of skills has been slowed down.

When Tagore won the Nobel Prize for literature written in Bengali before the first intra-civilizational war (World War I) it must have looked like a major step towards a Concert of Cultures, a step towards a partnership of civilizations. Even after making allowances for the influence of W. B. Yeats behind the Nobel scenes, even after allowing for the fact that the award of the prize was probably aided by the fact that Tagore had personally translated a number of his works into English, the award signaled not a clash of civilizations but the potentialities of parity of esteem across cultural divides.¹²

But progress in cultural parity since Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize has been slow and painful. The functions of culture in almost every society continue to feel the hegemony of Western power and the omnipresence of Western civilization. In every society women are the trustees of indigenous languages. Mothers transmit the mother tongue from generation to generation. A linguistic revolution in Africa will need to be reinforced by a gender revolution.

RENAISSANCE AND RELEVANCE

Next to indigenization as a strategy for transcending dependency is the related strategy of domestication. This second strategy involves making imported institutions like laboratories more relevant to Africa. For example, the Western-style University is basically a foreign institution in Africa, and yet every African country has attempted to reproduce it, often in unabashed imitativeness. Some of those African campuses were previously overseas extensions of European universities. Makerere in Uganda, Legon in Ghana and Ibadan in Nigeria started as overseas colonial extensions of the University of London, producing graduates with degrees of the British university. Université Lovanium in the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) was conceptually an extension of Louvain University in Belgium.¹³ The oldest universities in Africa are in Arab Africa. Egypt, and Morocco have institutions a thousand years old.

In most of Africa universities are, however, young. The strategy of domestication involved trying to make those African extensions more and more relevant to Africa in terms of the subjects they taught, the methods they used, the goals they sought to realize, and the actual people who taught the courses and made policy. In reality it has not been easy to Africanize African universities or the contents of their science curricula. In fact, many of them are now decaying, partly because they were not adequately relevant to the needs of their societies, and partly because they were not culturally designed in the image of their societies.¹⁴ They remained "undomesticated" in our terms.¹⁵ Most are neither culturally relevant through the arts nor developmentally relevant through science and technology. Skills are stifled.

If indigenization includes greater use of indigenous languages, domestication includes making the Euro-imperial languages and educations in Africa more relevant for African needs. The imperial culture of perception needs to be changed. Instead of using the French language to promote French culture and civilization, domestication would make the French language a servant of African culture and literature.¹⁶ Great African novels in French are achievements in domestication. The French language can also be used to serve and promote Arab culture in North Africa as well.

In secondary schools in Africa the literature taught to many African children is sometimes still European literature. What is more to the point is that the African literature taught to African school children is almost never in indigenous languages. The European Other haunts the African Self from a young age in a post-colonial school. Have we been witnessing a clash of civilizations in African schools? Or does literature provide a cover for dependency?

The format of the literature is also often heavily European-derived. The novel is of course, a European invention in any case, but even other literary genres in Africa have been profoundly affected by the legacy of colonialism.

Is this a clash of cultures in the classroom? Is it racism in disguise? Or a hopeful beginning of cultural convergence? Alamin M. Mazrui has reminded us that three of Shakespeare's plays have been translated into Kiswahili—*Julius*

Caesar, *The Merchant of Venice* and *Macbeth*.¹⁷ Shakespeare is being “domesticated” by President Julius Nyerere translating the first two—*Julius Caesar* and *The Merchant of Venice*. Why has there been no African President to translate Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* or *The Descent of Man*? We translate great Western works of literature into Kiswahili but not great Western works of science.

When he was a child, Apollo Obote of Uganda adopted the name Milton Obote out of admiration for John Milton, the author of *Paradise Lost*. While we now have an African President who became Milton Obote out of admiration of the great Western poet, we have no African President who became *Newton* Obote out of admiration of a great Western physicist.

What has not been translated into Kiswahili even among Shakespeare’s plays is the only play by Shakespeare with a *Black hero*, albeit a tragic hero. Why has it not been translated? Because in the play a Black man was married to a White woman, Desdemona. What is more, the Black hero killed the White woman in a fit of jealousy. The villain of the play is a White man, Iago, who manipulated Othello’s jealousies. The play is, of course, *Othello*.¹⁸ The character Othello was a Diaspora African.

Why did not Julius Nyerere translate the only Shakespearean play with a Black hero into Kiswahili? Why was not Nyerere’s compatriot, Samuel Mushi, fascinated by *Othello’s wife*, the fair Desdemona? We are still in the shadow of colonial dependency. Without realizing it, neither Julius Nyerere nor Samuel Mushi had confronted what colonial education had left out of their Shakespearean agenda—*Othello*. This play was virtually never featured in the syllabus of Cambridge School Certificate for the British coloured Empire. Colonial education was also sparing on technology and engineering.

Nyerere and Mushi did not translate *Othello* mainly because it was not part of the Shakespeare corpus to which they were exposed in their colonial textbooks. “Domesticating” Shakespeare in Africa has had its colonial limits. The subtle censorship of imperial racism had censored a tempestuous love affair between a White woman and Black man. If Alamin Mazrui’s research findings are correct, these Swahili translations of *Julius Caesar*, *The Merchant of Venice* and *Macbeth* have now become legitimized as part of Swahili literature itself (rather than simply as Swahili translations of foreign literature).¹⁹

Is this a deeper domestication of Shakespeare and a hopeful trend towards cultural synthesis? Is this another arena where the Euro-Other inhabits the Afro-Self? Why should translated Shakespeare become Swahili literature proper?

Here a comparison is appropriate with the *Rubayat of Omar Khayyam* by Edward Fitzgerald (1859). Although Khayyam was a Persian, the *Rubayat* is definitely part of English literature. Is this the equivalent of Nyerere’s translation of *Julius Caesar* becoming part of Swahili literature? Of course, the main difference was that the *Rubayat of Omar Khayyam* was not a translation. Fitzgerald breathed his own literary genius into an independent interpretation of the world view of the Persian poet of the 12th century, “*A jug of wine, a loaf of bread and thou*”; “*The moving finger writes, and having writ moves on. . .*”²⁰

A mere translation of *The Merchant of Venice*, on the other hand, should not give us a piece of Swahili literature. Only an indifference to Shakespearean literal authenticity and a readiness to engage in a drastic Swahili reinterpretation of the play would have justified enlisting the work within the corpus of Swahili literature. Only then would it have been cultural synthesis—and a deeper domestication of Shakespeare.

Nevertheless, a great area for cultural domestication is precisely such translations of distinguished foreign works into African languages. Civilization has grown out of mutual intellectual and cultural stimulation. Under another strategy we shall later refer to the need to make African cultural achievements available abroad. But under this strategy of domestication, the most relevant translations are from foreign to indigenous languages. Machiavelli has already been translated into Kiswahili, but the translation is not widely available. There is a crying need for the translation of Charles Darwin's *Origins of Species*.

Much more widely used are those Swahili translations of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, *The Merchant of Venice* and *Macbeth*. If modernization includes the trend towards globalization, the Africanization of Shakespeare is part of the process of wider modernization. But gender should always be taken into account. The strongest character in the play *Macbeth* is a woman—Lady Macbeth. Unfortunately her strength carries her to ruthlessness—usually a preserve of the male of the species.

RENAISSANCE AND DIVERSIFICATION

A third strategy for transcending dependency is that of diversification. In agricultural production that could mean diversifying the range of crops which a country cultivates for both domestic consumption and export. Nor should there be a division of labor between food crops grown by women and cash crops cultivated by men. It could mean diversifying a country's markets abroad, to make sure that the country is not too dependent on one or two overseas outlets for its products. Multilateral aid is a form of diversification as compared with bilateral aid. During the Cold War nonaligned countries were even able to diversity their "masters," playing one against the other. African countries were strategically important in superpower competition.²¹ Competitive imperialism, like that of the Cold War, can sometimes give smaller countries more space to maneuver than monopolistic imperialism allows.

Africa must also diversify the foreign cultures from which it seeks to learn. There is excessive reliance on the West as the only Other. And yet what is there in Japanese culture which enabled Japan to beat Westerners at their own industrial game? In 1868, after the Meiji restoration, the Japanese asked themselves: "Can we technologically modernize without culturally westernizing?" They embarked on a crusade of selective industrialization under the slogan of "Western technique, Japanese spirit."²² Fifty years later, they had become a technological power to reckon with. Their culture of motivation was highly stimulated. What was there in Japanese culture additionally, which enabled them to remain so

Japanese culturally and still pull off an industrial miracle before World War II? How did culture as identity and culture as production converge? To some extent—and relevant for Africa—education played a role in this convergence, although not without conflict.²³

After World War II, Japan was briefly occupied by the Americans following Japanese surrender after the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the occupation ended seven years later, Japan started its second industrial miracle—less culturally selective than the first, but even more technologically triumphant.²⁴ What was there in Japanese culture which made such miracles happen?

Of course, Japanese industrialization has not been without its costs. The culture of production has been allied to Japan's culture of stratification. The environment has often paid dearly, the Japanese women have remained marginalized, and the ethnic minorities in the country have been exploited without adequate recognition. Corruption, a secretive bureaucracy, and political instability—none of which are foreign to Africa—are also negative features in Japan.²⁵ Nevertheless, Africa needs to look eastward towards the Japanese experience, as well as northwards towards Europe and westward towards North America, for cultural insights relevant to modernization and development.

Africa should also swallow its pride and look more closely at countries like South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and others in Asia which had the same per capita income as Ghana in 1957 and which have since left most of Africa far behind in per capita income and industrial growth.²⁶ Recent setbacks notwithstanding, to what extent are the economic achievements of the Asian "Tiger" due to cultural factors?²⁷ Can foreign cultures be studied for lessons that are relevant for others? Can foreign sexism be studiously avoided?

Of course Africa has been studying Western culture for decades in the hope of stimulating its development. It is time that Africa diversified the cultural models to examine for the developmental lessons.²⁸ Such diversification may help reduce Africa's dependency upon the West in other areas of endeavor as well.

RENAISSANCE AND WIDER INTEGRATION

A fourth strategy in the fight against that dependency is the strategy of horizontal interpenetration and regional integration. This involves not only continental integration within Africa but also South-South integration as well. Pan-Africanism therefore becomes an instrument of horizontal Southern integration and it is partly rooted in cultural and racial identification.²⁹ The culture of identity is central. Horizontal interpenetration could also mean South-South cooperation.

In reality, Pan-Movements are born out of a combination of nightmare and dream, anguish and vision. What was the nightmare and the dream which released the forces which culminated in the formation of the European Union as a success story?

Pan-Europeanism had two parents—poetry and war. The poetry provided the vision and the sensibilities of being European; war provided the practical impetus either through conquest (as European nations expanded and contracted) or through a desire to avoid some future war. That was the combination of nightmare and dream.

After the World War II, the Schuman Plan, and the European Coal and Steel Community illustrated the creation of deliberate Pan-European interdependence to avoid the future risk of war. The Cold War both divided Europe (between east and west) and united Europe within each camp. Once again nightmare and dream played their paradoxical integrative roles. The poetry of Pan-Europeanism goes back at least to the European Renaissance, as Europeans were stimulated by a new sense of shared civilization. By the time of the French Revolution from 1789 onwards, William Wordsworth across the Channel in England, could proclaim passionately: “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very heaven.”³⁰

However, the French Revolution was a combination of both poetry and war—the two major stimuli of Pan-Europeanism. The French Revolution was both nightmare and dream.

Does Pan-Africanism have a comparable stimulus of poetry amid war? The real stimulus for Pan-Africanism has been the combined power of poetry and imperialism, rather than poetry and war.³¹ The poetry includes legends of past heroes and makers of history. More recently there have been two schools of Pan-African cultural nationalism—romantic primitivism and romantic glorianna.

Romantic primitivism celebrates what is simple about Africa. It is also a form of technophobia, a distrust of technology. It salutes the cattle-herder rather than the castle-builder. Among those who dig deep into the African soil are African women. This form of ecophilia celebrates women’s nearness to nature. It also manifests some technophobia.

On the other hand, romantic gloriana celebrates Africa’s more complex achievements. It salutes such technological achievements as the pyramids of Egypt, the towering structures of Aksum, the sunken churches of Lalibela, the brooding majesty of Great Zimbabwe, and the castles of Gonder. Romantic gloriana is a tribute to Africa’s empires and kingdoms, Africa’s scientific inventors and discoverers. It also salutes great Shaka Zulu rather than the unknown peasant. There is technophilia in romantic gloriana, a celebration of technology. Culture as identity and culture as stratification are intertwined.

Both forms of Pan-African cultural nationalism were a response to European imperialism and its cultural arrogance. Europeans said that Africans were simple, unskilled, and invented nothing. That was an alleged fact. Europeans also said that those who were simple and invented nothing were uncivilized. That was a value judgment.

Romantic primitivism accepted Europe’s alleged facts about Africa (i.e., that Africa was simple and invented nothing) but rejected Europe’s value judgment (that Africa was therefore uncivilized). Simplicity was one version of civilization, Romantic primitivism said:

Hooray for those who never invented anything
Who never discovered anything. . .³²

Romantic gloriana, on the other hand, rejected Europe's alleged facts about Africa (that Africa was simple and invented nothing) but seems to have accepted Europe's values (that civilization is to be measured by complexity and invention).

The same country in Africa can produce both types of Pan-African nationalists. Senegal's Léopold Senghor has been a major thinker and poet in the negritude school.³³ Negritude is associated with romantic primitivism. Senghor's most hotly debated statement is: "Emotion is black. . . Reason is Greek." Emotion is also female. Is Black epistemology the same as female intuition—"I feel therefore I am?"

On the other hand, the late Cheikh Anta Diop, Senegal's Renaissance Man who died in 1986, belonged more to the gloriana school. He spent much of his life demonstrating Africa's contributions to global civilization.³⁴ He was most emphatic that the civilization of pharaonic Egypt was a Black civilization.³⁵ This was all in the grand Pan-African tradition of romantic gloriana, steeped in technophilia.

What of the reality of Africa? It was a fusion of the simple and the complex, the male and female, as well as the cattle-herder and the castle-builder. It was more than romantic primitivism and romantic gloriana. Real Pan-Africanism must go beyond the twin stimuli of poetry and imperialism.

Pan-Africanism of economic integration will be led by southern Africa with the new community which has added South Africa to the old Southern African Development Community (SADC) fraternity. The success of this economic sub-regional integration will be partly because one member of the new economic fraternity (Southern African Development Community [SADC]),³⁶ the Republic of South Africa, is more equal than the others. A pivotal state [a technological vanguard] often helps to assure the success of regional integration. But a shared sense of Africanity will also be needed to sustain SADC. The culture of identity needs to be allied to political stratification in the quest for economic development.

The old European Economic Community soon after 1958 survived partly because some members were definitely more equal than others. Again, here was political stratification. The Franco-German axis was, under Charles de Gaulle, more "Franco" than German. But now German economic and industrial might has restored the balance in the new European Union. However, a shared European culture was also needed all along to sustain unification. The culture of identity was invoked.

Similarly, southern Africa has the advantage of having one member indisputably "the first among equals"—the Republic of South Africa with its credentials of size and technology. The pivotal power is the premise of regional survival. But a regional identity has to be culturally strengthened to sustain long-term unity.

Pan-Africanism of lingo-cultural integration will probably be led by East Africa with its good fortune of a region-wide indigenous language—the role of Kiswahili binding Tanzania, Kenya, to some extent Uganda, Somalia, and potentially Rwanda, Burundi, and Eastern Zaire. Northern Mozambique and Malawi are also feeling Swahili influence.³⁷

Swahili is spoken by more people than any other indigenous language of Africa. It will hit its first 100 million people early in the twenty-first century, if not sooner. Kiswahili is expanding more rapidly than any other lingua franca in the continent.³⁸ Is it also becoming the first East African language to bear the burden of a scientific vocabulary?

Pan-Africanism of political integration will probably be led by North Africa. There is (in good times) already a kind of economic cooperation fraternity binding five countries—Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. The economic cooperation has been limping along. However, Egypt has sometimes expressed an interest in joining this movement towards greater North African regional integration.³⁹ The sub-region is still a long way from political integration, but it is the best place in Africa for such an adventure—since it shares a religion (Islam), a language (Arabic), a culture (Arabo-Berber) and a substantial shared history across centuries.

Part of the stimulus for North Africa's integration will be European integration. The economies of North Africa and Southern Europe are to some extent competitive. The deeper integration of countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece into an enlarged European Union is ringing economic alarm bells in North Africa. This could help Pan-Africanism in Arab Africa.

Pan-Africanism of military integration is likely to be led by West Africa—with the precedent set by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In spite of the difficulties and inconclusiveness of ECOMOG's attempted rescue operation in Liberia, the effort has been a major pioneering enterprise in the history of Pax-Africana. In Sierra Leone, Nigeria has also claimed to be acting on behalf of ECOMOG in the effort to restore and maintain power in the elected government in the face of military threats.

This issue is precisely the Achilles' heel of Pan Africanism as a whole. Who will keep the peace in Africa as we approach the end of the millennium? Many skills and institutions will be needed. What will also be needed to sustain those institutions will be greater and greater horizontal integration and cultural synthesis. Again a culture of identity needs to be tapped for regional cooperation.

COUNTER-PENETRATION:

A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR RENAISSANCE

The fifth strategy for fighting dependency is that of counter-penetration. This strategy involves infiltrating the infiltrators—counter-penetrating the citadels of power. Since we have defined modernization partly in terms of sensitivity to

one's global context, counter-penetrating the powerful is a search for a more balanced globalization. It is a quest for a more symmetrical interdependence.

In the second half of the twentieth century, Japan has so convincingly counter-penetrated European and North American markets that it is no longer clear who is exploiting whom. During the eighties there was much hysteria in the United States and fears about Japanese command over the US economy as the Japanese made major investments in some leading film studios and landmark American buildings.⁴⁰

South Korea's counter penetration of the American economy has also been impressive, though on a much smaller scale. Recently, however, the investments of South Korean companies in US companies appear to be in some trouble.⁴¹ Has China counter-penetrated the United States by stealing its nuclear secrets? Did a Pakistani scientist previously counter-penetrate the nuclear secrets of the Netherlands? Scientific skills of the North can be stolen if necessary.

It is also possible for a Third World country to use its raw materials as a source of influence in the world rather than as a basis of dependency. For a brief decade (1973–1983) the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exerted some leverage on the world economy on a significant scale. Petropower from the Third World briefly counter-penetrated the commanding heights of the world economy.⁴²

Then there is demographic counter-penetration. Irish Americans are a demographic lobby for Irish interests in the United States; Jewish Americans are a demographic lobby for the state of Israel. Some African Americans like those who support TransAfrica, are a demographic lobby for Africa on Capitol Hill. All of these are cases of demographic counter-penetration. So is the case of African professors with Africa as their academic disciplines teaching young Americans in US colleges and universities.

Progress is being made in the teaching of courses on African literature, African art, African philosophy and African aesthetics in Western colleges and universities.⁴³ One day particular African works will no doubt be included in courses on world civilization, and not merely in courses on African culture. Westerners may also learn afresh about Africa's role in the history of science and technology across the centuries.

Making African culture available on equitable terms to the wider world could also be not only counter-penetrative but also modernizing for that wider world. The globalization of African culture is a modernizing imperative, provided it is done without exploiting Africa.

TOWARDS ANDROGINIZING MODERNITY: A CONCLUSION

We have re-defined the once discredited concept of modernization to mean change which is consistent with the present stage of human knowledge, which seeks to comprehend the legacy of the past, which is sensitive to the needs of future generations, and which is responsive to its global context.

We have defined development as modernization minus dependency. But what is dependency? It is either surplus need or deficit control. Country B is dependent on country A if country B needs country A more than A needs B (hence surplus need). Alternatively, dependency is a situation in which country B has less control over its relationship with country A than country A has (hence deficit control).

Androgynization is a process of conferring both female and male characteristics to a phenomenon. Only sixty-seven percent of school-age girls in sub-Saharan Africa are in school at all. Only twenty-three percent enter secondary school. And only three percent find their way into higher education via tertiary colleges and universities. Among the young women who finally do go to universities, only a small fraction do science and technology—a mere three percent in a country like Chad (on the lower side) and up to twenty-eight percent in South Africa (the highest percent of females).⁴⁴ It is, however, worth noting that in South Africa a disproportionate number of the females are non-Black.

All over Africa, girls are routinely discouraged from engineering and science. Scientific and technological careers are widely regarded as the preserve of men. In the new century it is time to dissolve this superstition. Science and technology in Africa need to be androgynized. Does this have implications for the brain-drain? Migration in Africa's history has been disproportionately a masculine pattern. Men have migrated for jobs in mines, cities and across the seas. Will the brain-drain of women be at most half of the brain-drain of men? Do African women have greater cultural obligations tying them to their ancestral land? Should we educate more women scientists as one answer to the brain-drain?

UNESCO is currently funding a chair in women in science and technology at the University of Ghana and another at the University of Swaziland. The androgynization of the scientific profession needs this kind of support. UNESCO has also supported Helena Rubinstein's Awards for Women in Science—four prizes, each worth \$20,000, awarded every two years to exceptional women scientists in medicine, chemistry, zoology, botany, physics agrofood research and environmental studies. The search continues for female excellence, partly as an answer to wider problems of African societies which men have failed to solve.

In the sciences and technical professions in Africa, the dissemination and instruction should initially focus on the four traditional custodial roles of the African women:

1. Woman as Custodian of Fire:
The science of energy supplies, from firewood to petroleum and natural gas.
2. Woman as Custodian of Earth:
The science of agriculture with greater facilitation in credit access and equipment for women.
3. Woman as Custodian of Water:
The science of water-management and the role of women in water supply.

4. Woman as Home Manager:

A whole new science needs to be developed to make home management more efficient, cost-effective, and part of the wider computation of the Gross National Product of a given society.

These moves towards the empowerment of women in science may need to empower them in society also.

In terms of legislative empowerment, one scenario is in terms of gender reservation of seats. Let us say 15 percent reserved seats for women; and 85 percent open to both male and female contests.

- PHASE 1 The candidates would be women and the voters for these particular seats would also be exclusively women.
- PHASE 2 The candidates for these seats would still be women. The women candidates would thus have to address the concerns of men as well as women.
- PHASE 3 When female parliamentary candidates would be in sufficient numbers to stand a chance of winning without special gender-reservation of seats. Gender-reservation of seats would be abolished and women would compete on the common electoral role.

If development equals modernization minus dependency, how is the dependency to be subtracted from the modernization? We have suggested five strategies for ending or reducing dependency—indigenization, domestication, diversification, horizontal integration and counter-penetration. In all of them skills have interacted with values. Underlying them all is the continuing salience of culture and its seven functions—Culture as a lense of perception, as means of communication, as a basis of stratification, as a spring of motivation, as a standard of judgment, as a pattern of production and consumption and as the foundation of identity.

We have ranged from poetry to Pan-Africanism, from sculpture to the scientification of African languages. The “Muse of Modernity” is trying to articulate a stanza vibrant with Alexandrian echoes:

A little modernity is a dangerous thing
 Drink deep or taste not the Western spring.⁴⁵

What is needed is more of modernity and less of the Western spring. A non-Western route to modernity is possible for Africa—provided African culture is fully mobilized as an ally in the enterprise.

NOTES

1. For a discussion on the “Protestant Ethic,” see Hartmut Lehman and Guenther Roth, (eds.), *Weber’s Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Washington, DC,

Cambridge, UK, and New York: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 1993). In the eighties, there was concern over the level of workaholism among Japanese employees; consult, for example, "The Search for an Antidote to Workaholism," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (December 19, 1985). Atsuko Kanai, Mitsura Wakabayashi and Sheila Fling have also studied Japanese workaholism in their "Workaholism Among Employees in Japanese Corporations: An Examination Based on the Japanese Version of the Workaholism Scales," *Japanese Psychological Research*, Volume 38, No. 4 (November 1996), pp. 192–203.

2. For a study of bureaucratic corruption in Africa, consult Monday U. Ekpo, (ed.), *Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Search for Causes and Consequences* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979). Of course, the extent of bureaucratic corruption means that reforms—particularly those that threaten bureaucrats' patronage powers—are often resisted fiercely by many. See, for example, John M. Mbatia, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Policy Reform in Africa," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Volume 19, Number 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 149–175.

3. K. Gottstein, *Islamic Cultural Identity and Scientific Technological Development* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986), p. 117.

4. Alamin Mazrui has examined this question in some detail; see his "The World Bank, The Language Question, and the Future of African Education," *Race & Class*, Volume 38, No. 3 (January/March 1997), pp. 35–48.

5. This functional definition of culture was first discussed in Ali A. Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, (London and Portsmouth, NH: James Currey and Heinemann, 1990), pp. 7–8.

6. For a review of conceptual issues in modernization, see Vijai P. Singh, "Comparative Methodological Approaches in the Study of Modernization," in Mustafa O. Attir, Burkart Holzner, and Zdenek Suda, (eds.), *Directions of Change: Modernization Theory, Research, and Realities* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 39–45.

7. Some outstanding guides to dependency may be found in Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); J. Larraín, *Theories of Development* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987); and A. Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism. Second Edition* (London: Routledge, 1990). One of the newer critiques of dependency and modernization theory is a feminist critique; see Catherine V. Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

8. An overview of the nexus between politics and language policy in education may be found in Ruth Wodak and David Corson, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Language Education. Volume 1: Language Policy and Political Issues in Education* (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997); chapters 15 and 16 deal with African countries.

9. Mahfouz was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1988; for an assessment of this author, see Matti Moosa, "Naguib Mahfouz: Life in the Alley of Arab History," *Georgia Review* Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 224–230 and for a profile, see *ibid.*, pp. 216–219.

10. Gordimer won the 1991 Nobel Prize in Literature. For a profile, see *Georgia Review*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 272–274.

11. Soyinka received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Literature. For a review of reactions to Soyinka being awarded the Prize—particularly in the British press—see James Gibbs, "Prize and Prejudice," *Black American Literature Forum*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 449–465. For a profile of Soyinka, see *Georgia Review*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 167–170; Henry Louis Gates in his essay "Wole Soyinka: Mythopoesis and the Agony of Democracy," in *ibid.*, pp. 187–194, examines the politics of Soyinka in his literature.

12. An Indian profile of Tagore may be found in Maitreya Devi, *Rabindranath Tagore—The Man Behind His Poetry* (Calcutta: Sudhir Das, Nabajatak Printers, 1971).

13. An overview of the historical background of higher education may be found in J. F. Ade Ajayi et al., *The African Experience with Higher Education* (Accra, London, and Athens, OH: Association of African Universities, James Currey, and Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 1–143.

14. Adonis Hoffman has described this dismal state in “The Destruction of Higher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Journal of Blacks in Higher Education*, No. 10 (Winter 1995–1996), pp. 83–87.

15. See Ali A. Mazrui, “The African University as a Multinational Corporation,” *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (May 1975), pp. 191–210. See also Ali A. Mazrui, “Afrocentricity Versus Multiculturalism? A Dialectic in Search of a Synthesis.” James S. Coleman Annual Lecture, University of California, Los Angeles, May 5, 1993.

16. Some authors have been noted for this; see “Negritude is Beautiful Too,” *The Economist* (May 10, 1997), pp. 85–86.

17. Alamin M. Mazrui. “Shakespeare in Kenya Between English and Swahili Literature,” paper presented at annual meeting of the African Literature Association of the United States, Columbus, Ohio, March 17, 1995.

18. Recent discussions on Shakespeare’s treatment of the racial aspects of Othello include J. Adelman, “Iago’s Alter Ego. Race as Projection in ‘Othello,’” *Shakespeare Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 125–144, and M. Neill, “Unproper Beds: Race, Adultery and the Hideous in ‘Othello,’” *Shakespeare Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1989), pp. 383–412.

19. Alamin M. Mazrui. “Shakespeare in Kenya: Between English and Swahili Literature,” paper presented at annual meeting of the African Literature Association of the United States, Columbus, OH, March 17, 1995.

20. For a biography of Fitzgerald, see Alfred M. Terhune, *The Life of Edward Fitzgerald: Translator of the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press and G. Cumberledge, Oxford University Press, 1947).

21. An account of the superpower rivalry in Africa from the start of decolonization to the end of the Cold War may be found in Zaki Laidi. *The Superpowers in Africa: The Constraints of Rivalry, 1960–1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

22. For a discussion of the way in which Western technique was married to the Japanese spirit, and the perceptions of Japanese themselves on this, see Kawamura Nozoma, “The Concept of Modernization Re-examined from the Japanese Experience,” in Gavan McCormack and Yoshio Sugumoto, (eds.), *The Japanese Trajectory: Modernization and Beyond* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 264–283.

23. A description of the conflict between Japanese culture and Westernization in education can be found in Michio Nagai, “Westernization and Japanization: The Early Meiji Transformation of Education” in Donald H. Shively, (ed.), *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 35–76.

24. On the second industrial miracle, a good description is Anne Waswo, *Modern Japanese Society, 1868–1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 104–118.

25. A survey of some of the problems affecting Japan may be found in Peter W. Preston, “The Socio-Economic Problems of Contemporary Japan and the Limits of Political Reform,” *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (July/September 1995), pp. 195–204. Naturally, this was written before the more severe economic crisis that affected Japan in the late nineties.

26. A comparative study of the Ghanaian and South Korean development experience may be found in Herbert H. Werlin, “Ghana and South Korea: Explaining Development

Disparities—An Essay in Honor of Carl Rosberg,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 29, Nos. 3–4 (July/October 1994), pp. 205–225. Werlin stresses the lack of political will in the Ghanaian case.

27. The links between culture and economics in Asia are discussed in Timothy Brook and Hy V. Long, *Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997) and Robert W. Hefner, *Market Culture: Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).

28. For an interesting discussion of the role of culture and politics in development, see Herbert H. Werlin, “Politics Versus Culture: Which is Stronger?” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Volume 29, Number 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 3–24.

29. The section on Pan-Africanism in this paper is indebted to the author’s paper “Pan-Africanism: From Poetry to Power,” first delivered as the closing address to the conference on “Africa in the Contemporary World,” sponsored by Espace Afrique and Centre de Recherches Entreprises et Societies (CRES), Geneva, November 13–17, 1994.

30. These lines are taken from William Wordsworth’s *The Fourteen-Book Prelude*, Book XI, W. J. B. Owen, (ed.), (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 218.

31. One history of Pan-Africanism is P. O. Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1991* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1994).

32. Ibid.

33. For a bibliography on “negritude,” consult Colette V. Michael, *Negritude: An Annotated Bibliography* (West Cornwall, CT: Locust Hill Press, 1988). An English-language version of Senghor’s thoughts on negritude may be found in his *The Foundations of “Africanite” or “Negritude” and “Arabite”* (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1971).

34. A bibliography of Diop’s work may be found in Christopher Gray, *Conceptions of History in the Works of Cheik Anta Diop and Theophile Obenga* (London: Karnak House, 1989), pp. 109–113.

35. Consult, for instance, Cheik Anta Diop, *Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology* (Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991) and *Precolonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa: From Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States* (Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1987).

36. The transformation from SADCC to SADC was formally announced in August 1992: see Arthur S. Banks, Thomas Mueller, et al., (eds.), *Political Handbook of the World, 1998* (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1998), pp. 1161–1163.

37. For an overview of the Swahili language, consult R. E. Asher, (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, Vol. 8 (Oxford, UK: Pergamon Press, 1994), pp. 4421–4422.

38. For more on the origins, impact, and spread of Swahili, consult Ali A. Mazrui and Alamin M. Mazrui, *The Power of Babel: Language and Governance in the African Experience* (Oxford, Nairobi, Kampala, Cape Town, and Chicago: James Currey, E.A.E.P., Fountain Publishers, David Philip Publishers, and University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 125–140 and pp. 60–191.

39. This grouping is called the Arab Maghreb Union. See Banks and Mueller, *Political Handbook of the World 1998*, pp. 1065–1066.

40. For one view of Japanese influence on the US economy, see Gary R. Saxonhouse, “Sony Side Up: Japan’s Contributions to the US Economy,” *Policy Review*, Number 56 (Spring 1991), pp. 60–64; for a historical view, consult Mira Wilkins, “Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 1879–1990,” *Business History Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter 1990), pp. 585–629.

41. *Wall Street Journal*, (April 10, 1998), p. A8.

42. A profile of OPEC's role may be found in Ian Skeet, *OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

43. Non-western literature, philosophy, and art face some resistance from those in the academy who feel that it does not meet "standards"; but there is also countervailing pressure from those who feel that these "standards" reflect the old beliefs of a Eurocentric hegemony in the academy which felt that only Europeans had scaled the heights of knowledge.

44. See *Africa Recovery* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information), Vol. 12, No. 4 (April 1999), pp. 30–31.

45. This is a paraphrasing of Alexander Pope's famous thought:

A little learning is a dangerous thing.
 Drink deep or taste not the Pyrean spring.

These lines can be found in "Essay on Criticism" (1711); see Pat Rogers, (ed.), *Alexander Pope* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 6.

Chapter 3.2

Language Planning and Gender Planning: Some African Perspectives

Language planning is usually part of wider social engineering and is used in order to achieve other goals such as political participation or national integration. Are there occasions when there is an inversion of cause and effect—when language planning emerges as a consequence of some other social planning in some other area of endeavor? This chapter deals with how language planning correlates to gender political participation.

Among such areas is gender planning. One idea is to plan for guaranteed female participation in Parliament in the new wave of democratization in Africa. Africa is accustomed to racial reservation of seats in those countries that had a significant number of white settlers. Zimbabwe's first decade of independence included seats in Parliament reserved exclusively for the white minority. Should Africa now experiment with gender reservation—seats set aside for women?

As indicated in the previous chapter, the legislative empowerment of women could be achieved in three phases. Phase 1 of such a gender plan could be an arrangement in which both the Parliamentary candidates for those seats and those who vote for those seats have to be women. Phase 2 would be the stage when the candidates still have to be women, but the voters for these gender seats are now both men and women. The female candidates would need to cultivate the male voters in their constituencies as well as the women. The third phase would be the abolition of the reserved seats for women altogether, but only when the political system has reached a stage at which female participation needs no special protection. Even during the stages when there are reserved gender seats, other women would be free to compete with men for the remaining seats on the common electoral roll.

What is clear is that this entire gender Parliamentary planning has language consequences. In most African countries, the language of debate in Parliament is

the ex-colonial Parliamentary language. Also, in most of those countries far more men speak a European language than women. A strategy of increasing female participation in politics may require either a review of the language policy of Parliament (with the possibility of changing it) or a longer-term campaign to make it easier for women to learn the ex-colonial European languages. Changing the language policy of the legislature may be easier to implement without waiting a long time. The legislature would have to permit debate in one or two indigenous languages, as well as in the relevant European tongue. A system of simultaneous translation would have to be installed.

The other solution would involve making it easier to learn a European language simply as a language and not as part of the pursuit of a comprehensive educational qualification. Most Africans learn the language of their former imperial masters not as an independent skill, but in pursuit of a more comprehensive school certificate, or a bachelor's degree or its equivalent. The new policy would establish language-learning centers in their own right, and pay special attention to the hours that are convenient to mothers and to the working patterns of women more generally.

A systematic convergence between gender planning and language planning will be easier in a country like Tanzania where an indigenous language, Kiswahili, is the main language of politics and public life. Tanzania is also among the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to consider the reservation of seats for women in Parliament.

In South Africa, the African National Congress has considered reserving seats for women on its own National Executive, but that idea has been shelved for the time being. In Parliament the struggle had been to try and get Black representation at all, male or female. The issue remained primarily *race* rather than gender. The first multi-racial elections in history took place in April 1994.

Is there such a concept as *de-planning* language? In South Africa the Soweto rebellion of young people in 1976 against the Afrikaans language was, in part, an effort to break down the Euro-bilingual plan of teaching African children both English and Afrikaans. The students regarded Afrikaans as the language of oppression, and wanted it knocked out of the educational grand design. Since the students were not in a position to provide an alternative national educational plan, and the South African situation was politically fluid anyhow, a process of *de facto* de-planning in language was under way. Again, the central issue in the politics of the country remained race rather than gender, even after the 1994 multi-racial elections.

As for the role of language in African diplomacy, there has been a surprising level of female participation despite the fact that there are far fewer African women who are fluent in European languages than men. While African ministries of foreign affairs do not have gender reservation of ambassadorships, there has been more affirmative action in favor of women in diplomatic posts than in most other areas of African public life. For one thing, having women in highly visible international roles is one way of impressing the Western world with regard to progress in the status of women in African societies.

Three forms of planning therefore converge: gender planning (affirmative action in favor of women), diplomatic planning (ways of cultivating Western sensibilities) and language planning (learning the European languages which African diplomats need for their work on the world stage).

FEMALE DIPLOMATS AND EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

African women have made their mark on African foreign services more firmly than on African Parliaments. Here a paradox emerges. While European languages in Africa are essentially instruments of elite formation, in diplomacy they serve the reverse role of gender equalization. In the wider society European languages help to deepen disparities between groups. In diplomacy, those languages help to narrow the gulf of privilege between men and women.

European languages have been a crucial factor in the development of African foreign services. Competence in two European languages (Euro-bilingualism) is often a major credential for rapid promotion in the diplomatic service. While almost all educated Africans are at least bilingual (combining an African language with a European one) very few are Euro-bilingual (competent in two European languages). The diplomatic service puts a premium on that dual Euro-skill.

The African woman who makes it diplomatically does not necessarily have to be Euro-bilingual. Indeed, it was not entirely accidental that the first African woman to be a major diplomatic success had the English language as her *mother tongue*. This was the Liberian woman, Angie Elizabeth Brooks, who in 1969 became President of the United Nations General Assembly. She was then one of only two women to have served in that capacity—the first had been Madame Pandit of the Nehru family in India (Indira Gandhi's aunt). From an African perspective, Angie Brooks's achievement would have been inconceivable without her command of the English language.

Ambassador Brooks had blazed other diplomatic trails before—including her appointment as the first woman and the first African to preside over the United Nations Trusteeship Council. When she took on the presidency of the General Assembly itself in 1969 Ms. Brooks affirmed: "I am proud of my continent, my country and my sex." Before long, international diplomacy was confirmed as one of the first prestigious professions to open its doors to African women. The language issue was crucial.

Uganda's Elizabeth Bagaya (Princess of Toro) served as Idi Amin's Roving Ambassador and Delegate to the United Nations and later as Foreign Minister in the 1970s. Nevertheless, Princess Elizabeth was too independent to last in such a capacity under such a volatile military regime. Under a different president she later served as Ambassador to the United States. Had she spoken only the Rutooro language of her traditional kingdom, Toro, Princess Elizabeth would never have made it in the Uganda foreign service.

Uganda has had other women in prominent diplomatic roles, ranging from Bonn (Ambassador Bernadette Olowo) to Ottawa (High Commissioner Anna

Amailuk). In the late 1980s these diplomats included Freda Blick as Ambassador to France. At least one European language was again indispensable.

Kenyan women who have served in quasi-diplomatic roles over the years have included Margaret Kenyatta (the late President's daughter), Grace Ogot, the novelist, and others. The Kenyan Foreign Service has also included high-ranking women officials and diplomats—often serving both Africa and their own country. Not even Kiswahili (let alone their ethnic languages) would have been enough to give them an international role.

At the time of Zambia's independence in 1964 the country's most highly publicized woman was not a diplomat at all. She was Alice Lenshina, the prophetess who led the Lumpa Church. Alice's defiance of Zambia's government and ruling party precipitated serious civil conflict. Her movement refused to declare allegiance to either the government or the ruling party. In Alice's case a European language was an aversion. Other women in Zambia since then have assumed quasi-diplomatic roles from time to time—including Mrs. Mutumba Bull, both as a minister and as a scholar. Such women have served both their country and the continent in the Euro-colonial language.

Certain spouses of African leaders in this period developed a high diplomatic and political visibility of their own. In the 1980s the late Mrs. Sally Mugabe became active in a number of humanitarian and international causes. She had to be articulate in a European language (English). Another African presidential spouse who was diplomatically active for a while was Mrs. Jehan Anwar Sadat of Egypt. Among conservative Muslim men in the Middle East, Mrs. Sadat's public posture and visibility were often a liability rather than an asset. But to many women in the Arab world, Mrs. Sadat became, at least for a while, a role model. Linguistically, she combined Arabic with Western credentials.

In southern Africa as a whole in this period, Pan-Africanism has been at its most tumultuous, both politically and in gender relations. In the Republic of South Africa, the most spectacular spouse of any race in the 1980s was Winnie Mandela. Although she had neither a direct diplomatic role nor an official political office in the struggle against apartheid, Winnie Mandela became the most famous African woman of the 1980s. She found herself in the middle of a variety of historical and Pan-African processes in her part of the continent. In the 1990s she partially fell from political grace. The English language was intricately interwoven in her national and international fate.

Pan-Africanism has traditionally been viewed as relations of unity between Africans across *territorial* boundaries. Pan-Africanism should be redefined to include relations of unity between Africans across the divide of *gender*. It is not enough to transcend the divisions of nationality and the territorial legacy of the scramble for Africa. There is a need to transcend an even older divide between Africans—the political gap between men and women in the realm of public affairs. In both cases Euro-languages are crucially relevant.

The big question was whether a woman Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would come *before* or *after* the first woman president of an African country. Both jobs necessitate competence in at least one

European language for the foreseeable future. In July 1993 Africa took a step towards those goals. Two Francophone African countries chose women for prime ministers—the first female heads of government in post-colonial African history. Mrs. Sylvie Kinigi in Burundi and Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana in Rwanda, each country polarized ethnically for so long between Hutu and Tutsi, took a momentous step toward narrowing the gap between genders. Unfortunately these new developments in gender relations were overwhelmed in 1994 by the much older ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi. At least half a million people died in the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The genocide was ended by an army of Rwandan exiles penetrating Rwanda from Uganda. These were English-speaking Rwandan Tutsi. The rest of the country was French-speaking. This language issue influenced the policy of France towards Rwanda and its new Anglophone rulers. France was for a while hostile to the new government in Kigali.

Meanwhile, the other lingo-gender paradox has persisted all over Africa. The same European languages which have been responsible for creating disparities of privilege in the wider African society may be contributing towards narrowing disparities between genders in the diplomatic arena. And language planning remains inextricably intertwined with other areas of social engineering.

PRE-PLANNING GENDER ROLES

Only the state in Africa—when all is said and done—is strong enough to make the necessary *cultural readjustment* on the gender question. Only the state can enable the market to benefit from fuller female participation in the economy. In Muslim Africa, Tunisia is one of the places where progress has gone the furthest in improving female participation, even in the professions. This has often meant promoting bilingualism in French and Arabic. In Algeria until 1989—where state socialism had also been attempted with the strong hand of government power—women's rights did fall short of the expectations of the revolution, but are still substantial in terms of public participation. Algeria even had women airplane pilots—a rather unusual situation in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, a change in language policy in Algeria from emphasis on French to emphasis on Arabic seemed to slow down female empowerment. This was because linguistic Arabization was often accompanied by Islamic traditionalism. Since the aborted election of 1992 the country has been plunged into civil conflict.

In much of Black Africa women traditionally have been almost natural entrepreneurs. In addition to their triple trusteeship of catering, water supply and subsistence cultivation, women have also entered the arena of trade and marketing. More recently African women are becoming less and less entrepreneurial in response to four wider processes of social change. These processes are: first, the enlargement of the scale of African economies; second, the internationalization of those economies; third, the mechanization of production; and fourth, the Westernization of supportive values and roles. European colonial languages played a disproportionate role in facilitating national economic activities and international economic relations.

Ethno-economies and sub-regional marketing still allow considerable room for women. As African patterns of production and exchange have become more integrated into national economies, the role of women therein has narrowed. An even more marginalizing factor for the economic role of women has been the internationalization of African trade and investment patterns. In spite of the new involvement of East African women in trading with Arabian Gulf countries, citizens who deal with transnational corporations are more likely to be men than women. Competence in European languages has again favored men. Ugandans who sit on boards of directors or who manage international subsidiaries are more likely to be men than women. The same applies to east Africans who control the Central Bank or who become advisers to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Production of food crops for local markets still leaves women in control in many parts of East Africa. Production of cash crops for export tends to increase male dominance.

Advancing technology and complex organization in African economies is also likely to favor men. There is a cultural presumption against women as technicians or engineers. Women may be involved extensively in a tea plantation in picking the tea leaves, but not in planning the original planting of the trees or in handling the tractor.

As for the Westernization of supportive values, these range from rules of credit to the language of economic discourse. The problem is not simply whether an African man is more likely to get credit from a bank than an African woman. At least as basic is the fact that a Westernized English-speaking African woman is much more likely to get credit than a non-Westernized female competent only in an African language. Let us look more closely at the cultural and historical background to this trend of declining female entrepreneurship.

THE GENDER OF TECHNOLOGY

What changes in Africa during this period that affected relationships between men and women has included the impact of new technologies on gender roles. Cultivation with the hoe still left the African woman centrally involved in agriculture, but cultivation with the tractor was often a prescription for male dominance.

Mechanization of agriculture in Africa has tended to marginalize women. Their role as “custodians of earth” is threatened by male prerogatives in new and more advanced technologies. It is true that greater male involvement in agriculture could help reduce the heavy burdens of work undertaken by women on the land. On the other hand, there is no reason why this relief in workload for women should not come through better technology. Tractors were not invented to be driven solely by men.

Another threat to the central role of the African woman in the economy in this period has come from the nature of Western education. We are back to the Euro-colonial languages. It is true that the Westernized African woman is usually more mobile and with more freedom for her own interests than is her tradi-

tional sister. But a transition from custodian of fire, water, and earth to keeper of the typewriter, is definitely a form of marginalization for African womanhood. Typing, even in the elegant French language, is less fundamental for survival than cultivation. The Westernized African woman in the second half of the twentieth century has tended to be freer, better equipped with at least one European language, but less important for African economies than the traditional woman in rural areas.

The third threat to the role of the African woman in this period came, once again, with the internationalization of African economies. As we have indicated, the colonial and post-colonial tendencies towards enlargement of economic scale have pushed women increasingly to the side in international decision-making. It is true that Nigerian women, especially, have refused to be marginalized completely even in international trade. On the whole, the Euro-glottal males have taken over the governing boards.

GENDER PLANNING AND CULTURAL ADJUSTMENT

What are the policy implications of all these trends? One central imperative is indeed to arrest the marginalization of women and to cultivate further their entrepreneurial potential. *Cultural adjustment* is the imperative. Traditionally, women as custodians of earth have emphasized food cultivation. Nevertheless, from now on greater involvement of women in the production of cash crops for export is one way of linking tradition to modernity—and preventing Africa's economic internationalization from resulting in the marginalization of African women. For this reason, support for traditional market women in food production and local food trade need not suffer as a result of the new androgynization of cash-crop production. Credit facilities should be made available in such a manner that there is equity not only between men and women but also between Euro-glottal Westernized and Afro-glottal, non-Westernized females. As matters now stand, traditionalist Afro-glottal non-Westernized women are often at a disadvantage when assessed for credit-worthiness. The system should stop disadvantaging women who cannot speak a European language.

On the other hand, a higher proportion of non-Westernized Afro-glottal women are involved in agricultural production than their Westernized sisters. Indeed, cultural Westernization of women though improving their credit-worthiness—tends to decrease women's direct economic productivity. A balance has to be struck between the two categories of women (Westernized and non-Westernized) in relation to both credit and production.

Preventing technology from marginalizing women is yet another imperative. Special programmes for women in technical training—from driving tractors to repairing a lorry engine—should be inaugurated. It will not happen on its own. Such shifts in the cultural aspects of technology need to be addressed purposefully. Effective participation of women in the world of economic entrepreneurship requires their upliftment in the world of technical and mechanical skills

as well. Higher forms of technical training in Africa require competence in Euro-colonial languages.

Women as custodians of fire make them the greatest users of firewood on the African continent. But should not women also be centrally involved in forest management and reforestation? Wood should increasingly be approached as an integrated industry, sensitized to the needs of environmental protection and ecological balance. Women as the greatest users of firewood should also be among the leading planters of trees for reforestation. This would not be incompatible with their involvement in the commercial aspects of wood more generally. Carpentry and furniture-making are crafts which cry out for greater female involvement than has been achieved so far. Culturally, women are often the selectors of furniture and trustees of the domestic infrastructure of the family. Yet it is an anomaly that African women have played a limited role in designing furniture—or making it. This is an area of entrepreneurship that beckons the female participant to become more involved. Do African women have to be Euro-glottal to perform these tasks?

As traditional custodians of water, do women have any special role in this era of faucets and dams? Africa's women, as we indicated, still trek long distances in some rural areas for their water. Water-related industries, surprisingly, are still male-dominated. This includes the whole infrastructure of water supply in urban areas. Even commercialized laundry and dry cleaning operations for the elite and for foreigners in African towns are still usually owned and managed by men, even when women do most of the washing and ironing. The soap manufacturing industry is also male-owned and male-managed, even when the consumers are overwhelmingly women. One question that arises is whether these water-related industries are appropriate areas of linking tradition to modernity in Africa's gender roles. Do they need language planning?

CONCLUSION

What is at stake is the tapping of female talent where it was previously underutilized. What is at stake is also the androgynization of entrepreneurship. Once again the imperative is cultural adjustment and part of that involves language planning.

Can the traditional custodian of fire be the innovative consumer of hydro-electric power? Can the traditional trustee of water be the new creative user of the high dam? Can the traditional trustee of earth take control of a new (and more creative) green revolution? The future of the continent depends upon a new sexual equation in the whole economic process. The future of the continent depends more fundamentally on cultural than on a structural adjustment. Language policy and language planning are likely to be basic elements in that cultural adjustment.

The underlying moral of Africa's experience is that language planning is always an aspect of a wider design of social engineering. As we have indicated, language policy has often been an instrument of national integration or promot-

ing political participation. In this chapter we have linked language to gender politics and history. The search for answers is eternal. The need for planning is one response.

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Chapter 3.3

The Black Woman and the Problem of Gender: An African Perspective

In this chapter, I shall address three levels of sexism in the world: benevolent, benign, and malignant. I shall also address three levels of redemption from sexism for Black woman: liberating the Black woman, centering the Black woman, and empowering the Black woman. While my illustrations will be mainly from the Black world, especially Africa, comparisons with the rest of the world will inform much of the analysis.

Benevolent sexism is a form of discrimination that is protective, or generous, towards the otherwise underprivileged gender. Gallantry and chivalry in defense of a woman's honor is a form of benevolent sexism. In Western culture men volunteer to carry heavy suitcases on behalf of women, open doors for them, and until recently a man would, as a matter of course, pay the restaurant bill for himself as well as for his woman-date. These days, more and more Western women insist on paying their own share of the restaurant bill, a mark of equality and liberation. In the old days in the West, men used to vacate their seats on over-crowded buses in favor of women passengers. That was also benevolent sexism.

In twentieth-century Western history, one of the more dramatic examples of benevolent sexism concerned the issue of who had priority to use the lifeboats while the *Titanic* was sinking in April 1912. The British ship hit an iceberg not far from Newfoundland on its way to New York. There were not enough lifeboats on board to save all the passengers. Indeed, the ship was regarded as unsinkable, which made complacency over safety even worse.

As the icy waters were gradually swallowing up the *Titanic*, one benevolently sexist decision had already been made. Women and children would have priority access to the lifeboats. Fifteen hundred people died in those icy waters; the overwhelming majority of them were men. Hundreds of others were rescued

in the lifeboat—the overwhelming majority of them were women and children—in the last hours of the *Titanic*, sexism had operated in favor of women.

BENEVOLENT SEXISM IN AFRICA

The question which now arises is, how much benevolent sexism is there in Africa and what form does it take? Are African women spared from carrying heavy loads by their men? While there is indeed considerable variation between one ethnic culture and another in Africa, rural women in Africa carry exceptionally heavy burdens of agricultural produce, firewood, and indeed their own children. African village women have had to learn incredible balancing skills: firewood on their heads, babies on their backs, and baskets of cassava and yams in their hands. On the whole, Africa does not score very high marks in aspects of benevolent sexism, which spare women heavy loads.

On the other hand, Africa has a higher proportion of matrilineal societies than any other continent in the world. Lineage and descent through the mother's family is more common in Africa than in any other region in the world. Mothers get a chance to determine the clan to which their offspring belong. In societies like Asante (Ashanti), the Queen Mother helped determine who the next Asantahene (emperor) was going to be. Benevolent sexism among the Asante was translated into real power.

Is bride wealth a form of benevolent sexism, or is it disguised bride price? Bride wealth (money from the groom to the bride) is certainly more benevolent than dowry (money from the bride to the groom). India has a vigorous system of dowry (bride paying for groom) and the social consequences are much more harmful than in Africa. After so many baby girls, some Indian parents have been known to resort to female infanticide out of fear of not being able to afford getting all their daughters a husband. Even Africa's bride wealth is not really benevolent sexism unless it increases the power of the woman over the man, or the power of the bride's family over the husband. More often than not, bride wealth gives the husband more power after the payment is made. This strips bride wealth of all pretenses of benevolence.

Aspects of the warrior tradition in Africa are also benevolent sexism. Most African societies throughout history have expected only men to risk their lives as warriors. Women could risk their lives for their societies in other ways, as when they take food to the male warriors in their hiding places. On the whole, Africa has indeed expected its women sometimes to be ready to die for their people. Africa has very rarely expected women to kill for their people. The patriotic duty to kill is gender-specific; it is a man's duty. The patriotic duty to die is gender-neutral; it can apply to both men and women. Benevolent sexism comes into play when women are spared the duty of destroying other lives. Africa does not normally call upon its women to kill, even in the name of patriotism.

There have, of course, been exceptions to this rule in Africa's history. In the nineteenth century, the kings of Dahomey had military regiments consisting entirely of women. The women warriors acquired the reputation of being partic-

ularly ferocious. Psychoanalytic interpretations of their ferocity have attributed it to their *de facto* celibacy. All five thousand female warriors were supposed to be wives of the king and were therefore sexually taboo to any other male. Not even the most potent monarch could do justice to five thousand women. Therefore, large numbers of female warriors either (dangerously) had secret lovers or observed *de facto* celibacy. Both the constant secrecy and the intermittent celibacy produced forms of anti-male aggressive behavior resulting in military ferocity. Those women killed for their king. The battalions of Amazons in Dahomey were destroyed by the new French colonizers towards the end of the nineteenth century. A fascinating African experiment in female warriorhood was thereby interrupted.

Were the Amazons of Dahomey a case of benevolent sexism? It is true that the female warriors enjoyed considerable privileges, especially as they were, theoretically, the king's wives. On balance, they were better off than the male warriors, who did not enjoy the same Royal standing. Since the women were used to fight battles chosen by and on behalf of male rulers, the Amazons were not a straightforward case of benevolent sexism. There were exploitative elements as well in the role and functions of these women in nineteenth-century Dahomey.

BENIGN SEXISM: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

The second category of sexism is *benign*. In this case the dominant gender is not being gallant and chivalrous to the disadvantaged gender (as when women and children are rescued first from a sinking ship). In its purest form, benign sexism acknowledges gender differences without bestowing sexual advantage or inflicting a gender cost. Benign sexism is harmless sexism. One example lies in the culture of naming babies.

Nigerian names are complex, and one could spend a lifetime trying to understand them. Although all the Abiolas I know personally are men, I am told that the name itself "Abiola" can be gender-neutral; a woman can occasionally bear it. Chuku-Emeka in Eastern Nigeria, on the other hand, is definitely masculine. So, in the North, is the name Ddanjuma, although the suffix Juma (born on Friday) is itself feminine.

Some Nigerian ethnic cultures have names that celebrate womanhood; *Wanye-buife* (women are precious) and *Wanye-buego* (women are wealth) are two cases in point. Other feminine names accept a woman's destiny. Examples include *Nkechi* (what God has given me) and *Obomu* (I am not the maker of myself). The Igbo seem to have a high proportion of gender-neutral names. These names include *Ebele* (a plea to God), *Ekene* (salute to God), *Ifeanyi* (Nothing is beyond God), and *Ngozi* (God's blessing). Igbo names are often prayers to God.

Most cultures all over the world, however, have a different category of names for baby girls than for baby boys. Among Christian names, no female is likely to be called Joseph, and no male is likely to be called Mary or Magdalena.

There are, of course, exceptions. At the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor there used to be a professor called Christopher Davis Roberts. Christopher Roberts was a woman, but that was an exception that proved the rule.

In Western culture, first names are almost invariably gender-specific (you can tell the sex from the name). Surnames are supposed to be gender-neutral, but because Western culture is patriarchal, patrilineal family names are masculine and are inherited by both sons and daughters, from their fathers.

Today, Westernized and Islamized Africans who were traditionally matrilineal are shifting towards patrilinealism in compliance with either Western or Islamic standards. This is particularly marked with regard to inheriting names from the father. While matrilinealism in Africa had previously been a case of benevolent sexism, it is in the process of being undermined by the patrilinealism of both Islamic and Euro-Christian cultures. The choice of first names for baby girls and baby boys may still be a case of benign or harmless sexism, but descent through the father reinforces a pre-existent male domination in most societies.

Africa has a triple heritage of names: indigenous, Islamic, and Euro-Christian. Many indigenous names have two versions: masculine and feminine. Kiberu is a baby boys' name in Buganda; add the prefix "na" at the beginning and the name becomes a girl's name: Nakiberu. A few Muslim names also have masculine and feminine versions; Amin is the infamous masculine leader of twentieth-century Uganda; Amina is the glorious woman leader of Hausaland in the fifteenth- or sixteenth-century. My own first name is Ali; I have a younger sister in Mombasa, Kenya, called Alia.

Euro-Christian names today are less subject to feminization than they once were. But Francis with an "i" is a man; Frances with "e" is a woman. And Pauline is both a diminutive and a feminization of Paul. Thus on the whole, the distinction between feminine names and masculine names is still fundamentally a case of benign sexism.

The uses of hair are also usually a case of benign sexism. Braided hair in Black Africa is gender-specific. It is normally done by women as a female hairstyle. Braided hair in Black America and the Caribbean is gender-neutral; it can be done and worn by either men or women. In Africa braided hair is a declaration of gender pride; in Black America and the Caribbean it is a declaration of racial pride; it is gender-neutral.

Hair is sometimes used as a medium of protest or as an expression of grief in different cultures. For women, the ultimate expression of anguish or protest is to shave the hair altogether. For men, the ultimate expression of anguish is to let it grow.

When the Kabaka (king) of the Baganda was exiled by the British colonial authorities in 1953, many of his male subjects let their beards grow in protest. By 1955, the agitation for the return of the king had succeeded. The British capitulated and let the Kabaka return from Britain. Many of his bearded subjects assembled at Entebbe airport and ceremonially shaved their beards collectively as the Kabaka's plane landed. The protest had been victorious.¹ How many of the King's female subjects shaved their heads in protest at his exile is unclear;

there were rumors that some of the King's mistresses had done precisely that. Certainly the shaving of a widow's head was widespread in Africa on the occasion of the husband's death. Islamic culture has sometimes also encouraged the shaving of the head of the widow in mourning.

Is the sub-culture of women shaving in anguish, while men let their beards grow sufficiently, reciprocal to make this a kind of benign sexism? On the whole this sub-culture is probably to the disadvantage of women, and cannot therefore be regarded as entirely benign or harmless. But different hairstyles for men as distinct from women can, indeed, be entirely benign.

What about the sub-culture of cosmetics, jewelry, and perfume? Although many cultures have different forms of perfume for both men and women, and allow rings, bracelets, and some kinds of necklaces for both genders, the burden of beautification is disproportionately on the shoulders of the female. Women end up spending more time, energy, and resources making themselves attractive in most cultures. Is this distinction a benign form of sexism? It depends partly upon the balance between the pleasure of successful beautification and the pain of unsuccessful self-improvement.

The aesthetics of the principle of utility are at play—the greatest happiness of the greatest number. If there is a clear majority of women in Africa who would be less happy if they did not have to constantly strive for self-beautification through clothes, jewelry, cosmetics, perfume, and hair style, then these aesthetics of sexism are indeed benign and may at times even be benevolent (especially when men pay for them). However, these aesthetics of sexism have their risks. They may sometimes amount to the unfair sexual exploitation of women; we need to study their implications with greater care.

Is alimony in Euro-Christian culture a form of benign or benevolent sexism? Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, alimony was always paid by the former husband to the former wife and not the other way around. Even if the woman was richer than the man, the flow of alimony for most of Western history was from the male to the female. It has only been in the last quarter of the twentieth century that Western countries have been experimenting with the reverse flow of alimony, from the ex-wife to the ex-husband, if the woman is richer. Alimony had been gender-specific for most of Western history; it is now beginning to become gender-neutral.

Neither Black men nor Black women have been major recipients of alimony in history. This has been true in both Africa and the African Diaspora. Marriages break up in the Black world, and the former partners go their different ways without erecting long-term supportive systems between them.

In the United States there is a higher proportion of single-parent families among African-Americans than among Whites. The single parent is almost invariably the mother. African-American mothers are less likely to receive either alimony or child support than are White mothers. This is not necessarily because African American fathers are less caring or less law abiding. Sometimes the mother and the children are better off if they receive welfare from the state than contributions from the meager earnings of the former husband. Indeed, the pro-

portion of unemployment among African-American males is twice the rate among White males in most US cities. Sometimes the absence of African-American alimony is due to the absence of African-American employment.

In a fight for the custody of children in the United States, the system tends to lean in favor of the mother. The mother also keeps the house and often the family car. While alimony settlements in the US are beginning to be gender-neutral, custody settlements still tend to have a mother-bias.

In most of Africa, it is fathers who have disproportionate custodial advantage. They are often regarded as the “owners” of the children, with mothers as simply the instrumental wombs that brought the kids into the world. While Western legal systems exaggerate the rights of mothers and may therefore be regarded as examples of benevolent sexism, African customary law exaggerates the rights of fathers and may therefore be guilty of malignant sexism.

MALIGNANT SEXISM IN HISTORY

What is this third category of sexism, the malignant version? Actually, this is the most pervasive and most insidious. In most societies it subjects women to economic manipulation, sexual exploitation, and political marginalization.

In Africa after European penetration, Black women have sometimes suffered both as women and as Blacks. As far back as 1706, a young woman, holding her baby son, was burnt at the stake on the border of what are today Angola and Zaire. She was Dona Beatrice, otherwise known as Kimpa Vita. She was part of Africa’s long struggle to indigenize imported religions even while Africa’s authenticity was being validated.

This religious reformer claimed that many of the Apostles of Jesus were not Hebrews at all but were the Lord’s African companions; that Jesus never prohibited polygamy, and that the virgin birth was not a monopoly of the Mother of Jesus. She claimed that an African woman, with God’s intervention, was as capable of producing a child while still a virgin as anybody in Bethlehem or Nazareth.

These were very radical claims. When she sought to demonstrate the virgin birth theory by having a baby son of her own in a kind of African “Immaculate Conception,” that was too much for the new European colonizers and the local agents of the Kingdom of the Kongo. The Portuguese officials set to work; she was set on fire at the stake with her baby son.

Out of the ashes have come new African religious movements, sometimes led by women and often confronting the opposition of both religious and political establishments. In the twentieth century, Alice Lenshina of Zambia was one case in point. Asking her followers to boycott the alien political culture of colonial and post-colonial Zambia, her Lumpa Church became the Christian Maitatsina of Zambia. In a 1964 uprising, President Kenneth Kaunda ordered his troops to shoot to kill Alice’s followers. Many were indeed killed and the Lumpa Church was forced underground.

On the other hand, the people who produced Dona Beatrice and her martyrdom at the stake later produced Simon Kimbangu, another African Christian reformer. In the Belgian Congo, Kimbangu spent almost as much time in prison as Jesus Christ spent on earth. Today, his Kimbangu Church has four million followers, more than Jesus Christ had in the first three centuries of the Christian era. The matrilineal nature of Kimbangu's ethnic background made his church receptive to female church leaders almost from the start. In that respect the Kimbanguist church was ahead of the mainstream Christian denominations in the Western world.

Dona Beatrice, before she was burnt on the stake, insisted that Jesus Christ never forbade polygamy. Whether she was right or not in a strictly literal sense, there is little doubt that many African Christian males have practiced polygamy despite the disapproval of the church. Is polygamy a case of malignant sexism, where the harm definitely outweighs any advantage? Or, is it an instance of benign sexism where the husband and the wives gain different things, and it all evens out in the end?

Actually, polygamy probably varies from one African cultural system to another. There are societies where the wives of a single husband provide a support system for each other, including a babysitting pool that permits the women to be socially and economically active in the wider world. This could be benign polygamy. On the other hand, there are polygamous systems where the women are little more than sex toys and housekeepers for the husband. This is definitely malignant polygamy.

Then there is the special case of southern Africa. Many men from, say, Mozambique who went to work in the mines in the Republic of South Africa for a year or eighteen months at a time were not allowed to take their wives with them. There evolved a class dichotomy of a male proletariat (going to work for wages in South Africa) and a female peasantry (remaining to cultivate the land in the villages).

On the other hand, there were still enough men in the villages to lend a hand to some of the women whose husbands were away. Over the decades a reverse kind of polygamy occurred: an African woman with more than one husband instead of an African man with more than one wife. When the husband from the mines returned home, the village husband vacated the hut for the duration. Agreements were sometimes reached between the men as to the paternity of the women's children. In most cases the first husband claimed a lion's share of the offspring. It was *de facto* polyandry, not yet sanctioned by custom and ritual, but evolving as a result of the racist constraints on migrant labor in Southern Africa. Was it benign or malignant sexism? It was probably benign sexism operating in conditions of malignant racism.

While there may be doubt about the legitimacy of polygamy as against the legitimacy of polyandry, there is little doubt about the inequality between male and female circumcision. Male circumcision is a case of benign sexism. It is often healthy for the male; certainly much more hygienic. However, circumci-

sion need not be done to both sexes. When done to only men it is benign and even beneficial.

Female circumcision, on the other hand, is fundamentally a case of malignant sexism. Africa practices it more widely than any other continent in the world. It has been estimated that at least eighty million African women alive today have been victims of female circumcision in its different forms. At its worst, female circumcision (massive removal of the clitoris and its accompanying sensitive flesh) seeks to deprive the female of sexual enjoyment. Some Nigerian groups practice adult circumcision of the woman; others do it to baby girls.

There is widespread belief in the West that female circumcision is an Islamic institution. This is not correct, although it is widely practiced in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia. The Nile was the mother of civilization; but also the mother of infibulations. In the Nile Valley female circumcision is a legacy of the Pharaonic times, not of the Islamic times. In Ethiopia, female circumcision is practiced by both Christians and Muslims, and Ethiopian Christianity is the oldest in Black Africa. Ethiopia was introduced to Christianity in the fourth century of the Christian era—that is to say, before England was Christianized.

On the whole, there is enough pain and suffering and denial of pleasure in female circumcision to make it a case of malignant sexism. How to abolish the practice, on the other hand, has been a problem. The Kenyan Government has forbidden qualified modern doctors from performing the operation. This only drives the women to unqualified and unsanitary pseudo-surgeons. As a result, more women die from infection, fatal bleeding, or neglect.

Before the Marxist-Leninist regime in Ethiopia collapsed in May–June 1991, it did attempt a propaganda campaign against female circumcision. The regime was, nevertheless, losing control over the society, and had the more pressing problems of civil war engulfing it. Clitoris removal remains widespread in the Horn of Africa as a whole: a form of malignant sexism, which is immersed in tradition and ritual, and saturated with blood. Clitoridectomy and infibulation have outlived whatever cultural value they may have once had—they are inhumane.

However, the most fundamental aspects of malignant sexism concern differences in power between men and women, both politically and economically. This is, of course, a universal, not just an African, problem. Women in the United States own far more of the economy than they actually control. Women in Africa own far less land than they cultivate. Wives in Britain did not earn the right to own property until 1870. Women in Switzerland did not earn the right to vote in national elections until 1971. Women in places like Kuwait still do not have the right to vote. In a country where racism and sexism are once again interlocked, the majority of both men and women in South Africa had not voted in elections prior to the end of apartheid.

THE PARADOX OF GENDER

Underlying this problem of power relations between men and women is what might be called the paradox of gender, influencing politics, economics, and issues of war and peace. But what is the paradox of gender? It consists of three propositions: (i) among humans, the senior partner in the creation of new life is the female of the species (woman as mother); (ii) among humans, the senior partner in the destruction of life is the male of the species (man as warrior); and (iii) it is the power of destruction which has given the male of the species dominion over the female (man as ruler).

The argument here is that the origins of male dominance do not lie in economic specialization but in military specialization. Women till the land; the means of production. Women control the womb; the means of reproduction. However, women do not control the means of physical coercion: the spear, the bow and arrow, and later, the gun. Even being senior partner in giving life can be, militarily, a weakness. Pregnancy is a time of life-enhancement for a woman; it is also a time of physical vulnerability. While motherhood is a qualification for centrality, pregnancy can be a disqualification for power, at least according to Kikuyu mythology. The Kikuyu myth about the destruction of matriarchy recounts how men staged the most supreme of all coups; the coup against female power. The coup plot was not about how to capture the armory but about how to cause widespread impregnation. The men knew that women were at their most vulnerable when they were at their most creative—when they were heavy with child. Collective impregnation made it possible for men to disarm and disempower matriarchy.

The men seduced the most powerful leaders of the women and the leading female warriors on approximately the same night, thus planting the seeds. The Kikuyu myth of the overthrow of matriarchy through impregnation is treated by Ngugi an Thiong'o in *The River Between*, and by Jomo Kenyatta in *Facing Mount Kenya*, and by the Kikuyu ancestors for generations before. Kenyatta makes a case as to why matriarchy had to go. The women rulers had been ruthless, and horror of horrors, they even practiced polyandry! The coup of impregnation became a political necessity!²

There may be more evocative stories of the disempowerment of women than of empowerment in African legend and mythology. The Kikuyu myth about the destruction of matriarchy is one case in point. There is also the great royal story of Ethiopia about the seduction of Makeda, the Queen of Sheba, by King Solomon of the Jews.

The Queen of Ethiopia was invited to Israel by the wise King Solomon. The King was enchanted by the African Queen, but she did not respond to His Majesty's overtures. That night, after a banquet, the King finally seduced both Sheba and her maid, and two future dynasties of Ethiopia were separately conceived—a dual impregnation of historic proportions. Sheba's baby son grew up to become Menelik I. Thus the Solomonic patriarchy of Ethiopia came into being and was—according to Ethiopian tradition and legend—to last for three thousand

years. I knew the last Lion of Juda, His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I. I met him first in Uganda and later in Ethiopia. He was overthrown in 1974, ending a dynasty that claimed descent from a royal seduction three millennia previously.

The seduction of Sheba by Solomon is, in a sense, the reverse of the seduction of Adam by Eve. In the Ethiopian legend, woman is seduced by man and the outcome is royal patriarchy. In the Biblical genesis, man is seduced by woman and the outcome is mortality. Both stories are male-centric. When the sinner is a man, royal Solomonic patriarchy in Ethiopia is glorious. In Genesis, Eve is a scapegoat; the result is dishonor and original sin. How far can we hold certain interpretations of religion accountable for malignant sexism? Lord, how much sexism has been committed in your name?³

Matriarchy in Kikuyuland ended as a result of indigenous collective impregnation. Matriarchy in Ethiopia was undermined as a result of exogenous royal impregnation. Male dominion over the female was consolidated not only in Kikuyuland and the plateaus of the Amhara, but over almost all of Africa.

Colonialism and Westernization have solved some problems while creating others. The colonial order discouraged homosexuality but encouraged homoracality. Sexual homoracality is enforced racial endogamy; love-making within the same racial group. Blacks make love to Blacks, Whites fornicate with Whites. For African men the beginnings of decolonization came as homoracality was breaking down. One illustrious example was the wedding of the White woman Ruth to Seretse Khama of Bechuanaland (Botswana). Winston Churchill denounced the marriage as “a disreputable transaction.” Then there was Senghor’s “Bigamy”—married to Negritude and a White woman. Thirdly, there was Kenyatta’s first wife, Jomo’s marriage to the mother of the first Peter Kenyatta. Fourth, there was Kwame Nkrumah and his fair-skinned Egyptian wife.

Indeed, there were other inter-racial romances during the colonial days of enforced homoracality. In a poem entitled “Eden,” echoing the theme of forbidden love; the original sin of Christianity was itself sex. The primeval sin of colonialism was sex between Black and White, otherwise known as heteroracality. The taboo was broken by Seretse Khama, Jomo Kenyatta, Léopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Bernard Chidzero, and Ali Mazrui. These people may have married for love, but the wider meanings of their actions were political.

If heteroracality (Black and White sexuality) was the beginning of racial decolonization, can female homosexuality be the beginning of gender decolonization? Is lesbianism capable of effectuating female liberation but not female empowerment? The evidence in the Western world is that lesbianism is liberating, but definitely not yet empowering. Nevertheless, if sexism is the earliest form of colonialism, is lesbianism the earliest form of female self-reliance?

Is lesbianism a form of the decolonization of male dominance? In middle class circles in the Western world, the liberating potential of lesbianism has begun to be examined. Militant Western feminists reject the condescension of benevolent sexism. A few are even in rebellion against benign sexism, harmless as it appears to be. But in the final analysis, the real war is against malignant sex-

ism. Is there a way out? It is to the three levels of progressive redemption we must now turn.

LIBERATION, CENTERING AND EMPOWERMENT

With regard to solving the problem of gender inequity, there are three interrelated tasks concerning the destiny of womanhood: liberating women, centering women, and empowering women. Women can be at the center without being empowered; they can be liberated without being either centered or empowered; there can be different degrees of even malignant sexism.

In rural Africa women are more centered than they are in urban America; but rural African women are less liberated than are urban American women. Rural African women are custodians of fire (in charge of energy in firewood), custodians of water (ensuring its supply in the home), and custodians of earth (cultivating the land).

On the other hand, women in Saudi Arabia are at once less liberated and less centered than either rural African women or urban American women. Women in Saudi Arabia are over-protected from economic activity; even from driving. This is malignant sexism in the name of the dignity of womanhood. Allah, please forgive them, for they know not what they do.

The United States leads the world in women's liberation but not necessarily in female empowerment. In the March elections in Bangladesh in 1991, the two main contenders were both women: Begum Khalida Zia and Begum Hassina Rahman; Bangladesh's two main parties were both led by women. When is the US likely to have women as both the Democratic and the Republican candidates for President in the same election? Uganda has had a woman Foreign Minister sooner than the US has had a woman Secretary of State. African countries like Nigeria, Liberia, and Swaziland have had women as Heads of Universities sooner than had the United Kingdom. All these are cases of female empowerment.

GENDER AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Female liberation in Africa sometimes gains from military rule, but not necessarily female empowerment. Under Siad Barre in Somalia there were dubious gains in female liberation; Muslim Mullahs were executed in the name of female liberation and token women were recruited into the Somali armed forces.

Egypt witnessed important legal changes in favor of women under Nasser and Sadat, both of them soldiers. Idi Amin appointed Princess Elizabeth Bagaya as Uganda's first woman foreign minister. She was not really a symbol of empowerment, but she struggled to remain a symbol of liberation. While military rulers do sometimes make greater feminist gestures to African women, the future of genuine empowerment of women in Africa requires, as a precondition, either or both of the following scenarios: (i) the demilitarization of African politics (get the armed boys back to the barracks; military rule at the moment is more masculine); and/or (ii) the androgynization of the African military (arm the girls as well as the boys). In real life, motherhood leaves the African woman at

the center but not necessarily in power. In rural African life, woman is also at the center of the economy, the water supply, and the energy supply without ever being powerful. This is the legend of the African woman as custodian of fire, custodian of earth, and custodian of water; woman at the center but not empowered.

Postcolonial Africa is a land where religion has declined and militarism increased. The decline of indigenous religions may have hurt the centrality of women; the rise of militarism may have further reduced women's empowerment. Every counter-coup is probably a blow against female empowerment (malignant sexism). In her song for Agostinho Neto, Molaria Ogundipe-Leslie may have deliberately committed cross-linguistic blasphemy from the Yoruba *Ogun* to the English *a gun*. Is the modern history of Nigeria a transition from the sacredness of *Ogun* to the sacrilege of *a gun*? Mazisi Kunene's poem "Thought on June 26" is full of masculine metaphor. Mazisi Kunene talks about "monuments of blood" and "the neck of young bulls."

GENDER: THE MISSING AGENDA

Whatever one may think of Ibrahim Babangida's precise measures for reforming Nigeria, his grand design has shown sensitivity to the following divisions in Nigerian society: the ethnic divide; the religious divide; regional distinctions; the divide between political generations (old politicians versus new); and the class divide (as affected by structural adjustment, for better or worse). The divide missing in the grand design is that of gender. Throughout Africa there is inadequate planning for the empowerment of women in the political process; the Babangida Administration in Nigeria is no different.

It has been more by default than design that postcolonial Africa started using women in senior diplomatic positions more readily than in almost any other major public service. Uganda had a woman Foreign Minister (Princess Elizabeth Bagaya) sooner than the United States had a woman Secretary of State. Since independence Uganda has also had a number of senior female ambassadors at posts which range from Accra to Paris, Copenhagen to Washington, Paris to Ottawa.

Paris itself has had a diverse number of African women ambassadors representing a range of political regimes from Ghana to Tanzania and from the African National Congress to Uganda. The ANC Envoy—Ms. Dulcie September—was indeed assassinated in Paris in 1988, probably by agents of apartheid.

The most famous African woman of the 1980s was Winnie Mandela. Again, this was not because of a planned political agenda. In a sense, Winnie Mandela's ascent to political prominence was in the same tradition as Mrs. Aquino in the Philippines (in the wake of a martyred husband), Ms. Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan (in the wake of a martyred father), and Mrs. Bandernaike in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), also in the wake of a martyred husband. Winnie—like the other women—is another illustration of female succession due to male martyrdom. But Mrs. Mandela has yet to acquire supreme power the way those Asian women

have done. On the contrary, legal as well as political problems are swamping her.

Will Winnie Mandela one day become the first or second Foreign Minister of a Black-ruled South Africa? Although thoroughly controversial in South Africa itself, Winnie Mandela does stand a chance for a ministerial position in post-apartheid South Africa; despite diverse critics at home she has fervent admirers abroad. However, for the time being, the African National Congress is no more equipped with an agenda for the empowerment of women than any other liberation movement has been.

It seems fairly certain that South Africa—like Zimbabwe before it—will, under Black rule, experiment with a system of racial reservation: seats for Whites, at least for a while. Should not planned governance in Africa as a whole include a strategy of gender reservation—seats for women?

I have proposed the three phases of gender representation as follows:

- PHASE 1: Reserved seats for women in the legislature elected only by women, without prejudice to the rights of women as voters on the common electoral roll as well.
- PHASE 2: Reserved seats for women in the legislature, elected by universal franchise on an electoral roll consisting of both men and women.
- PHASE 3: Abolition of special seats for women when the evidence shows a commensurate and more balanced representation of men and women through a common electoral roll.

Where is this kind of gender-planning most likely to happen? Ironically, the most likely laboratories of gender planning in Africa may turn out to be Muslim countries, followed closely by Nigeria. For one thing, Muslim societies are more used to gender separation in other areas of social life. Second, Muslim countries like Pakistan and Egypt have already experimented with special seats for women. Third, Muslim African countries like Somalia and Libya have experimented with gender-regiments in the armed forces—in a continent where soldiers remain among the major actors in politics. Fourth, it is a Muslim country—Algeria—which seems to have led the way to using women in the air force, which has often been a major influence on political strategies in Africa. (The attempted coup in Kenya in 1982 was led by the air force.) Nigeria has some of the ingredients of Muslim Africa, but differs in other respects. Nevertheless, gender planning is on the horizon in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The dearth of gender planning is perhaps the most serious of all the omissions in Africa's political and economic reforms. We are indeed witnessing a general shift in the doctrine of planning in African affairs. We have noted the declining faith among Africans in central economic planning. We have witnessed, through select examples, the emergence of a new optimism about political engineering

and planned governance. We need to add gender planning if Africa's grand design for the 1990s and the twenty-first century is to become comprehensive enough and fundamental enough to tilt the balance in favor of genuine societal transformation. *Afrostroika* needs to be androgynized.⁴

In spite of the paradox of gender, of the male as the senior part in destruction, peace prizes go to men. It is astonishing that although women are the greatest peacekeeping force, so few of the Nobel prizes for peace have gone to women; malignant sexism thus takes the form of ultimate denial. None at all of the Nobel Peace Prizes have gone to Black women; malignant sexism is mated to racism, once again. At the very least, women have done far less to cause war than men in the entire span of human history.

Five Nobel Peace Prizes have gone to Black people, all of them men: Ralph Bunche (US); Albert Luthuli (South Africa); Martin Luther King, Jr. (US); Desmond Tutu, and Nelson Mandela (South Africa). I have a recommendation to the Nobel committees in Oslo and Stockholm. Somehow, peace has to be re-defined. The Nobel Peace Prize for the year 2000 should be awarded not to some unknown male warrior, but to some unknown female peace-maker. This would not be benevolent sexism, but delayed recognition.

Against the shadow of the gender paradox, with the male as the senior destroyer of life, society after society has a tomb of an unknown soldier at which every state visitor leaves a wreath. The skeleton underneath is almost invariably that of a dead male. Let Africa set a new precedent, country after country. From now on there should be two tombs, that of a man and that of a woman. For women, too, have always paid the price of war and the sacrifices of patriotism. Women more often have paid the price of peace and compassion. Even in death there should surely be female empowerment. The struggle does indeed continue beyond all three forms of sexism. The strategy of redemption needs to go beyond liberation and beyond centering, towards genuine power-sharing between the two halves of the Black world—male and female.

NOTES

1. Kabaka Mutesa II acknowledges this gesture by some of his subjects in his book *Desecration of My Kingdom* (London: Constable, 1967), pp. 123–124.

2. Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1965 edition), pp. 7–8.

3. The second half of the essay is greatly indebted to Mazrui's own keynote address to the African Literature Association of the United States, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 21–23, 1991.

4. I define "Afrostroika" as fundamental structural reforms in Africa. Gender-planning in this paper has borrowed from Mazrui, "Afrostroika and Planned Governance: Economic Adjustment and Political Engineering," a presentation at a Multidisciplinary Colloquium on "Evaluation of Development Strategies for the 1990s," held at San Francisco State University, California, April 19–20, 1990. By the word "androgynize" I mean "purposefully making something both male and female."

Chapter 3.4

The Dialectic Between Men and Women: The Legacy of ‘A’isha

A central issue concerning the role and status of women in Islam has concerned the price of dignity. Throughout history men in all societies have linked issues of honor with the dignity of mothers. Men have killed or been killed because their mothers were insulted. By extension, issues of honor were then extended not just to one’s own mother but also to the mother of one’s own children. Over the centuries the honor and dignity of womanhood became an issue not just of personal commitment, but an elaborate social, legal and moral code. In the history of Islam a single incident became a defining moment of the paramountcy of female dignity. Let us first set the stage.

Women are in the first instance themselves, but they are also mothers, wives, daughters and citizens. The most important woman in Christianity is primarily a mother; the most important woman in the Sunni Islam is probably a wife. The mother of the founder of Christianity was of course the Virgin Mary. The wife of the founder of Islam who has been the most revered was ‘A’isha, daughter of Abu Bakar al-Siddiq. [My third son is named after that loyal friend of the Prophet’s Abu Bakar. My sister is named after ‘A’isha]. Shiite Islam regard Fatima, daughter of the Prophet and mother of Hassan and Hussein, as the most important woman in Islam.

Muhammad’s mother—who died when Muhammad was a mere child—does not feature strongly in Islamic tradition and symbolism. On the other hand, Jesus did not have a wife at all and, of course, Jesus did not have a daughter. Muhammad had wives as well as daughters—and the history of the family in Islam has been shaped in part by those factors. Muhammad was a prophet and a Head of State. In marriages he behaved like a Head of State of his age—matrimony as statecraft.

‘A’isha has a dual significance in the history of Islam. One is the link between dignity and love; the other is the link between dignity and war. The Prophet was basically monogamous in the Meccan phase of his prophetic career. He became polygamous in the Medinite phase. Muhammad’s strongest loves were for his first wife, Khadijah—and for the wife who survived him by several decades, ‘A’isha. Khadijah was older than the Prophet; ‘A’isha was much younger.

When did the issue of the dignity of womanhood become such an overpowering principle in the Islamic ethos? It arose out of a single incident affecting ‘A’isha. Fourteen centuries ago, a post-modern question was asked: Can a young man and a young woman be accidentally thrown together on their own and still relate to each other purely as human beings and not as male and female?

‘A’isha had accompanied the Prophet on an expedition with a regiment of believers against the Banu Mustalik in the year 628 C.E. (the year 6 Hijra). On the last day of the return journey they broke the journey when it got dark and established camp. ‘A’isha left the camp to respond to a natural call. On her way back to the camp she noticed that a necklace of hers of valuable Yamanite agates was missing. ‘A’isha retraced her steps in search of the necklace by moonlight and the light of the dawn. She left her curtains closed. People thought she was still asleep when the order was given to depart. By the time she got back to the encampment area, the group had left on the assumption that ‘A’isha was in her litter on her camel. In fact ‘A’isha was left behind—bewildered but calm. She decided to wait where she was until they discovered she was missing. An author takes up the story of how two young people incidentally male and female were thrown together:

Waiting there alone, in the still hours of the morning, she soon fell asleep. She awoke to find an embarrassed young man, Safwan ibn al-Mu’attal, and his lone camel by his side. Gallantly the young man helped her to mount his camel and silently he led her on the way to Medina. Her absence was not discovered until Mohammed and his party had reached Medina late that afternoon. But presently Safwan arrived leading his camel bearing the missing ‘A’isha.¹

At issue were questions of dignity and honor. Could these two young people have ignored their genders? A cloud descended on ‘A’isha’s reputation—although she was the last to hear the rumors. Her dignity was on the line.

The incident was exploited politically between contending factions in the Muslim community. The lines were drawn as follows:

1. The refugees from Mecca versus the saviors of Medina;
2. The Abu Bakar—Omar faction *versus* the Ali faction;
3. The different families of the different wives of the Prophet.

‘A’isha loved the Prophet; the Prophet loved ‘A’isha. This was probably the greatest crisis of their relationship. Had she been unfaithful? Even ‘A’isha’s parents faltered. Had she succumbed to temptation? “Frailty, thy name is woman”—Shakespeare later said. Only ‘A’isha herself was so convinced that she could say, “Let Allah intervene! Let Allah pronounce on guilt or innocence.” It was a daring challenge. She called upon the next verses of the Qur’an to declare the truth.

What was at stake was not just ‘A’isha’s reputation, but the reputation of all those suspected or accused of the family-destructive offense of adultery. When God intervened he proclaimed the Law of Evidence on adultery that was to remain part of Islamic Law into the twentieth century. Initially intended to protect the dignity of women, it became a method of protecting the sanctity of family:

Why have they not brought four witnesses regarding [the accusation]? Seeing then that they have not brought the witnesses, they are in Allah’s eyes the speakers of falsehood.²

‘A’ISHA AND THE VIRGIN MARY

My father, the Chief Kadhi of Kenya, was once visited by a Roman Catholic priest in the 1940s—two learned men of different religions in friendly dialogue. The Roman Catholic priest decided to tease my father on the issue of ‘A’isha and the scandal. The priest said:

It must have been very embarrassing, Sheikh Al’Amin. The Prophet’s wife lost in the dark in the middle of the desert—and arriving many hours later with a handsome young man her own age, when the prophet was an old man. Most embarrassing, eh Sheikh Al’Amin?

My father considered carefully the Roman Catholic’s mischief—and then my father said:

Yes, Father. Most embarrassing. But one person would have understood—the Virgin Mary. Imagine getting pregnant and trying to tell the world it has nothing to do with sex. Most embarrassing—eh Father? Most embarrassing—eh Padre?

It is true that ‘A’isha’s indirect contribution to Islamic Law of Evidence on adultery did not save a Saudi Princess from execution in our own times.³ But ‘A’isha’s experience did result in a degree of meticulousness in the application of the law of adultery that the supreme penalty has seldom been applied.

American Muslims try to decide how to judge their President over the Monica Lewinsky affair. According to their values as Americans it is not the adultery that is the most serious offense. It is the lying about it—especially lying under oath. But according to their values as Muslims, surely adultery (*Zina*) is a much more serious offense than lying; it is even more serious than perjury; adultery under the *Shari’a* can be a capital offense.

Because the punishment for adultery is so severe, judges discouraged the accused from confessing even if they wanted to. And adultery is one of the few offenses where even after a confession is made, it is permissible under Islamic law to withdraw it. Clinton could have withdrawn his televised “confession” of an “inappropriate” relationship with Lewinsky.

As for the rules of evidence for adultery, they are almost Draconian. According to some *madhahib*, conviction may need as many as four males who can testify to having been eye-witnesses to the sexual act itself. Clinton’s secret service guards would have had to have seen the President naked and in action.

In the West a woman may choose to become a mistress of a married man, but she is not allowed to marry the same man and have equal legal rights as a second wife. In Islam having a second wife is legitimate. Having a mistress is a crime. That is cultural relativism in sexual mores. Monica as Clinton’s second wife would have been acceptable to Islam, but not as a mistress.

Are human rights sometimes trapped between the sacredness of art *versus* the sacredness of religion? As the West has got more and more secular, it has looked for new abodes of sacredness. Has the dignity of women been gained or lost in the process?

By the late twentieth century the freedom of the artist was more sacred to Westerners than respect for religion, hence the clash which occurred from 1988 onwards between the Western world and the Muslim world in relation to Salman Rushdie’s book *The Satanic Verses*. The book makes fun of the Holy Scripture of Muslims, the *Qur’an*—suggesting that the verses were fake or inspired by the Devil. The novel also strongly suggests that the Prophet Muhammad was a fraud and not a very intelligent one. The book puts women bearing the names of the Prophet Muhammad’s wives, including ‘A’isha in a whore-house. The prostitutes were indeed called Hafsa, ‘A’isha, and Khadija—the historic names of the Prophet’s wives. The names of the Prophet’s wives were supposed to be an aphrodisiac for the clients’ sexual excitement.⁴ Since ‘A’isha was the Prophet’s favorite, Rushdie makes her name what we would today call the *Viagra* effect. (*Astaghfiru ‘Ilah*).

Iran had a *fatwa* or legal judgment accusing Rushdie of a capital religious offense and sentenced him to death in absentia. Iran was the only Muslim country—of the then 44-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)—to pass the death penalty on Rushdie.⁵ Now the organization of the Islamic conference has 53 members.

For nine years, Rushdie has had to spend most of his time in hiding. The bad news is that a number of airlines used to refuse to have him as a passenger because he is a security risk. The good news, on the other hand, is that he became a millionaire several times over from the book and related products. He became more wealthy but less secure.

Westerners have argued that as a novelist Rushdie had a right to write anything he wanted. Muslims have argued that he had no right to hold up for obscenity and ridicule some of the most sacred symbols in Islam. The sacredness of the artist has been in collision with the sacredness of religion over Salman

Rushdie's novel. The abuse of Islam's sacred mothers was one of Rushdie's sins.

Some Muslim societies themselves had assumed that there were two different doors of knowledge—one for men and one for women. Many Muslim societies had assumed that there were branches of knowledge that were not fit for women and children under 15. Partly for reasons of modesty women were spared from certain areas of know-how. Today the Taliban in Afghanistan have carried this theory of two tiers of gender knowledge to the extreme.

The new internet information technology is going to blow that distinction totally out of social existence. US Muslims may be leading the global umma in the new technology. More and more information may refuse to be susceptible to gender-discrimination. What men know about sex, pornography, politics and corruption may also be accessible to women through the World Wide Web, Internet and the emerging information superhighway.

In time the veil as the modesty of the face is bound to be destroyed by the new technology. Women may cover other aspects of their personality, but increasingly they will be available facially to the viewer through the Internet and the approaching image telephone system. The new technology will pass a death sentence on the tradition of the *harem* as we have known it since the Abbasid Dynasty in many Muslim societies. Will US Muslim women lead the way?

The traditional forms of seclusion of women will not long survive a technology in which women can declare their presence and in time assert their rights. Women voting in the US will be a start. Women running for election will come a generation later. American Muslims will join forces with the new technology of information to precipitate fundamental reforms in gender relations in the Muslim world.

A woman's freedom within the umma and a woman's dignity: Is there a trade-off between them? The Muslim world has higher standards of *dignity* for women than the West—but most of the Muslim world has lower standards of liberty for women than the West.

Has dignity in the Muslim world been bought at too high a price of liberty for the woman? Or has liberty in the West been bought at too high a price of dignity for the woman? Can Muslims in America make a difference and evolve a new calculus of gender, a new code of *balance* between dignity and liberty?

Perhaps in the United States Muslims can restore the balance and produce a new model of gender relationships which is at once more dignity-friendly than that of mainstream America and more liberty-friendly than that of the mainstream Muslim world. Perhaps also in America there can evolve a code of conduct where husbands respect their women more than ever, and where sons respect their mothers to new levels of loyalty. Popular images of Islamic values in the West tend to regard those values as "medieval" and hopelessly anachronistic. In reality most Muslim societies are decades rather than centuries behind the West—and in some respects Islamic culture is more humane than Western culture.

The gender question in Muslim countries is still rather troublesome. But again the historical distance between the West and Islam may be in terms of decades rather than centuries. In almost all Western countries apart from New Zealand women did not get the vote until the twentieth century. Great Britain extended the vote to women in two stages—1918 and 1928. The United States enfranchised women with a constitutional amendment in 1920. Switzerland did not give women the vote at the national level until 1971—long after Muslim women had been voting in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.⁶ France gave the vote to women as recently as 1944.

British wives earned the right to own independent property in 1870. Muslim wives had always done so. Indeed, Islam is probably the only major religion that was founded by a businessman who was in commercial partnership with his wife, Khadija, a rich widow.⁷

The United States, the largest and most influential Western nation, has never had a female president as head of government. On the other hand, both the first, the second and third largest Muslim societies in population have had women as the heads of their states more than once each. Indonesia has had Megawati Sukarno Putri as the Vice President and who was then elected as President. Pakistan has had Benazir Bhutto twice as Prime Minister and Bangladesh has had Khaleda Zia and Hasina Wajed consecutively in power. Such Muslim countries are ahead in female empowerment though still behind in female liberation.

Turkey, another Muslim country, has also had a woman Prime Minister—Tansu Çiller. Turkey is a Muslim society that inaugurated a secular state as recently as 1923, but it has already produced a woman chief executive. The United States has been a secular state for two hundred years—and has still not produced a woman president. Neither has France or Russia. Nor has Germany produced a female Chancellor. However, there are current forms of stratification that may have to be watched carefully even if culturally sanctioned.

CONCLUDING REMARK

Pre-eminent among these is *gender stratification*. In Islamic culture liberty and dignity are deemed to be a trade-off with regard to the status of women. But this also involves different *cultural perceptions*.

Women in the Muslim world enjoy greater dignity than women in the West, but Muslim women enjoy less liberty than women in the West. Sons in the Muslim world are more respectful and more loyal to their mothers than sons in the West. But husbands in the West are more respectful (though not necessarily more loyal) to their wives than husbands in the Muslim world. Muslim women living in the West may, if they are lucky, synthesize the best of both traditions—as they enjoy more liberty than women in the mainstream Muslim world and more dignity than women in the mainstream Western world.

Some cultures *center* women but fall short of *empowering* them. In traditional Africa women are far from *marginalized*—they are *centered*.

1. Women as custodians of fire (symbol of light and heat);
2. Women as custodians of water (symbol of life and cleanliness);
3. Women as custodians of earth (linked to the dual fertility—the fertility of the womb: woman as mother, and the fertility of the soil: woman as cultivators).

By traditional culture, women were at the center of water supply; at the center of supply of rural fuel (firewood); at the center of production (food cultivation).

African women were more centered than Western women—but not necessarily more empowered. Reform until recently, has often been to educate African women in a Western style and thereby decanter them. Many African women with high school diplomas end up as telephone operators or typists. They move from the triple custodial role of fire, water and earth to the lower ranks of the service sector. We need to find ways of keeping women central on the land—and add empowerment to the equation. Increasing rights of hand-ownership, independent credentials for bank loans, improvement of skills, and betterment of equipment for water supply, fuel use and methods of farming.

NOTES

1. Nabia Abbott, *A'isha the Beloved of Mohammed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 31, 1985 edition.

2. Surah 24 of the Qur'an: 11–16. For the translation, Richard Bell, *Qur'an*, 2 Vols. (Edinburgh, 1937–1939), I, 336f.

3. See the documentary *Death of a Princess* (Public Broadcasting Services, 1980), which portrays the execution of Sacred: Princess Misha.

4. On some of the complex issues raised by *The Satanic Verses*, see Ali A. Mazrui, "Is *The Satanic Verses* A Satanic Novel: Moral Dilemmas of the Rushdie Affair," *Michigan Quarterly Review*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 347–371.

5. See Daniel Pipes, "The Ayatollah, the Novelist, and the West," *Commentary* 87, 6 (June 1989), p. 13.

6. A chronological list of women's suffrage dates may be found in Caroline Daley and Melanie Nolan, (eds.), *Suffrage and Beyond: International Feminist Perspectives* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 349–352.

7. See M. Rodinson, *Mohammed*, Anne Carter, (trans.), (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), pp. 49–50.

IV.

The Politics of Citizenship

Chapter 4.1

Armed Kinsmen and the Origins of the State: An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology

In a book about the role of political violence in some traditional African communities, Eugene Victor Walter adapted in a new way the categories suggested by E. R. Service to illustrate the nature of fundamental social organization. A “band” is regarded as the most rudimentary political community, involving literal face-to-face relationships. A band may have a leader, but there are no specialized political roles. A piece of land may be jointly exploited, or hunting may be jointly organized, but collective life is based on collective decisions and not on formal roles and carefully differentiated functions.

A “tribe” is a larger political community involving more than one residential unit. Walter limits the use of the term “tribe” strictly to what others have regarded as only one kind of tribal society—the stateless tribal society:

Lacking officers and specialized political roles, it is integrated by segmentary lineages, clans, age grades, religious associations, or other corporate modalities, which dramatize relationships that extend beyond the local units occupied with herding or agriculture, and they live in neolithic style. . . Bands and tribes are egalitarian societies, which shun formal distinctions of rank, but all the others are organized hierarchically.¹

Walter’s third type of political community is a “chiefdom,” where the notion of a central focus of authority is finally institutionalized. The chief’s functions, rights, privileges, and obligations are carefully defined and often limited. A chief organizes the labor of his people for public tasks, and is in charge of collecting revenue and distributing the wealth of his society, as well as of organiz-

ing and co-coordinating the functions of arbitration, collaboration, and conflict-resolution in that society.

Walter then passes on to a “state,” an entity more complex than a chiefdom. The state has a greater degree of centralization, role specialization, and an emergent professionalization of certain services. Even more fundamental the difference in scale and complexity between a chiefdom and a state is difference in the organization of purposeful social coercion:

What distinguishes a state from a chiefdom is the nature and means of coercion authorized and exercised in the political community. In contrast to a chief, who can mobilize an armed force if necessary, the head of the state claims the legitimate monopoly of force and commands a special body of men organized to use it.²

Walter’s categories, though open to challenge in some important respects, have decisive advantages in trying to understand the nature of political organization in Africa. That may also be the disadvantage of the categories. Bands, tribes, and chiefdoms are less fundamental to political organization in Europe, North America, and Latin America than they are to Africa and to island societies in different parts of the world. Asia still has bands, tribes, and chiefdoms, but even in Asia these are less basic to the lives of the great majority of people than they are in the African continent.

In modern terms, Walter’s category of “the state” is the most universal. We shall have to return to this as a special kind of polity, and estimate in what way the kinship factor remains pertinent to this level of political organization.

Nevertheless, in their very primordial implications, the other three categories put forward by Walter and Service do provide us with indicators about the origins of human organization, and the degree to which the political functions of man might have emerged out of roles which were originally those of an extended family.

What may be illuminating here is to relate Walter’s four categories of band, tribe, chiefdom, and state to another set of categories—society, nation, and state. Again the state provides the element of overlapping universality in modern terms between these two categories. The state is the most governmentally oriented of all forms of political organization. At least to that extent, the state may also be the most political of all forms of human communities.

The question that arises is whether the state is also the least kinship oriented of all the categories we have mentioned. When the polity becomes the state has it ceased to be an extended family? And how does all this development relate to the phenomenon of division of labor, both inter-sexual and intra-sexual.

Two forms of survival have been at stake in the history of human collectivization—economic survival and military survival. We use economic here in the most basic sense—the organization of resources of livelihood and their exploitation for human purposes. The quest for economic survival was a major aspect behind the origins of society; the quest for military survival constituted part of

the origins of the state. It is too often assumed that politics and economics have a special intimacy, that man is a political animal mainly because he has economic needs.

In fact, man was an economic agent before the polity as a distinctive organization came into being. Families had to cultivate land and bands had to organize for hunting animals, even in situations where no political organizations or distinct political processes were discernible. Even the pre-political man was at the same time an economic agent. The real push towards the politicization of man lay not in economic, but in military considerations. The processes of politicization and militarization were often intimately and mutually reinforcing. One of the great paradoxes of the growth of statehood in Europe was the emergence of the doctrine that the military must be apolitical. It may indeed be true that the culmination of statehood must ultimately lie in a viable divorce between politics and militarism; but this is compatible with the proposition that the very origins of political organization lay in military consideration. Perhaps the basic transition is from the warfare polity to the welfare polity—and underlying that transition is the current of kinship as a system of political symbols.

KINSHIP AND SOCIETY

We might ask ourselves which of Walter's four categories of human organization are in fact pre-political, in spite of Walter's own assumptions that they are all different types of political organization. It is certainly arguable that the "band" is a pre-political society, organized primarily for economic survival. In the history of political theory there has been a debate as to whether such bands were units of convenience or units of consanguinity. In a way it was the debate that John Locke had with Filmer. Did society originate in the free consent of individuals previously independent, as Locke maintained, or in the natural authority of a father over his children and children's children, as Filmer claimed? Filmer's position was in fact better anthropology, even if poorer philosophy, than that of Locke. There is far more concrete evidence in favor of the family, rather than the individual, as the basis of primordial society.

Filmer's own version of the family may have been excessively oriented towards a patriarchal organization. One does not have to believe in patriarchal authority in order to see kinship as part of the original basis of society. The organization of that kinship need not have involved an omnipotent father figure, exercising dictatorial authority over younger males, women and children. What is basic here is simply the distinction between society as an aggregation of families and society as a collection of individuals. Filmer was nearer to the former familial interpretation of the origins of society; Locke was nearer the latter individualist version. And it was Filmer, rather than Locke, who had anthropologists on his side, at least to some extent.

An additional advantage in the familial approach to the origins of society is the simple fact that it allows for a pre-political society, before the birth of concepts such as "public purposes" and "public processes." Within relatively small-

scale extended families, the concept of “public” is not as yet meaningful. And we define the polity as a form of human organization large enough to allow for public functions in pursuit of collective goals. Politics is not merely the process of determining *who* gets what, when and where—but also *how*. The “how” includes the issue scale, and the extent to which collective life requires more than literal familial authority.

By the time we get to Walter’s concept of the tribe, the politicization of kinship is already underway. The tribe in this sense is a stateless society, but it is not a pre-political society. On the contrary, the tribe in this sense is a social unit in which kinship ties play a particularly pronounced role in political organization.

The concept of the warrior has, by this time, entered the scene. Politicization on this scale includes militarization. Initiation into adulthood for every young male often includes initiation into martial virtues. The organization of the functions, rights, and privileges of the warriors becomes an essential aspect of the polity. In some societies, age grades come into play. Division of labor then involves not only issues of economic survival, but also issues of real or presumed military survival. There are occasions when the two are intimately intertwined. Raids for economic goods are themselves categories of military behavior. Counter raids for cattle and sometimes women demand their own forms of military preparedness. Hobbes was right in linking the origins of political organization not only to economic competition but also to military glory. Hobbes saw in the nature of man three main causes of quarrel—“first, competition; second, diffidence; third, glory.” By diffidence, Hobbes meant the need for security. The pursuit of competitive advantage, security, and glory became central to the phenomenon of conflict itself.

The first maketh man invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third for Reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children and cattle; the second to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession or their name.³

The triple quest, for competitive advantage, general security and glory, was to Hobbes a basic aspect of human nature. For us, all we claim for that triple quest is that it provides the main area of interaction between the politicization and the militarization of human society. A long-term consequence of this equation between politics and militarism was the de-politicization of the female. The exclusion of women from the commanding heights of political decisions has its origins in this equation between politics and militarism.

Culture often changes in response to technological innovations. There is one aspect of culture that has resisted the cumulative technological revolutions—the simple cultural fact that it is men who go to the battlefield to fight. In the days when fighting involved face-to-face confrontations, this sexual division of la-

bour made sense. Primordial warfare with fists, clubs, or spears gave advantage to men as the taller and more muscular members of the species. Because the men fought the wars, it was they who reaffirmed the right to decide between war and peace. Such decisions required high political authority. In a sense, men became politically preeminent because they were militarily preeminent. They also became militarily preeminent because of an old factor in primordial kinship culture that gave the club or the spear to the spouse with greater muscular throwing power. It was, thus, that the male of the species was converted into the warrior.

Yet the technology of war has by now changed so fundamentally in technologically advanced societies that this particular division of labor needs no longer to be maintained. Intercontinental ballistic missiles require no male finger to press the button. The technology of B-52's requires no male pilot to drop the bombs. And yet the cultural equation between war and masculinity has persisted in spite of these technological revolutions. And partly because of that, the men have retained ultimate control of the polity as a whole to the present day in societies that are otherwise vastly different from each other. The warrior class remains a male class. Nations continue to send their sons to fight their wars, at least in the first instance. Even Israel makes her women equally liable to conscription without making them equally liable to service on the front line. Israel gave herself a woman prime minister—but presiding over a highly masculine cabinet, and certainly a highly masculine military establishment.⁴

Political stratification between the sexes is ultimately based on military considerations, even if political stratification within sexes is based on economic criteria. Men are above women in politics because men are warriors and not because men were in some societies the breadwinners. The role of the male as the warrior is more universal than as the breadwinner. Kinship and the polity have exerted an influence on stratification that bears a military insignia.

KINSHIP AND NATIONHOOD

If the aggregation of families led to the first pre-political societies, the aggregation of small societies gradually led to the emergence of nations. In 1875 Henry Maine argued that the development of nationhood was in fact a transition from kinship to territoriality. At least in the earlier versions of his theory, Maine saw kinship in patriarchal terms. The bond of union within the group started by being a belief or fiction of common descent, and the myth of origin sacralized a common ancestor. The transition first from family to tribe, and then to nation was, in the words of Maine, “a system of concentric circles which have gradually expanded from the same point.”⁵

Maine then discussed the transition from bonds of kinship to the boundaries of territory:

We may bring home to ourselves the transformation of the idea in another way. England was once the country which Englishmen habited. Englishmen are now the people who inhabit England. The descendants of our forefathers keep up the tradition of kinship by calling themselves men of English race, but they tend

steadily to become Americans and Australians. I do not say that the notion of consanguinity is absolutely lost; but it is extremely diluted, and quite subordinated to the newer view of the territorial constitution of nations. . . .⁶

Although Maine's general theory was stimulating and has to a substantial extent been vindicated by history, he grossly underestimated the continuing residual political power of kinship. Territory has not replaced kinship as a basis of allegiance; it has simply introduced a new way of defining kinship. Territoriality is an extension of the old methods by which new members of a society were absorbed by an allocation of artificial kinship roles. Territoriality provides a broader definition of kinship, but by no means supplants it.

In England, kinship, real or imaginary, is still a major factor behind attitude to policies on both immigration and emigration. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968 drew a sharp distinction between citizens who could successfully claim kinship ties with people in England and those who could not. The Act was intended to regulate the flow of British Asians from East Africa, as these individuals sought to claim what would otherwise have been a natural right of access to England as the country of their citizenship. The British concept of citizenship was, however, pre-modern at least in the sense of clinging substantially to presumed descent as a basis for the right of access to Britain.

Nor is this merely a racial factor, though racism played a large part in the events which led to the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968. In 1972, with Britain's impending entry into the European Common Market, a related issue of kinship arose. Would Italians and Germans as citizens of fellow members of the European Economic Community have easier access to Britain than New Zealanders and Australians? An initial draft put before Parliament by Edward Heath's government carried implications which made Australians and New Zealanders less favored in terms of access to Britain than citizens of the other members of the European Economic Community. The debate culminated in a defeat of the government in Parliament, to the surprise of many observers. Edward Heath's government retreated from the original formulation of the legislation, and proceeded to revise it in a manner which would restore the rights of British "kith and kin"—now citizens of other countries—to have access to Britain on special consideration. The revised Act even made it difficult for the governments of Australia and New Zealand, since it discriminated by implication between Australians and New Zealanders who were of British origin and those who were not. Both governments in the antipodes expressed some anxiety about this differential treatment of their own citizenry in terms of access to Britain. For the time being, the residual pull of kinship considerations seemed to have triumphed in England. The evidence would seem to suggest that Sir Henry Maine was a little premature in seeing kinship as an anachronistic factor in political allegiance. On the contrary, political phenomena that range from racism to regional integration have continued to be influenced by considerations of shared descent. Continental movements like the European Economic Community, on one side, and the British reluctance to use arms in overcoming Ian Smith in

Rhodesia, on the other side, have all included various degrees of presumed kinship ties.⁷

When nationality is defined in "racial" terms, the issue of presumed consanguinity asserts its immediacy. Movements in Europe like Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism encompassed theories of nationhood based on shared *blood*. In Africa, the whole theory of *apartheid* rests partly on considerations of "kith and kin" and partly on the rationalization of cultural differentiation. In Uganda, Field Marshal Idi Amin has sought to create a nation of Black Ugandans, partly on the grounds that Black peoples are in a sense, which is more than metaphorical, what Amin would call "my brothers and sisters." And in the Middle East a whole new state was created in 1948, on the basis of shared descent from ancient Hebrews. The creation of Israel was once again an event deeply related to the interaction between kinship and nationhood.⁸

President Idi Amin of Uganda seemed to have a general theory to the effect that people who were not prepared to mingle blood were not prepared to form a shared political community. The sexual exclusiveness of the Asians in Uganda prior to their expulsion led Amin to the conclusion that since Asians were not prepared to mingle blood with Black Ugandans, they were by that very reluctance unprepared to share nationhood with Ugandans. There was considerable evidence to indicate that Amin adhered to this interpretation, and had by his own example encouraged transethnic marriages within the country. However, there had been occasions when even he had been reported as being suspicious of Eurafricans and Eurasians. In February 1973, *The Times* of London reported that there were signs of "a new clampdown beginning on Eurafrican and Eurasian Ugandans, whom General Amin recently described as even bigger crooks than the Asians."⁹

The link between citizenship and readiness to engage in joint military self-defense has certainly continued into the national scale of the growth of the polity. There was a time when citizenship itself could never be described as complete unless it included eligibility for military service:

In the primitive nation as exhibited to us by its earliest records in Greece and Rome, and in the German tribes so far as they have a common permanent head, we find political functions distributed among three differently constituted organs—the king or supreme chief, a council of subordinate chiefs or elders, and the assembly of fully qualified citizens which is . . . a martial muster of the free—men in arms.¹⁰

In the growth of the Islamic Empire, the ultimate differentiating characteristic between fully absorbed citizens and conquered peoples was that the citizens were eligible for military service.

In Israel today the Arabs who are Israeli citizens fall short of being full citizens again by the yardstick of eligibility for military conscription. All Jewish citizens are liable to military conscription, but not Arab Israelis. In a curious way the Arabs are second-class citizens partly because the nature of a racially

purist state like Israel is such that the non-Jew cannot be called upon for that ultimate sacrifice in war. Some countries have second class citizens by reducing the rights of the less privileged group; but both Israel today and Islamic states in the past, had second class citizens by reducing the obligations of the less privileged groups.

Of all the countries in the world, perhaps the United States comes nearest to fulfilling Sir Henry Maine's criteria of territoriality as against kinship as the basis of nationhood. The mixture of nationalities and races in the composition population of the United States has certainly transformed the concept of "American" into a territorial concept *par excellence*. Territoriality as a basis of nationhood is even stronger in America than it is in those other immigrant countries like Australia and New Zealand. The greater mixture in the United States has oriented the history of the country precisely towards illustrating Sir Henry Maine's precept.

Even the duty to do military service in the American situation has been distinctive in being distributed not only among first class citizens, nor indeed only among citizens in lower classes, but also among resident aliens. The laws of United States until recently allowed for the conscription of those who were territorially located in the United States, even if they had not as yet been granted citizenship, nor indeed applied for it. Even foreign students studying in the United States at the peak of the Vietnam War were sometimes threatened with conscription by American authorities on the basis of the laws as they then existed.

Although the United States has perhaps gone furthest in the move from kinship to territoriality, it has still retained kinship factors as a force within its political system. Again issues of race and ethnicity, taboos of intermarriage and principles governing racial descent, have all had their ultimate roots in the dominant kinship culture of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The impact of Anglo-Saxon kinship on other groups has ranged from a desire by Italians or Jews to shed their names in preference for Anglo-Saxon names to the whole problem of racial disparities between Black and White within the American society. Sir Henry Maine has not had it all his way in the United States.

KINSHIP AND STATEHOOD

There is a good deal of overlap between the evolution of the polity as nation and the polity as state. Both do link up with Eugene Victor Walter's concept of the chieftdom. In some parts of the world the principle of primogeniture in the family did help to consolidate the principle of hereditary succession in the chieftainship or kingship. Primogeniture sometimes implied the right of the eldest son to inherit the family. Primogeniture in Japanese society certainly tended in this direction, though the system in England narrowed itself more to the right of the eldest son to inherit the title and the lands of his father. The question of how far Japanese and British principles of monarchical succession were conditioned by the broader doctrine of primogeniture in the wider society has remained one of

the more intriguing issues in the political anthropology of monarchical institutions.

But apart from the impact of the wider kinship system on monarchical principles, there was also the political role of the monarch's relatives and the role of leading aristocratic families in societies like Japan and England. The polity in Japan and England has at times been indeed a family affair at least to the extent that elite recruitment has drawn so disproportionately from a number of distinguished upper class and upper middle-class families. The polity as an extended family in such situations is almost literal, in spite of the enlarged scale of political organization in a nation of fifty million and more.

The behavior of the monarch's relatives and the leading families in Japan and England bears a strong resemblance to the style of politics in chiefdoms in traditional Africa. Certainly the history of the British monarchy until this century when the monarchy became powerless was the history of an institution subject to the pulls of relatives and distinguished families within the realm, and therefore similar in important respects to experience in chiefly polities in Africa. In the words of Schapera:

Tribal politics is in fact made up to a considerable extent of quarrels between the chief and his near relatives, and of their intrigues against one another to command his favour. . . . They are entitled by custom to advise and assist him in his conduct of public affairs, and they actively resent any failure on his part to give them what they regard as their due.¹¹

The interplay between politics and militarism continues both at the level of chiefly polities and on the larger scale of imperial monarchical systems like those of Japan and Great Britain before World War II. Sons from distinguished families entered the military profession, thus partly consolidating the hold which their families already had over the political sector of the power structure in the land. The officer corps in such armies drew disproportionately from the illustrious kinship systems.

When statehood included imperial ambitions, the interplay between politics and militarism was particularly strong. Again both Britain and Japan qualify in regard, but so does Ashanti in Ghana's history. Fortes comments:

The Ashanti state was created and maintained by war, and a military ideology remained a central feature of its structure to the end. Guns and gold were its training foundations. As imported firearms spread among the populace, the chiefdom which could muster the largest supplies of guns and ammunition had every chance, if ably led, to triumph in the intertribal wars.¹²

That old link between economic survival and military survival had become in Ashanti a link between gold and guns by the nineteenth century. Statehood and imperial ambitions reinforced the military factor in the foundations of the Ashanti polity. It is here that we come back to the centrality of the concept of *force* in the very definition of statehood.

Statehood that is so defined has important points of contact with Max Weber's classic definition. Weber asserted that, sociologically, the state could not be defined in terms of its ends. Maintenance of law and order, preservation of society, promotion of the well-being of the community, and control or suppression of deviant behavior, may all be central to the purposes of the state. Yet Weber's point was that there is scarcely any task performed by the state that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations, which are designated as political ones. To Weber, the modern state could be defined sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, namely, the use of the physical force.

Weber went on to quote Trotsky's belief that "every state is founded on force." Weber conceded that force is neither the normal nor the only means of the state, but he regarded it as a means specific to the state:

Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib—had known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that 'successfully' claims the monopoly of the *legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which a state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.¹³

Walter's own definition of the state mentioned earlier is Weberian—since Walter sees the chief difference between a state and a chiefdom as lying in the nature and means of coercion authorized within the system and exercised in the political community. To Walter the head of state does claim "the legitimate monopoly of force and commands a special body of men organized to use it."¹⁴

Radcliffe-Brown, M. Fortes, and Evans-Pritchard take the link even further, and assert that the control and manipulation of force is what all political organization is about, and not just what statehood is about.

The political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force.¹⁵

British social anthropologists, by venturing into political anthropology, have helped political scientists to refine some of their concepts. Yet this should not blind us to the fact that the social anthropologists themselves betray a residual difficulty in distinguishing between statehood and a political system. Radcliffe-Brown invoked the principle of territoriality not only as part of a definition of a state but as part of a definition of political authority. To Radcliffe-Brown, political authority is concerned with "the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force."¹⁶

Another major British anthropologist, John Beattie, has also embraced the principle of territoriality as part of the definition of "political authority." Beattie goes on further and uses territoriality as a way of distinguishing political authority from authority in the family.

I take authority to be 'political' only when its applicability depends upon, among other things, the occupation of a certain territory by the persons who acknowledge and are subject to it . . . This is not the case with the, for example, domestic authority; a man's acknowledgement of his father's authority over him depends not, or not primarily, on where he is, but on what he is, that is, a son.¹⁷

Beattie is awakening us to the limits of regarding the polity as an extended family. While important kinship factors were still at play for a monarch like the Mukama of the Nyoro state, the nature of the Mukama's authority went beyond mere kinship. What Beattie does not fully grasp is that this is because the Mukama's authority was the authority of a head of state, and not merely because it was political authority. While territoriality remains pertinent to the very concept of statehood, it is not necessary as a basis for certain levels of political authority, nor does it necessarily replace the principle of kinship.

The issue of organization of physical force is more difficult to handle if we are to regard the state also as an extended family. Are the bonds which keep a family together ultimately definable in terms of the organization of physical force? We quote Weber again, "the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib—had known the use of physical force as quite normal." Although coercion is a factor that can condition the sib as a system of relationships, it is not a factor important for the sib's definition.

We are back now to the distinction between economic survival and military survival. The sib or family cooperates primarily for economic survival, at least in the sense of eking out a living and having bread to share. Statehood, on the other hand, has so far been the final consummation of that marriage between politicization and militarization. Is the state an extended family? The answer must be negative for as long as the ultimate impulse behind the state is the manipulation of force for public ends. The instincts of companionship and economic solidarity so basic to the survival of a primordial family are not the same as the impulses of organized coercion within a state as a militarized polity.

And yet the twentieth century has seen a closing of the gap between the ethos of an extended family and the ethos of modern statehood. A gradual transition, still incomplete, has started, from a warfare state to a welfare state. The emergence of the welfare state indicates a return to the principle of responsibility for the aged, the economically unproductive, and the infirm.

For the time being the welfare state coexists with the warfare state. Indeed, they are often fused in one. Principles of shared economic survival and policies of presumed military survival are conducted simultaneously. But the very emer-

gence of the welfare state in the twentieth century signifies a reinforcement of the ethos of kinship in this particular kind of polity.

CONCLUSION

In his book, *Primitive Society*, Robert H. Lowie emphasized the role of *associations* as “potential agencies for the creation of a state by uniting the population within a circumscribed area into an aggregate that functions as a definite unit irrespective of any other social affiliations of the inhabitants.”¹⁸ In a later article on the origin of the state Lowie went on to say that “associations invariably weaken the prepotency of blood ties by establishing novelties regardless of kinship; and they may indirectly establish a positive union of all the occupants of a given area.”¹⁹

Lowie, however, came to have second thoughts before long on the issue of the autonomy of associations in relation to kinship within political processes:

Further study leads to serious modification of this view. Undoubtedly the claims set forth for the destructive efficacy of associations hold by the very fact of their existence they have created novel bonds bound to encroach upon the omnipotence of kinship ties. But their positive achievement is more doubtful: it is only when supplementary factors of unification supervene that they achieve the solidarity of the entire local group. In itself, in other words, associational activity is not less separatistic than the segmentation of society into groups of kindred.²⁰

Lowie sees the need for supplementary factors to give associational activity the driving integrative force. What he does not adequately work out is the impact of kinship itself as a factor behind the integrative functions of association. When political integration is an aggregation of sub-societies, it is quite often also an aggregation of kinship fields, real or fictitious.

The politicization of society had its origins less in economics than in combat. We have sought to illustrate in this chapter that the growth of the polity in the direction of statehood was in part a process of militarization. The emergence of political authority was linked more to the dictates of military survival than the impulse of economic self-sufficiency. If Caesar's observations are to be relied upon, the German tribes in his time had chiefs in common only in wartime; as soon as peace was restored, the small clans had separate chiefs who administered justice and reconciled differences. The principle of expanding authority was closely tied to questions of military security rather than economic well-being.²¹

We have sought also to demonstrate how the kinship factor has played a part not only in the origins of human society but also in the system of symbols for races and nations in more recent times. The principle of territoriality behind the emergence of nations has simply transformed the mythology of kinship; it has not obliterated such mythologies. The range of implications in recent international history is from the doctrine of “kith and kin” in British immigration

laws to the principle of a Jewish state as a basis for the creation of Israel, and from Field Marshal Idi Amin's expulsion of Asians in Uganda to the nature of interracial marriages in the United States. A particularly obstinate residue of a primordial division of labor is the subordination of woman to man both in politics and in war, and the man emerging supreme not because he was supposed to be the breadwinner, but because he was supposed to be the warrior.

POSTSCRIPT

The self-elevation of Jean Bedel, later Salah Eddine Boukassa, into the Emperor Bokassa I, further strengthens my argument (*Jeune Afrique*, 832, 17 December 1976, 19). Jean Bedel Boukassa passed away in 1996.

NOTES

1. Eugene Victor Walter, *Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence, with Case Studies of Some Primitive African Communities* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 57–58. Walter was adapting E. R. Service, *Primitive Social Organization* (New York, 1962).

2. Walter, *ibid.*, p. 59.

3. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, Chapter 2.

4. Consult also Ali A. Mazrui, "Phallic Symbols in Politics and War: An African Perspective" (Panel on Biology and Politics) and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Militarization of Charisma" (Panel on "Political Elites") 9th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, August 20–25, 1973. These issues are discussed in a wider international context in a book by the same author still under preparation, and provisionally entitled *A World Federation of Cultures*, sponsored by the Institute for World Order, New York, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

5. Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law*, Chapters V and VII.

6. Sir Henry Maine, *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions* (New York, 1875).

7. For a recent discussion of the supposed anachronism of kinship in British identity, consult Jerome Caminada, "Kith and Kin: A Myth Wearing Thin?" *The Times* (London) December 2, 1972.

8. For a more extensive comparison between Israel and Amin's Uganda as racially purist states, consult Ali A. Mazrui, "Nation-Building and Race-Building: Israel and Amin's Uganda as Racially Purist States" (Panel on "Economy and Culture in the Politics of Nation-Building"), 9th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, August 20–25, 1973. For issues of nationhood in relation to race in Kenya, consult Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Minorities and the African Crisis over Citizenship," *Race* (London), Vol. IX, No. 4 (April 1968), pp. 421–437. See also the companion piece by Rathchild, "Citizenship and National Integration: The Non-African Crisis in Kenya," *Studies in Race and Nations*, Center on International Race Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Vol. 1, Study 3 (1969–1970), 1970.

9. *The Times* (London) February 2, 1973. The General had presumably just been irritated by particular individuals, conceivably of mixed racial extraction, and was responding to the mood of the moment rather than to his interest in seeing Black men mingle their blood with others as a form of black assertiveness.

10. Henry Sedgwick, *The Development of European Polity* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1920), p. 57.
11. I. Schapera, "The Political Organization of the Ngwato of Bechuanaland Protectorate," in *African Political Systems*, M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, (eds.), (London and New York: Oxford University Press on behalf of the International African Institute, 1940, 1950 edition), p. 79.
12. M. Fortes, *Kinship and the Social Order* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963), p. 140.
13. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills, (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957) p. 78. For the application of Weber's definition to the Situation in Uganda consult Ali A. Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as a New Political Class," *Political Studies* (Oxford) Vol. XXI, No. 1, March 1973 and Mazrui, *Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 247–275.
14. Walter, *Terror and Resistance*, op cit., p. 59.
15. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, op. cit., pp. xxiii, 14.
16. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Preface to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, *ibid.*, pp. xi–xxi.
17. John Beattie, *The Nyoro State* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 4–5.
18. Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920), pp. 394–396.
19. Lowie, "The Origin of the State," *The Freeman*, Vol. V, July 19 and 26, 1922, pp. 440–442, and 465–467.
20. Robert H. Lowie, *The Origin of the State* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), pp. 107–108.
21. See Sidgwick, *The Development of European Polity*, op. cit., pp. 44–46.

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Chapter 4.2

Gender, Skill, and Power: Africa in Search of Transformation

As Africa approaches the third millennium of the Christian era, three major transformations are needed and, to some extent, have begun to unfold. First, there is the domestic revolution in relations between the sexes; second, there is the need for a revolution in technology and skill all over the continent; and third, there is the need for transforming Africa's power relations within the global system. The three revolutions of gender, skill, and power are intimately intertwined. The history of Africa since 1935 is, to a large extent, a preparation for these three revolutions.

A fundamental change in relations between the genders has been occurring partly because of Africa's interaction with other cultures in this period. Islam and Western colonialism came with alternative paradigms of relationships between the sexes. Both the family and African society at large are caught up in these tensions of cultural change. This chapter examines the transformative mechanism which Africa needs in order to advance its competitiveness in skills, power, and gender liberation in the global contexts.

TOWARD DUAL SOLIDARITY

Two forms of solidarity are critical for Africa and the Third World if the global system is to change in favor of the disadvantaged. *Organic solidarity* concerns South-South linkages designed to increase mutual dependence between and among African or Third World countries themselves. *Strategic solidarity* concerns cooperation among Third World countries in their struggle to extract concessions from the industrialized northern world. Organic solidarity concerns the aspiration to promote greater integration between Third World economies. Strategic solidarity aspires to decrease the South's dependent integration into northern economies. The focus of organic solidarity is primarily a South-South eco-

conomic marriage. The focus of strategic solidarity is either a North-South divorce, a new marriage settlement, or a new social contract between North and South. The terms of the North-South bond have to be renegotiated.

We start also from the additional basic observation that economic flows are in any case far deeper between North and South than between South and South. On the whole, southerners do far greater trade with the North than with each other, and have more extensive relations of production with industrialized states than with fellow developing countries. Those economic relations between North and South are unfortunately distorted by a tradition of dependency involving unequal partnership. The structural links give undue advantage and leverage to the North and leave the South vulnerable and exploitable.

What then is the way out? How can these two forms of solidarity help to ameliorate the Third World's predicament of dependency and its persistent economic vulnerability? One of the more neglected areas of cooperation is human power and human power training. A start has been made in manpower exchange between some Third World countries and in the field of manpower training across Third World boundaries. The importance of this area has, nevertheless, been grossly underestimated.

It is not often realized that the most obstinate line of demarcation between North and South is not income (criteria of wealth) but technology (criteria of skill). The entire international system of stratification has come to be based not on "who owns what" but on "who knows what." Libya and Saudi Arabia may have a higher per capita income than some of the members of the European Economic Community, but Libya and Saudi Arabia are well below Western Europe in skills of production and economic organization. Indeed, members of OPEC do not even have adequate skills to control or drill their own oil.

Nowhere is this demonstrated more clearly than in southern Africa and the Middle East. Less than five million Whites in South Africa have been able to hold to ransom a Black population in a region ten times as large as their own. They have held neighboring Blacks to ransom both economically and militarily. The main explanation is not simply because South Africa is rich, but because that wealth has been extracted through African labor and European expertise. South Africa's neighbors have African labor too. Some of them are also rich in minerals. What the Blacks have lacked indigenously is the superior technology of production and the accompanying culture of efficient organization.

In both South Africa and Israel the cultural variable is critical. Had Israel consisted entirely of Middle Eastern Jews, the Arabs would have won every war. Indeed, it would not have been necessary to have more than the 1948 war. After all, Middle Eastern Jews are not very different from their Arab neighbors in culture and skill. In a war against fellow Middle Easterners, the numerical preponderance of the Arabs would have triumphed against Jews long before the numerical advantage was reinforced by Arab petro-wealth.

What has made the Israelis militarily preeminent is not the Jewishness of 80 percent of the total population, but the Europeanness of less than 50 percent of

that Jewish sector. It is the European and Western Jews who have provided the technological foundations of Israel's regional hegemony.

If then the ultimate basis of international stratification is indeed skill rather than income, what is Africa to do in order to ameliorate the consequences of its technological underdevelopment? The more obvious answer is for Africa to obtain the know-how from the northern hemisphere as rapidly as possible. There are, nonetheless, difficulties. Countries of the northern hemisphere are often all too eager to transfer certain forms of technology, especially through transnational corporations, but the South's need for certain technological transfers only helps to deepen relationships of dependency between the two hemispheres.

On the other hand, there are other areas of technology that the North is not at all keen to transfer. Preeminent among the taboos is the transfer of certain branches of nuclear physics and technology. The computer is part of the phenomenon of dependency through technology transfer; the nuclear plant or reactor is a symbol of dependency through technological monopoly by the North. The transnational corporations are often instruments of northern penetration of the South through technological transfer; nuclear power, on the other hand, is a symbol of northern hegemony through technological monopoly.

The dual strategy for Africa and the Third World is both to learn from the North and to share expertise among themselves. Those aspects of technology, which are being freely transferred by the North should be "decolonized" and stripped of their dependency implications as fast as possible. Those aspects of technology, which are deliberately monopolized by the North, should be subjected to southern industrial espionage in a bid to break the monopoly. Pakistani scientists have been on the right track in their reported efforts to subject northern nuclear monopoly to southern industrial spying. If Pakistan becomes Islam's first nuclear power and decides to share the nuclear secrets with a few select fellow Muslims like Egyptians or Libyans, that trend would be in the direction of enhanced technological cooperation among Third World countries.

That is one reason why the brain-drain from the South is not an unmitigated disaster. What would be a catastrophe is a complete stoppage of the brain-drain. It is vital that the South should counter-penetrate the citadels of technological and economic power. The counter-penetration can take the form of African engineers, teachers and professors, medical doctors and consultants as well as businessmen and scientists, working in the North. The North needs to be more sensitized to southern needs not only by the speeches of southern statesmen and ambassadors, but also by the influence and leverage of southerners residing in the North.

In any case, there is no law of gravity that says expertise can only flow from the North to the South. There is no gravitational logic that says that European teachers teaching African children is natural—but African teachers teaching European children is not. The structure of scientific stratification in the world should rapidly cease to be a rigid caste system—and allow for social mobility in both directions. Of course, too big a brain-drain from the South northwards could deeply hurt the South—the trouble with the present level of the brain is

not that it is too great, but that it is grossly underutilized by the South itself. Professor Edward S. Ayensu, a Ghanaian research director at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, has argued that there is a large potential pool of Third World experts, residing in the northern hemisphere, who would be only too glad to serve for a year or two in developing societies, if only their services were solicited. What is more, the northern institutions where they work would, according to Professor Ayensu, be sympathetically inclined toward facilitating such exchanges from time to time if so requested by Third World authorities.¹

If that were to happen, it would be a case of tapping the brain-drain on the basis of a triangular formula. The flow of expertise would be, first, from South to North, then North to South, and then South to South—often involving the same southern experts or their equivalents, sharing their know-how across hemispheres. This sharing of southern experts by both North and South would be a more realistic formula than the tax on the brain-drain, which Professor Jagdish Bhagwati of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has often recommended as a method of compensation by the North toward the South for manpower transfer. Unfortunately, while the North may indeed be willing to share with the South some of its newly acquired southern experts, the South itself has shown more enthusiasm for borrowing “pure” northern experts than for borrowing southern experts residing in the North. The psychological dependency of the South is less likely to be impressed by an Indian or Nigerian expert coming from the United States than by a US expert with far less understanding of the Third World. The American is regarded as “the real thing” in expertise—while the Indian statistician or Nigerian engineer is deemed to be a mere southern “carbon copy.”

Fortunately, all is not bleak. There is some movement of expertise between Third World countries. Dr. Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s minister of state for foreign affairs, assured me in an interview in Cairo in 1983 that Egypt had “two million experts” working in other countries, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. South Asia also exports a considerable body of expertise to other parts of the Third World.

Some of the traffic in expertise across Third World frontiers is caused by political instability and economic problems at home. Qualified Ugandans and Ethiopians are scattered in almost all the four corners of the Third World, as well as in the North. So are qualified Ghanaians, southern Africans, Nigerians, and others. Then there is the inter-Third World traffic of experts caused by the magnetism of petro-wealth. The Gulf States have a particularly impressive variety of human power from different lands. Two Ghanaian scholars visited the University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1984. They were impressed by the Ghanaian presence in the research complex of the university. They were also surprised to learn about “24 highly qualified Ghanaian medical officers working in and around this University town of Dhahran.”²

To summarize, there is a *push factor* in some of the less fortunate Third World countries which forces out many native experts in search of alternative

opportunities in other countries. There is also a *pull factor* in the wealthier Third World societies, which magnetically attracts workers and specialists from other lands. Together, the two forces are helping to lay down some of the foundations of organic solidarity within the Third World in the field of know-how.

What is lacking is an adequate linkage between organic and strategic solidarity in this field of evolving Third World expertise. A systematic program, which would enable Africa to borrow some of the southern experts now residing in the North, could become an important stage in the evolution of a merger between organic and strategic solidarity. Behind it all is the realization that the ultimate foundations of international stratification are not income differences, military gadgets, or demographic variations. Ultimate power resides neither in the barrel of the gun nor in the barrel of oil—but in the technology which can produce and utilize both efficiently. A new international economic order would be void without a new international technological order. Africa needs strategies of solidarity to realize both.

FOUR FORMS OF POWER

Although the power of skill is at the moment overwhelmingly in the hands of the North, there are other areas of power that the South possesses but underutilizes. OPEC is an illustration of *producer power*. From 1973 to 1983 OPEC grossly underutilized its leverage. Instead of using that golden decade to put pressure on the North for fundamental adjustments in the patterns and rules of the world economy, OPEC concentrated almost exclusively on the price game, a game of short-term maximization of returns.

There is a crying need for other *producer cartels*, no matter how weak in the short run. Cobalt has more promise as a mineral of leverage than copper, and would involve fewer countries. Experimentation in a cobalt cartel could pay off if Zaire, which is now called Congo, asserted itself a little more decisively as an independent power. After all, Congo has the credentials of being the Saudi Arabia of cobalt when the market improves in the years ahead.

The Third World has also underutilized its *consumer power*, regionally specific and patchy as it is. The Middle East and African countries like Nigeria are especially important as consumers of Western civil and military hardware, technology, and household products. Occasionally Nigeria or individual Middle East countries flex their muscles and threaten to cancel trade contracts or to refuse to renew them. Such muscles are, however, flexed usually for relatively minor issues—like protesting against the television film *Death of a Princess* or when an Arab or African delegation is snubbed by a Western power. The consumer power of Africa and the Middle East could be used as leverage for more fundamental changes in the exchange patterns between North and South.

The fourth form of power currently underutilized by the South is *debtor power*. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, upon being elected chairman of the Organization of African Unity in November 1984, identified development, debt, and drought as the three leading concerns of the current African condition. Of

course, African debts are modest as compared with those of Latin America, but Nyerere identified debt as a source of power and not merely as a source of weakness. At the first press conference after his election, Nyerere lamented that the Third World was not utilizing the threat of defaulting more efficiently to induce Western banks to make more fundamental concessions to the indebted.³

It is indeed true that if I owe my local bank a few thousand dollars, I am vulnerable—but if I owe the bank millions of dollars, the bank is vulnerable. Tanzania still owes so little that the country is still very vulnerable. Nyerere virtually declared that if he owed as much as some of the leading African debtor countries owed, he would simply refuse to pay. (Africa's leading debtor nations include Nigeria, Egypt, and Congo. South of the Sahara, Africa's debt by 1986 was over 90 billion dollars.)

In reality, Tanzania would still be vulnerable unless there was substantial strategic solidarity among both African and Latin American countries. The utilization of debtor power requires considerable consensus among the indebted. The Western banks have evolved a kind of organic solidarity of their own as well as mechanisms of almost continual consultation. The creditors of the North are united—but the debtors of the South are in disarray. Africa and Latin America need to explore the possibility of creating a strategic solidarity of the dispossessed and the indebted—to help induce the Shylocks of the North to make concessions on such issues as rates of interest, schedule of payment, methods of payment, and the conditions for a moratorium or even total debt relief where needed.

Fundamental as all these areas of strategic solidarity are, they are no substitute for organic solidarity in terms of greater trade, investment, and other interactions among Third World countries themselves. Here, the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are caught up in one of several contradictions. In their relations with the North, the LDCs need to diversify their economies, but in their relations with each other, the LDCs need to specialize in order to increase mutual complementarity. Uganda could revive its cotton industry and sell the fiber to Kenya to process into a textile industry. This specialization would help the two countries develop in the direction of complementary specialization. The imperatives of Uganda's relations with the world economy as a whole dictate diversification of Uganda's industry rather than specialization. This is an acute dilemma, which Third World countries need to resolve as a matter of urgency. They need to find a suitable balance between diversification for North-South relations and specialization in South-South trade.

Related to this is the imperative of finding alternative methods of payment in South-South trade. The principle of using northern currencies for South-South trade has been very stressful. The bogey of "foreign exchange" has bedeviled southern economies. Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have been exploring possibilities of reviving *barter* as a basis of at least some aspect of their economic relations. Nigeria, in the 1980s, has experimented with "counter-trade"—exchanging its oil for manufactured goods. The new *détente* between Kenya and Tanzania also envisages areas of barter trade between the two countries in the

years ahead. If Uganda's cotton did feed Kenya's textile industry more systematically in the future, it would not be unrealistic for Kenya to pay back Uganda in shirts and processed military uniforms, rather than in hard foreign exchange.

Another area of organic solidarity among Third World countries concerns the issue of sharing energy. There have been years when Kenya has needed to get a third of its electricity from the dam at Jinja in Uganda. Uganda is still a major supplier of power to Kenya.

The Akosombo Dam on the Volta River in Ghana was also designed to be a major regional supplier of electricity in West Africa. Unfortunately the level of water has been so low that far from supplying power to neighbors, Ghana has periodically had to ration power domestically. Ghana has sometimes needed electrical cooperation from the Ivory Coast. Southern African dams like Kariba have had more successful regional roles. They all symbolize a kind of pan-Africanism of energy, organic solidarity through interlocking structures of hydroelectric power.

An integrated European steel complex once served as midwife to the birth of the European Economic Community (EEC). Indeed, the integrated steel industry was envisioned as an insurance against any future fratricidal war in Europe. If European steel production was interlocked, industrial interdependence was at hand—and separate military aggression in the future would therefore be less likely.

In the same spirit, interlocking electrical systems between Third World countries should deepen mutual dependence—and create incentives for cooperation in other areas. The struggle for a more integrated Africa has encountered many setbacks—from the collapse of the East African Community of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania—to the substantial drying up of the Akosombo Dam.

An experiment worthy of Africa's attention and study is Southeast Asia. The struggle for a more integrated Southeast Asia is more of a success story—as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emerged as a major economic and diplomatic force in the affairs of the region. The struggle for a more integrated Arab world is a mixed story—ranging from the positive promise of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the negative internecine squabbles of Arab politics. Libya and Egypt are often close to conflict.

In Latin America, regional integration is also a mixed record. Central America in the 1980s is tense under the clouds of war. On the other hand, Chile and Argentina—through the mediation of the Vatican—have diffused the sensitive issue of the Bege Channel. Economic cooperation has had its ups and downs throughout the region, but the ideal of greater integration is still a live flame. Africa should watch this distant political laboratory with fascination.

The northern hemisphere, as a whole, is divided between two economic blocs, which coincide with the ideological divide. The split is of course between the socialist world of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance/CMEA) and the capitalist world of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Africa, as a southern region, on the other hand, is still in multiple fragments. It is now in search of the elusive secret of putting the fragments together. It is in search of the secret genius of cohesion. Strategies of solidarity are but a means to an end. The goal is distant and difficult—but Africa's reach should exceed its grasp or what's a heaven for?

Should Africa's "reach" extend to participation in the politics of nuclear power? Where does Africa fit into these nuclear calculations? How have cultural and racial inequalities affected Africa in the nuclear age? It is to this theme that we must now turn.

AFRICA VERSUS THE NUCLEAR AGE

It is symbolic of the basic African condition that the first form of African participation in the nuclear age concerned a raw material. Uranium is of course as indigenous to Africa as "the flame trees of Thika" or the baobab tree of Senegal. Africa in the 1930s and 1940s helped to provide the uranium that launched the Western world into the nuclear orbit.

To change the metaphor, Africa was in attendance at the birth of the nuclear age. It was in part Africa's uranium from Congo that helped to set in motion the first nuclear reactor in North America. For better or for worse, Africa's uranium may have gone into those dreadful atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Of course, Africa had no say in the matter. An African resource had simply been pirated by others—and once again played a major role in a significant shift in Western industrialism.

Not that uranium was all that scarce even in the 1940s. What was significant was that, outside the Soviet Bloc and North America, uranium seemed to be substantially available only in Black Africa. As Caryl P. Haskins put it way back in 1946, "[Uranium] stands next to copper in abundance, is more abundant than zinc, and is about four times as plentiful as lead."⁴ Of course, since 1946 other reserves of uranium ore have been discovered in the world, including in different parts of Africa. African uranium has continued to fill many a reactor in the Western world, and to help create many a nuclear bomb.

The second service (after uranium supply), which Africa rendered to the nuclear age, was also symbolic. Africa provided the desert for nuclear tests in the early 1960s. In this case Africa's nuclear involvement had shifted slightly from a purely indigenous resource (uranium) to a partially Islamic context (the Sahara). The transition was from providing indigenous nuclear material to furnishing a neo-Islamic laboratory in the desert for a Western bomb. At least two of the legacies of Africa's triple heritage (indigenous, Islamic, and Western legacies) were inadvertently involved—from the mines of Congo to the sand of Algeria.

The third African point of entry into the nuclear age has been through the Republic of South Africa. For better or worse, South Africa has probably become a nuclear power—or is close to it. This provides the third leg of Africa's triple heritage: indigenous resources (Africa's uranium), a semi-Islamic testing

laboratory (the dunes of the Sahara), and an actual Western productive capability (White South Africa's expertise).

A circle of influence developed. The progress of the French nuclear program and its tests in the Sahara probably helped the Israeli nuclear program. This was a period when France was quite close to Israel in terms of economic and technological collaboration. The French helped the Israelis build a nuclear reactor at Dimona and seemed at times to be closer to the Israelis in sharing nuclear secrets than even the Americans were. The evidence is abundant and clear—the French nuclear program in the late 1950s and 1960s served as a midwife to the Israeli nuclear program. French tests in the Sahara were part and parcel of France's nuclear infrastructure in that period.

By a curious twist of destiny, the Israeli nuclear program, in turn, came to serve as a midwife to the nuclear efforts of the Republic of South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Relations between the two countries cooled a little after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and when Israel briefly considered the possibility of extending aid to African liberation movements in southern Africa. By 1970 there were, however, clear improvements in economic relationships. After Black Africa's almost complete diplomatic break with Israel in 1973, cooperation between Israel and South Africa entered new areas, including the nuclear field. When a nuclear explosion occurred in the South Atlantic in September 1979, the question that arose was whether it was primarily a South African nuclear experiment undertaken with Israeli technical aid, or primarily an Israeli explosive experiment carried out with South Africa's logistical support. A cover-up policy was pursued by both countries, helped in part by their Western allies, especially the Carter administration in the United States. The cyclical nuclear equation was about to be completed. The Sahara has aided France's nuclear program, France had aided Israel's nuclear design, and Israel had in turn aided South Africa's nuclear ambitions. Kwame Nkrumah's fear of a linkage between nuclear tests in the Sahara and racism in South Africa had found astonishing vindication nearly two decades later. It was in April 1960 that Nkrumah addressed an international meeting in Accra in the following terms:

Fellow Africans and friends: there are two threatening swords of Damocles hanging over the continent, and we must remove them. These are nuclear tests in the Sahara by the French Government and the apartheid policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa. It would be a great mistake to imagine that the achievement of political independence by certain areas in Africa will automatically mean the end of the struggle. It is merely the beginning of the struggle.⁵

It has turned out that Nkrumah's thesis of "two swords of Damocles," one nuclear and one racist, was in fact prophetic. The Republic of South Africa is using nuclear power as a potentially stabilizing factor in defense of apartheid. The old nuclear fallout in the Sahara in the 1960s involved a linkage between racism and nuclear weapons that is only just beginning to reveal itself.

The cultural and technological inequalities between White and Black in southern Africa, however, affected other areas of security—conventional areas as well as nuclear domains. The Republic of South Africa has used its technological superiority to bully its Black neighbors into submission and into “nonaggression” pacts. The sovereignty of Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and even independent Zimbabwe has been violated from time to time, sometimes with utter impunity. European technological leadership in the last three centuries of world history has been inherited by people of European extraction operating in Africa—and has been used as a decisive military resource against Black Africans. South Africa’s neighbors have begun to appreciate what it must feel like to be Israel’s neighbor—for both South Africa and Israel have seldom hesitated to use blatant military muscle at the expense of the sovereignty of their neighbors.

Again, cultural and technological inequalities have played a part in these politics of intervention. As we have indicated earlier, Israelis have enjoyed military preeminence for so long not because they are Jews but because a large part of their population is Western and European. We have argued that had the population of Israel consisted overwhelmingly of Middle Eastern Jews, the Arabs would have won every single war they fought with their Jewish neighbor. Numbers would have counted. Middle Eastern Jews in Israel are often more hawkish and eager to fight the Arabs, but the military capability for assuring Israeli victory has come more from their European compatriots. Again, culture has played a decisive role in deciding victory and defeat in military equations.

The danger both in the Middle East and southern Africa lies in pushing the weak too far. We have already seen how desperate conditions in the two subregions can easily become fertile ground for different forms of terrorism. For the time being, that terrorism in the two geographical areas has not yet gone nuclear. If the cultural imbalances between Israeli and Arab and between White and Black continue to deepen the sense of desperation among the disadvantaged, we cannot rule out the possibility of their acquiring those nuclear devices one day from radical friends elsewhere. Powerlessness also corrupts—and absolute powerlessness can corrupt absolutely.

Once again there is one kind of powerlessness the implications of which are particularly distinctive—the powerlessness of women on issues of war and peace. Related to this issue is the whole question of the psychology of nuclear macho. It is to these sexual questions that we must now return.

GENDER OF NUCLEAR WAR

In societies that are vastly different from each other, war has so far been preeminently a masculine game. “Our sons are our warriors”—this has been almost universal. Daughters have had different roles as a rule. Even countries like Israel, which involve women substantially in issues of war and peace, have tended to be protective of women in the allocation of combat duties.

If it is indeed true that there is a pronounced *macho* factor in the psychology of going to war, we cannot ignore the macho factor when we are discussing *nuclear* war. Perhaps that is indeed what is distinctive about war in the nuclear age—it has become too important to be left to men. The whole human species is at stake—men, women, and children. While the human race has managed to survive for perhaps three million years in spite of the violent proclivities of the caveman, nuclear power requires the most fundamental of all human revolutions—a truly androginized system of social and political power.

It is true that the most famous women rulers in the twentieth century have tended to be “iron ladies” with a taste for nuclear credentials—Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, as well as Margaret Thatcher. These are the Dahomey Amazons of the Nuclear Age. However, for as long as most societies remain primarily male dominated, the women who succeed in the power game will tend to be approximations of what men regard as tough and heroic. Africa and the rest of the community could only discover the true impact of women on decisions concerning war and peace when the power system as a whole has acquired true sexual balance, commensurate androgyny.

Are we to assume that women in Africa and elsewhere are generally less violent than men? The answer is “Yes”—though the reasons may be more cultural than biological. Our information is inadequate about the causes, but there is no doubt about the correlation between violence and masculinity. The jails of crimes of violence are a solemn testimony; the wars across history; the concentration camps and their Eichmanns. Of course, the world has also produced brutal women. While men and women have had an equal share in determining births, men have had an overwhelmingly larger share in determining deaths. Men and women are co-creators of the human race, but men have often been solo destroyers of large chunks of that race. The female of the species is the senior partner in the process of baby making; the male of the species has been the senior partner in the business of corpse making. In the twentieth century alone there has been no female equivalent of Hitler, or Stalin, or Pol Pot, or Idi Amin, or the more brutal architects of *apartheid*.

In reality we cannot be sure that an androginized power system either in Africa or on the world stage will in fact succeed in moderating the violent inclinations of states. Perhaps nothing short of a gender revolution can stand a chance of containing the nuclear threat to the species. If that does not work either, the future will be grim indeed for the human race as a whole as it faces its own escalating technological capacity for planetary self-destruction.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

There is one happy prospect that Black Africans can contemplate which the Arabs are denied. Black Africans can contemplate the prospect of inheriting the White bomb of the Republic of South Africa. As we have argued elsewhere, before the end of this century the Blacks of South Africa will probably succeed in overthrowing the regime of White supremacy. In the wake of the racial war

that has to precede the Black victory, half the White population would probably have to leave the Republic. But it seems almost certain that half the White population of South Africa would in the end also still remain behind. Through that other half, South Africa's nuclear capability would be transmitted from White control to Black control.

It is therefore a fair question to ask whether the prospect of a nuclearized South Africa today is a blessing or a curse for the rest of Africa. Is it possible that White South Africa's nuclear bomb is a short-term nuisance for Black Africa but a long-term advantage? Are South Africa's Blacks going to be the legitimate heirs of South Africa's nuclear capability before the end of the century?

There is little doubt that White South Africa's bomb is irrelevant to the survival of apartheid. The main threat to South Africa's racist regime is internal to South Africa—and the regime is unlikely to use nuclear devices in the streets of Soweto. Such a use would, in any case, precipitate a White exodus—at least as serious a crisis for apartheid as the rebellion of Blacks.

While nuclear power is of marginal significance in the fortunes of present-day South Africa, it may be more significant in the post-apartheid era of the Republic. As the new rulers inherit the White nuclear bomb, they will be transformed from the status of being the most humiliated Blacks of the twentieth century to the status of becoming the most powerful Blacks of the twenty-first century. Black-ruled South Africa will of course remain not only one of the richest countries in the world in terms of mineral resources, but also one of the most industrialized in the southern hemisphere. The nuclear capability will remain part of a wider industrial complex.

Can such "horizontal nuclear proliferation" be a cure to vertical proliferation? Again the underlying hope lies in creating the necessary culture shock for a serious commitment to *universal* nuclear disarmament. In any case, Black inheritance of South Africa's bomb will not be horizontal nuclear proliferation in the usual sense. No new *country* will have been added to the membership of the nuclear club—only a new *race*. For the first time the nuclear club will have a Black member. At the most, the horizontal proliferation will have been across the racial divide rather than state boundaries. Since northern nuclear powers are more afraid of South African Blacks handling the bomb than of South African whites doing so, the new Black member of the nuclear club may well precipitate an agonizing reappraisal as to whether the club should exist at all. The racial prejudices and distrust of the White members of the nuclear club may well serve the positive function of disbanding the club—and dismantling the nuclear arsenals in the cellars that had constituted credentials for membership.

However, nuclear disarmament is not enough. There is need to reduce the risk of war. After all, once the "genie" of nuclear know-how is already out of the bottle, it can be reutilized if war broke out—and a new nuclear arms race could be inaugurated. The ultimate evil is man's proclivity toward war, and not merely the weapons with which he has fought it. What kind of fundamental revolution could stabilize the gains in nuclear disarmament and reduce the risk of war? In order to answer that question we need to ask that other question: What has been

the most persistent characteristic of war in all societies, across all time, traversing all cultures?

No, the most persistent attribute of war has not been the consistency of motives—for men have fought for reasons that have ranged from greed to glory, from gold to God, from liberty to land, from sex to soccer. The motives have varied but war has continued.

The most recurrent attribute of war has not been its technology either—for we know that the technological range has been from the spear to the intercontinental missile. Nor has war been a peculiarity of certain climates—for men have fought under the blazing sun as well as in snowdrifts. No, the most persistent attribute of war has not been its motivation, technology, organization, goals, or geographical context. As we have indicated, it has in fact been its masculinity.

With the coming of the nuclear age, war has become too serious to be left to men. The power system of the world does indeed need to be androgynized. The most poignant of all paradoxes amounts to the following imperative: *If man is to survive, woman has to bear arms.*

Africa originally declared woman as custodian of fire, water, and earth. The nuclear age is redefining the scope of the triple custody globally. Africa once entrusted to woman both the survival of this generation and the *arrival* of the next generation through the doctrine of dual fertility. The nuclear age is expanding that responsibility into a planetary agenda for collective self-preservation. Africa's three future revolutions of gender, skill, and power will find their supreme fulfillment when African women take the lead in universal nuclear disarmament and effective arms control. War has for so long worn a masculine mask. Peace may one day unveil a feminine face—perhaps Black in complexion.

NOTES

1. Edward S. Ayensu, Lecture on "Natural and Applied Sciences and National Development," delivered at the Silver Jubilee celebration of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Science (Accra), November 22, 1984.

2. The two Ghanaian visitors were Professor Alexander Kwabong, Vice-Rector of the United National University in Tokyo, and Professor Edward Ayensu of the Smithsonian Institution in the United States. See Ayensu's lecture (mimeo), Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, (Accra), November 22, 1984.

3. The Voice of America's African Service broadcast a recording of both Nyerere's speech and Nyerere's press conference. One such broadcast by V.O.A. African Service was on Saturday, November 24, 1984, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

4. Caryl P. Haskins, "Atomic Energy and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 24, No. 4 (July 1946), pp. 595–596.

5. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (London: Heinemann Educational, 1961), p. 213.

Chapter 4.3

From Kinship to Citizenship

We seek to demonstrate in this chapter how kinship culture affects the struggle for our three world-order values: minimization of violence, maximization of social justice, and optimization of economic welfare. In this connection, we see the transition from rights of kinship to those of citizenship as a movement toward expanding empathy. Within nations, citizenship is a system of rights and obligations that attempts to fuse or balance the claims of the individual with the claims of the collective.

In the global context of the future—whether or not a world government is achieved—societies and cultures may claim collective citizenship of the world in a bid to balance their distinctiveness with the claims of world culture. Before that can happen, the force of kinship culture in human affairs has to be understood and tamed. In the context of our world-order-values, let us first examine how kinship culture relates to the interplay of masculinity and femininity inserted by Christianity in Africa.

COMPASSION AND FEMININITY

Pre-Christian Europe had considerable phallicism. The burden of infertility, which at that time was almost always blamed on the woman, resulted in a variety of phallic superstitions. Artificial insemination may be said to have originated with sterile women having sexual intercourse with a temple priest in a bid to get a child. Other attempts made by Western women in those days to transcend the curse of barrenness were marked by phallicism:

Down to the revolution there stood at Brest a chapel of St. Guignolet containing a priapean statue of a holy man. Women, who were, or feared to be, sterile used to go and scrape a little of the prominent member, which they put into a glass of water from the well and drank. The same practice was followed at the chapel of St. Pierre-à-Croquettes in Brabant until 1837, when the archaeologist Schayes called attention to it, and thereupon the ecclesiastical authorities re-

moved the cause of the scandal. . . . At Antwerp stood at the gateway to the church of Saint Walburga in the Rue des Pêcheurs a statue, the sexual organ of which had been entirely scraped away by women for the same purpose.¹

There had been so much phallicism in pre-Christian Europe that not even Christian prudishness could eliminate it entirely. The church compromised with elements of ancestral paganism, including the phallic themes of Christian cultures. In 1247 the Decree of Mans explicitly forbade phallicism, as did the Synod of Tours in 1396. When in 1781 Sir William Hamilton visited Naples he found in Isermia phallic images being sold on the streets and placed in the church like candles today.² The candles themselves are not too far removed from phallic associations. Candles have been known to be used at a moment of weakness by otherwise dedicated women in a nunnery. Yet the nunnery itself, in its sexual renunciation, symbolizes the counter-phallic theme in Christianity.³

The coming of Christian civilization into Africa has included these counter-phallic themes. To a certain extent Christianity has softened African masculinity. Some might even argue that it initiated a process of demasculinization. The movement of "pacification" which imperialist powers helped to initiate reduced tribal confrontations. The idea of "loving thy neighbor," though still painfully unfulfilled in Africa, denuded warfare of some of its previous mystique. "Turn the other cheek!"—This was the most feminine imperative of them all. Only a woman turned the other cheek upon being punished by her man. Even a woman attempted at times to shield herself with her arms. The principle of turning the other cheek was, however, part of the feminine baggage that came with Christianity.

Sexual richness which had been so much a part of an Africa before the onslaught of neo-Victorian prudery was now to be drastically circumscribed. The missionary schools were the great champions of a new prudish civilization. Suitably "modest" uniforms were devised for girl students; suitably "smart" uniforms came into being for the boys. The boys and the girls were usually in quite separate schools. Visits across the sexual divide were either strictly discouraged or rigidly controlled. Most African forms of dances were abolished altogether, for the movements were interpreted as "sinful." Phallic dances retreated before the accusing finger of the new self-righteous creed.

Behind it all was the virgin birth of the Son of God when the male was dispensable, and the celibate life of Jesus when female sexual companionship was dispensable. The counter-phallic stream of Christianity had begun to erode the banks of Africa's masculinity. And so the traditionalist woman, Lawino, compares her Christianized husband, Ocol, with the real men of the tribe who had once faced death and emerged triumphant.

What about Ocol, with his books of knowledge and Christian inhibitions? Lawino suggests that Ocol's testicles have been put between two books and smashed. His manhood has been weakened. He cannot even play the drum of war or wield the shield. On the dancing arena, as in the battlefield, Ocol is now an outcast.

However, the emasculating impact of Christianity on Africa simply increased Africa's cultural and psychological dependency. The kind of Christianity which was taught in Africa—"Turn the other cheek"—was needed more desperately by expansionist Europe than by vulnerable Africa. The strong need the softening influence of Christianity to curb their aggressive tendencies; the weak still need a warrior tradition to help their resolve to resist. Europe at the peak of her power needed feminine Christianity to restrain her; Africa in the depths of her weakness needed a residual martial determination to transcend dependency.

KINSHIP CULTURE AND WOMEN'S LIBERATION

Perhaps changes in Europe and her Western extensions are already under way, not necessarily in the direction of softening White men—but of hardening White women. In either case, sexual division of labor in White countries—both communist and noncommunist—is under a new challenge. Christianity may have lost the battle to soften the White man—but the White woman, asserting that new direction of change, does make her man share some of the chores of domesticity. In this new process, the future of violence by White people may be affected. It is conceivable that the White man will become less aggressive to others as his woman asserts her own right to decide policy, although that is not yet fully clear. The masculinization of the White woman could reduce White racism as the White woman asserts the right to love a Black man if she is so inclined. It could also work the other way if she is so powerful as to stop the White man's "illicit" relations with Black women.

Initial indications on the American scene show a change in both directions. The parallel eruption of women's liberation and Black militancy has resulted in more Black men being married to White women *but* fewer White men being married to Black women. Women's liberation in the United States has been primarily, though not exclusively, an assertion of White women against White males. As the sense of independence of White women has increased, so has their readiness to marry Black men. As the militancy of Black males has risen, so has their interest in conquering White women in defiance of old White taboos.

The White male, on the other hand, is on the defensive against both Black Nationalism and women's liberation. He can no longer have his pick of Black females. The Black female is also on the defensive, mainly because of a fundamental dilemma: if she is in love with a White man would she not let the Black movement down if she married him? On the other hand, would she not let women's liberation down if she let such considerations interfere with her choice of a mate?

Nevertheless, the decline of the number of Black women married to White males was less dramatic than the rise of Black males married to White women. Black women married to White men fell from about 26,000 in 1960 to about 23,500 in 1970; Black men married to White women rose from about 25,500 in 1960 to over 41,000 by 1970.⁴ Clearly, both the Black movement and women's liberation are movements in the direction of greater social justice, but the fact

that mixed marriages are so few in the American "melting pot" emphasizes the persistent strength of kinship culture in matters of matrimony.

The most promising mechanism for the transformation of kinship culture may lie precisely in the transformation of the role of women in society—an aspect of social and bio-cultural mobility. Mobility in relation to the sexes is partly concerned with interchangeability of roles. The whole movement toward sexual equality in Western history has been in the direction of bio-cultural mobility: fathers playing nursemaids to little babies, and feeding them at night while the mother sleeps; mothers competing in the job market, at least with other people's husbands. The biological differences between male and female naturally remain as rigid as ever; but the cultural roles devised for the two sexes in different societies have been moving in the direction of growing interchangeability. Even in the Western world some residual emphasis for one sex as against another has persisted, yet no forms of differentiation apart from the strictly biological one are increasingly safe from challenge. The new feminist movement in the United States seeks to obliterate almost the last vestiges of cultural differentiation based on sexual differences.

Physical refinements and adornments are also determined by a culture to emphasize biological variations. Until recently the fate of hair in Western history had kept pace with the trend toward sex equality. Most societies, historically, have regarded manliness in terms both of dignified behavior by males in the face of difficulties and dangers and in terms of effective relationships with females. The beard has played a part in this cultural evolution. If you go back far enough in time, this may not have been unconnected with the change from the general mammalian copulation style of back-to-front to the more characteristically human style of face-to-face. C. D. Darlington has asserted that the directly psychological and social effects of face-to-face mating initiated evolutionary consequences, which "will no doubt continue as long as Man exists." Facial beauty, as a major aspect of sexual attractiveness, therefore owes its origin to this major transformation of the sexual posture of man.⁵ The beard became a symbol of masculinity among men precisely because it was peculiar to the male. Among many ethnic groups in the Middle East, for example, the beard became part of the honor of man and a symbol of manliness.

It is especially in the changes of hairstyles in Europe that we find the most direct correlation with the growth of sexual egalitarianism. When the differentiation between the sexes was at its sharpest in Europe, men grew beards and women had long hair. The beard became less and less common in the male population of the West, and long hair became less and less characteristic of western femininity, precisely when the relations between the sexes themselves socially were also becoming less sharply differentiated. More recently among the younger generation in the Western world, hair as an aspect of unisexuality has taken a different direction. It is no longer a question of women shortening their hair to a length comparable with that of men, but of men letting their hair grow to a length comparable with that of women.

As men have gotten round to letting their hair grow long, women have gotten around to wearing trousers. A group of long-haired men and women in trousers sitting together sharpens the visual impact of unisexuality at work. A related tendency is a growing toleration toward transvestism in western society. There was a time when transvestism was inevitably interpreted as indicating homosexuality. Recognition has grown that there could be a compulsion to wear the dress of the opposite sex without accompanying compulsion to experience sexual intimacy with one's own sex. Of course, societies which have had elaborate traditions of dress have also tended to have elaborate differentiation in dress between the sexes. Some African societies have tended to be minimalist in attire. A few African communities had men going completely naked, while women had coverings in strategic places. The concept of transvestism among the Karamajong of Uganda would be difficult to define.

We have so far discussed unisexuality and transvestism as trends in direction of bio-cultural mobility. What should not be forgotten is that the greater toleration toward homosexuality itself is an additional dimension in this tendency. The permissive society in the West has grown more tolerant of sexual deviants provided their deviance is not publicly displayed. Toleration of homosexuality between two consenting adults as aspect of liberal freedom first conquered continental Western Europe, then won over England in the 1960s, and is now spreading in the United States. We shall return to these aspects of moral freedom. Permissiveness to homosexuals starts with discreet permission to two otherwise respectable males, and then grows to encompass toleration of special homosexual clubs and societies. The next step might well be a social acceptance of marriage between partners of the same sex. The concept of husband and wife is already a residue of bio-cultural differentiation between the sexes. When society begins to accept solemn mating between members of the same sex, with automatic rights of inheritance should one die, and perhaps specified obligations attaching to a female husband or a male wife, bio-cultural mobility would have achieved its ultimate flexibility.

Finally, there is the phenomenon of transsexualism—an actual biological sex conversion in the human male or the human female. Surgical sophistication to facilitate sex conversion was attained earlier but not implemented, yet in recent times the world has grown to accept more readily the notion of a person growing up in a particular sexual role and later being helped to assume a different biological personality. Society has grown more tolerant of marriages involving transsexual personalities and it must be regarded as one further dimension in the complex of the bio-cultural mobility of the twentieth century.

These trends toward greater sexual toleration are all fundamentally relevant to the quest for social justice. Social justice involves the toleration not only of differences but also of previously unacceptable similarities. Women's liberation is a demand for the right to be similar to men in roles and functions. Gay liberation is a claim for the right to indulge in sexual sameness. Transvestism is a blurring of differences.

Yet the battle is far from concluded. Preeminent among the residual lines of sexual division of labor is the line separating those who fight wars from those who are initially exempted. The warrior class is still a male class. Nations send their sons to fight their wars, at least in the first instance. Even Israel makes her women equally liable to conscription without making them equally liable to service on the front line.

Because the men fight the wars, the men claim the right to decide between war and peace in almost all societies. The right to decide between war and peace requires high political authority. In a sense, men have become politically preeminent because they have been militarily preeminent. And they have been militarily preeminent because primordial kinship culture gave the club or the spear to the spouse with the greater muscular throwing power. Culture often changes in response to technological innovations. There is, however, one aspect of culture that has resisted cumulative technological revolutions—the simple cultural fact that it is men who fight wars.

If social justice in politics is a transition from kinship rights to the rights of citizenship, Black males even in South Africa and the United States will acquire full rights sooner than White women. A residual sexual division of labor will persist—involving better social justice and control of large-scale violence. This world may even remain male-dominated generations after it has ceased to be White-dominated. Perhaps relations between the sexes are the ultimate claim of kinship culture to determine distribution of power in man's political universe. On this front, all one can hope for is at the most, the economic and social liberation of women—which is still not the same thing as the equalization of sexes in war and politics.

KINSHIP CULTURE *VERSUS* HUMANITARIANISM

For the time being the tensions between kinship culture and humanitarianism are wider than the issue of women's rights. Those tensions have been aggravated in the Third World by the whole experience of racial domination.

There is evidence to suggest that the concentrated loyalties of the traditional kinship system are not easily compatible with the purely humanitarian impulse. It is almost as if there was a limit to how much responsibility a man can accept for his fellow man. If he accepts a large area of responsibility within a system of extended kinship obligations, he reduces, in the process, his readiness to accept responsibility for more distant human beings.

Within the kinship system, Africans know a level of human compassion and human obligation, which is not even comprehensible to the mind. The idea of a tribal welfare system, within which voluntary service and hospitality is extended to the indigent, the disabled, and the aged, provides a striking model of the instinct of social fellowship in man. We Africans all know of distant relatives we support, distant cousins have a share in our salaries, distant kinsmen who call upon us as guests in our houses for days, sometimes for weeks. Yet it seems as if the very fact that we have a highly developed sense of responsibility toward our

own kinsmen, a much more developed sense than is discernible in Western society, has resulted in diluting our capacity to empathize with those who are much further from us.

The growth of individualism in the West has, curiously enough, resulted both in reduced collective responsibility within the immediate society and increased capacity to empathize with man much further away, even in other lands altogether. The Western individualist would be capable of rising to the occasion when news of a natural catastrophe in Pakistan or Chile reached him. With the African it is the reverse; he is much more moved by the day-to-day problems of a distant kinsman than a dramatic upheaval in a remote part of the world.

Qualifications need to be made here, especially in regard to the Western response to humanitarian appeals, which bring us to the imperial or behind African suspicions of pure humanitarianism. The growth individualism in Western Europe did indeed result in the rhetoric and sometimes even in the practice of humanitarianism. However, the humanitarian impulse in a liberal Europe took the form of imperial expansion and a racialistic assumption of responsibility for the colored races of the world. Kipling's concept of the White man's burden was, in the rhetoric in which it was formulated, a case of civilizing humanitarianism. The concept of spreading the Gospel as enunciated by Christian missionaries was in turn a case of Christianizing humanitarianism. Both these themes in the history of Western Europe are inseparable from the history of imperial expansion. In other words, the whole phenomenon of colonial annexation, an imposition of White power on Colored races, was legitimated in history partly by reference to humanitarian and Christian principles. It may indeed have been significant, from the point of view of studying the relationship between individualism and humanitarianism, in which the growth of liberalism in Europe coincided with the expansion of imperialism. An internal European renunciation of kinship and feudal obligations coincided with an external European assumption of responsibility for people much further away from their shores. Nevertheless, from Africa's point of view, it remains pertinent to measure European humanitarianism partly by the yardstick of the imperial experience.

More recently, there have been incidents since Africa's attainment of independence, which have been defended on humanitarian grounds by the West, when in fact issues of racial solidarity on the part of the Whites were discernible. A controversial example concerned the White hostages held by Congolese rebels in 1964 in their confrontation with their central government under Moïse Tshombe. The hostages were later rescued by Belgian troops landing in what was then Stanleyville, using American planes in this venture. Much of Africa was indignant, but the West justified the Stanleyville operation on the grounds that it was a humanitarian act: the Whites being saved from Congolese rebels were ordinary teachers, nurses, men, women, and children who gave service and dedication to the Congolese. They were now being used as hostages and pawns in a civil war between the Congolese themselves. Was there not a case that the Western powers should, on humanitarian grounds, rescue these hostages?

Were the Americans and the Belgians really putting their humanity first and their nationality and racial identity second in that operation? Conor Cruise O'Brien, the former United Nations representative in Katanga, pointed out the relative indifference of European and American opinion toward Congolese suffering as contrasted with the indignant compassion which was aroused on behalf of White prisoners. O'Brien suggested that the "humanitarian" sensitivity displayed in the West at the time of the Stanleyville rescue operation was, in fact, little more than an instance of racial solidarity. He indicated that Africa's own indignation against the operation had the same source as Western self-righteousness—the main difference was that Africans lacked the power to send in paratroopers to rescue Black victims from their oppressors in South Africa.⁶

Catherine Hoskyns has also pointed to the role of the Western press. She first admits that the Congolese did kill a number of Europeans and Africans. She goes on to add:

Having said this, however, it is also clear that press and diplomatic reporting did to a considerable degree distort the extent, the circumstances, and the political implications of these deaths. . . . The main distortions [included] . . . the suppression of any evidence of violence on the other side; and the much greater coverage given to acts of brutality against Europeans than to those against Africans. The result was to tarnish the genuinely humanitarian reaction. . . .⁷

African spokesmen themselves argued that the ultimate outcome of the rescue operation was the loss of many more lives than those actually saved. The paratroopers from Belgium shot their way to the hostages, killing a number of innocent Africans. As the Foreign Minister of the Congo (Brazzaville) put it in somewhat dramatic terms at the time:

What humanitarian principles are at stake, when, on the pretext of saving lives of an insignificant number of Whites, tens of thousands of Blacks are massacred. . . ?

. . . When we were younger, we learnt that in music one white note was worth two black ones. The famous humanitarian operation in Stanleyville has just proved to us that one White, particularly if his name is Carlson, if he is of American, Belgian, or British nationality, is worth thousands and thousands of Blacks. . . .⁸

Even if we made allowances for rhetorical exaggeration, it remains suspiciously true that no rescue operation of that scale would have been launched by the United States and Belgium if the hostages had not been White. The Belgians and the Americans were almost as susceptible to considerations of racial solidarity as the African nationalists who so bitterly resented their intervention in Stanleyville. The whole affair was, in a real sense, a conflict of racial sensitivities. It is partly because of incidents of this kind, reinforced by the whole doctrine of the White man's burden in history and the place of humanitarian legitimation in

imperialism, that the very term humanitarianism is sometimes suspect in the eyes of African nationalists.

Not merely the virtues of humanitarianism have been compromised by Caucasian abuse of its symbols, but also the virtues of nonviolence. Black people were forced to retreat from a warrior tradition—only to be dominated. Implicit in concepts like that of Pax Britannica was the idea that the White races had a duty to disarm the rest of mankind. So when the champions of imperial rule were at their most articulate in its defense, one argument they advanced was that imperialism had given the African, for example, a chance to know what life was like without violence. Claims of having abolished tribal warfare in Africa, and establishing a civilized pacification, were all claims for an imperial monopoly of the use of armies. In the total ideology of imperialism the warrior's right to initiate violence became a prerogative, which only civilization and statehood could bestow.⁹ What had happened to women in individual societies—as they were kept demilitarized—now happened also to colonial subjects. Lenin argued once that imperialism was “the monopoly stage of capitalism.” What was perhaps more defensible was the thesis that imperialism was the monopoly stage of warfare.

Both anti-imperialism in Africa and Black militancy in the United States might therefore be said to be, in some sense, a challenge against the monopoly of violence, which White rulers had preempted for themselves. The Third Pan-African Congress held in Lisbon in 1923 already challenged the doctrine of the White man's exclusive right to initiate violence. The Congress first argued the link between Negro dignity and world peace. “In fine, we ask in all the world that Black folk be treated as men. We can see no other road to peace and progress,” the meeting affirmed. Also it asserted a connection between Negro dignity and the right to bear arms, though it linked the second assertion with the demand for general disarmament. The reasoning implicit in the demands of the Congress was that if the White man was going to insist that everyone else should be disarmed the White man must also renounce his own weapons. And so this Third Pan-African Congress called for: “World Disarmament and the Abolition of War; but failing this and as long as White folk bear arms against Black folk, the right of Blacks to bear arms in their own defense.”¹⁰

The resurrection of the warrior tradition among Black people was now a threat—but, as we shall indicate later, the pace toward that resurrection was still slow. Relations between races are not simply a matter of balance of weaponry; they are also a matter of balance of numbers between the groups themselves. What is not always grasped by observers is the simple fact that population figures, and the very image of being numerous, have often been at the heart of the struggle for racial dignity. In this regard, issues of economic welfare implicit in smaller families are up against the dictates of social justice and racial self-defense.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted in this chapter to focus more comprehensively on the tensions between kinship culture and world-order-values. Cultural determinants of group behavior range from the clash between kinship loyalty and global perspectives in Africa to the interplay between violence and masculinity in the history of human cultures. Tensions between war and peace are related to a sexual division of labor; questions of social justice and economic welfare are affected by systems of descent. The transition from kinship to citizenship continues to be slow.

For the time being the phenomenon of expanding empathy in American society is best illustrated by White people, as the first signs of a Caucasian retreat from racism begin to emerge. Among Black Americans, on the other hand, the phenomenon of the decade is that of *receding* empathy, as belated counter-racism among Blacks becomes radicalized in the ghettos. In Southern Africa there is evidence of receding empathy among both White and Black populations. The possibility of a violent racial confrontation before the 2000s cannot be ruled out.

Behind these racial situations there persist factors of kinship identification, which are fundamentally domestic in their basic origins. A transformation of the racial and marital picture of the world would be inconceivable without a narrowing of cultural gaps between groups, and without changes in cultural values within groups. In the United States the cultural gap between White and Black is more a consequence than a cause. The Blacks have had a different subculture mainly because they were not permitted full social integration from the start.

NOTES

1. Sidney Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, Vol. 1, pp. 63–64 quoted by Chapman Cohen, in *Religion and Sex* (London: T. N. Foulis, 1919), p. 108.

2. See George B. Vetter, *Magic and Religion: Their Psychological Nature, Origin, and Function* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1968), pp. 60–61.

3. Chapman Cohen, *Religion and Sex*. Consult also James H. Loba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1926). At a more popular level, consult also R. E. L. Masters, *Sexual Self Stimulation* and R. E. L. Masters, *Forbidden Sexual Behavior and Morality* (New York: Julian Press, 1962).

4. See summary of special Census Bureau report on marriage, *New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1973.

5. C. D. Darlington, *The Evolution of Man in Society* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 55–56. Consult also Mazrui, "Political Man and the Heritage of Hair: An African Perspective," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1971.

6. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Mercy and Mercenaries," *The Observer* (London), December 6, 1964.

7. See Hoskyns, "Violence in the Congo," *Transition*, Vol. 5, No. 21, 1965. This incident is discussed in a related but wider context in "External Events and Internal Racial Tension," chapter 4 in Ali A. Mazrui, *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship* (London: Longmans, 1967), pp. 52–55.

8. South Ganeo, *United Nations Security Council Official Records*, 1170, December 9, 1964, pp. 14–16. Carlson was the American missionary who was killed by the insurgents.

9. Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (University of Chicago Press and Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 196–171.

10. George Padmore, (ed.), *History of the Pan-African Congress*, pp. 22–23. See also Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana*.

Chapter 4.4

The Warrior Tradition and the Masculinity of War

At the annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity held in Kampala in July 1975, Field Marshal Idi Amin drew attention to the presence of women in a special “suicide squad of the Ugandan Armed Forces.” The question arose whether African women were about to play a bigger role in African military establishments. If this were to happen, how would it affect the status of women in African societies? And how does modern military technology relate to that process?

In cultures that are otherwise vastly different, the role of the warrior has been reserved for men. “Our sons are our warriors.” This is virtually universal. (Israel is no exception, in spite of contrary appearances.) Again, in cultures that are otherwise vastly different, crimes of violence have been disproportionately committed by men. The jails of the world bear solemn testimony to the basic masculinity of violent crime.

Is there a connection between this masculinity of violent crime and the preponderant masculinity of the military profession? The barracks and the prisons have a majority of men. Is this link between warriorhood and Mafiahood accidental? Or are there organic interconnections between the two?

ON VIOLENCE AND MASCULINITY

Images of valor, courage, endurance, and maturity have, in different societies, been intimately related to the role of the male in social and military affairs. Sexual division of labor has been both a cause and an effect of a range of social symbols defining boundaries of propriety and congruence. We have discussed this in a related context of the warrior tradition in relation to the origins of the State.

Especially pertinent for politics and war is a historic link between manliness and capacity for violence. Nothing illustrates this more poignantly than the sexual ambivalence of at least one major prophet of non-violence in modern history. In this ambivalence we see that link between masculinity and martial prowess.

In his psychological study of Mahatma Gandhi, Erik H. Erikson refers to Gandhi's tendency to see himself as half man and half woman, and his aspiration to acquire motherly qualities. Factors identified with Gandhi's bisexual state of mind range from his love for home-spinning, traditionally women's work, to his self-description as a widow when a man dear to him died. We know that his renunciation of sexual activity, combined with a motherly interest in a young girl's physical development, added to the widespread speculation about Gandhi's psychological orientation with regard to sex:

He undoubtedly saw a kind of sublimated maternalism as part of the positive identity of a whole man, and certainly of a *homo religiosus*. But by then all overt phallicism had become an expendable, if not a detestable matter to him. Most men, of course, consider it not only unnecessary, but in a way indignant, and even irreverent, to disavow a small god-given organ of such singular potentials; and they remain deeply suspicious of a sick element in such sexual self-disarmament. And needless to say, the suspicion of psychological self-castration becomes easily linked with the age-old propensity for considering the renunciation of armament and abandonment of malehood.¹

Erikson goes on to suggest in passing that increasing the mechanization of warfare would continue to decrease the equation of manliness with martial qualities. The move from the spear to the intercontinental ballistic missile amounts to some extent to the demasculation of warfare. Face-to-face warfare makes greater demands on individual courage than does destruction by remote control. Gandhi's nonviolence, linked to Gandhi's sexual renunciation, was a simultaneous renunciation of both the spear and the penis. In Erikson's words:

Here, too, Gandhi may have been prophetic; for in a mechanized future the relative devaluation of the martial model of masculinity may well lead to a freer mutual identification of the two sexes.²

Africa still has many societies that are within a combat culture of the spear. In such societies killing is a confrontation between individuals, and a man tests his manliness within a spear-throw of another. In such cultures martial and sexual qualities become virtually indistinguishable for the male of the species. Eligibility for marriage is sometimes tied to experience in killing—just as the war hero in developed technological societies continues to enhance his sexual appeal. There are of course differences of scale in the killing between a culture of the spear and a culture of bombs falling from B-52s. And the purposes of the violence may be intelligible to one culture and bizarre to another. What we do

know is that within the culture of the spear, the effort is more deeply personal. The bridegroom revels in having known moments of violence and danger.

Colin M. Turnbull was once looking at a Dodo tribesman called Lemu, and reflected on issues of this kind in a comparative perspective.

Lemu's shoulders were covered with rows of weals left by cicatrization. These are cut to show the number of people you have killed, and are an indispensable prerequisite to marriage. Lemu could look pretty fierce, if all you looked at was the rows of scars, his powerful body proudly bare except for the cloak flying in the breeze, and a string of ivory beads. His ears were pierced and lined with colored seeds, though he often wore a tuft of antelope hair on top of his head, and his smile and his eyes were warm and gentle like those of the rest of his people. His spear was for the protection of his cattle and his family, and it was difficult to think of Lemu wishing harm to anyone.³

And then, bringing home this mysterious relationship between violence and sociability, Turnbull goes on to say the following of Lemu:

He probably wished *no* harm at all even to those he killed, but faced with the choice of the life of a Turkana or that of himself and perhaps those of his wife and children, he made the same choice that most of us would make, without trying to justify it in the noble terms with which we justify our essays at mass murder.⁴

Lemu belonged to a combat culture still distant from mass destruction. He was also an African untouched either by Gandhism or by Euro-Christian inhibitions and tendencies. We shall return later to the softening and demasculating consequences of Christianity in Africa. What we should note from the outset is the interplay between martial and sexual prowess in man's ancestral heritage.

The interrelationship between sexual maturity and military manhood has had wider political consequences within Kikuyu political culture. Circumcision ceremonies involving the "shaping" of the penis were also ceremonies of initiation into the virtues of endurance and valor. The spear also featured more explicitly in initiation ceremonies of a traditional kind. Kenyatta tells us about the paramount resolution of young Kikuyu boys on being initiated by ancient custom. They used to say in courageous affirmation:

We brandish our spear, which is the symbol of our courageous and fighting spirit, never to retreat or abandon our hope, or run away from our comrades.⁵

In the Mau Mau insurrection, the Kikuyu tendency to link sexual symbolism with martial symbolism continued in an even more elaborate fashion. Josiah Kariuki, who was later to be a Minister in the Kenya government took the Mau Mau Batuni oath in the 1950s to fight on the side of the rebels. He stood naked, his penis pushed through a hole in the thorax of a goat, while he solemnly swore not to hesitate in the obligation to kill should it be necessary.

Some of the mixed symbolism of sexual and martial elements that were characteristic of Mau Mau became subjects of wide controversy. The mixture of sexual and martial ceremonies revolted some sections of international opinion, and convinced them that the movement was not nationalistic but atavistic and primitive. Pre-eminent among the controversial Mau Mau symbolism was the use of female menstrual blood, sometimes swallowed by the men in the oath-taking ceremonies.⁶

Some of the details of these ceremonies have in fact been disputed by those who took part in them. For our purposes in this chapter it suffices that an elaborate intermixture between sexual and martial symbolism formed part of the foundation of the Mau Mau movement.⁷

POLITICAL MASCULINITY IN AN AFRICAN EMPIRE

The Kikuyu—as well as the Dodo, the Turkana, the .lk, etc.—are all among the less centralized of the societies of Eastern Africa. The Amhara, who ruled Ethiopia, are among the most centralized and elaborately institutionalized of the peoples of that part of the continent. The theme of masculinity as capacity to kill continues in the culture of the Amhara and the Empire they ruled. The society is on the one hand deeply Christianized, and on the other continues to have a premium placed on martial virtues. Donald N. Levine tells about the place of the purposeful cultivation of ferocity in the process of socializing and educating young people. The Amhara youth develops skills in versification, especially of the kind which is declaimed in order to inflame the blood of the warrior. Young people memorize lines of aggressive assertion, many of which glorify the warrior and the act of killing:

Kill a man! Kill a man! It is good to kill a man!
One who has not killed a man moves around sleepily.

Levine cites an anecdote. A provincial school teacher, a boy of about twenty, was walking with Levine and another Ethiopian teacher in the country side in Ethiopia one afternoon. Levine suggests that the mountain breeze and the rugged landscape might have gone to the head of the young teacher, for he suddenly exclaimed to his fellow:

We are Ethiopians. Let us kill something. Let us kill a man or a wild beast.⁸

Levine sometimes sees too much in rhetorical bravado. Although hyperbolic in some of his interpretations, Levine is persuasive in the central thesis that “For the Amhara the virtues of the male are the virtues of the soldier.”⁹

In some African societies the expansion of economic and political opportunities for young people has resulted in the decline of the prestige of the profession of combat as such. In Ethiopia the prestige of the military hero, however, continues to exercise considerable influence on the imagination of young people. A study some years ago on Ethiopian student conceptions of cultural heroes

discovered that about ninety percent of the students tested “showed a preference for the ‘military man’ as their ‘culture hero.’”¹⁰

Levine himself also conducted research among Ethiopian students and discovered that military virtues were the qualities most appreciated in Ethiopian historical figures of the past. In spite of the persistence of martial sentiments in a large part of the student population, Levine discovered that those who reached the upper grades of the educational system “no longer look upon military activity as sanguinely as do their traditional counterparts.” The following two tables provide useful comparative perspectives in this connection.¹¹

Table 1
Attitudes of Ethiopian Students to War

	<i>N</i>	War is Needless and Preventable	Necessary Evil	Sometimes a Good Thing
Secondary School Males	392	% 46	% 11	% 43
Secondary School Females	39	46	18	36
College Males	199	45	20	35

Table 2
Attitudes of International Sample of College Students toward War

	<i>N</i>	War is Needless and Preventable	Necessary Evil	Sometimes a Good Thing
France	105	% 65	% 26	% 9
Israel	28	68	18	14
Japan	95	72	16	8
Mexico	106	51	23	26

Across the border is Somalia. The Somali are radically different in political organization and social orientation from the Amhara. Politically and diplomatically there is also considerable tension between the Somali and the Amhara. One cultural factor that they do have in common is the mystique of purposeful ruthlessness as a manly virtue where the occasion arises. This is the central element within what I. M. Lewis calls:

the martial character of the traditional Somali society where the display of force, however brutal and merciless, is associated with manly virility and con-

trasted with weakness, a quality which though despised, is held to possess a certain compensating mystical virtue.¹²

When the link between masculinity and aggressiveness is so close, almost any weapon of war becomes by definition a phallic symbol as well. The associations between combat and sexual conquest are so intimate that an easy psychological transition takes place between martial and sexual symbolism.

The war dances in many African societies become also phallic dances. Many African dances fuse the aesthetic and the athletic. The grand leap, the stamping of the feet, the vigorous movements of the warrior's body, all acquire both sexual and martial suggestiveness. Sometimes fertility dances share movements with war dances. The orientation towards reproduction becomes interlinked with the mystique of brave destruction. Again the range of elements which feature in such dances are from chest thumping to thunderous imitations of the copulation of beasts.

In many a context, the African dancer becomes himself a phallic symbol. The dancer, the warrior, and the lover become indistinguishable where the heritage of imagery draws no sharp distinction between valor and virility.

THE WARRIOR AND SOCIETY

African societies differed in their modes of self-defense and security arrangements, and are certainly different in their conceptions of the rights and duties of the warrior. However, certain themes have persisted in cultures within the African continent which are otherwise very different from each other. This is partly because the concept of the warrior captures some quite fundamental aspects of human organization and human symbolism. Preeminent among the more obvious shared aspects is, firstly, the link between the warrior and idea of adulthood; and secondly, the link between the warrior and the concept of manhood. These are quite fundamental linkages and carry a variety of implications.¹³

Adulthood is related to notions of self-reliance. The adult is he who has a capacity to earn his own living and maintain his own homestead. Adults are sometimes to be differentiated from elders, in this sense, while children are pre-adults, elders are post-adults, no longer at the peak of their physical powers, though hopefully much enhanced in their mental powers. African languages differ in the way they handle the distinction between relatively young adults, with warrior duties, on the one hand, and elders, on the other.

Even if we use the term adult in its usual sense in the English language, to indicate those who are no longer children, the basic point remains that it is from the ranks of adults that full warriors are recruited. One became a warrior when one was presumed to be capable of protecting cattle, or defending land, or collectively fighting to protect the clan. A heavy element of self-reliance was thus built into the concept of warrior because of its link with the concept of adulthood.

In many African societies the process of initiation carried implications of this presumed stage of self-reliance. The generations are separated for a while.

The young adults are separated from their elders. In this respect there is sometimes a closer bond between the third generation and the first, between the elders and the children, than there is between the elders and the young adults. Many African societies encourage newly grown boys to live separately in a lodge after puberty.

The removal of the boy from parental care is a matter of separation of the generations. The boy is developing into a man, a new generation has come into being within the family. This is on an individual level. Seclusion of the whole group of initiands in their own lodge, and their reluctance to give the fathers, i.e., the parental generation, access to the lodge, also points to the separation of adjacent generations, but on a *group* level. The 'oneness' of the circumcised in the lodge would seem to express the solidarity of a new adult generation. . .¹⁴

The gulf between the parental generation and the generation of the new adult has its own tensions. Alnaes tells us about Konzo fathers who are reluctant to have their sons circumcised "too soon." This is because the circumcision ceremony converts a son in some sense into a rival in adulthood. Among the Konzo, a boy eager to cross the line into adulthood might in desperation go to a Muslim to be circumcised without going through the traditional Konzo ritual. This is certainly a last resort. A better strategy in the face of a reluctant father is to run away and be circumcised in the traditional manner before the father manages to intervene.

. . . a fair number of boys run away to be circumcised in the traditional manner and they usually manage to have the operation before the father arrives on the scene. . . The traditional circumcision is a symbolic transition from childhood to manhood.¹⁵

African societies with age-grade systems have more complex stages of social progression. The Nandi of Kenya have seven age-grades, each with a name of its own, and all operating on the basis of a recurring cycle. Every fifteen years the fighting age hands over to the age next below it. And members of that succeeding age would have been preparing themselves for the previous fifteen years to qualify for warriorhood after circumcision. The retiring age moves up to become elders.¹⁶

The theme of mature independence again links adulthood with warriorhood. The initiation ceremonies, both those involving circumcision and those that do not, share certain important characteristics. S. N. Eisenstadt has summarized the descriptions of these ceremonies as they abound in the literature. We might use here Eisenstadt's summary, but relate it more explicitly to the theme of self-reliance and mature independence which initiation implies:

- (a) In these ceremonies the pre-adult adolescents are transformed into full adult members of the tribe, the transformation being effected through;
- (b) a series of rites in which the adolescents are symbolically divested of the characteristics of youth and invested with those of adulthood from a sexu-

- al and social point of view. This symbolic investment, which has deep emotional significance, may have various concrete manifestations, bodily mutilation, circumcision, taking on of a new name, symbolic rebirth, etc.;
- (c) the complete symbolic separation of the adolescents from the world of their youth, and especially from their close status attachments to their mothers; i.e., their complete 'male' independence and autonomous male image are articulated (the opposite usually holds true of girls' initiations);
 - (d) dramatization of the encounter between the different generations, a dramatization which may take the form of a fight, competition, etc., and which the basic complementariness whether of a continuous or discontinuous type—is stressed; thus, in all initiation rites the members of different generations must act together, the ones as teachers, the others as 'students.' The elders sometimes assume frightening forms and stress that without them the adolescents cannot become adults. Quite often the discontinuity between adolescence and adulthood is symbolically expressed in the 're-birth' of the adolescent—in their symbolic death as children and rebirth as adults.¹⁷

Those communities in Africa which have had age-set systems have usually done so in relation to the military organization of the tribe. Even among the Nuer, where the age-set system is less directly militaristic, the link between adulthood, manhood, and warrior remains explicit. In Eisenstadt's words:

When a boy passes into the grade of manhood his domestic duties and privileges are radically altered. From being everybody's servant and an inferior, he becomes an independent adult. This change of status is epitomized in the taboo on milking through which he becomes separated from women, with whom he was identified as a boy—a taboo which begins at his initiation and remains in effect throughout his life. . . . At initiation the youth receives a spear from his father or uncle and becomes a warrior. . . . He becomes a true 'man' when he has fought in war (battle) and has not run away, has duelled with his age mate, has cultivated his garden and has married.¹⁸

We hope to demonstrate later that the theme of self-reliance involved in this warrior tradition is antithetical to the dependency complex which many Africans later acquired under the impact of colonial rule. We hope also to illustrate that the struggle against dependency as exemplified by Field Marshal Amin at his best is, in an important sense, a reactivation of the ancestral assertiveness of warrior culture.

What should not be overlooked is again the sexual dimension of the warrior culture. As we indicated, an initiation ceremony was simultaneously a moment of confirmation as an adult and graduation as a man. Adulthood and manhood were sometimes indistinguishable for the male line of the tribe.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MASCULINITY

In the history of military technology, there was no doubt a time when muscle was directly relevant for combat effectiveness. How effectively a fighter wielded his *rungu* or his axe, how far he threw his boomerang or spear, how totally he dislocated the jaw of his opponent, were all partly determined by the physical strength and physiological prowess of the fighter. As military technology advanced, pure muscle became less relevant. The preponderance of men in the fighting profession became less justifiable in terms of the muscular technology of combat. To press the button of a B-52 on a bombing mission over North Vietnam was an assignment which did not need a man's finger. Yet the great majority of those who fought in the Vietnam war were men.

Technology may change many aspects of culture, but so far it has not yet fundamentally changed that part of culture which assigns the warrior-role disproportionately to men. Is the explanation biological or cultural? Are men more violent because of upbringing and socialization or because of higher biological aggressivity in their nature?

Experiments have indicated a definite difference in levels of aggressivity between male and female in other creatures. The political power of men can perhaps be traced to their preponderance in the military profession from very early times. In a few countries recently, women have attained high office. But here one must distinguish between:

- (a) political power by delegation
- (b) political power by derivation
- (c) direct political power

When Elizabeth Bagaya was Foreign Minister of Uganda, that was clearly un-even delegated power. The real authority resided in President Amin.

What about Indira Gandhi? Was her original ascent to high office partly based on the credentials that she was Nehru's daughter? Was Mrs. Bandaranaike's original ascent to power partly derived from her status as the widow of an assassinated male Prime Minister? Did Señora Peron's position emanate from her late legendary husband? If so, each of these three impressive female heads of government derived her power partly from the stature of a man she was related to.

In the recent history of women in power, perhaps only Mrs. Golda Meir attained supreme authority without the prestige of a towering male relative. Her authority, while it lasted was neither delegated (like Bagaya's) nor derivative (like Mrs. Gandhi's, Mrs. Bandaranaike's or Isabella Perón's), but direct.

A major reason behind the relative powerlessness of women in politics may lie in their military impotence. Sexual division of labour had reserved the role of the warrior disproportionately for the male of the species. In so doing it also helped to reserve the role of the ruler for the male also.

In the African colonies a great experimental opportunity was missed this century. Why did not the British and the French imperial governments create colonial armies made up of African women? The experiment could have been of immense value for the human race as a whole. Since the imperial powers were disrupting local cultures in other ways in any case, it might have made sense also to attempt a disruption in one of the most perennial and obstinate aspects of human culture—the masculinity of warriorhood.

Indeed, as indicated in another chapter in this collection, the French even helped to destroy in the nineteenth century that rare female class of warriors, the Amazons of Dahomey. In the process of colonizing Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin), the French shattered Dahomey's most distinctive institution. Elsewhere in their colonies the French were no different from the other European colonial powers—they all missed an opportunity for the kind of social engineering which would have effectively enlisted African women to the profession of arms.

Such an imperial experiment might not have worked in every African country, but if it worked in any of them at all, the consequences for African politics after independence could have been epoch-making. The soldiers who took over power after independence would in some cases have been women. Some of the presidents in uniform at meetings of the Organization of African Unity would therefore have come from the female half of Africa's humanity. African women in control of armies could have started a unique experiment in the sharing of power.

This brings us to the connection between democracy and military technology. There are African societies to the present day where military skills are still assessed in terms of prowess of handling spears and in the use of the bow and arrow. The simplicity of this technology made it accessible to almost everyone. In the words of the British anthropologist, Jack Goody:

The bow and arrow are essentially a democratic weapon; every man knows how to construct one; the materials are readily available, the techniques uncomplicated, the missiles easy to replace (though more difficult with the introduction of iron that affected even hunting people like the Hadza of Tanzania and the Bushmen of the Kalahari). With the technologies of the bow and stone-tipped arrow any kind of centralization is almost impossible. But with the introduction of metals, kingdoms are on the cards.¹⁹

In the case of the original West African kingdoms it was, according to Goody, the uneven distribution of raw materials which involved systems of exchange and often brought about long distance trade. This in turn necessitated systems of control and security.

With the coming of the rifle in colonial Africa, and the tank in independent Africa, military elitism became more conspicuous. The old days of military democracy, when everyone passed through the warrior stage, and when the weapons were the simple ones capable of being manufactured by the warrior himself,

were now replaced by the era of military professional specialists, with weapons requiring high technological skill to manufacture and specialized training to use.

Even in the days of the more democratic bow and arrow, women in almost all African societies were left out of combat. Only an imperial power with a higher military technology could have started quickly enough the process of militarizing womanhood. African women in charge of tanks and artillery under the colonial regimes would have been potential wielders of political power after independence.

It so happens that colonial armies were often recruited from some of the least privileged ethnic communities in Africa and from some of the most peripheral regions. There was a belief among most colonial administrators that illiterate or semi-literate Africans made better soldiers than the better educated. The better educated was sometimes distrusted as “cheeky” and not adequately obedient.

In any case, the better educated young men had other ambitions. A job as a soldier even in modern uniform—with guns rather than spears and bows and arrows—was seldom the most attractive option for an ambitious African youth. White collar work often ranked much higher.

The British and the French therefore bequeathed to their former colonies military establishments manned primarily by people recruited from some of the poorest and least influential sections of the population. When these finally took over power after independence, some balance was partially restored in their societies. The intelligentsia and the former bourgeoisie still remained influential, but no longer paramount. The lumpen-militariat had successfully (and sometimes brutally) claimed a share of the power.

Unfortunately, this lumpen-militariat was almost exclusively made up of men. On the basis of ethnic balance in the sharing of power, their triumph in places like Nigeria and Uganda had some democratic consequences. Previously deprived communities entered the main stream of national life. But from the point of view of restoring balance between men and women, the lumpen-militariat which colonialism created contributed nothing to the resolution of sexual injustice. The very fact that the colonial recruiting officers often insisted on physical height of five-feet eight-inches (5'8") as a qualification for joining the army, aggravated the discrimination against female recruits.

Given that a great experimental opportunity was lost in Africa, are there signs of a change in the future? Field Marshal Idi Amin's female “suicide squad” is at least symbolic of some basic rethinking about the role of women in war. This rethinking may have started among otherwise relatively traditionalist groups in Africa. Less traditionalist circles include the new rulers of independent Mozambique and the experimentation in female recruitment which FRELIMO inaugurated while it was still fighting Portuguese colonial rule, and has maintained since.

It is unlikely that male political dominance in the world as a whole will end this century, but a step in that direction has to include the increasing militarization of womanhood. This may be a sad reflection on the human race. It is cer-

tainly a reflection of the historical linkage between statehood and the control of physical force, between politics and the instruments of coercion, between power and warriorhood. Military technology is now too sophisticated to be as democratic as the bow and arrow. It is sophisticated enough to make physical height and muscle power no longer relevant in recruiting for the armed forces. While military technology is now elitist in terms of the skills needed, it is at the same time more sexually neutral than ever before. The primeval war of the sexes is about to enter its most fundamental stage ever.

CONCLUSION

Some steps have already been taken in a number of countries to deal with this potential social crisis. Promotion of women in the American armed forces has been accelerated. The Soviet Union and Israel have attempted to consolidate their relative "equal opportunity" policies. The Egyptian army is using more women than ever before, but there is no room for complacency. On the contrary, some of the current shifts of power in the world may be aggravating the problem. The energy crisis from 1973 onwards aroused the hopes of the people of the Third World. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries had demonstrated how "primary producers," technologically underdeveloped, could put pressure on the industrial giants. Since then the movement for the creation of a new international economic order has gathered momentum, led partly by members of OPEC.

If the politics of oil shows a shift of power in favor of at least some Third World countries, that same shift is in favor of countries which are still more "male-dominated" than average. Saudi Arabia, the most influential of the OPEC countries, also has a social system in which women are not only demilitarized but also depoliticized. Most of the Gulf states have basically similar social systems. So does Iran by-and-large.

The Third World has good reason to celebrate the emergence of OPEC and oil power. Do the women of the world have similar reasons for rejoicing? Is not the balance of influence shifting in favor of greater masculinity as illustrated in the social structures of OPEC countries?

It is too early to be sure. The new prosperity of the oil-exporting states may gradually lead not only to the politicization of their women, but also to their militarization. What is clear is that momentous changes are about to occur. How those changes will affect the interaction between sex and war, between technology and stratification, are questions whose answers still lie in the womb of future history.

NOTES

1. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Violence* (New York: W. W. Norton 1969), pp. 402–403.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

3. Colin M. Turnbull, *The Mountain People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 104–105.

4. Ibid.

5. Jomo Kenyatta gives a version of this story in his anthropological book about the Kikuyu, *Facing Mount Kenya* (first published in 1938) (London: Secker & Warburg, 1959), p. 199.

6. J. M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). Consult also my review of his book entitled, "On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship," *Transition* (Kampala), 1963.

7. Idi Amin, who later became President of Uganda, fought the Mau Mau insurrectionists as a member of the King's African Rifles. For the masculine image of Amin himself consult Mazrui, "The Militarization of Charisma: An African Perspective," paper presented at 9th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, August 19 to 26, 1973.

8. Donald N. Levine, "The Concept of Masculinity in Ethiopian Culture," *The International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1966), pp. 18–20.

9. Ibid., p. 18. Philip Attlee gives us a light-hearted fictional dramatization of ones first encounter with the stone phalli of Michichi in Ethiopia. "The length of the grassy glade was broken by what seemed jutting, slanting, fallen, and erect stone cylinders. We paused to consider them in the bright moonlight. . . . All of the tapering cylinders were over five feet long, and the largest of them towered over twenty feet. . . . A tremendous gallery of erect male members, every one loaded and ready to fire. All circumcised. For uncounted decades and centuries, they had been aimed at heaven, enduring seasonal rains and storms. . . . Men had long sought the Elephant's Graveyard and King Solomon's Mines, the Golden Fleece of Jason, and the fabled delights of the Old Man's Garden, where Assassins were trained. But this was the ultimate secret, the fierce and fecund heart of Africa, where all the unspent orgasms of the world were honoured." See Attlee, *The Judah Lion Contract* (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1972), pp. 81–82.

10. This work was conducted by Dr. William Shack, an American anthropologist who worked in Ethiopia for a while, and is now at Berkeley. The study is cited by Levine.

11. See Donald N. Levine, op. cit., p. 22, and Levine, *Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 143.

12. I. M. Lewis, "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 1972), pp. 389–390.

13. For the latest debate concerning the warrior tradition and resistance to colonial rule consult T. O. Ranger, "African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa," in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870–1914*, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 293–324; John Illife, *Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905–1912* (Nairobi and Cambridge, 1969); Terence Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Parts I and II, *Journal of African History*, Vol. IX, Nos. 3 and 4 (1968), pp. 437–453 and 631–641. Consult also Michael Crowder, *West African Resistance* (Ibadan, 1970); and Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, (eds.), *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York, 1970); Terence Ranger, "The 'New Historiography' in Dar es Salaam: An Answer," *African Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 278 (January 1971), pp. 50–61.

14. Although this description refers specifically to the Konzo it also applies to a large number of similar cultures in Africa. For this particular quotation consult Kirsten Alnaes, "Nyamayingi's Song: All Analysis of a Circumcision Song," *Africa*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (October 1967), p. 460.

15. Ibid., pp. 458–459.

16. G. W. Huntingford, *The Nandi of Kenya* (London, 1953); A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi, Their Language and Folklore* (London, 1909) and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Politi-

cal Structure of the Nandi-Speaking People of Kenya,” *Africa*, Vol. XIII (1940), pp. 250–268.

17. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press, 1971 edition), pp. 31–32.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

19. Jack Goody, *Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa* (London, 1971), pp. 43–46.

Chapter 4.5

Gandhi, Marx, and the Warrior Tradition: Towards Androgynous Liberation

In the struggle for equality and liberation in this century, three forms of resistance have been particularly important in eastern and southern Africa. One form is rooted in indigenous culture and has sought comfort in African symbols and drawn inspiration from African heroes. This is the form of resistance associated with the warrior tradition. The second form of struggle has been partly inspired by the whole tradition of passive resistance as dramatized by the techniques used by Mohandas Gandhi against White racism in South Africa and British imperialism in India. The third form of struggle has been inspired by the Marxist revolutionary tradition and has so far found its most successful fulfillment in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola.

The warrior tradition was at play in some of the very earliest instances of resistance against the penetration of the White man in southern Africa. These early struggles are now sometimes referred to in the literature as cases of “primary resistance.”

Partly as a result of stimulation provided by the Dar es Salaam School of African History, increased attention has recently been paid to this phase of “primary resistance” when Africa first had to confront Western intrusion. The argument of scholars like Terrence Ranger for Eastern Africa and Michael Crowder for Western Africa identifies those early armed challenges by Africans against colonial rule as the very origins of modern nationalism in the continent.¹ By this argument Tanzania’s ruling party and its function as a liberating force has for its ancestry both the Maji Maji and the pre-Maji rebellions against German rule from the 1880s onwards. African struggles against colonial rule did not begin with modern political parties and Western trained intellectuals, but origi-

nated in those early “primary resisters” with their spears poised against Western military technology.

This author is basically in sympathy with the *Dar es Salaam School of African Historiography*, but with one important difference. While the *Dar es Salaam* historiography regards the Nkrumahs and Nyereres of modern Africa as the true heirs of those primary resisters, we believe that it is much more the liberation fighters in southern Africa that have really carried the mantle of the original primary resisters.

It is more the fighters in the field rather than the westernized leaders who have shown affinity with Africa’s ancestral combat culture. The rural recruits into liberation movements have often been steeped in traditional norms and perspectives. Their concepts of valor and honor as well as their conceptions of solidarity and loyalty, have all been partly conditioned by important aspects of African culture. That is one major reason why “tribalism” or ethnicity has been so resistant among liberation fighters in southern Africa, especially in Angola and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).

Historians have used the term “primary resistance” chronologically, applying it to the earliest times of confrontation between the indigenous fighters and foreign intruders. However, it is at least as defensible to use the term “primary resistance” in a cultural rather than a chronological sense. In this cultural meaning, primary resistance could be taking place today—provided it is a form of resistance that draws its “primary inspiration” from indigenous symbols and values. The Mau Mau insurrection was therefore in part a case of primary resistance in this cultural sense although chronologically it took place almost on the eve of Kenya’s independence. Similarly UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) was nearer to being an instance of primary resistance in its use of indigenous values and symbols than was MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). This was partly because UNITA was much more of a rural movement than MPLA. If we accept this cultural sense of “primary” we may then relate the warrior tradition to primary resistance, the Gandhian tradition to passive resistance and the Marxist tradition to revolutionary resistance.

In earlier chapters we examined linkages between military and sexual symbols. Virility and valor were often intertwined in cultural terms. In this chapter we have to note that primary resistance is connected with masculinity, passive resistance with feminine techniques and revolutionary resistance with both. The warrior tradition once again asserts its manliness; Mahatma Gandhi displays feminine virtues and Karl Marx becomes a prophet of androgyny or sexual parity. Let us examine these three dimensions as we relate them to the African struggle for social justice in its wider implications.

MASCULINE WARRIORHOOD AND PRIMARY RESISTANCE

The Mau Mau Movement, in rebellion against British rule and White settler occupation of African land in Kenya, constituted the first major resurrection of the

warrior tradition in recent East African history. The Kikuyu mobilized themselves into armed rebellion against European settlerdom. The Kikuyu fighters in the forests and the hills of the Aberdares became for a while true heirs of that heritage of primary resistance. The Kikuyu went back to reactivate primeval symbolism and anti-resurrect important elements of traditional Kikuyu virtues as a basis for establishing a military solidarity against the colonial presence in Kenya.

The connection between martial symbolism and sexual symbolism remains a major aspect of the oath of allegiance demanded from the Mau Mau warriors. We have details of the Batuni oath. The new warrior initiate was first stripped naked, and seated facing the oath administrator. Then, a long strip of goat's meat was placed around the neck of the new initiate. One end lay across the chest of the naked man and the other dropped down his back around his waist several times, and then between his legs. The new initiate was ordered to hold this end of the goat's meat up against his penis. On the floor were the two eyes of an uncastrated he-goat, called a "Kihei." The word itself meant "uncircumcised youth," but paradoxically it was used during the Mau Mau insurrection to refer to a man who had taken the Batuni oath.

The oath itself did not demand total sexual abstinence, but forbade the use of prostitutes and the seduction of "other men's women." These particular prohibitions were to discourage the danger of betrayal by temporary sexual companions, such as prostitutes. They were also designed to discourage the warriors from fighting with each other over women. However, once the Mau Mau fighters were in the forests, total sexual abstinence was demanded among some groups. In some of the detention camps, where the possibility of having intercourse with women detainees was possible, special codes were self-imposed by the detainees against sexual relations while they were all behind bars.²

The Mau Mau did use aspects of that old discipline which Shaka had demanded of his own warriors but the movement did not push the particular discipline to total extremes. There were other instances in the Mau Mau movement linking sexual with martial symbolism, including the use of menstrual blood for certain oath-taking ceremonies in at least some sections of the movement. What was happening was an attempt to provide a sense of sacred awe to counterbalance belief in the invincibility of the White man, which the colonial experience had so far consolidated. Let us remind ourselves that the warrior tradition earlier in the century had been badly damaged by two terrors, which had come with the White man—the terror of gunfire and the terror of hellfire. The terror of gunfire was what the new military technology of the White man was all about. Those early primary resisters against the European intrusion discovered before long the overwhelming superiority of the cannon as against the spear as well as the gun as against the bow and arrow. In the words of the English writer, Hillaire Belloc:

Whatever happens we have got
The Maxim gun, and they have not.³

European technology soon overrode and demoralized the resisters. The new terror of gunfire initiated the decline in the warrior tradition.

The decline was reinforced by the terror of hellfire, which came with Christianity. Death for millions of Africans was now given a new meaning. African ancestors were cut down to size, denounced as insignificant by the missionaries of the new religious order. A new god was proclaimed, and a new fear of damnation was propounded. Some African Christians, like many other Christians before them, accepted the concept of hellfire at its face value; others equated it simply with the threat of damnations after deaths. Whatever interpretation, literal or symbolic, the new religion had come with a new system of punishment and rewards. The power of all indigenous beliefs began to decline; the authority of the village medicine man was struggling against the challenges of local missionary schools. The old order was partially disintegrating—and with it, the warrior tradition.

Movements like that of Mau Mau had to invent new forms of ritualized damnation in order to outweigh the combined demasculating effect of the fear of the White man's gunfire and the Christian priest's hellfire. Christianity had in addition damaged the warrior tradition in Africa by proclaiming the ethic of "turning the other cheek." Meekness was regarded as a virtue even for otherwise virile and valiant men. A version of Christianity which had hardly even been truly implemented in Europe, and which had in part become anachronistic on its home ground, was now bequeathed to African school children and peasants. The god of love was mobilized behind the task of "imperial pacification." The message of Christianity discouraged Africans not only from fighting each other but also from resisting the colonial presence.

A movement like Mau Mau had to help Kikuyu Christians transcend the conditioning of "turning the other cheek," as well as overcome the terror of external Christian damnation. Those oaths of Mau Mau combining sexual symbolism with militant commitment were part of the process of countering the demasculating consequences of the colonial experience.

The Mau Mau movement was militarily defeated by the British, but it was clearly a victory of the vanquished. The political triumph went to the African people, even if the military successes were retained by the colonial people. The stranglehold of the White settlers on Kenya was at last broken and before long Kenya was preparing for independence.

The Mau Mau movement was also the first great African liberation movement of the modern period. All the efforts which are now being made in southern Africa to consolidate resistance, organize sabotage, and seek to dispel White power and privilege, have for their heroic ancestry that band of fighters in the Aberdare forest of Kenya. The warrior tradition was at least temporarily revived at a critical moment in Kenya's history.

The revival of primordial symbolism—which was so striking in the history of Mau Mau—has also been discerned in more subtle forms in the struggle for the liberation of Rhodesia, currently called Zimbabwe, since Ian Smith unilaterally declared its "independence" in 1965. As in the case of Mau Mau, a return to

cultural ancestry has included in Zimbabwe a return to aspects of indigenous religion as well. Hostility to Christianity has reared its head among the liberation fighters. In the rural areas the internecine fighting among the rival nationalist parties has included the burning of churches. Many young men have re-established contact with time experience of spirit possession.⁴

Basil Davidson has also drawn our attention to the fact that an oath taken by guerrillas in the names of the great spirits of Chaminuka and Nehanda forms part of a "truly impressive" continuity.⁵ The Zimbabwe nationalist, Nathan Shamuyarira, has also observed the effort often made to give meaning to the Zimbabwe struggle through the utilization of the African heritage itself.

In rural areas meetings become political gatherings and more. . . , the past heritage was revived through prayers and traditional singing, ancestral spirits were evoked to guide and lead the new nation. Christianity and civilizations took a back seat and new forms of worship and new attitudes were thrust forward dramatically. . . , the spirit pervading the meetings was African and the desire was to put the twentieth century in the African context.⁶

A grandson of a rebel leader killed in 1897 invoked the memory of Chaminuka, the great prophet who provided the focus of Shona solidarity in the nineteenth century.

Joshua Nkomo, the Zimbabwe leader, on arrival back home from abroad in 1962, was met at the airport by a survivor of the 1896–1899 rebellion. He presented a spirit axe to symbolize the martial succession and the transmission of the warrior torch.⁷ In their campaign in northern parts of Zimbabwe more recently the liberation fighters have reportedly shown respect for traditional beliefs and customs, and this has helped the movement to build a more effective infrastructure of popular support. Some of the campaign zones have at times been named after senior spirit mediums. Indeed, some of those mediums have been known to operate from guerilla camps. The link between the warrior and the prophet has often been permitted to persist in these movements. Manliness, valor and some degrees of ancestral devoutness have gone alongside the spirit of modern liberation.

FEMINIZED WARRIORHOOD AND PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Almost inevitably the strong connection between masculinity and warfare has resulted in a similar connection between kindness and femininity. The example of Gandhi we mentioned earlier is certainly a case in point. The great prophet of nonviolence found himself torn between serving as a father figure and acting as a mother symbol. At a more personal level Gandhi had played this second role for a young orphan girl named Manu. The girl had previously been adopted by Gandhi's wife Kasturba. Kasturba, on her death bed, had asked her husband to take her place as a mother to Manu. Gandhi took this role so seriously that he assumed the task of teaching the girl about womanhood, and watching her physical development, and later actually sharing a bed with her as if Gandhi was an-

other woman. The young woman's memoirs captured this strong maternalism in Gandhi's relationship with her when she entitled her book, *Bapu, My Mother*.⁸

Erikson points to a "persistent importance in Gandhi's life of the theme of motherhood, both in the sense of a need to be a perfect and pure mother, and in the sense of a much less acknowledged need to be held and reassured, especially at the time of his infinite loneliness." To the extent that the loneliness might have been aggravated by a long period of sexual renunciation, we have in the story of Gandhi an illustration of the tense relationship between celibacy and masculinity, nonviolence and manliness.

The same problem arises with regard to Christianity. Is Christianity, in the ultimate analysis, a feminine religion? Does the centrality of forgiveness make the Christian God less manly than the Jewish Jehovah? Is the transition from the Old Testament to the New Testament a process of the demasculation of God? Does the centrality of love as a divine attribute make the Christian God less manly than Islam's Allah? Before he was assassinated and became a Black martyr, Martin Luther King was sometimes denounced by some of his more militant Black critics as "Martin Luther Queen."⁹

What we have in these questions is the prior question of whether certain symbols are counter-phallic. Are there aspects of Christian imagery which go almost purposefully against phallic symbols without being sexually neutral? It may have started with the whole concept of a virgin birth. Intercourse was not necessary to produce Mary's baby boy. Yet the very insistence that the conception of the baby was "immaculate," the very consciousness of virginity as the basis of this supreme miracle, is indeed counter-phallic. God did not really have to send His son as His own price for forgiving the human race. Even if He did send His son, the son did not have to be born at all. If He had to be born and have a human mother, why not also a human father? The two natures of Jesus Christ on earth could still have been maintained without the notion of a virgin birth. However, the basic counter-phallicism of Christian mythology starts precisely with the virgin birth. The emphasis on celibacy for the priests of the church prior to the reformation was a continuation of the counter-phallic tradition.

Gandhism was clearly not an exercise of "turning the other cheek." It was not even a case of nonviolence broadly defined. Gandhism was a philosophy of nonviolent *resistance*. The idea was not to accept injustice meekly, but to fight it nonviolently. It was between 1906 and 1908 that a civil disobedience campaign was launched in South Africa under the leadership of Gandhi, directed against laws in the Transvaal that required Indians to carry registration certificates. The movement did have an impact on African opinion in South Africa. Leo Kuper has reminded us of a series of Gandhian protest experiments in South Africa in those early years.

African women in Bloemfontein used the technique of civil disobedience in 1913 in their protests against the extension of pass laws to them by municipalities in the Orange Free State. The women's movement spread to other towns, and continued for a few years. In 1919 the African National Congress started

experimenting with these techniques in Johannesburg. The Communist Party in Durban in 1930 also went "Gandhian." The Indians in South Africa resisted in 1946 in a similar way in protest against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representative Act. Meanwhile the struggle in India itself was helping to give Gandhian tactics global visibility and capturing the imagination of politically conscious Blacks in South Africa, as well as elsewhere. Then came the South African campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws of 1952, again using Gandhian techniques of civil disobedience. In the very wake of such tactics, the system in South Africa was, nonetheless, closing up and getting more intolerant.

The Gandhian resistance in South Africa in the early 1950s was an alliance between Blacks and Indians in the Union. It was in July 1951 that the African and Indian Congresses and the Franchise Action Council of the Coloreds appointed a Joint Planning Council. The aim was to coordinate the efforts of Africans, Indians, and colored peoples in a mass campaign for the repeal of the pass laws, the Group Areas Act on racial segregation, and the Separate Representation of Voters Act which was moving in the direction of further curtailment of the political rights of Coloreds, and the Bantu Authorities Act seeking to ensure a re-tribalization of Africans. The campaign was successful in terms of the degree of involvement of the three groups, but a failure in terms of its aims. The failure was even more significant as an indicator of the limits of Gandhism and the implications of this for pacific socialization in Africa at-large.

Meanwhile strategies of resistance to racial domination in South Africa were regionalist rather than purely national. In September 1958 there had come into being further north a movement called the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). The aim of the organization was to coordinate nationalistic movements mainly in British West and Central Africa and ensure periodic consultations on strategy and methods of agitation for self-government. At that time, nationalism in British Africa was still significantly under the influence of Gandhism. Today, Southern Africa especially presents a mixture of domestic and international violence related to the wider international environment.

Violence in Southern Africa has been both *inter-racial* (White against Black) and *intra-racial* (Black against Black). Angola, especially since April 1974, has been a particularly acute case of Black intra-racial violence. The Angolan tragedy illustrates the fragility of any sense of nationhood in the country; indeed, it illustrates how easily violence against colonialism could then lead to an acute primary struggle for power among Black nationalists themselves. Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) has encompassed both inter-racial violence (Black against White) and periodic eruptions of internecine Black violence.

The contemporary political morality in Black Africa is supportive of anti-colonial violence and, to a large extent, of violence directed against domestic White minority rule. This supportive African attitude towards inter-racial violence in the name of national liberation is a relatively recent development. The earlier phases of African nationalism showed a strong African distrust of violence as a strategy of liberations.

In this regard the ideological history of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is particularly telling. Fergus Macpherson, Kaunda's biographer, reminds us that Kaunda's early nationalistic ideas were greatly influenced by Mohandas Gandhi. Kaunda saw that violence was indeed a tempting strategy for those who were denied alternative means of correcting injustices. Kaunda insisted on the need for *passive* resistance (*Satyagraha*):

I could not lend myself to take part in any (violent) campaigns. I reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problem.¹⁰

Although Kaunda was not basically a philosopher he did place his attachment to nonviolence in the context of a broader philosophical view of the world. Curiously enough Kaunda seemed to believe that there was something unnatural in being nonviolent. He did not share the romanticism that saw man as being essentially peaceful. On the contrary, Kaunda felt that "Man, just like other animals, is violent."¹¹

Like the late Martin Luther King of the United States, Kaunda virtually saw Gandhi as playing Lenin to Jesus's Marx. Just as Lenin had operationalized the teachings of Marx in a concrete political situation, so had Gandhi operationalized the teachings of Jesus and converted them into a political strategy. The theme of Gandhism as a politicization of the love-ethic of Jesus recurs in Kaunda's intellectual growth. This is related to the conversion of Kenneth Kaunda—"Gandhi and Jesus had a special magnetism for the twenty-four-year-old Kaunda. He saw them as realists with a vision and rejected the popular notion that this was a contradiction in terms."¹²

Alice Lenshina's Lumpa Church posed the most serious domestic challenge to Kaunda's "nonviolence" soon after the attainment of self-government; while liberation movements in "Portuguese Africa" and the implication of Ian Smith's U. D. I. later posed external challenges to Kaunda's legacy of Gandhism. Alice was one woman who served as prophetess to new religious warriors in Zambia.¹³

Macpherson discusses the struggle against the Lumpa Church, Kaunda's initial demand for Alice Lenshina "dead or alive," and his more conciliatory attitude later on. However, Kaunda's biographer does not fully understand this Lenshina shock to Kaunda's universe of values. He does not even directly relate it to Kaunda's concept of the state, which is part Weberian, part Marxist, part Christian and part Gandhian. In Kaunda's words as cited by Macpherson:

Gandhi tried to organise things in such a way that the state must eventually wither away—for the whole state machinery has in it the seeds of violence—when man would do to others what he would like them to do to him.¹⁴

In this short quotation from Kaunda we have the Marxist concept of the state as an instrument of class oppression; we have Weber's idea that the state exercises a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force; we have Gandhi's distrust of the state in favor of village industry and general decentralization; we have the

Marxist idea of the withering away of the state and its replacement with a classless society; and we have Jesus's Golden Rule as something which can only be adequately realized when Marx's dream of a classless society is finally brought to fruition.

As head of state, Kaunda was inevitably in charge of something, that had the seeds of violence. Alice Lenshina shocked Kaunda into experiencing what state management was all about. By 1975, Kenneth Kaunda seemed to be in a diplomatic alliance with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa in pursuit of a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia. The President of Zambia was even prepared to meet and have discussions with the prime minister of the most racist regime in Africa's history. The word *détente* had entered the political vocabulary of southern Africa, affirming the need for White and Black to live together in relative peace. Prime Minister Vorster was the chief architect of the principle of *détente*, and Kenneth Kaunda was perhaps his most sensational convert.

Was Kaunda returning to Gandhism? Had he rediscovered *Satyagraha*, or "Soul Force," which Mohandas Gandhi had espoused as an alternative to violent resistance? If Kaunda had rediscovered Mahatma Gandhi through John Vorster, history had once again indulged its own mischievous sense of humor. It was after all in South Africa, as we have noted, that Gandhi had first experimented with *Satyagraha* much earlier this century. We know that within South Africa the Gandhian experiment failed. Kenneth Kaunda later became one of the Mahatma's most enthusiastic Black converts. Kaunda retreated from *Satyagraha* partly in the face of domestic violence in Zambia after independence, and partly in response to hardening attitudes in southern Africa as a whole. The question which has arisen in the 1970s is whether a new Gandhian mood is in the air in the region—a readiness to try alternative pressures on the remaining racist regimes in southern Africa, and let "Soul Force" destroy apartheid in the fullness of time.

In reality, the chances of a peaceful transition to social justice in South Africa and Rhodesia without additional violence are remote. The region is likely to need *Gandhians*, *Warriors* and *Radical Guerillas* before racial equity daily prevails, but of even longer-term consequence than inter-racial violence will be the cleavages of Black against Black. These are likely to be the most obstinate. They are also likely to tax the ingenuity of Africa to find both preventive and curative measures. Violence as a form of political pathology will need more than traditional witchdoctors or modern psychiatrists. It will need a long but vital process of creating self-discipline and establishing self-policing techniques to govern Africa's relations with itself.

In this quest for new approaches to problems of violence, Kenneth Kaunda's name looms large. More a strategist than a theoretician, more a statesman than a philosopher, Kenneth Kaunda gropes for answers about some of the most basic questions of man's relations with man. Kaunda is a nationalist who is ready to give the oppressor the benefit of the doubt; he is a humanist capable of supporting armed and violent insurrection; he is a world figure who is capable of be-

ing concerned about a village; and he is a political warrior who is capable of bursting into tears.

Yet in those very tears we are back to feminine symbolism in culture. The convert to Gandhism has retained the supremely feminine prerogative of unabashed capitulation to tears on relatively casual emotional stimulus. The sublimated maternalism of Gandhi has found its African counterpart in Kenneth Kaunda.

ANDROGYNOUS WARRIORHOOD AND REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE

It is with the intrusion of modern revolutionary ideas in southern Africa that androgynous warriorhood became at last a serious aspiration for some of the liberation movements. We define androgynous warriorhood as a principle that seeks to end masculine monopoly of the skills of war. Historically, before total European control was established, Angola had indeed known strong women with warrior skills, from a warrior queen to peasant fighters. However, the principle of masculine monopoly of the war-machine was the order of the day in Angola as elsewhere.

Perhaps more fascinating was the Dahomean experience with women fighters, especially in the nineteenth century. It started earlier when the Kings of Dahomey had at times conscripted some of their wives as armed palace guards, especially in times of emergency. In the nineteenth century the practice became institutionalized. After a dynastic coup in 1818 the royal pretender, King Gezo, selected from among non-Dahomean captive girls a corps of fighters to defend him in case of further trouble. These women had certain privileges as both his soldiers and his wives, and their loyalty to the king was, on the whole, strengthened by their vested interest in his survival.

The Amazons in time became not merely the monarch's civil guard but important units in the Dahomean army. From about 1840 onwards they started getting involved in foreign wars, and soon earned a reputation as particularly ferocious and often cruel fighters. King Gezo died in 1858. In the years which followed, recruitment into the Amazons' Corps was no longer restricted to captive girls, but was extended to Dahomean women, some of whom came from high ranking families.

Psychological explanations of their ferocity have included the sexual frustrations that emanated from their being all the wives of a single man—the king.

These female soldiers had all the privileges of important royal wives; they lived in the royal palaces, they had their food prepared for them; anyone who met them on the roads had to make way for them. They had also to obey the regulations that governed the lives of the King's wives. The most onerous of these was that, although they could only enjoy the favors of their royal spouse infrequently, they were forbidden any relations with other men. Any deviation from this rule was punishable by death. No doubt this enforced state of chastity goes a good deal towards explaining their ferocity.¹⁵

In the course of much of the rest of the nineteenth century the “standing army” of Dahomey had regular male and female units. At its peak the size of the army in an emergency rose up to twelve thousand warriors, nearly half of whom were women. The Amazons of Dahomey were destroyed as a fighting force by the French colonizers in 1892. The male units of the Dahomean army were almost equally decimated. One of the most dramatic experiments in androgynous warriorhood anywhere in the world came abruptly to an end.

The Dahomean experiment was not an ideal instance of androgynous warriorhood. In the first place the fighting units of men and women were kept separate. Even more fundamental was that the primacy of the male in the political system as a whole was not in question. The Amazons were after all, the king’s wives. And while the monarch could have more than four thousand wives at a time, a wife could enjoy the favors of another man only on pain of death.

Androgyny as a negation of sexism cannot therefore be credited to the Dahomean experiment. As an ideological ideal, androgyny is a child of both western liberalism and western socialism. After all, both John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx championed the liberation of women in the nineteenth century.

In much of colonial Africa it was Western liberalism that began to influence events in the direction of greater equality for women. Girls were encouraged to go to school, polygamy was sometimes taxed by the colonial master, and female circumcision where it was practiced fell under the shadow of Christian and imperial disapproval. There is little doubt that in much of Africa important new areas of feminist freedom were opened up by the imperial order itself, yet warriorhood even under Western liberalism continued to remain a preserve for the male. Could this military monopoly by men be reconciled with a genuine liberation of women?

It is among the leftist regimes of Africa—especially those in former Portuguese colonies—that the principle of androgynous warriorhood is *beginning* to be seriously entertained. FRELIMO in Mozambique had begun to use women in the struggle against the Portuguese by the late 1960s. The radical nationalist thrust in Guinea-Bissau under the Cabral had initiated similar experimentation. MPLA in Angola as an initially urban movement began to tap sophisticated urbanized female talent in ways which were less dramatic than, but still comparable to those which had once been used by the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria in their war against the French. In the vivid words of Franz Fanon, who shared the experience of fighting for Algerian resistance:

Three metres ahead of you the police challenge a veiled woman who does not look particularly suspect. From the anguished expression of the unit leader you have guessed that she is carrying a bomb, or a sack of grenades, bound to her body by a whole system of strings and straps. For the hands must be free, exhibited bare, humbly and abjectly presented to the soldiers so that they will look no further.¹⁶

But with the conversion of the veil into a military camouflage the enemy became extra alert.

In the streets one witnessed what became a commonplace spectacle of Algerian women glued to the wall, over whose bodies the famous magnetic detectors, the 'frying pans' would be passed. Every veiled woman, every Algerian woman became suspect. There was no discrimination. This was the period during which men, women, children, the whole Algerian people, experienced at one and the same time their national vocation and the recasting of the new Algerian society.¹⁷

Fanon may have been exaggerating, but he certainly captured the androgynizing tendency of revolutionary resistance: Women gradually become radicalized. If the revolutionary resistance lasts long enough, the androgyny may become a conscious morality and not merely a side-effect of sustained struggle.

Yet the patron saints of modern socialist revolutions, Marx and Engels, drastically underestimated the relevance of military factors for the status of women in society. The two thinkers were such consistent economic determinists that they saw relations between men and women in primarily economic terms.

They argued that it was because men controlled the means of production that the women had become servants and serfs. In the words of Engels:

Today, in the great majority of classes, the man has to be the earner, the breadwinner of the family, at least among the propertied classes, and this gives him a dominating position which requires no special privileges. In the family, he is the bourgeois; the wife represents the proletariat.¹⁸

Engels assumed too readily that where women were effective economic producers, they attained high status. He thought "savages" and "barbarians" with economically active women respected their women more than Western men respected Western women:

That woman was the slave of man from the commencement of society is one of the most absurd notions that have come down to us from the period of Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Woman occupied not only a free but also a highly respected position among all savages and all barbarians of the lower and middle stages and partly even of the upper stage. . . . People whose women have to work much harder than we would consider proper often have far more real respect for women than our Europeans have for theirs. The social status of the lady of civilization, surrounded by sham homage and estranged from real work, is socially infinitely lower than that of the hard-working woman of barbarism. . .¹⁹

What Engels did not seem to realize is that it is possible for women to work hard and be economically productive—and still enjoy low status in society. Kikuyu women work much harder than Western women. They are economically more productive in relation to their society than Western women are in relation to

their own. It is far from self-evident that Kikuyu women enjoy higher social status than do their Western counterparts.

Engels did see the coming of the patriarchal family as a major disaster for women. How did men manage to control the means of production in the first place? Did they not first have to control the means of destruction—the instruments of violence? Was it not masculine superiority in the skills of physical coercion, which tilted the balance in the first place?

In the chapter on “Armed Kinsmen and the Origins of the State” we have argued more fully that it was military factors rather than economic ones, which initially gave men control over the political system. Primacy in the means of destruction rather than ownership of the means of production is the ultimate factor in the origins of sexism. This may not be neatly compatible with economic determinism but it explains a wider range of societies. The economic role of women varies enormously in different societies, while the military role of women is rather constant. Low status for women is almost universal; so is their limited military involvement. The subjection of women correlates much more neatly with the degree of their demilitarization than with the degree of their involvement in economic production.

Twentieth century Marxists are perhaps a little more sensitized to the importance of controlling the means of destruction than Marx and Engels seem to have been, in spite of the Paris Commune of 1871. In the course of World War I, Lenin hoped that if the fighting in Europe continued long enough the bourgeois regimes might start enlisting women. Such enlistment could help to bring the revolution closer.

Today the imperialist bourgeoisie militarises not only the adults, but also the youth. Tomorrow it may proceed to militarise the women. To this we must say: All the better! Go ahead faster! The faster it goes, the nearer shall we be to the armed uprising against capitalism.²⁰

Lenin then remembers a “certain bourgeois observer” of the Paris Commune who, writing to an English newspaper in May 1871, said: “If the French nation consisted entirely of women, what a terrible nation it would be.” Lenin himself went on to observe:

Women, and children of thirteen and upwards, fought in the Paris Commune side by side with the men. Nor can it be different in the forthcoming battles for the bourgeoisie. The proletarian women will not look on passively while the well-armed bourgeoisie shoot down the poorly armed or unarmed workers. They will take arms as they did in 1871. . .²¹

This is the revolutionary fervor of which androgynous warriorhood is made. Leninist ideas are now slowly penetrating such countries as Mozambique, Guinea, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. A major sexual revolution in African conditions may be under way if such ideas do take root.

However, in Lenin's own country true androgyny as a refutation of sexism is far from a reality as yet. Russia has discovered that the liberation of the proletariat is easier than the liberation of Russian women. Mozambique and Angola may also discover that national emancipation is an easier target than equality between the sexes—least of all on the battlefield.

CONCLUSION

We have sought to demonstrate in this paper that three forms of resistance have been particularly important in Africa in the twentieth century. These are passive resistance, as championed by Mohandas Gandhi, primary resistance as manifested in the warrior tradition, and revolutionary resistance as embodied in the Marxist tradition.

Mahatma Gandhi's influence in Africa lasted mainly from the 1930s to the 1960s. In the 1930s the Indian nationalist movement was already being followed with close interest in other parts of the British Empire. Politically conscious young Africans—especially in West Africa—were already drawing inspiration from the struggle in the Indian sub-continent.

By the 1940s the African struggle itself was gathering momentum. Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast (later Ghana) was toying with Gandhi's ideas on non-violent campaigns, and dreaming about translating them into what Nkrumah called "positive action" in his own fight against British rule. Nkrumah was aware that Gandhi had first used his technique in South Africa. What had not worked against White racism in South Africa might work against British colonialism elsewhere. Gandhian ideas thus helped to influence Nkrumah's approach to the struggle.

In 1958—when Nkrumah hosted the All-Africa Peoples conference in the newly independent Ghana—neo-Gandhism was still relatively popular in much of Africa. The Algerian National Liberation Front—then engaged in armed insurrection against the French—had a hard time persuading the Accra conference to give their armed struggle legitimacy and support.

In Southern Africa the most distinguished and most explicit disciple of Gandhi was Kenneth Kaunda of what was then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). Kaunda since then has become reconciled to violence under circumstances. Nevertheless, his flirtation with the idea of "détente" with White-dominated South Africa has probably been partly due to a residual neo-Gandhian faith that Kaunda has retained.

The late Albert Luthuli's belief in non-violent struggle against apartheid in South Africa was more a heritage of Christianity and the strategy of "turning the other cheek," than a product of conscious conversion to the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi. Yet who was to say where Christianity ended and Gandhism began in a politically conscious African in the second half of the twentieth century?

Since the 1960s Gandhism has drastically declined in prestige and importance in much of Africa. In Angola and Guinea-Bissau, the anti-colonial struggle was gradually radicalised—and revolutionary resistance came into being. In

Angola the triumph of MPLA (with Russian and Cuban support) also signified the victory of revolutionary forms of struggle. These radical forms of resistance have been substantially influenced by the Marxist tradition. It is true that Marx himself was more concerned with proletarian revolutions in industrialized countries. It was Lenin early in the twentieth century, who came to address himself to the nature of imperialism. And it was Mao Tse-tung, Ché Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, Franz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral who took the analysis further into the nature of struggling against imperialism. All these philosopher-soldiers were influenced in varying degrees by Karl Marx and his ideas concerning class struggle and the necessity for revolution.

However, affecting both passive and revolutionary resistance in Africa has been the resilience of primary resistance. We use the term here in the sense of struggle deeply imbued by aspects of indigenous military culture and African tradition generally. The colonial experience may have destroyed a large number of things in Africa, but many aspects of African culture have survived through it all. Colonialism was more successful in destroying organized African institution than African values. It is true that Westernized Africans have, by definition, lost a substantial part of their culture, but these are only a small minority in their societies. Among the masses many traditional values and perspectives persist—including special definitions of such militarily relevant concepts as adulthood, fear, courage, discipline, honor, loyalty and enemy. When these norms are in a certain relationship with each other, and are sanctified by cultural ancestry and usage, they add up to at least part of the warrior tradition itself.

Combat and resistance reveal more than the attributes of the two sides in a fight. They tell us more than the nature of the fight itself. Combat and resistance reveal an additional piece of information seemingly unrelated to the fight—a piece of information, which touches upon something as old as the origins of the human species. More important perhaps than the tension between the nationalist and the imperialist, between the socialist and the capitalist, is the relationship between men and women. How wars are fought is partly a lesson on how men and women relate to each other on issues of power.

The warrior tradition in Africa—in spite of such exceptions as the Amazons of Dahomey—is a self-consciously masculine tradition, preserving warriorhood for relatively youthful males, and emphasizing such hard virtues of manliness as valor and physical endurance. Primary resistance in this sense is therefore an undertaking overwhelmingly for men.

Passive resistance may be undertaken by either men or women but its values are culturally defined as feminine. They include the softer virtues of non-violence, love, and on occasion “turning the other cheek.” Passive resistance is in part a politicization of “sublimated maternalism.” Mohandas Gandhi had a “motherly” side to his personality, as we indicated. So perhaps does Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

It is with revolutionary resistance that androgyny as a refutation of sexist differentiation becomes at last a conscious aspiration. The term itself belongs more to women’s liberation than to socialist thought, but the desire to liberate

women was probably as strong in the philosophy of Marx and Engels as it is among radical feminists today.

The ideal towards which I believe we should move is best described by the term 'androgyny.' This ancient Greek word—from *andro* (male) and *gyn* (female)—defines a condition under which the characteristics of the sexes, and the human impulses expressed by men and women, are not rigidly assigned. Androgyny seeks to liberate the individual from the confines of the appropriate.²²

Has female participation in the skills of violence been excessively regarded as "inappropriate?" Has the role of men in war been too "rigidly assigned?"

The militarization of women in southern Africa has at best only just started. The legacy of the Amazons of Dahomey will perhaps be radicalized in the southern parts in the continent in the years ahead. If the warrior tradition in southern Africa does get androginized, a new dimension would be added to liberation itself. As colonies have got their independence, races their dignity, and classes their rights, the women have so far been passively awaiting their turn, but now it is time for a change. In the words of a famous American musical "Annie, Get your Gun!"—for that is where power resides,²³ or so old Chairman Mao once told us.

NOTES

1. Consult especially T. O. Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Parts I and II, *Journal of African History*, Vol. 9, Nos. 3 & 4 (1968), pp. 437–453 and pp. 631–641.

2. Consult Karigu Munch, *The Hard Core* (Richmond, BC, Canada: LSM Information Center, 1973), pp. 19, 22, 43; Don Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau from Within* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1966), and J. M. Kariuki, "*Mau Mau*" *Detainee* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

3. Stavrianos links Belloc's cynical observation and the literature of self-righteous power to Social Darwinism as an ideological movement. See L. S. Stavrianos, *Man's Past and Present: A Global History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), pp. 270–273.

4. Reverend S. Madziyere "Heathen Practices in the Urban and Rural Parts of Marandellaz Area," *Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa*, T. O. Ranger and John Weller, (eds.), (London, 1975), pp. 76–82. I am greatly indebted to Professor Ranger for stimulation and for bibliographical guidance.

5. Basil Davidson, *The Africans: An Entry to Cultural History* (London, 1969), p. 255.

6. N. S. Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London, 1965), pp. 68–69.

7. Shamuyarira, *ibid.* See also Ranger, "Connections between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Part II, *op. cit.*, pp. 635–636.

8. Manubehn Gandhi, *Bapu, My Mother* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1949). Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth*, *op. cit.*, pp. 403–404.

9. For Gandhi's influence on King consult, for example, Martin Luther King, *Stride Toward Freedom* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), pp. 76–77.

10. Kenneth Kaunda and Cohn Morris, *Black Government* (Lusaka: United Society for Christian Literature, 1960). The emphasis is original.

11. See the journal, *New Africa*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1963), p. 4.

12. Fergus Macpherson, *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man* (Lusaka and London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 105.

13. Consult Andrew D. Roberts, "The Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, (eds.), *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 513–570.

14. See Macpherson, *ibid.*, pp. 105–106.

15. David Ross, "Dahomey" in *West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation*, Michael Crowder, (ed.), (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1971), p. 149.

16. Franz Fanon, *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*, translated from the French by Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965), pp. 61–62.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Frederick Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," (1884); Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), p. 510.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 489–490.

20. V. I. Lenin, "War Programme of Proletarian Revolution" (1916) *Selected Works*, Vol. I, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), pp. 820–821.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Carolyn G. Heilburn, *Toward a Recognition of Androgyny* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1974), p. x. Consult also Linda Jenness, (ed.), *Feminism and Socialism* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972) and Alfred G. Meyer, *Marxism and the Women's Movement* (Mimeo), Department of Political Science, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

23. In the musical *Annie, Get Your Gun*, the woman could not be both a good shot and attractive to the man she loved. So she deliberately disguised her firing skills in order to win his love. In real life Annie should retain her fire power—if she wants liberation.

Chapter 4.6

Post-Liberation Movements: In Search of Racial, Sexual, and Class Utopias

Our concern in this chapter is with social and political movements in the First, Second and Third Worlds—the worlds of advanced capitalist countries, of advanced socialist industrial powers, and of the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Our first proposition is that successful political liberation in the Third World has so far been the burial ground, the graveyard, of other social movements. By “political liberation” we mean here the pursuit or acquisition of political independence. The acquisition of that independence in most of the Third World has often resulted in a rapid shrinkage of the arena of social movements.

Our second proposition is that socialism in the Second World has so far been the burial ground, the graveyard, of other social movements. This has been partly because socialism in the Second World has capitulated to the logic of the state system, and has itself interpreted liberation and revolution as the successful control of state power.

Our third proposition is that the First World is the mother, both of the worst aspects of the human condition in the twentieth century, and some of the best aspects. Those two aspects are also captured in the proposition that political and social movements are at their most diverse precisely in this First World of liberal capitalist democracy.

Let us take these three propositions in turn and examine the components that add up to this particular paradigm of social movements.

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL CONFORMITY

In many Third World countries the heyday of political diversity and the open society consisted of the last days of colonial rule and the first few years of independence. The last days of colonial rule witnessed a rich explosion of dissent and nationalist aspirations, an open defiance of those in authority, a candid challenge to the legitimacy of the colonial order.

The first few years of independence included a shared euphoria among the different elements which had struggled for autonomy, an acceptance in the case of former British colonies of the Westminster model with its pluralist assumptions, an emphasis on civil liberties and human rights, and a concession to the principle of limited government.

Basically what had happened was that the struggle for political independence had generated a variety of movements—cultural and literary groups like Negritude in West Africa, labor movements like Tom Mboya's organized experiments in collective bargaining in East Africa, religious movements like the Mahdiyya in the Sudan, as well as a diversity of political parties and political organizations. Some of this rich pluralism survived into independence.

After the first few celebrations of Independence Day, the rot in many Third World countries set in. The creative energies of anti-colonialism became diffused. It is partly because of this that political liberation has so often become the cemetery of other social movements. Labor unions fell under stricter control in one former colonial country after another, where they were once part of the vanguard of opposition to colonial authority. Leaders of literary movements and editors of magazines were intimidated, detained, or forced into exile. Within Africa, the mystique of the one-party system helped to annihilate one opposition political party after another, as power within the ruling party was consolidated, dissent discouraged, and political diversity forced to shrink.

One fundamental reason for this clash of political liberation with political diversity is that the very concept of "national liberation" has been disproportionately translated as indigenous capture of the machinery of the state. When was Mozambique liberated? When Blacks captured the state! When was Vietnam liberated? When the state machinery in that country was Vietnamized. National liberation movements have been unduly inspired by the lure of the state, the dream of capturing it and using it.

However, the state has its own logic. Max Weber's famous definition of the state emphasized its capacity to assert "the legitimate use of physical force" within a given territory. To assert a monopoly in the legitimate use of physical force, the state is all too often tempted to assert a monopoly in the legitimate use of *intellectual* power. Attempts by the state to monopolize instruments of coercion often include attempts to monopolize avenues of opinion. A desire for concentrated physical force leads to a desire for orchestrated intellectual power.

In such an atmosphere, independent social movements suffer as the state seeks to contain their activities and control their direction and orientation. There are of course occasions when the state does not succeed in asserting a monopoly

of either physical force or intellectual power (as we shall discuss later). For immediate purposes we may, however, note that the logic of the state seeks not simply to assert Weber's "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force," but also of intellectual power.

The demise of independent social movements in much of the Third World has been part and parcel of this logic of the state. Political pluralism has been among the first casualties of state formation in the Third World.

THE SOCIALIST STATE: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS?

It has not been merely in the Third World that social movements have suffered: just as those successful national liberations have often resulted in shrinking pluralism, so has the establishment of socialist states in the Second World. The reasons are certainly interconnected. When was Zimbabwe liberated? When Blacks captured the state. When was socialism achieved in China or the Soviet Union? When socialists captured and used the state. As with national liberation movements, radical proletarian movements are again unduly inspired by the lure of the state—dreaming of marrying socialism to state power.

This leads to our fourth, and in some ways most basic, proposition: whoever captures the state is captured by it. When liberation movements succeed in capturing the state, the leaders become converted to the state system itself, sometimes almost fanatically. When workers capture the state in the name of socialism, they too soon develop state consciousness rather than class consciousness. They seek to protect the interests of the state that they now control, rather than continue the struggle to realize the interests of the workers in whose name they initially captured the state. The bizarre example of the socialist state in Poland pitched against the workers is only the most open of the illustrations available in the Second World of advanced socialist countries.

Classical Marxism and orthodox Leninism have always envisaged "the withering away of the state" as a kind of ultimate utopia. Since the state has been seen ideologically as the instrument of the ruling class, theory has taken for granted that the withering away of classes would inevitably result in the withering of the state. It is our contention that any capture of the state by the proletariat would be a Sisyphus exercise—a stone is taken to the top of the hill, made to roll down the hill, only to be laboriously pushed back to the top again for another go, and so on.

The way that any section of the working class (should it capture the state) often finds its class consciousness undergoing a rapid transformation into state consciousness, is one reason why a preoccupation with class interests is often replaced by a preoccupation with the interests of the state; this is why we have concluded that whoever captures the state is captured by it. The conqueror's orientation changes. The survival of the state becomes the paramount aim—even if it means repressing fellow workers or fellow nationals. When workers capture the state, they commit class suicide. The Sisyphus absurdity arises because we first witness a section of the workers capturing the state in order to roll it down

to its doom and redundancy. Before long, these same workers are concerned about the “need” to preserve the state. They roll the stone of the state back up to the top.

They may in time be overcome by another group of workers, or socialists, or nationalists, bent on the same ambition. They in turn wish to roll the state downwards to its doom—only to attempt a renewed ascendancy. Where does this leave the Marxist-Leninist expectation of the withering away of the state? When socialist workers capture the state, it is not the state that begins to wither away—it is socialism itself. The state corrupts; the absolute state corrupts absolutely. A functional equivalent of the absolute state is the garrison state, a state geared towards militaristic self-preservation.

A striking illustration of the corrupting power of the garrison state is Israel. Israel was born out of the womb of a social movement, the Zionist movement going back to Theodor Herzl and beyond. The ideals were rooted in compassion and a longing for national dignity and human worth. The Zionist political and social movement felt that it could best realize Jewish dignity and human worth through the creation of a Jewish state.

The obstacles facing this Zionist movement were immense. Where would the movement find land without a people for use by a people without land? Though a return to Palestine was always the favorite aspiration of the Zionist movement, alternative homes were considered (including the famous offer of parts of Uganda and Kenya by Joseph Chamberlain, Britain’s Colonial Secretary at the turn of the century). Curiously enough, it was the excesses of the Nazi absolute state that helped to assure the ultimate political victory of the Zionist movement. Hitler’s policy of genocide created what many Westerners regarded as a compelling moral case for the establishment of a Jewish state after the war. The excesses of Hitler’s absolute state resulted in what was to become a Jewish garrison state. Just as Nazi absolutism corrupted the German state, so did Israeli militarism come to corrupt the Jewish state.

Israel was born out of the marriage between Judaism and the legacy of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which helped to inaugurate the modern system of the sovereign state. The legacy of Judaism had contributed enormously to the finer moral sensibilities of the international community as a whole; but the legacy of Westphalia came to corrode and corrupt those same sensibilities in the new Jewish state. By the time Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, it had already become the most arrogant sovereign state on the world scene since Nazi Germany. Certainly, the state corrupts—and either absolutism or militarism could make it corrupt absolutely.

Nazi Germany was of course both absolutist and militaristic; but the state of Israel is only militaristic. Within its own borders it is the most open society in the Middle East, though the openness has been shrinking in recent years. In relation to its neighbors, Israel has permitted itself to become the mini-bully of the Near-East.

In time, the establishment of the state of Israel created a counter social movement in the Arab world, especially since the 1960s, when Arab Palestini-

ans converted themselves into an independent nationalist movement in their own right. The Palestinians gradually evolved a dream of either again creating a unified Palestine encompassing both Arabs and Jews (the two nations/one state, solution) or creating a separate Palestinian state of their own (the two nations/two states, solution). A Palestinian diaspora had resulted from the establishment of Israel, and those dispersed Palestinians evolved the same kind of nostalgia and longing for a return to their homeland that the Jews had previously manifested. Again the solution was widely seen in terms of creating yet another state. If the Palestinian state, when it is established, becomes either absolutist or militaristic, it would display the same symptoms of spiritual and moral decay that the state of Israel has manifested in recent years.

CAPITALISM AND THE STATE

Social movements are not held hostage, simply by the system of sovereign states, but also by the machinery of capitalism worldwide. Indeed, the future of social movements in the world is subject to a dual hegemony, a condominium being exercised by capitalism on one side and the state system on the other. The capitalist world economy and the state system are two distinct prisons in which our era finds itself. The most ambitious global reform for the future may have to include a search for alternatives not only to capitalism but also to the state.

Partly because of the state system, the world has evolved the most destructive arsenals ever accumulated. Partly because of the state system, the resources of this planet (including the sea bed) are still disproportionately controlled by principles of state sovereignty and national jurisdiction. Partly because of the state system, governments are prepared to go to war for the sake of inches of barren territory. Impossible as the task may be at present, there is a compelling case for exploring both alternative state systems and alternatives to the state. For the time being, however, we are prisoners behind the bars of Westphalia.

We are also prisoners of the capitalist world economy even when we declare our own societies socialist. In a sense, the Soviet Union was as much a prisoner of the world capitalist economy as is Mozambique. The global system operates on the basis of supply and demand, the classic logic of the dynamics of capitalism. Market forces often reign in the world arena, again reflecting capitalist preferences. The rules of international trade and exchange emanate from capitalist doctrine and history. The currencies of international exchange, the so-called "foreign exchange," are basically currencies of the leading capitalist countries of the world. The leading financial and banking institutions, both for commerce and for development, are under the control of capitalist powers and subject to capitalist rules of the game. Second World countries like Poland and Rumania are heavily in debt to Western financial institutions; so are countries like Cuba and Mexico in the Third World.

The prison walls of global capitalism are not broken down simply by the announcement that a state has become socialist or is now under indigenous control. Both capitalism and the state system continue to be omnipresent, as the twenti-

eth century goes through its ninth decade. Is there no escape? Is there a way of fighting capitalism and the state system? Certainly the case against capitalism in the second half of the twentieth century has been best heard in the Second and Third Worlds, while that against the state system is best heard in the First World (especially among social movements committed to global reform).

Sometimes the case against capitalism, as expressed in the Second or Third World, is not necessarily accompanied by the establishment of a genuine alternative. In Africa, the normative climate for socialism is quite favorable, but the sociological soil is relatively barren. The climate of opinion in the continent is quite often responsive to the image of a socialist utopia of equity and classlessness, but the sociological realities of Africa militate against the actual practical establishment of socialist arrangements. The slogans of economic justice often find a ready ear among the masses, but the policies of structural transformation often meet immovable impediments.

The climate of opinion in Africa is still basically anti-imperialist, and those who are politically conscious tend to link imperialism with capitalism. Opposition to imperialism is first translated into a distrust of capitalism; and this distrust in turn makes many Africans favorable to the socialist alternative. Again, many Africans regard socialism as *culturally* more suitable to Africa, since African traditions are often collectivist and based on bonds of primordial solidarity.

Many parts of Africa have also been disenchanted with the development record since independence, which they see as having been based initially on capitalist principles which have not worked. Disenchantment with the performance of their own country so far has resulted in a longing for alternative models of transformation. The socialist alternative is one such model.

Corruption in Africa has increased considerably in the last twenty years. Many politically conscious Africans believe that what corruption shares with capitalism is greed. The pursuit of the profit motive within Africa is seen as having a logic of its own, its momentum leading to self-aggrandizement and corrupt practices. The logical conclusion of capitalism, many Africans believe, is the corrupt individual pursuing his own interests. These are some of the factors of disenchantment and renewed aspiration that have helped to make the climate of opinion in Africa congenial to the socialist message.

The sociological realities are different. One factor is the low class-consciousness in Africa. One result for social movements is a pattern of weak labor movements or any other class-based movements. Labor unions do of course exist, but their power is often considerably circumscribed by the state on one side and by the low level of class-consciousness on the other. Another sociological reality is the high ethnic-consciousness. Most Africans are more emotionally involved in ethnic solidarity than in class solidarity. When it comes to the crunch, a Muganda peasant is a Mugandan first and a peasant second.

A fourth sociological impediment is the post-colonial structure that links African societies to capitalist markets and the global capitalist economy. The prison walls of international capitalism are part of the post-colonial legacy in Africa. Another aspect of the legacy, and a related impediment, is the cultural

distance between basic concepts of modern socialist literature and the primordial paradigms of the African masses. In many African languages, the term “class” does not exist—let alone concepts like “dialectic” and “bourgeois.” The language of Marxist analysis is still culturally alien to the masses of the African people.

There are no major spontaneous socialist movements in Black Africa that are independent of issues of national liberation. The movements which led to the independence of former Portuguese colonies did indeed become socialist, but under the stimulus of national liberation. Robert Mugabe’s movement in Zimbabwe has also included a socialist ambition, but once national liberation was achieved, the impetus for socialist transformation in Zimbabwe seems to have been diluted.

To summarize, both class movements and socialist movements in Africa are weak despite local traditions of anti-imperialism. The normative advantages that socialism has enjoyed in Africa have not been enough to tilt the balance against the sociological and structural disadvantages.

Africa becomes one more illustration of the resilience of both the global capitalist system and the state legacy of Westphalia. If the struggle for ethnic and class utopias has not left any mark on the prison walls of these two systems, is the situation hopeless? We have sought to demonstrate that the underprivileged races have attempted to capture the state—and were captured by it. Nationalists of Asia and Africa sounded the knock of entry into the world system, and then became the high priests of the state system itself. The same has happened to the underprivileged *classes*. Domestically, countries of the Second World have achieved some kind of socialist structure, but externally the prison walls of the global economy surround socialist and non-socialist countries. The state system is for the time being triumphant in the Second and Third as well as the First World. The underprivileged races and classes have not as yet made a difference to the fate of the two global systems. Could the underprivileged sex or gender hold the secret of global transformation? Women are for the time being, fellow prisoners behind the bars of capitalism and Westphalia.

There is one fundamental difference between the oppressed races and classes on one side, and the oppressed gender on the other. While an oppressed race or class might aspire to capture the state monopolistically for itself, there is no question of women capturing the state instead of men. Indigenous liberation fighters may want to capture the state and replace the foreigners; an underprivileged class might wish to replace the privileged classes, but the balance of probability is that there is no question of women capturing the state instead of men. The feminist case is in reality not substitution but balance, never replacement of men but parity with men. Given the need of men and women for each other, women can never really seek to capture the state monopolistically—but to share it equally. National liberation fighters never seek to share equally with foreigners, nor socialist workers with the bourgeoisie. Women are prisoners of egalitarianism in their ultimate ambitions.

When the state becomes androgynous, will its nature change? We cannot be sure. All we know is that, until now, the state has been tied to patriarchy—including its central primordial principle of male dominance. If the state is an institutionalized monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, and if women are less physically violent than men, the very concept of legitimate use of physical force may change when the state becomes androgynous.

The state's ultimate instruments of coercion have so far been disproportionately male. The great majority of members of the armed forces in one state after another have been men; the great majority even of police in most states have been overwhelmingly men. The great majority of prison wardens have been men. Those entrusted with the duties of execution, or the guillotine, have been almost exclusively men. The World's navies and air forces have been composed mainly of men. In other words, all the security forces and security services on which the power of the state has been based have themselves been highly masculine.

Who is likely to challenge the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force? The overwhelming majority of those who commit crimes of violence in societies otherwise vastly different from each other, have been men. The Mafia has been a deeply masculine presence in the world of crime. The goals of the world (and especially their maximum security sections) are populated with males.

The world of political rebellions, military coups, and sheer terrorism is again masculine, despite some female guerrilla fighters and "terrorists." The game of physical violence involving direct spilling of blood has been more a heritage of the male of our species than of the female. To that extent, the inner gender of the state has been basically masculine—for better or for worse.

What has happened when a woman has been at the pinnacle of the state, seemingly in control of its destiny? What has happened when there has been a Queen Elizabeth I, or Mrs. Golda Meir, or Mrs. Indira Gandhi, or Mrs. Margaret Thatcher? In reality, in political systems that are primarily male-dominated, a single female at the top does not change the fundamental masculine dynamic of the structure. The women who succeed in a male-dominated world have themselves displayed male-derived perceptions of strength. Margaret Thatcher had to out-macho the Tory patriarchs over the Falklands issue if she was to survive the apparent "national humiliation" which was perceived as the outcome of the Argentinean invasion of the islands. The female prime minister in London had to display all the toughness of masculinity if she was to remain credible in a male-dominated political system.

The question for the future is whether a real feminization of the state would reduce its propensity for violence. Is the female predicament one that is unlikely to result in a mere substitution of who controls the state?

On the whole, it is arguable that the feminist movement has been seeking mechanisms for sharing, rather than monopolizing power. It is also arguable that feminism (given that men and women need each other more than races or classes do) might result in reducing polarization in the struggle for equity. Again, be-

cause femininity is less militaristic than masculinity, the feminist struggle might help to minimize the militarization of ultimate utopias. Given those previous considerations, feminist styles and aspirations should help to minimize this game of post-liberation violence.

The concepts for describing the different struggles also need to be differentiated. The struggle for national or racial utopia is indeed national liberation; the quest for a class utopia is usually class struggle; the new movement for a gender utopia is women's liberation. National liberation in this period tends sooner or later to be militarized; revolutionary class struggle tends to be armed; but women's liberation can be basically agitational and mobilizational without becoming militarized.

National liberation is obsessed with the state, seeking to capture it on behalf of the indigenous population. The quest for a class utopia is in turn also enticed by the state, and can subsequently become entrapped by the state. However, the struggle for a gender utopia can be state neutral, seeking to realize the rights of women without monopolizing the power of the state.

For those who seek to create the right conditions for a nationalist struggle, a first phase in liberation lies in cultivating national consciousness. For those who seek to realize a dictatorship of the proletariat, a first phase in the class struggle is the cultivation of class-consciousness. For those who seek to realize a gender utopia, the basic aim lies in *conquering* gender consciousness rather than cultivating it. National liberation emphasizes the distinction between the alien and the indigenous; class struggle emphasizes the distinction between the alienated and the integrated; the struggle of the sexes transcends such distinctions. Whether the androgynization of the state will transform its nature is the tantalizing question for the future. If the state has always been masculine—so far—what about capitalism? What has been the gender of the capitalist animal in the world arena?

On the whole, capitalism had become more masculine as it became more internationalized; it also became more masculine as it became more mechanized. In the earlier years of the pursuit of the profit motive, women were almost as active in production as men. Certainly in rural production in many societies, women were in control of basic cultivation, and sometimes of at least part of animal husbandry.

In West Africa, women have been conspicuous in trade and marketing, sometimes overshadowing men's commercial activities. All this was in relation to small-scale economic arenas. As the economic activities of West Africa became more international, and as the transnational corporations entered the scene, the ratio of men and women has changed. The greater internationalization of West African economies has meant more men making decisions on boards of directors, or assuming control in factories, overshadowing the market ladies of yesteryears. Internationalization has meant greater masculine control.

Similarly, mechanization of African economies has diminished the feminine role in those economies. Where the technology of cultivation is that of the hoe, women are omnipresent in African agriculture—but the tractor driver is usually

male. Similarly, as industries move from soft to hard, the masculine role increases. The textile industry is more likely to consist of men *and* women than the steel mill. Industries like mining in Southern Africa are almost entirely composed of male personnel.

To summarize the argument so far: the state has always been basically masculine in its inner dynamic, but the gender of capitalism has been less constant. Capitalism in its primitive form involves both men and women in comparable productive capacities. As capitalism became more internationalized and more mechanized, it also became more male dominated. The gender of capitalism is still more androgynous than the gender of the state system, but this is only a relative measure. On the whole, both the state system and the capitalist global economy are major universes of the male of our species, awaiting fundamental reform through partial feminization.

TOWARDS THE FUTURE

Let us conclude with the imagery of two ships in history—the *Bounty* and the *Titanic*. On His Britannic Majesty's ship the *Bounty* there had been tyranny under the Captain's rule. In desperation, the men ultimately rebelled; they overcame the captain and his supporters, put them in lifeboats and let them loose on the sea, and to keep its distance from Britain's laws. The mutineers—then retired—took charge of the ship themselves. The post-mutiny *Bounty* attempted to disengage from the international nautical system, and to an island, an exercise in primordial delinking. Today the world itself is an island and no mutiny on the *Bounty* can be an escape in its own right. No mutineers from the *Bounty* could find refuge in those stark terms.

Here comes the other image of a ship, the *Titanic*. Is capitalism itself a global ship? Is it a *Titanic* in search of an iceberg? Is it a ship seemingly unsinkable but with a hidden vulnerability of its own? Is the state system also a *Titanic* in search of an iceberg? Is it a ship seemingly unsinkable but with a hidden agenda of destructibility?

It is conceivable that the feminist movement is the tip of that iceberg. Is it also conceivable that the peace movement is the tip of another iceberg threatening the state system? These icebergs are benign: the two *Titanics* of capitalism and the state system are malevolent. Are we heading for a crisis of human survival or simply a test of human engineering?

The destiny of the world may depend on those social and political movements that seek to increase the role of women in decisions about war and peace, the role of workers in decisions about production and consumption, and the role of oppressed political groups in decisions between tyranny and freedom. National, class and gender utopias need to find an equilibrium of their own in the tempests of social change and global reform.

V.

The Politics of Population

Chapter 5.1

Islamic Doctrine and the Politics of Induced Fertility Change: An African Perspective

Contrary to popular belief, Islam in Africa as a whole has been more relevant for the culture of lineage and procreation than for the culture of combat. It has been more important in buttressing high fertility and defining lineage than jihad, or holy war, to eliminate rivals. This chapter concentrates primarily on Islam in sub-Saharan Africa (or Black Africa).¹

The indigenous African religions are basically communal. Because they are not proselytizing religions, indigenous African creeds have not fought with each other. Over the centuries, Africans have waged many kinds of wars against each other, but rarely religious wars before the coming of Christianity and Islam.² Precisely because these two latter faiths are universalist in aspiration (that is, their followers sought to convert the whole of humankind), they were inherently competitive. The two Semitic religions are often rivals in Africa.³

Why has Islam in Africa been less a cause of war than of impregnation and less a destroyer of rivals than a creator of new generations of believers? The main reason is that in its encouragement of large families the faith has reinforced indigenous African values.⁴ Yet, in its competitive tendency and universalist rivalry, Islam has run counter to the natural orientation of traditional African creeds, which are ecumenical and nonmonopolistic.

BETWEEN THE PACIFIER AND THE BATTLEFIELD

In their relative support of fertility among believers, Islam and the indigenous African religions are basically allies. In certain versions of the jihad tradition, however, Islam diverges from the synthesizing tendencies of traditional African religions. Islam in Africa has been less a trumpet call to fanatical combat than an

invitation to familial cohabitation, but is the culture of procreation decisively distinct from the culture of war? Within the indigenous African paradigm, virility represents valor, and the sexual privileges of the warrior are inseparable from the culture of war among many groups, including the Nandi of Kenya and the Nuer of the southern Sudan.⁵

Part of the complexity lies in the historical division of labor between men and women, not just in Africa but almost everywhere. Islam outside Africa has reinforced both the female role as childbearer and the male role as warrior (sometimes as the suicidal *mujahid* destroying himself in combat), but within Africa, Islam has more insistently reinforced the former than the latter.

Islam's culture of procreation has also included early motherhood. The proportion of women between 15- and 19-years-old who are married in Muslim countries is 35 percent. In other developing nations the proportion is 19 percent. In developed countries the proportion is three percent.⁶

A related cultural factor is the lineage system brought to Africa by the Arabs, which has accommodated considerable intermarriage. The Arab presence in Africa is concentrated in the northern part of the continent, along the Nile Valley, and, to some extent, along the East African coast. In these areas, the Arabo-Islamic lineage system has operated effectively for a long time: If the father is Arab, the child is Arab, regardless of the race or ethnic origins of the mother. Some ethnic groups (for example, Jews) throughout their history have theoretically protected themselves by strict endogamy and matrimonial exclusivity. Islam from the outset used exogamy as a strategy for making new ethnic alliances. The Prophet Muhammad set this precedent of diplomatic exogamy.⁷ Under certain circumstances, polygyny in Islam has also been among the factors that have encouraged large families.

In Black Africa, more than anywhere else in the world, Islam and Christianity are rival religions, competing as alternative spiritual paradigms for the soul of a continent. In Lebanon, by contrast, Islam and Christianity are not attempting to convert each other, but are often, literally, at daggers drawn. In sub-Saharan Africa, followers of the two faiths often attempt spiritual conversion or reconversion, often scrambling for the allegiance of followers of indigenous African religions. Africa is still a free market of religions rather than a battleground for them.⁸

However, if Islam and Christianity in Africa are in competition rather than at war, why did the first Sudanese civil war last from 1955 to 1972? Why was the second civil war partly precipitated by President Jaffer Numeiry's inauguration of *Shari'ah* (Islamic) Law in 1983? Why has the Muslim North of the Sudan been at war with the primarily non-Muslim South since the 1980s? Why was a coherent population policy impossible in the Sudan even in the years of relative peace between North and South from 1972 to 1983?

The divide between North and South in the Sudan is not just the difference made by Islam. The differences between the two regions go beyond religion, to the reality of ethnicity. The ethnocultural divide is both more comprehensive and deeper than the religious divide.⁹ Events in the Sudan since the resumption

of the civil war there in the early 1980s have demonstrated that the country's problems are more complex than many assume). Colonel John Garang's dissident Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) of the 1980s and 1990s were neither secessionist movements like the Anya Nya of the earlier years nor were their supporters exclusively southern Sudanese.¹⁰ In the North, Muslim "fundamentalists" have had determined (fellow) Muslim opponents. Likewise, the assorted tribes of the southern Sudan have, on the whole, manifested some unease about the demographic preponderance of the Dinka, some of whom are inhabitants of the northern Sudan.¹¹ Attitudes toward family planning in the country generally are conditioned more by competitive ethnicity than by competitive sectarianism.

On the whole, religion in sub-Saharan Africa is probably divisive mainly when it reinforces a preexisting ethnic differentiation. At least this is a hypothesis worth exploring. How was it possible for Senegal, which is more than 80 percent Muslim, to have had a Roman Catholic president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, for two decades without religious riots or the "need" for strict repression? In fact, Senegal since independence in 1960 has been one of the most open societies in sub-Saharan Africa. Senghor came from the Serer ethnic group, which comprises approximately 16 percent of the national population of Senegal. The majority of the Serer at the time Senghor served as president (1960–1980) were Muslim, although a sizable Serer minority were Roman Catholic.¹² Why did not the 80 percent multiethnic Muslim population in Senegal revolt in indignation? In 1980, Senghor became the first African president to step down voluntarily as Head of State. He has been succeeded by a Muslim as Head of State, but President Abdou Diouf is married to a Roman Catholic; the First Lady of this Muslim society owes spiritual allegiance to the Vatican. In Senegal, Islam does not reinforce a preexisting ethnic divide.

In Nigeria almost all Hausa are Muslim; almost all Igbo are Christian; and the Yoruba are split between Muslim and Christian. The Nigerian situation is midway between that of Sudan and Senegal. In Nigeria religion reinforces the ethnic divide between the Hausa and the Igbo. The Yoruba are potential bridge-builders across the religious divide.

Debate about the shared tolerance of polygyny between Islam and African ethnocultures has been extensive. How does polygyny relate to kinship culture and comparative family values? Many Nigerian Christians are polygynous because of native custom. The rivalries about the number of children a woman should have, and the number of wives a man should have, do not translate neatly into a confrontation between Christians and Muslims.¹³

POPULATION POLICY AND COMPETITIVE RELIGION

In January 1988, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria used the occasion of a budget speech to declare his government's intention to encourage and promote family planning and population control. In doing so, Babangida ignited a national debate. Particularly controversial was the government's tentative target of a

maximum of four children per woman. The controversy concerned not merely the rights of women, but also the costs and benefits to different ethnic groups and rival religious denominations.

One major interpretation of the target of four children per woman was that it would favor the Muslims of Nigeria in their demographic rivalry with Christians. After all, Islam permits a maximum of four wives to every man. If each of those wives had the option of having four children, a Muslim man could theoretically father 16 children to every four children of a Christian marriage. Since President Babangida was himself a Muslim, there were suspicions in some Christian circles that his program of population control was intended to tilt Nigeria's demographic balance even more firmly in favor of Islam and its followers.¹⁴ The last published and credible census in Nigeria, in 1963, had computed the Muslim proportion of the population as 47 percent, while Christians accounted for 35 percent. Since then, the Muslim percentage is widely believed to have exceeded the 50 percent mark.¹⁵ By the mid-1980s, there were more Muslims in Nigeria than in any Arab country, including Egypt.¹⁶ Nigeria was not only the largest country in Africa, it also had the largest Muslim population on the continent, and may also have the largest Christian population as well.

Was the new population policy of the Babangida administration intended to consolidate and expand Islam's numerical advantage in Nigeria? Some Christian Nigerians were already worried that Islam in their country was expanding not only by conversion but also by faster procreation.¹⁷ In such a situation, only a national policy that combined limiting every woman to four children with the principle of limiting every man to only one woman would avert an unfair war of procreation between Muslims and Christians. According to this school of thought, the struggle for population control in Nigeria would only work if it were combined with a crusade against polygyny.

When certain precepts of Islam are challenged, a Muslim defensiveness is provoked. Muslim fundamentalism relates itself to the culture of war. When we look more closely, how does that orthodoxy relate to the culture of procreation? Although Islam does not directly or totally prohibit contraception, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan, North Africa, and parts of West Africa has already had varied implications for fertility. Religious fundamentalism is, almost by definition, cultural revivalism. The role of women is redefined in ancient terms by the fundamentalist community. In Muslim Africa this has usually meant less choice for women in deciding how many children to bear, even when the family is middle class and relatively well-educated. This diminishing of women's role is the result of Islam's deep cultural conservatism, its very old presence in Africa (much older than Christianity, except in Coptic Egypt and in Ethiopia), and its cultural comprehensiveness, entailing, as it does, more than religious or spiritual matters.¹⁸

When Islamic fundamentalism is combined with the zeal and dedication of jihad (the mission of militant struggle in the path of Allah), that sense of mission often intensifies a cultural preference for male children as potential *mujahidin*

(crusaders for Allah). At that point, the culture of procreation merges with the culture of combat.

Muslim families in modern Africa are unlikely to resort to female infanticide simply because male babies are culturally preferable, but fundamentalist Muslim families in Africa and elsewhere may resort to having more and more children as a strategy of "multiplying in the name of Allah." Procreation can itself be counted as a form of jihad. The Muslim umma (global community of Muslims) is allowed to expand by divine intervention and biological impregnation.¹⁹

A third factor (after conservatism and the jihad complex) that may tend to make Islamic fundamentalism "pro-fertility" is a distrust of Western culture and the forces of Westernization in the Muslim world. Modern forms of contraception like condoms and intrauterine devices are identified as part of the Western culture of family planning. The financial and moral support that family planning clinics in Africa receive from Western sources deepens fundamentalists' distrust of Western-style contraception. The international family planning campaign, especially when backed by such citadels of Western power as the World Bank, may be perceived as a subtle invasion of the sanctity of the harem. In the eyes of the militant, contraception becomes a meeting point between the forces of cultural imperialism and the forces of preemptive genocide.

The fourth factor affecting the fundamentalist attitude to family planning is the association in Africa of the condom with prostitution. Only about one percent of the worldwide use of condoms occurs in Africa and the Middle East combined. The rubber device is widely assumed to be intended less for family planning than for protection against sexually transmitted diseases. Many African men, Muslim and non-Muslim, find the idea of using condoms with their wives distasteful. Indeed, many African women would be insulted if their men did so.²⁰ This association of condoms with prostitution and illicit sex may be particularly marked among African religious fundamentalists, both Christian and Muslim.

The fifth factor that makes Islamic fundamentalists distrustful of contraception is the presumption that birth control is a challenge to Allah's ability to feed all His children. The most distrusted rationale for contraception to a Muslim is often the economic rationale. This is because of a verse in the Qur'an denouncing economically motivated infanticide:

And do not kill your children because of want or poverty. It is We who provide for you, and for them as well. Do not take away life which God has made sacred except in the cause of justice. Verily this is the injunction of God to you in the hope you will understand.²¹

Orthodox interpretations have concluded that the practice of family planning is morally dubious if the motive is to avoid poverty or avert a decline in the family's standard of living. On the other hand, contraception may be permissible when the reasons for it are connected with the health of the mother, or the risk of

transmitting a major disease to the child, or when, because of the narrowness of the mother's pelvic girdle, damage could occur to the mother or the baby.²²

However, contraception, even for economic reasons, is morally acceptable in Islam if the method used is withdrawal. In a hadith or tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, he is quoted as having said:

There is no harm for a man to discharge semen outside the body of his wife if he desires no child. But Muslims should bear in mind that this notwithstanding, Allah creates whomsoever He intends to create.²³

The fundamentalists among Muslims distrust many of these concessions to the use of contraception, especially in a world dominated by non-Muslims and seemingly threatened by the forces of "evil" and "unbelief." The idea of small families among Muslim fundamentalists is, therefore, sometimes discouraged more for strategic rather than theological reasons. However, the theological concern remains that to reject the chance of an additional child is a form of ingratitude to Allah.²⁴ The Qur'an itself proclaims that honest wealth and children are the supreme bounties of earthly life. To a fundamentalist, the rejection of a gift from God is a form of blasphemy.

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HIGH FERTILITY

Studies indicate that Muslims have the highest rates of population growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Factors that have favored higher fertility among Muslims include, first, an exceptionally early marriage for women, even by African standards. As has been noted, in Muslim countries 34 percent of brides are under the age of 20. Among the Hausa of northern Nigeria, brides below the age of 15 are much more common than they are among the Christianized Igbo in the south.²⁵

Islamic African fertility rates have sometimes been seen as part of a global Islamic phenomenon, expansion not only by conversion, but even more by procreation:

The single most remarkable demographic aspect of Islamic societies is the nearly universal high level of fertility—the average level of child-bearing in Islamic nations is six children per woman. . . Fertility rates are highest for those Islamic nations in sub-Saharan Africa—an average of 6.6 births per woman. . . Furthermore, African Islamic nations south of the Sahara have higher fertility on average than do the other developing nations in that region.²⁶

Ironically, the lowest fertility rates on the continent today may well be in the almost purely Muslim north. This is because this most deeply Islamized part of Africa is also more susceptible than other parts of the continent to cultural Westernization. Geographically it is the closest part of Africa to Europe. Historically, the two regions have had old and deep ties. North Africa has also outstripped sub-Saharan Africa in levels of urbanization, industrialization, seculari-

zation, and Western-type education.²⁷ The Islamic hold on North Africa in such matters as procreation and family planning has probably been diluted by these processes in a manner akin to the weakening in the Western world of the influence of fundamentalist Christianity in this realm.

The second reason for higher fertility rates among Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa relates to levels of education. Although progress in women's education has been impressive in Africa in the second half of the twentieth century, there is still a smaller proportion of women who are highly educated among Muslims than among non-Muslims. Muslim families south of the Sahara are still profoundly distrustful of Western education as potentially Christianizing, even corrupting influence on their womenfolk. Muslim girls are less likely to complete secondary education than are their Christian counterparts. In the absence of compulsory education, many Muslim families withdraw their girls as soon as they complete elementary school. Loss of access to education means Muslim women are less likely to be exposed to methods of contraception and the idea of birth spacing.

A third reason for the higher fertility rates among Muslims is the interplay between the Islamic patrilineal tradition and polygyny. Even among African groups that were previously matrilineal, Islam has strengthened descent through the father. A man with two, three, or four wives stands a chance of expanding the size of his clan. In conditions of politicized ethnic rivalry, this becomes a case of competitive procreation.

Arabized Sudanese from the north of the country have been known to vow not only to create more Muslims by conversion in the south but also to create more Arabs by intermarriage with Black southerners. As noted earlier, by the lineage system of the Arabized north, the children would be Arab if the father was Arab—regardless of the mother's religion or ethnicity.²⁸ "I am going south—to bring into the world 40 more Arabs before I die!" Such a boast is probably part of Sudanese competitive ethnicity. What has made such aspirations possible is the convergence of three forces: the strong Islamic patrilineal tradition, legitimized polygyny, and politicized ethnic rivalry.²⁹

A fourth factor behind higher rates of fertility among Muslims in Africa may be Islam's undermining of traditional birthspacing practices. Under Islamic doctrine, breastfeeding is not the subject of sexual taboo. Moreover, Islam permits the baby of one mother to be fed regularly by another woman. The tradition of surrogate breastfeeding goes back to the experience of the Prophet Muhammad. Though this tradition was not unknown in Black Africa, it acquired the status of a sacred precedent (*sunna*) in parts of Islamized Eastern Africa.

This configuration of factors in Muslim Africa weakened the indigenous systems of birth spacing, which had relied on sexual abstinence for the mother during the period of breastfeeding.³⁰

A fifth factor is more elusive. Are Muslims more prone to fatalism? Do they more readily accept birth after birth than do Christians? What Laila S. El-Hamamsy said of Egyptian peasants may be true as well of Muslims south of the Sahara:

It is not surprising that the Moslem peasant, living so precariously, should decide that fate, as determined by Allah, is responsible not only for the pleasures and good things of life, but also for its misfortunes and pain. . . . Surely life would be insupportable were the peasant to have himself responsible by his own deeds and efforts for all that befalls him.³¹

The Kenya Fertility Survey in 1977 revealed that among Muslim married women in Kenya at the time, the average desired family size was 8.4 children. This was higher than for any other religious group. Among Catholic women the average preferred size was 7.1 children; among Protestants it was 7.0 children.³²

John R. Weeks compares countries as well as religious groups on this issue. Weeks refers us to 1975:

The Sri Lankan Fertility Survey had revealed that currently married Moslem women in that country expressed a desire for a family of 4.2 children. Buddhists preferred 3.9; Hindus preferred 3.8; and Christians expressed a desire for 3.4 children. Thus, although Moslem women preferred larger families than did members of other religious groups, it was also true that, regardless of religious preference, women in Sri Lanka wanted fewer children than did women in Kenya.³³

In the Muslim world, the proportion of women using some method of contraception is 22 percent; in the rest of the developing world, it is 39 percent; and in the Western world, it is 70 percent.³⁴

A sixth reason for high fertility among Muslims is the wide age difference between husbands and wives. A difference of eight years between a young bride and her older groom is fairly common in Muslim Africa. If the husband is considerably older than the wife, male dominance tends to be aggravated, and male dominance is associated with avoidance of contraception. A 1973 study in Senegal illustrated that the opposition of the husband was the second most important reason why women in Senegal did not practice family planning. The most important reason was "lack of information."³⁵

Sudanese society also illustrates that male dominance militates against contraception.³⁶ Again the custom of a much older husband has been sanctified by the Islamic sunnah. After all, the Prophet's favorite wife, Aisha, was young enough to have been his daughter, as is common knowledge among modern-day Muslims.

How does this explanation for high fertility relate to the historic divide between Sunnis and Shi'a in Islam? How does that divide affect the nature of Islamic fundamentalism and its orientation to birth control? Only a fraction of Africa's Muslim population is Shi'ite, the great majority being Sunni of different denominations (Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi). However, since the Iranian revolution of 1979–1980, proselytism in Africa in favor of Shi'ite conversions has expanded significantly. The Islamic Republic of Iran probably regards Africa as second only to the Middle East as an area "ready for Islamic resurgence." Subsidies from Iran for Muslim publications and activism in Africa

increased dramatically in the 1980s. The Shi'ite direction from Teheran has recently become more visible internationally.

The minority status of Shi'ites almost everywhere in the Muslim world outside Iran, combined with their global status as a "faction" of the Islamic ummah, has helped to make the Shi'ites more eager for larger families than Sunni Muslims. Contraception in Shi'ite Islam is less directly forbidden than in the Roman Catholic Church, but it is also less actively practiced than among Sunni Muslims. In any case, there are only a very small number of Shi'ite Muslims in Africa.³⁷

ON PROPHECY AND PARENTHOOD

Curiously enough, the most Westernized of all Muslim denominations also happens to be Shi'ite—the Isma'ili followers of the Aga Khan (Imam) who live in East Africa as well as in South Asia. The wives (begums) of recent generations of Aga Khans have tended to be European women. The ruling families of this particular Shi'ite (Isma'ili) denomination have practiced Western-style family planning. The general culture of the Isma'ili denomination has been too Anglicized to encourage large families.

However, the followers of the Aga Khan in East Africa and elsewhere are more the exception than the rule in their attitudes toward fertility. In the African context, the Isma'ilis practice restrictive family planning more consistently than any other Muslim group, and more than Christian Protestant Africans as well.

In Kenya and Tanzania, Sunni Muslims have sometimes debated the issue of whether artificial contraception was consistent with the Shari'ah. There has been a consensus that withdrawal is legitimate. Debate has centered on the use of condoms instead. The Islamic chief judges of Zanzibar and Kenya have often reaffirmed the legitimacy of condoms. Since the end of World War II, almost all of half-a-dozen such chief *kadis* in Kenya alone have given a *fatwa* (judgment) legitimizing family planning and confirming most forms of contraception. Every chief *kadi* in Kenya and Tanzania has, of course, been a Sunni Muslim. However, the more fundamentalist Muslims in Kenya and Tanzania have often denounced condoms as instruments of *umalaya* (Swahili for prostitution).

Muslim children in Africa are taught quite early that among the glories of Islam in Arabia was the abolition of female infanticide. The Arabs before the advent of Islam had a concept of "surplus daughters." Pagan parents (especially the pagan father), having had "enough daughters already," would decide to use a pillow or a blanket to put an end to a new infant daughter.³⁸

According to Islamic history taught in Qur'anic and Madrasa schools of Africa, it was the Prophet Muhammad who terminated this barbaric custom in Arabia. The question that has arisen since then in Africa is whether Islam's original crusade against Arab female infanticide should be extended doctrinally to include a ban on contraception in modern Africa. African Sunnism has agonized over the issue and decided that contraception is not a form of infanticide. Yet, the balance of sensibility in African Sunnism tends to be against abortion. Con-

traception is legitimated, but abortion is often regarded as much closer to the sin of infanticide.

As for the relationship between fertility and infant mortality, both Shi'ite and Sunni Islam are all too aware of how close the Prophet Muhammad came to having no descendants at all. Although the Prophet had several children (both male and female), only Fatma survived long enough to become a parent, the mother of Hassan and Hussein. Without Fatma there would have been no fusion between the blood of Muhammad and the blood of Ali. There would have been no assassination and martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala in C.E. 680, with all its implications for the martyrdom complex in Lebanon in the second half of the twentieth century. There would have been no Iranian Revolution and no schism between Sunnism and Shi'ism in the grand history of Islam across the ages.

Because of the fate of the Prophet's own children, Islam is highly sensitized to infant mortality as a factor in its historical destiny. Yet historically in Shi'ite Islam, infant mortality deepened a distrust of contraception, while in Sunni Islam the mortality of the Prophet's children did not preclude the legitimacy of family planning in terms of doctrine.

The Ahmadiyya (Mirzai) Movement in Africa (originally from South Asia) has often been the most militant of all the proselytizing Muslim efforts in Africa. The Ahmadiyya have been active in both West and Eastern Africa, converting more and more Africans to their school of Islam. The Ahmadiyya movement, however small it may be as a faction in Muslim Africa, has succeeded in raising pressing issues of mortality, succession, and heredity. The relationship between demographic trends and social doctrine remains complex and sometimes inscrutable. Religion and culture have continued to condition family values, sometimes mediating between the competing claims of freedom of choice and social well-being.

CONCLUSION

Islam originally arrived in Africa as a religion on the run. The first Muslim refugees arrived in Ethiopia early in the seventh century C.E., fleeing from persecution in a polytheistic Arabia. The refugees presumably decided that intermarrying with Ethiopians and having large families was a way to strengthen their kinship ties in the Horn of Africa, and to expand their local Muslim communities in exile. The first great muezzin in the history of Islam was Ethiopian—the famous Bilal, one of the Prophet Muhammad's favorite disciples. Islam's culture of procreation included racial intermarriage from the start.

The second significant arrival of Islam in Africa occurred in Egypt in C.E. 639. This time the Arabs arrived as conquerors rather than as refugees. How was the Egyptian population not only converted to another religion (Islamization), but also transformed into Arabs (Arabization) over the centuries? How was this Arabization accomplished in the rest of North Africa and in much of the Nile Valley as well? Historically the culture of procreation among the conquering Arabs reinforced their jihad culture of combat. North Africa and much of the

Nile Valley were Arabized as much by Arab intermarriage as by Arab conquest. The patrilineal system of the Arabs was part of their population policy, destined to transform a continent and affect the world.

By the twentieth century, Islam had changed Africa more through intermarriage and procreation than through war or combat culture. By the end of the twentieth century, half the population of Africa was professing Islam. The largest countries in Africa in population were, by then, Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Congo. Between them, these four countries accounted for more than 120 million Muslims.

The lineage and procreation principles of Islam were not doctrinally isolated. They were profoundly affected by issues as varied as the shadow of infanticide and the economic justification for contraception. Preference for large families, or for male children, was often deeply rooted in the divergent origins of Sunni and Shi'ite Islam, and sometimes conditioned by the imperative of jihad. The culture of reproduction and the culture of competition have continued their dialectical interplay among the families of Islamized Africa.

NOTES

1. For consultation about Islamic doctrine, the author is particularly indebted to Sheikh Ahmed H. Al-Maamiry of Muscat, Oman, who in turn consulted the Grand Mufti of Oman and interpreted the fatwa (legal opinion) of such scholars as Sheikh Al-Shaarawy of al-Azhar, Cairo, Egypt. The author is also indebted for theological assistance to his elder brother, Sheikh Harith Al'Amin Mazrui, in Kenya, and to Ahmed Abdullah, also of Kenya.

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Chapter 5.2

Ethnicity, Power, and Population in Eastern Africa

INTRODUCTION

Sometime in 1970 an external observer watched a baraza (rural assembly) in a small Kikuyu village under the Aberdare Mountains in Kenya. It was a family planning gathering similar to others that the observer had witnessed before, but there was one important difference in this case. There was an unmistakable air of hostility, pervading the baraza. In the middle of the talk on family planning the village Chief left rather abruptly. The questions asked were hostile, and inclined toward disruption. At the clinic there were a number of women, more than usual, wanting their coils removed for a variety of remarkable reasons.

The observer later set about trying to make a cautious inquiry. He had noticed the presence of the General Service Unit in their purple baretts. He had also noticed that the key worker for Family Planning, a devout Christian, was particularly nervous this time. Then, the explanation began to unfold itself. Oathing had begun once again in the village—"and an essential part of every Kikuyu oath is a vow against any form of family planning or birth control."

ETHNIC INSECURITY AND BIRTH CONTROL IN KENYA

Oathing in Kikuyuland often comes with a sense of insecurity. The insecurity, in this case, does not arise from the very rapid expansion of Kenya's population. A 3.3 percent increase, by the latest estimates, is one of the highest rates in the world.

The Government as a source of authority is sympathetic to some degree of population control. However, there are important explosive issues underlying such a policy, some of them directly connected with the power base on which the Government rests. The explosive nature of population control in a situation of high political competitiveness in Africa does not lie in any religious explana-

tion. It is not religious sensibilities that are likely to be offended by the enterprise. It is something much less explicit and yet sometimes profoundly present. It includes a sense of ethnic insecurity.

This external observer probably exaggerated the dimensions of this factor in Kenya. Nevertheless, he was certainly alluding to something that is all too often overlooked. The writer distinguished between the policy of the Government in Kenya and the psychological attitudes of its individual members:

As a Government, it preaches a consistent nontribalism, but as individuals its members fear for the effect of any birth control policy on the size of their tribe relative to the others. . . . The Kikuyu are still generally believed to be the larger tribe, but reliable census figures are hard to come by, and many think the Luo have already attained the numerical majority which, if true, raises again in stronger form the old question as to why they have so small a share of the available power.¹

In effect the census figures so far do still maintain a Kikuyu numerical superiority. Should, in a decade, a census inquiry reveal an altered relationship between the Luo and the Kikuyu, it is almost certain that the revelation would be of momentous political implications. A crisis could arise which might again threaten to shake a nation to its very foundations.

POPULATION SIZE AND POWER POLITICS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

A less hypothetical example concerns the tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi. Unequal, both demographically and socially over the centuries, the two communities entered the new post-colonial era in ominous circumstances.

It was in 1959 that the Hutu of Rwanda rose against their Tutsi overlords. An estimated 20,000 lives were lost, and five times that number fled for refuge to neighboring countries. Rwanda was now firmly under the rule of the Hutu. These were despised for generations by the Tutsi, but were numerically superior to the Tutsi, and were now at last politically triumphant in Rwanda. Yet that triumph had cost many thousands of lives, and its maintenance was to cost more lives in the years that followed. In neighboring Burundi, the same two communities shared a nation, but the Tutsi were still in power in Burundi. In 1972 more than 100,000 people were killed and the great majority of them were the Hutu. The government asserted that a plot to overthrow the Tutsi government had been discovered, and the slaughter of the Hutu ensued. Many more thousands fled the country.

An interplay between democratic ideas and demographic realities in the twentieth century was perhaps what inaugurated the new tensions. A faint awareness that things need not be what they were began to dawn on the Hutu, especially in this century. As a Hutu intellectual explained to a western journalist in 1973:

The Tutsis were taught from birth that they were superior and they believed it. We were taught that we were inferior and we believed it. So, in effect, we were inferior until we made ourselves believe otherwise.²

The stage was set for the slaughters that have devastated the lives of these two communities in two different countries:

The era of independence, with its emphasis on majority rule, also meant that the leaders of the Hutus began to feel the power of their numbers. On the other hand, the Tutsis—only 15 percent of the population of Burundi, 10 percent of Rwanda—began to feel deep fears about their place in societies where power might go to the majority. These two feelings—inferiority by the Hutus, fear by the Tutsis—probably account for most of the terrible blood shed of the last ten years.³

In the cultural domain, the two communities, Hutu and Tutsi, are in fact much closer than most other communities in Africa are to each other. Kinyarwanda is their joint language and they have a sizeable overlap in their cultures. It might even be argued that each is a sub-culture of the broader Kinyarwanda culture. In the case of the Tutsi and the Hutu the problem is not one of cultural distance resulting in an incapacity for recognizing each other as compatriots. The problem in this case is of cultural nearness, so close that the caste system of the ages had become no longer admissible. The lower caste could no longer see the Tutsi as legitimate overlords. In the ultimate analysis the violence emanating from the situation is basically primary. If the two groups had been in comparable numbers population-wise, the best answer might have been a neat ethnic exchange of population between Rwanda and Burundi. Rwanda could then become an entirely Hutu country, and Burundi a Tutsi nation-state. These two countries might have become one of the very few truly homogenous nation-states in the classical West European sense within Africa. Unfortunately, however, such a neat exchange of populations is bedeviled by the considerable difference in numbers between the Hutus and Tutsis.

Meanwhile, birth control is anathema to the majority of people in each community. On that issue the Catholic Church in the two countries has found a very responsive constituency. Neither the Hutu nor the Tutsi wish to “adversely” change their numerical ratio in relation to the rival group.

As matters now stand, each of these two countries is already one of the most densely populated countries, not only in Africa, but in much of the rest of the world. Conservative estimates of the density of population in Rwanda would put the population per square mile at three hundred and seventy, and in Burundi at two hundred and twenty-five. This contrasts with the population density of less than twenty per square mile in Tanzania.

THE TANZANIAN SITUATION

Tanzania is indeed one of the most sparsely populated countries of this region. Rwanda and Burundi are among the most densely populated. It just so happens that mainland Tanzania is one of the least politically violent countries in Africa; while Rwanda and Burundi have been among the most politically violent countries. The question that arises is whether there is indeed a correlation between at least levels of density of population and certain levels of political violence in countries that have not as yet gotten beyond the danger of primary violence. Neither Tanzania nor its neighbors, Burundi and Rwanda, have gotten past that danger. Yet the scale of violence occurring in these countries differs dramatically in proportion to density of population. Is this correlation partly causal?

Within the United Republic of Tanzania itself, is a marked difference between the island of Zanzibar and the mainland, both in density of population and in scale of violence. Once again, the question arises whether there is a causal connection. Of course, the violence in Rwanda, Burundi and Zanzibar has had other causes as well even if we were to include population density as a factor.⁴ What is being suggested here is not that demography is ever likely to be a sufficient condition for violent political eruptions. All that is being asked is whether demography might, given other conditions, tilt the balance on the side of such eruptions.

If demographic balance does have such relevance, this is partly a case of tertiary violence. It is a combination of environmental, spatial considerations, on one side, and a special instance of group dynamics on the other. As Lemarchand has suggested, the most salient combination of environmental and situational factors likely to generate more pressure in the years ahead include:

... an explosive population growth in both Rwanda and Burundi, far exceeding the economic capabilities of either state and hence reinforcing the conditions of chronic instability and ethnic strife inherent in their respective social system.⁵

POPULATION GROWTH IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

The situation in Africa in the modern period has indeed been aggravated by two major developments. One concerns the rapid decline of the death rate with improvements in medical and sanitational facilities; the other factor is the emergence of national boundaries legally defined and constituting serious political impediments to mass migrations. The growth rate in population in Rwanda is at least 3.5 percent per annum; in Burundi at least 3 percent. Both are of course high in absolute terms, and dangerously high given the high density already there.

The numbers that were previously killed by diseases, including periodic epidemics, are now killed by their neighbors, almost from year to year. The declining death rate, a lack of awareness of implications of population growth, and traditional ignorance about contraception reinforced by the negative influence of

the Roman Catholic Church on these matters, have all conspired to create a major population problem in these two small countries.

Before the Europeans came with their idea of carefully defined national boundaries, each legally under the jurisdiction of a particular state, Black Africa had its own safety valves for population pressure. Part of this was simply migration to some areas of land some fifty or a hundred miles away. Indeed, that whole momentous phenomenon of Bantu migration in history was at least in part due to population pressures. Roland Oliver, a professor of African history at the University of London, has gone further and likened the expansion of the Bantu to the Teutonic invasion in Europe in the Middle Ages. That is to say, Oliver saw Bantu migration as being due more to population explosion than to conquest, although conquest often accompanied population growth.⁶

POLITICAL BOUNDARIES AND POPULATION POLITICS

With the coming of the territorial nation-state, this primordial safety valve of moving on to another piece of land, or even conquering a tribe that had previously been distant and separate, is no longer available to relieve the pressure for scarce resources.

Some scholars have studied African state boundaries, and noted the low degree of conflict to redefine those boundaries. There have of course been broader clashes between countries like Kenya and Somalia, or Morocco and Algeria, or Upper Volta and Dahomey. On balance, the conflict-potential of African boundaries has rightly been estimated as relatively low, considering the arbitrariness with which these boundaries were drawn by European imperial powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

What has not been adequately examined is the conflict potential of those boundaries within each territorial entity rather than across territorial entities. It is a mistake to assume that the only violence produced by boundaries is violence over or about those boundaries. There are other consequences of the boundaries that have not been adequately examined.

It is in part an accident of European rather than African history that Rwanda and Burundi did not become part of what is now Tanzania. All these countries were ruled by the Germans before World War I. Each imperial power calculated the administrative convenience of determining which colony was separated from which and in what manner. Had both Rwanda and Burundi become part of Tanzania proper, and considering the sparse population of the rest of mainland Tanzania, there might have been some migrations of either Hutu or Tutsi or both nearly fifty years before Tanzania became independent. The scale of the migration of the Hutu and Tutsi within the broader area of mainland Tanzania might have been enough to ease some of the tensions of population pressure in those parts inhabited by these two communities.

Moreover, since neither community would be in charge of the government in Dar es Salaam, their power to inflict damage against each other would be reduced. Certainly neither would be in control of an army. Outbreaks of violence

among them would have to be handled by a central government with its own institutions of pacification and stabilization.

Conceivably even the distrust between the Hutu and the Tutsi might have become less severe if they were not competing for the control of governmental institutions, or plotting to control those institutions. A historical situation that might have developed could have been fundamentally different. In fact, it is even feasible that the Hutu and the Tutsi, because they are culturally very much alike and share a common language, might have found a basis of solidarity against other groups in a large Tanzania, and united to compete for electoral advantage or for patronage from the central government in Tanzania.

An alternative scenario would be one in which the Hutu and the Tutsi in what is now the area covered by Rwanda and Burundi would have mobilized to have become a separatist movement within Tanzania. The tensions would therefore not have become a case of violent animosity between the two communities, but of ambitious separatist feeling uniting the two communities against the rest of Tanzania. Once again the scale of violence might have been different under such conditions.

After World War I, Tanganyika (what is now mainland Tanzania) became a mandate of the League of Nations and was entrusted to Britain for administration. Rwanda and Burundi were entrusted to Belgium for administration on behalf of the League of Nations. All three later became mandates of the United Nations. Rwanda and Burundi were ruled virtually as an integrated political system (Ruanda-Urundi). An opportunity had been missed to integrate the Hutu and the Tutsi into a larger territorial entity. The stage was set for demographic pressures, ethnic rivalry, competition for the control of the means of destruction, and periodic eruptions of mutual brutality.

In the absence of open frontiers for migration, many Hutu in Burundi have to wait until the next round of brutality. Under the immediate pressure of brutality one can escape to neighboring countries, seeking refuge and political asylum. When things are, for the time being, peaceful, the borders become a little tighter, and those that remain behind quietly await another confrontation with fate.

POPULATION POLITICS IN UGANDA

Another country that has been profoundly affected by borders and demographic imbalance is Uganda. Let us take a closer look at its experience in turn in historical perspective. The issue of political insecurity in relation to the distribution of population has been present in Uganda's political history since the British defined and redefined its borders. The formation of political parties in the 1950s and the introduction of the whole idea of popular elections suddenly revealed new implications of ethnic demography in national affairs. The Baganda were the largest single group, but still only 17 percent of Uganda's population. They were the most nationally-oriented of all Ugandans; but there was a sharp decline in their commitment to the Uganda nation in the face of the rise of political parties and the concept of numerical power. Like the Southerners in Nigeria, the

Baganda felt that their part of the country was by economic development and educational success, the best fitted to lead in the affairs of the nation. If the principle of one man's one vote was introduced in Uganda, the Baganda would be out-voted by the rest of the country, and a new leadership might arise less "qualified" for the great trust of the nation's destiny.

The factors therefore came into play in national politics—anti-partyism and anti-unitarism. The Baganda were opposed both to party politics as a mode of dealing with political affairs and to the concept of a unitary state, which reduced all groups to a collection of potential voters irrespective of the differing traditions of authority and loyalty.

Anti-partyism and anti-unitarism in Buganda created a number of crises in the last few years before independence. And as in Nigeria, the fear of numbers resulted in the boycott of elections in Buganda. The Baganda turned away from the democratic process in 1961, and the Democratic Party came into being in self-governing Uganda.

Meanwhile, Buganda had at last decided to have a party of its own, the royalist Kabaka Yekka. It was so conscious of its own anti-partyism that Kabaka Yekka preferred to call itself a "movement" rather than a party for a while. In any case, the deep distrust of popular democracy in the sense of one man, one vote, and the distrust of a unitarism as a principle for the new Uganda, remained very much part of the ideology of Kabaka Yekka.

The 1962 negotiations for a New Independence Constitution granted the Baganda what they wanted. The principle of unitarism for independent Uganda was diluted by the concession given to Buganda as a neo-federal region, enjoying in part its own local autonomy. The other kingdoms were also given concessions of a neo-federal kind, though in effect less elaborate than what Buganda enjoyed.

As for the principle of popular vote, this too was diluted with a decision to convert the Lukiko into an electoral college for the nomination of Buganda's representations in the National Assembly. Buganda's twenty-four seats came to be taken by Kabaka Yekka.

On the point of view of population control, a unitary system of government would have added resistance among the Baganda to any idea of reducing their procreation in the face of competition from other ethnic groups. However, the neo-federal system coupled with the indirect elections by the Lukiko of Buganda's members in the National Assembly helped to reduce the full potential of such a system.

It could not completely eliminate the factor of ethnic competition in local attitudes to birth control, partly because Buganda as a region has tended to be attractive to other groups and had absorbed a variety of ethnic elements. The numerical advantage of the Baganda within Buganda could be seriously threatened if the immigrant population in Buganda rose faster than the Baganda's capacity to keep pace demographically.

Further, the 1962 formula of securing Buganda's autonomy against the danger of numerical challenge elsewhere turned out to be less durable than expect-

ed. Tensions between the allies—Obote's Uganda Peoples' Congress and Buganda's Kabaka Yekka—began to tell politically. Again, there were elements reminiscent of the Nigerian alliance between the Northern Peoples' Congress and the more progressive N.C.N.C. of the Eastern Region.

Events first led to the break up of the alliance between Kabaka Yekka and Obote's party in 1964. They later led in 1966 to a confrontation between the central Government under Obote and the Government of Buganda under Kabaka Yekka Mutesa II. Buganda was vanquished, the 1962 Constitution was first suspended and then abolished, and the neo-federal protection for Buganda came to an end.

Curiously enough the fear of numbers gradually shifted away from issues of Buganda's autonomy to issues of support for the Uganda Peoples' Congress under Dr. Obote. Given that large numbers of people in Independent Uganda continued to vote on the basis of ethnic affiliation, it became a matter of significant interest to Dr. Obote to devise a mode of election that would diffuse the ethnic factor. The last elections in 1962 had, in effect, indicated an increase in ethnic politics, as compared with the 1961 elections. What sort of scheme was therefore to be devised for 1971?

Obote's Document No. 5 on electoral reform was designed to deal both with ethnicity as a factor influencing voting behavior and with population distribution. The two issues were of course interrelated, but they were by no means the same. On the issue of ethnicity Obote's whole concept of each parliamentarian standing in four constituencies attempted to make every candidate dependent on more than his own tribe. Northerners might already have had a say in deciding who spoke for Buganda; but Obote's Document No. 5 proposed to give the Baganda also a say in choosing who spoke for the Northerners. The Baganda, like other groups, would have had a chance to vote for candidates for areas other than their own.

In addition, Document No. 5 grappled with the issue of disproportionate distribution of population. The scheme proposed that votes cast in each constituency were to be computed on the basis of each percentage counting as an electoral vote. All Constituencies were to become equal in the electoral power they had regardless of differences in populations within. In the words of Document No. 5, the scheme was designed to "ensure" that the President was "elected by the whole country." It sought to "remove any possibility that one or two regions with heavy populations could dominate the election of the President one way or the other."

The same principle was intended to apply to the election of Parliamentarians. Document No. 5 proceeded to try and illustrate numerically how a simple straight popular vote could frustrate the whole idea of making each parliamentarian a representative of four constituencies, and of four regions in the country instead of one. Paragraph 42 of Document No. 5 attempted to give an illustration of "how one constituency may frustrate the will of a large part of the country." It illustrated how one particular candidate could get support from three regions of Uganda—for example, South, West, and North—but because he was heavily

rejected in the East, some other candidates with massive support from a particular constituency could become the member for all those four constituencies.

Document No. 5 therefore proposed that each constituency should have its voting population again computed into one hundred electoral votes, and the question of electoral success by candidates be on the basis of how many electoral votes from the total four hundred in the four constituencies a candidate had won, rather than on the basis of how many individual votes on a popular franchise he had obtained.

The effect on Document No. 5 from the point of view of ethnic competition would have been to de-politicize population spread to some extent. The question of which region had more people than which could have been less politically significant in an election.

Varied implications could have arisen from this. With the depoliticization of distribution of population, census figures could continue to be reliable in Uganda, unlike the situation in the old Nigeria where figures began to be "cooked." Ugandans might have learned to restrict the size of their family without worrying whether this is a disservice to their tribe. Obote's electoral scheme was, however, not destined to be implemented after all. On January 25, 1971, a military coup took place in Uganda and overthrew Milton Obote's Government. Among the casualties was an innovative electoral scheme of potential relevance for the task of depoliticizing the issue of population control and family planning in Uganda.

COLONIAL BOUNDARIES AND THE CONTEMPORARY UGANDA SCENE

Meanwhile, the tensions of ethnicity are still very much part of national life in Uganda. The ethnic groups in political power since Idi Amin's military coup in 1971 are from the north of the country, with special reference to those communities that were divided by the colonial boundaries. General Amin's own tribe, the Kakwa, are in Sudan, Congo, as well as Uganda. Since he took over power he had not hesitated to recruit ethnic compatriots from Sudan and Congo into the Ugandan army. A sizeable proportion of the Ugandan army might therefore be deemed to be consisted of non-Ugandans, and exercising considerable authority and power over the population of Uganda. Had the boundaries of Uganda been drawn in a way which made West Nile District of Uganda part of Sudan, as a number of administrators during the British colonial period recommended, the history of violence in Uganda could have been dramatically changed. All the Kakwa would have been part of Sudan, and might have been substantially oriented either toward controlling Juba in southern Sudan, or toward influencing Khartoum. The refusal of the British colonial authorities to define the boundaries in that manner has had consequences for the internal dynamics of Uganda society. Idi Amin, who might so easily have been a non-Ugandan had the border been drawn a few miles differently, became eligible for the highest position in Uganda's armed forces soon after independence. He then became the head of the

army and later captured ultimate power in Uganda, with devastating consequences for the country.

What all this analysis implies is that the conflict potential of African boundaries consists of more than border disputes and quarrels over frontiers between independent states after the 1960s. Conflict potential also includes the nature of domestic cleavage arising from the manner in which Europeans drew those boundaries.

Looking at Africa as a whole, there would have been violence whichever way the Europeans had defined their colonies territorially. However, looking at the issue from the perspective of individual entities as they now exist, it is clear that certain alternative territorial definitions of these states would have had less violent potential in specific cases. Uganda would probably have experienced less violence if the West Nile was part of Sudan, and the Hutu and the Tutsi might have brutalized each other on a more limited scale if they were both subject to the government of Julius Nyerere in Dar es Salaam and were both without the military instruments of mutual destruction.

When we examine demographic factors as influences on social tensions we must also relate them to the geo-politics of boundaries. Demography in Africa has had political relevance in relation not only to density of population but also to concentration of population, relative sizes of the different ethnic groups, and the nature of competition for resources.

Density is to be distinguished from concentration in the sense that the latter refers to migratory patterns that result in major concentrations either in urban areas or in more prosperous sub-regions. The national destiny might be low, and yet a particular city or a particular region might have a high concentration of people.

The size of the different ethnic groups is also relevant. On balance, large ethnic groups converging on the center of the nation, and competing for power and influence, have run greater risk of becoming violent against each other than small ethnic groups scattered more widely. Kenya and Uganda have had ethnic tensions partly because they have at least one large ethnic community centrally located, critical in national affairs and with access to certain advantages. Some forms of tensions in Uganda have been connected with the Buganda issue—the Baganda having been the most favored community under the British, the largest in size, the most centrally located in terms of proximity to the capital city, the most responsive to the new economic and to some extent cultural civilization that came with the British. The conflict potential of the Buganda question in Uganda has been overshadowed since the military coup by the nature of intermilitary quarrels with the armed forces and their resulting consequences for northern ethnic groups. The Buganda issue is very much part of the scene, and may once again emerge as a continuing problem in national affairs once the internecine military conflicts under Amin's distinctive personality and style have receded into the past.

The tension between the Kikuyu and the Luo in Kenya, both large communities by African standards, also illustrate the relevance of size to the style of

competition. Kenya so far has been spared some of the convulsions that have characterized recent Ugandan and Nigerian history, but all three countries are an ominous illustration of the interplay between ethnicity, size, location, density and concentration. In Nigeria the cost was heavy, both at the time of the eruptions against the Ibo in 1966 in Northern Nigeria, and in the course of the civil war from 1967 to 1970. The exceptionally large size of the Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba communities reinforced by the nature of federal government in Nigeria, played a part in setting the stage for the type of confrontations that took place. In situations of limited resources demography, ethnicity and location can be major aspects of the background to violence.

It might also be argued that the Mau Mau insurrection in colonial Kenya, involving the Kikuyu fighting the British presence there, had as part of its background the concentration of land-hungry Kikuyu overlooking large areas of relatively underutilized land reserved for European immigrants in Kenya. The frustrations of the Kikuyu in the face of their own land, hunger and population explosion in Kikuyuland, with rising expectations fed in part by the nearness of fertile land reserved for others, propelled much of the community in the direction of rebellion. The Mau Mau movement burst into African history, resulted in a major reconsideration of colonialism and its future, and helped to persuade Britain to move in the direction of granting independence to as many of its African colonies as possible. With that British example before it, the French empire, too, began to feel the stresses and strains of social change in the continent as a whole. And before long even the Portuguese empire, the oldest surviving empire in the continent, collapsed in 1974 and 1975.

It might therefore be argued that the size of the Kikuyu people in Kenya, their concentration near the White highlands, their proximity to the capital city, their need for more land as a resource, their containment in a new territorial entity called Kenya subject to an authority outside themselves, all contributed towards the scale of violence which tore Kenya apart but also set the stage for the country's liberation from colonial rule. Once again demographic factors had profoundly affected the course of East African history.

Demographic issues in East Africa are not only connected with inter-ethnic and inter-racial relations; they are also connected with problems of individual choice. Individual choice in turn has to be placed in a cultural context. It is to these aspects of the subject that we should now turn.

Traditional East African belief systems tend to link the past with the present so intimately that life and death themselves become points on a continuum rather than opposing sides in a sharp dichotomy. The living and the dead move on a plane of continuity. This is by no means peculiar to the religions of the eastern board of Africa.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to go beyond the problem of comparative numerical strength in African politics. It has also drawn renewed attention to the demo-

graphic relevance of the colonial boundaries, which were drawn in the European scramble for Africa. A relatively slight alteration of the northern boundary of Uganda would have made Idi Amin "Sudanese"—and changed the course of Uganda's history. The ethnic balance in the Uganda army might have varied enough to result in qualitatively different national alignments.

Less hypothetical is the whole agony of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi. Demographically and socially unequal over the ages, they have been at their worst in terms of mutual brutalization in our own day. In their case, the colonial powers did not create artificial frontiers. On the contrary, they created culturally intelligible boundaries, encompassing culturally related peoples within two continuous nation-states.

In the case of the Hutu and the Tutsi, one laments that they did not emerge into independence as part of a greater Tanzania. This artificial incorporation into a larger entity would have transformed the demographic context of Hutu-Tutsi relations, deprived them both of independent armies of their own, and scaled down their capacity for destroying each other. However, that did not happen. The Tutsi and Hutu now share two of the most densely populated countries in Africa, and seem doomed to suffer periodic eruptions of reciprocal brutality in conditions of a worsening "population explosion."

In the final analysis the case of Eastern Africa has to be paced in its global context, with all the contradictions between the haves and the have-nots. In this connection the politics of population growth in East Africa are directly relevant to the problem of ecological balance in the world, especially if we agree with those writers who see the environmental crisis in the following terms:

The world's population is continuing to grow at an alarming pace; finite resources are being utilized at exponential rates; and technological advances are contributing to negative ecological outcomes. . . . Thus, it is imperative that population, resources, technology, and environmental effects be considered jointly.⁷

One major cause of the technological advances was that original ecological curiosity in Western culture; two major consequences of those advances in technology have been depletion of resources and the decline of the death rate. The twentieth century has seen a demographic revolution in much of Asia and Africa, and has, therefore, created concern about the capacity of this planet to meet the needs of its inhabitants. It has been estimated that the food supply on this planet could be increased nine-fold if new technological breakthroughs are sought and all possible lands utilized. When food resources are thus multiplied nine times, the earth could sustain a population of thirty billion.

This kind of estimate gives mankind some time. At present growth levels, a thirty billion population for the world will take another seventy to one hundred years. There have also been estimates of the carrying capacity of this planet in terms of roughly forty billion human beings. These estimates might be over-stating the time that mankind has to control population before it reaches tragic con-

sequences. In any case, this has to be related to a number of other factors concerning resources other than food, and the hazards of new forms of imperialism and human aggression as societies compete to control mineral and energy resources. The Middle East and Africa might conceivably become vulnerable afresh as the desperate developed states seek to ensure their standards of affluence by renewed annexation of areas of raw materials and fuel.

Is this really an argument for reducing the population growth in Africa and the Middle East? Could it not even more convincingly be used to defend that population growth as a way of increasing the capacity of these areas to resist the ambitions of the more powerful states? There is indeed considerable logic in this latter position. The Malthusian view could be used, and has been reversed, in examining the new relationships between standards of wealth and levels of population. Instead of getting to reduce the rates of their population growth, why not get the rich to stop growing altogether?

The world as a whole ought perhaps to be moving towards a selection international taxation system—tied for purposes of sanctions to an International Bank which has the additional function of allocating loans for reconstruction and economic normalization in individual states, for nature calamities, and for other *ad hoc* issues of economic and social welfare.

Individual countries have had *death duties* for many years now as a mode of income distribution. The world may be ready shortly for international *birth duties*. These birth duties would, in fact, be population control. They are to be a tax applied to every member of a nuclear family—parents and children regardless of age. Under the present taxation system having more children establishes eligibility for tax reductions, at least up to a certain point, but under the proposed restructuring of the tax system, having more children under specified conditions increases the tax burden.

There is an important consideration to be borne in mind about the precise moment of the application of such a tax in a given society. Countries would become subject to population taxation of this kind only after life expectancy if the particular society has hit the fifty-year mark. Each citizen would stand a good chance of living at least to the age of fifty. An alternative measurement is to relate the birth duties to infant mortality—asserting that countries become subject to the global population taxation as soon as the rate of infant mortality is down to fifty in a thousand. At the moment, life expectancy in much of Black Africa is 40 years. The kind of taxation proposed would penalize Americans for having four children in a family, but would not penalize Indians or Nigerians for having six children in a family.

The tax would be collected by the individual country concerned from its citizens, and the national resources of the country would then add another fifty percent of the total amount collected before transmission to the global Taxation Authority. The national supplementation provided by the government of the country concerned would be designed to increase the incentives for the paying government to take adequate action in reducing population growth within its own area.

The amount collected from these international birth duties would go toward the special fund concerned with problems of infant mortality. These problems in developing countries may include general underdevelopment as such. There may also be subsidiary matters, ranging from health education and sanitary arrangements to the availability of powdered milk in remote areas. The fund would be used both for research and for the alleviation of existing hardships.

Yet the ultimate strategy must again remain that of reaching the villages with information, convincingly presented, about both the risks and rewards of unplanned procreation. This should be combined with a strategy to influence cultural symbols in the direction of greater responsiveness to discipline and control in this sphere.

NOTES

1. Yorick Wilks, "Family Planning and Tribal Planning," *Cambridge Review* (England), Vol. 92, No. 2198 (October 23, 1970).

2. *The New York Times*, June 6, 1973.

3. Stanley Meisler, "Rwanda and Burundi: Decade of Independence—Murder," *The Washington Post*, May 22, 1973.

4. Consult UN Statistical Year Books for 1970 and 1971. The density for Rwanda and Burundi is also analyzed by Rene Lemarchand in his essay "The Military in Former Belgian Africa," Table I, in Catheline M. Kellehe, (ed.), *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspective* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 91.

5. Lemarchand, *ibid.*, p. 101.

6. Roland Oliver, "The Problem of Bantu Expansion," *Journal of African History*, VII (1966), pp. 361–376.

7. *Ibid.*

Chapter 5.3

Population Control and Social Justice: An African Perspective

The case for population control is normally seen either in terms of the survival of the human race or in terms of the economic welfare of a particular family or a particular country. If one were basing new policies on the three guiding principles of the optimization of economic welfare, the minimization of violence and the maximization of social justice, one might say that on the whole, debates about the population explosion have related more to the first two guiding principles than to the last. When one relates the demographic danger to human survival, one is operating in a realm of assessment not far removed from the horrors of violence. The idea of an over-crowded world, not necessarily short of food but conceivably short of conditions for a healthy life, and perhaps even of pure, clean air to breathe, has the same repellant effect on the imagination as the image of the aftermath of a terrible war.

It is true that, in some respects, a costly war would be an alternative catastrophe to a population tragedy. It has been pointed out often enough that one of the few positive functions mutual human destruction has served for the welfare of humanity has been to keep the numbers down. Total abolition of military explosions might well accelerate the approach of a demographic explosion.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact of war and over-crowding being alternative catastrophes, they do remain catastrophes of comparable magnitude. Both could, in some sense, be related to the kind of ambition that made the ideal of minimizing violence one of the guiding principles of this chapter.

The relationship between population control and economic welfare is even more direct. It is sometimes attached to calculation about economic growth and per capita measurements of economic improvement.

The determination of services—education, hospitals, general clinics, sanitation and housing—is affected in situations where the increase in population is more rapid than the country's capacity to cater for it.

On the basis of the remarks already made, this is the relationship between population growth and the three guiding ambitions. Expansion of the population of the world may mean an increase in the incidence of violence, but not necessarily. On the other hand, a very radical decrease in the incidence of violence is bound to result in an expansion of the population, should other factors remain constant. The guiding ambition of the minimization of violence is, therefore, placed in an antithetical relationship to any concurrent ambition to restrict population growth.

As regards the relationship between economic welfare and population growth, it is clear that in the developing countries a rapid expansion of population reduces the economic welfare of the average citizen, in the short run. What is less clear is whether, in the long run, the bigger population might not result in an economically more powerful country, even if the individual citizen is not economically better off. The United States is economically much more powerful than Sweden, but it is not clear that the average American is, as an individual, economically much better off than the average Swede.

Will a certain standard of economic welfare result in any case in smaller families? Much of the history of the Western world does seem to support the prospects of such a trend, although recent American experience has indications of fluctuation.

NUMERICALISM IN WORLD ORDER

What is the relationship between population growth and social justice in the world? This is a more difficult issue to tackle, partly because social justice is more culturally relative and more difficult to measure than either economic improvements or any decline in the casualties of violence.

What needs to be grasped is, however, the simple fact that numbers have been important for the dignity of Colored people in a sense not often realized by those who are not Colored. This is the phenomenon which one has had occasion before to designate as "numericalism" in international politics. Numericalism in inter-group relations was defined to be that collection of attitudes or general principles which puts a moral premium on numerical advantage. The range of forms which numericalism takes is from the moral complexities of "majority rule" to the simple adage that "there is strength in numbers." The two ideas do not necessarily amount to the same thing, though they could indeed overlap. The liberal principle of majority rule asserts that those who prevail in numbers ought to prevail in politics. But the adage of inner "strength in numbers" might be invoked even in situations in which majority rule as an elaborate system of government is not in favor. The "strength" in the sense meant here could be physical. Yet, even where the power of numbers is thought of in physical terms,

numericalism remains, in the ultimate analysis, a belief in the dignity of being numerous.

The ethic of numerical supremacy has played an important part in multiplying the number of sovereign states in the international community since the end of the Second World War. One knows that in the history of colonial liberation, the principle of "one man, one vote" was often crucial. And the appeal of this principle for the colonized lay in the assumption that if "one man, one vote" was conceded, power would inevitably pass to the majority of the people. In practice, two concepts of "majority rule" have tended to operate. One concept postulated that the rulers should be responsive and institutionally answerable to at least a majority of those they ruled. This was the normal liberal concept. The other concept of "majority rule" simply required that the rulers should broadly be of the same ethnic racial stock as the majority of those that they ruled. In this latter sense, the rulers were still "representative"—but more in the sense of being ethnically "typical" than democratically accountable.

In the history of colonial liberation movements in the Third World, it was the ethnic conception of "majority rule," rather than the orthodox liberal one, that was particularly crucial. And yet, for as long as the nationalist movements had the support of the general populace as a whole, this distinction was merely academic. The nationalist leaders were "representative" by the canons of both liberalism and ethnic typicality.¹

Any discussion of population control in relation to social justice has to take account of this numericalist ideological orientation among Colored people. The importance of numbers for the dignity of Colored people is not even limited to situations in which the Colored people are in a majority. The position of the Black man in the United States has been as much a part of the total picture of race relations in the world as the liberation movements in Angola. In the latter, Africans are in the majority; in the former, the Blacks are in a minority. Yet, the Black American has been no less conscious of the liberating potential of numbers than has the Afro-Asian nationalist in colonial situations. There was a time when the more militant of American Blacks saw the significance of their numbers in quasi-militaristic terms. Even as far back as the slave days, Black numerical superiority in individual situations occasionally turned a Black man's thoughts towards a possible rebellion. And where it did not lead to rebellion, it was sometimes interpreted by Black militants themselves as a sign of their inherent servility. As the defiant Black man, David Walker, put it in 1829 in his *Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World*:

Here now, in the Southern and Western sections of this country [the United States] there are at least three Coloured persons for one White, why is it that those few weak, good-for-nothing Whites are able to keep so many able men . . . in wretchedness and misery? It shows what the Blacks are, we are ignorant, abject, servile and mean—and the Whites know it—they know that we are too servile to assert our rights as men—or they would not fool with us as they do.²

More recently, the Black American has sometimes seen the significance of population figures in electoral terms, rather than revolutionary ones. While the Afro-Asian nationalist had previously linked numerical power to the ethic of self-determination, the American Black has linked it with the liberating potential of the franchise. As Herbert Aptheker, a specialist on the history of the Black American, once put it:

It never was right 'for the administration' to 'postpone' effective action on the Negro question because of so-called political expediency; today it is not wrong, it is unwise. This is shown . . . in the fact that President Kennedy would have remained a United States Senator if but 75 percent of the Negro vote went his way in 1960 rather than the 85 percent cast for him.³

Jimmy Carter's victory was also virtually decided by the Black vote. Indeed, as the Black movement has become more revolutionary, the importance of numbers has not diminished. Any speeches to Black Americans suggesting that they should reduce their rate of reproduction are widely interpreted as a device to keep them numerically weak. The battle cry of Black militancy might almost be paraphrased in the following slogan: "Burn, baby, burn!—and then breed some more!" It is the dual strategy of engaging both in destructive acts that weaken the power of the White man and in creative acts that strengthen the power of the Black man.

Afro-Asianism and pan-Negroism were forms of solidarity based on a vague sense of shared humiliation as Colored people. But what defenses do the Colored people now have against the technologically more advanced White people? Almost the only measurable military factor in which the Colored races have a superiority over the White ones is that of numbers. It seemed at first that the advent of nuclear weapons had made the numerical factor virtually irrelevant. If war remained conventional, numerical superiority of soldiers under arms would remain an asset. But in a conflict of massive nuclear destruction, the size of a conventional army appeared to be of dubious military significance.

Yet, this whole line of reasoning is itself tied to conventional assumptions about "victory" and "defeat" at the end of a war. In a nuclear war, numbers are indeed irrelevant in determining a conventional "victory," but that is mainly because a full-scale nuclear holocaust could not end in an orthodox victory. As soon as one starts to assess the consequences of a nuclear war less in terms of "victories" and more in terms of the balance of survival, population figures once again become admissible in the calculations. As Mao Tse-tung is reported to have said to a visiting Yugoslav official in 1957:

We aren't afraid of atomic bombs. We have a large territory and a big population. Bombs could not kill all of us. What if they killed over even 300,000,000? We would still have plenty more. China would be the last country to die.⁴

It is not certain that Mao ever made such a statement. A specialist on Chinese studies at an American university has even suggested in a conversation that the statement was probably propagated by the Russians in their anti-Chinese strategy for the specific purpose of gaining concessions from the West. But, as Edgar Snow put it: "Even if Mao did not say that, someone would have had to invent it." The statement is certainly consistent with Mao's general philosophy on the role of population in warfare. Communist China's policy on population control has itself not been consistent. The attraction of an ever-expanding base of humanity has had to be balanced against the fate of policies intended to raise standards of welfare. But there is no doubt whatsoever that China is profoundly conscious of the size of its population and regards it as one of its credentials for leadership in the world.

But, in any case, both India and China, as the two largest nations in the world, can perhaps afford to put the brakes on. There is certainly more consistency in India with regard to the need for some family planning and birth control. When demographic superiority is so far advanced, it is easier to sell the idea of cutting the numbers down.

NUMERICALISM IN AFRICA

In Africa the cause of family planning and population control lacks, on the whole, adequate credibility. One or two African countries, strongly advised by technical assistance experts, have taken measures to promote some degree of propaganda in favor of population control. Among the East African countries, Kenya has gone the farthest in this sphere. But the majority of African countries seem to be at best lukewarm in their support, and more often than not, skeptical of population control measures.

In situations of confrontation between Blacks and Whites, either in active combat or in terms of hostile attitudes, the issue of population links the two principles of the maximization of social justice and the minimization of violence. It has been inequalities in other spheres between White people and Colored people which have given the status of numerical superiority extra prestige among the more preponderant Colored people. "We may be unequal to you in technology and education, in physical power and diplomatic sophistication—but when all is said and done, there are more of us than of you!"⁵

In 1958, Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania was quoting from Abraham Lincoln's romanticization of numbers to rebut those who shared Cecil Rhodes' dictum of "equal rights for all civilized men." Nyerere quarreled especially with the "undignified assertion" of the colonial Tanganyika Government that in the special circumstances of East and Central Africa, universal suffrage would put the common good in jeopardy. He defended the idea of allowing "the common people" to have their own way—and quoted Lincoln's statement that "God must love the common people because He made so many of them."⁶

Sometimes the idea that history is on the side of Colored people derives its credence from the numerical preponderance of those people. An oppressed peo-

ple that is in a majority, often finds a nagging reassurance that the imbalance of power could not possibly last forever. That is certainly the great feeling of the Black population of South Africa. For the time being, they are no match for the connivance and technology of the Whites, or for their organizational power and industrial sophistication. The Blacks might feel that history is on their side, not because their cause is just; for, the cause of the Jews in Nazi Germany was also just, yet, the condemned Jews did not feel such optimism. The sense of the impending vindication of history in the years ahead for Black South Africans arises quite simply out of a refusal to accept that a victimized majority can remain effectively victimized for any length of time.

To ask the Black people of South Africa to engage in vigorous family planning and birth control, while the White regime equally vigorously promotes immigration from Europe, is to seek to deny the preponderant Blacks even the solace of their numerical preponderance.

The idea of numbers as an investment for the future goes beyond the security of whole races and social groups. It extends to the psychology of the individual father in situations of underprivilege.

Critical factors include infant mortality as a special problem and low life-expectancy generally. Parents who limit themselves to two or three children, while living in conditions of poverty and low life-expectancy, are taking a serious risk. By the time they themselves are so old as to need the assistance of their children they may have lost one, two or all three of them. Families that have lost several of their children are quite common in low-income countries. Having a large family then becomes an insurance policy for old age. One wants to ensure that there is a son at the end of the road to help in feeding the family; or a daughter to help in tending the sick.

Leonard Doob once defined modernization in terms of an expanding capacity to look to the future, rather than the past. The argument is open to attack from a number of viewpoints, but it has areas of profound suggestiveness. Ideas of saving, of long-term investment, of planning for the future, all have important modernizing implications. Of course, all societies have some kind of planning, and some concept of the future. But the variety of uncertainties in underdeveloped societies tends to restrict planning to shorter periods. It does not always make sense in economic terms to plan beyond the next harvest or two. And, even then, the hazards of the weather, too much rain or too little, a wave of worrying parasites afflicting the cultivated land, the uncertainty of disease as it takes its toll in a family—all these are factors that make it difficult to plunge into calculations too far beyond the next harvest or two.

Yet, in their very desire to have many children, traditional families often manifest a consciousness of the future. Children are a primordial form of insurance, but the very idea of insuring is connected to some of the defining characteristics of modernity.

In some African traditional attitudes, the idea of having many children is connected both to the risks of infant mortality and to the hope of parental immortality. Many have already discussed the nature of the risks of the mortality of

children, whether infants or more fully-grown. In some African traditional beliefs, there is the additional insurance for the personal immortality of the parents. The period after death is quite often divided between an earlier period of "Death within Living Memory" and a later period concerning "Death beyond Living Recollection." John S. Mbiti has called the first period *Sasa* (the Now or the Recent) and the second period *Zamani* (the Long Ago). Mbiti recounts that death is a process by which a person moves gradually from the *Sasa* period to the *Zamani*. For, as long as the individual is *remembered* by relatives and friends who knew him in this life, and who have survived him, he remains in the *Sasa* period. For, as long as the deceased is remembered by name, he is not completely dead: in fact he combines death with life. He is a member of what Mbiti calls "the living-dead":

The living-dead is a person who is physically dead but alive in the memory of those who knew him in his life as well as being alive in the world of the spirits. So long as the living-dead is thus remembered, he is in the state of *personal immortality*.⁷

What has this got to do with family planning and population control in Africa? Mbiti is not specifically concerned with this issue in his book, but what he has to say about dominant themes in African traditional religions are relevant towards understanding African traditionalist attitudes towards these matters.

So long as the living-dead is thus remembered, he is in the state of personal immortality. This personal immortality is externalized in the physical continuation of the individual through procreation, so that the children bear the traits of their parents or progenitors . . . This concept of personal immortality should help us to understand the religious significance of marriage in African societies. Unless a person has close relatives to remember him when he has physically died, then he is nobody and simply vanishes out of human existence like a flame when it is extinguished. Therefore it is a duty, religious and ontological, for everyone to get married; and if a man has no children or only daughters, he finds a wife so that through her, children (or sons) may be born who will survive him and keep him (with the other living-dead of the family) in personal immortality. Procreation is the absolute way of ensuring that a person is not cut off from personal immortality.⁸

The idea of ensuring for the future is, as we have indicated, modern, but the idea of the future consisting in what happens to the dead after death is primordial. Large families in Africa become, therefore, symbols both of a forward-looking orientation and of a backward-looking traditionality. And the two issues of fear of infant mortality and hope for parental immortality jointly contribute towards a reluctance to engage in devices that circumscribe the creative potential of procreation.

TOWARDS THE FUTURE

What kinds of institutions are required to cope with this kind of situation for the next thirty years? On questions of personal immortality, no purposeful policy need be undertaken to challenge or support African conceptions of death. If modernization includes a process of secularization, there may be modifications of these conceptions in any case. The notion of having large families in order to ensure parental immortality may fall under revision when the problem of infant mortality itself is tackled. In other words, if a smaller number of children live longer, and life-expectancy in the society rises significantly, a person may be remembered for many years more, but by fewer people. Personal parental immortality could still be assured more effectively by three children who live up to the ripe old age of sixty-five or seventy than by fifteen, most of whom die before they reach the age of forty-five.

What this, therefore, means is that the critical variable to be tackled is the issue of infant mortality and life-expectancy at-large. Once these problems are solved, it becomes more meaningful to handle population control without violating the legitimate hopes and ambitions of parents.

If one were to reform the world for the last two decades of this century, one would have, under one's hopes for the 1990s, a transformed Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. One would place under it a Taxation Authority for General Development, an International Bank with responsibilities for reconstruction, for economic development, for *ad hoc* issues of economic and social welfare.

Among the functions of this global Taxation Authority would be the collection and administration of a special kind of poll tax. The purpose of this special poll tax would, in fact, be population control. It would be a tax applied to every member of a nuclear family—parents and children—regardless of age. Under the present taxation system in individual countries, having more children establishes eligibility for tax reductions, at least up to a certain point. But under the proposed restructuring of the tax system of the world, having more children under specified conditions would increase the tax burden.

There is an important consideration to be borne in mind about the precise moment of the application of such a tax in a given society. Countries would become subject to population taxation of this kind only after life-expectancy in the particular society has hit the fifty-year mark. An alternative measurement is to relate it to infant mortality—asserting that countries become subject to the global population taxation as soon as the rate of infant mortality is down to fifty-in-a-thousand.

This kind of taxation would, in fact, penalize Americans for having three children in a family, but would not penalize Indians or Nigerians for having six children in a family.

The tax would be collected by the individual country concerned from its citizens, and the national resources of the country would then add another fifty percent of the total amount collected before transmission to the global Taxation

Authority. The national supplementation provided by the government of the country concerned would be designed to increase the incentives for the paying government to take adequate action in reducing population growth within its own area.

The amount collected from the population poll tax would go towards the special fund concerned with problems of infant mortality. These problems in developing countries may include general under-development, but there may also be subsidiary matters, ranging from health education and sanitary arrangements to the availability of powdered milk in remote areas. The fund would be used both for research and for the alleviation of existing hardships.

Whatever solution is finally adopted as a general population policy on a global basis, it would have to relate the problem to principles of equity and to the whole quest for a New International Economic Order.

NOTES

1. See Ali A. Mazrui, "Numerical Strength and Nuclear Status in the Politics of the Third World," *The Journal of Politics* (Gainesville, Florida), Vol. 29, No. 4 (November 1967). The article is reprinted as Chapter 3 in Mazrui, *Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa* (London, 1969), pp. 50–81.

2. The *Appeal* is an important document in the history of Black protest in the United States. It is reproduced in Herbert Aptheker, *One Continual Cry: David Walker's Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World (1829–1830): Its Setting and Its Meaning* (New York, 1965). For the above excerpt, see p. 129.

3. Herbert Aptheker, *Soul of the Republic: The Negro Today* (New York, 1964), p. 109.

4. Cited by, among others, Edgar Snow in his *China, Russia and the USA: Changing Relations in a Changing World* (New York, 1962), pp. 631–632.

5. Ali A. Mazrui, *The Barrel of the Gun and the Barrel of Oil in the North-South Equation* (World Order Models Project Working Paper), (Transaction Publishers, 1978).

6. Julius Nyerere, "The Entrenchment of Privilege," *Africa South* Vol. 2, No. 2 (January/March 1958) (Cape Town), pp. 86–89.

7. John S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (London, 1969), pp. 25–26.

8. Ibid.

Conclusion

The struggle between genders in the educational domain in Africa has had its paradoxes. Although Great Britain has had a woman head of government earlier than Africa, Africa has had women heads of *universities* earlier than Great Britain has had. The United States is behind Britain in providing a woman head of government—but ahead of both Britain and Africa in providing female presidents of universities, including my own president at the State University of New York at Binghamton.

A more fundamental paradox of Western education in Africa is that it has tended to marginalize women *functionally*—removing African women from the productive sector of the economy to the service sector. According to African legend and tradition, God had originally intended woman to be *custodian of fire*—symbol of light and heat, *custodian of water*—symbol of survival and cleanliness and *custodian of earth*—tied to the doctrine of *dual fertility*; the fertility of the womb (woman as mother) and the fertility of the soil (woman as cultivator).

God took charge of the fourth element: the omnipresent air. In real life, woman as custodian of fire made her disproportionately responsible for rural fuel supply—*firewood*, walking miles to fetch it. Woman as custodian of water put her in charge of rural water supply—with disproportionate exertions. Woman as custodian of earth made her the main grower of food crops in most countries south of the Sahara. All these functions reduced a woman's *freedom*—but increased her *importance* to society. *Western education* has tended to have the reverse effect—expanding a woman's freedom but reducing her importance to society. Most Western-educated African women *move from the farm to the office*, from production to service. Many middle-range Western-educated African women become secretaries and clerks—from custodian of fire, water and earth to typists and junior administrators. Western education improves the *rights* of women, but often shrinks the *roles* of women.

The big gender question is: How can the educational system restore a better balance between female rights and female roles—between the functional importance of women on one side and their freedom as people on the other? One fragment of a solution is simply a much bigger proportion of educated woman power. Among African-Americans this is happening for all sorts of *wrong* reasons. Black women are emerging as the better-educated gender of tomorrow's Black America—but that is because there are more African-American men in prison than in colleges. The US system is hurting the Black male even more than the Black female.

Both in Africa and the African Diaspora women should reach the highest levels of education for the right reasons—not by destroying the male of the species, but by motivating and rewarding the female. The National University of Lesotho may be on the right track—women graduates are beginning to outnumber

ber males. And there is a higher proportion of women with PhD's on the staff than males.

Related to this imperative is the need to break down the gender specializations of disciplines—women as primary school teachers, men as engineers; women as nurses, men as doctors; women as linguists, men as engineers and economists. We should find incentives and counter-incentives to make the genders cross the disciplinary lines of specialization.

Universities should encourage research into the contributions of women to development today and to our entire history across time. When I was in Nigeria in the 1990s, I was presented with the most hotly debated book on gender in Nigeria, Chinweizu's book, *The Anatomy of Female Power*. The author gave me the book himself. Other male chauvinists have already re-titled the book—not *The Anatomy of Female Power* but *The Power of Female Anatomy*.

Just before I left for the Murtala Muhammed Airport, Lagos, on my departure from Nigeria in 1992, I was told about a more historical book which had just been launched that day in Nigeria. It was a book about the role of specific Nigerian women in Nigeria's history. A very independent and highly educated Nigerian woman was telling me about this book proudly as she said goodbye to me before I left for the airport. Westerners will never understand this, but this PhD woman who was saying goodbye to me was the fourth wife of a polygamous Nigerian friend of mine. The lady promised to mail me a copy of the book before very long.

In 1992 *The Guardian*, one of the leading newspapers of Nigeria, asked me to give their annual *Guardian* anniversary lecture (usually given on the birthday of the newspaper). The topic which *The Guardian* chose for me was "The Black Woman." I accepted the invitation on condition that the Chair at my lecture was a woman; and provided the Distinguished Guest was also a woman. (Nigerian occasions often differentiate between the Distinguished Speaker and the Distinguished Guest.) *The Guardian* did choose a major woman jurist (the equivalent of Queen's Counsel) as my Chair; and they invited the First Lady of Nigeria, Mrs. Mariam Babangida, as the Distinguished Guest. She accepted the invitation. The event turned out to be one of the major intellectual events of the year in Lagos—and generated considerable press and public discussion on gender issues.

What all this means is that at least in Nigeria, scholars and the media between them are already responding to pressures from women and other social sectors for greater scrutiny of the gender issues in national life. Courses in history, literature, religion, philosophy, politics, economics and others already need to accommodate much more material of relevance to women and the gender issue than ever before. Educational reform and gender reform should indeed be inseparable.

Is African traditional religion particularly sensitive to the feminization of divinity? Would we value women more if in our theology classes we taught more about Mumbi than about Matthew? Has African traditional religion been

more ready across the centuries to accept female priestesses and goddesses than have either Christianity or Islam?

The latest example was that of Alex Lakwena in Uganda in the 1980s—who served as the Joan of Arc of the Acholi against the government of Yoweri Museveni.

THE STATE *VERSUS* SOCIETY

The tensions between the state and society are usually perceived as primarily political in nature. This is definitely one domain. Governments elsewhere in Africa are often excessively interventionist. Academics are silenced, books are banned. Professors and academic administrators are often intimidated. My own TV series, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*, has yet to be shown in my own country, Kenya.

The post-colonial government of Namibia is trying to avoid the temptations of politically controlling the new university. The Governing Council envisaged for the university may well be the most politically independent in the whole of Africa.

The tensions between the state and society are not only political in this direct sense of a chain of command. In Africa the tensions between the state and society are also profoundly *cultural*. In most African countries *the state is culturally alien*—an invention of the colonial experience and heir to colonial authority and power. The African university is also culturally alien. What is not alien is civil society and indigenous culture. On one side is the alien state; on the other side is the indigenous society. Can the university (alien as it is) be the bridge which culturally reconciles the state with society?

Can the university take the lead in creating cultural compatibilities in society—reconciling the traditional with the modern, the indigenous with the alien, the local with the universal? If other African universities have not yet succeeded in that role, can the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in Kenya be the vanguard for its own country? Cultural compatibilities are also relevant for every development programme the state may embark upon. Usually feasibility studies are about *economic* feasibility for new projects.

The Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology should develop a capability for assessing the *cultural feasibility* of each major project. Indeed, the Charter and Constitution of the University itself should be drafted partly with considerations of *cultural viability*.

The Jomo Kenyatta University should aim towards the long-term goal of drastically reducing the need for foreign technical personnel in Kenya's development.

THE STRATEGY OF INDIGENIZATION

Using more indigenous materials in courses, and trying to understand indigenous paradigms.

The Strategy of Domestication

Making the wild beast less wild; making the colonial university more relevant; making what is foreign more pertinent.

The Strategy of Diversification

Instead of Africans and Westerners just learning from each other (*bilateral*); and Arabs and Westerners learning from each other (also *bilateral*); all three should have triangular intellectual interaction (*trilateral*). They should also expose themselves to Chinese, Indian, Japanese and other civilizations.

The Strategy of Horizontal Inter-Penetration

South-South relations between universities should be particularly emphasized—encouraging movement of scholars, researchers and students across different parts of the Third World.

The Strategy of Vertical Counter-Penetration

Intellectual and scientific penetration by the South into the North. Making Northern educational systems respond to Afrocentricity and multiculturalism. Africans teaching young North Americans or young Europeans.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The twentieth century is coming to a close with three major struggles which are affecting, in different degrees, universities in different parts of the world—

- (a) the struggle between contending cultures;
- (b) the struggle between genders;
- (c) the struggle between the state and society.

In Southern Africa the struggle between contending cultures gets mixed up with the more temporary struggle between contending races. Culturally, how far can Southern African universities be Africanized?:

- (a) in personnel;
- (b) in syllabus and curriculum;
- (c) in model and paradigm.

Can we Africanize further the teaching of:

- (a) History—UNESCO volumes;
- (b) Literature—oral and written; in European languages and in African;
- (c) Language teaching—BA, MA and PhD in Sesotho, Ovambo, Khoisan, as well as Kiswahili and Hausa.

- (d) Religion—The litmus test of cultural self-esteem. Westernization and Mazrui's *sangoma*.
- (e) Philosophy
 - i. The cultural school (collective, cumulative, oral tradition);
 - ii. The critical school
 - a. William Abraham
 - b. Houtoundji
 - c. Kwame Appiah
 - iii. The ideological school
 - a. Negritude and Senghor
 - b. Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism

Are there women philosophers we should pay special attention to? There are certainly women writers we should examine more closely—from Nobel Laureate Nadine Gordimer to short-story writers like Grace Ogot.

Research into the role of women in society and history should be given top priority. In the struggle between the state and society, Africa is experiencing a reactivation of its *democratic instinct*. It once took the form of nationalism and anti-colonialism—and Africans were prepared to pay a high price.

Is Africa's democratic instinct now taking the form of demands for:

- (a) popular participation;
- (b) governmental accountability;
- (c) openness and transparency;
- (d) human rights and social justice.

Where should universities fit into this momentous development? Should they merely transmit the *values* of democracy—or is it time to forge the *skills* of democracy? If so, how? The struggle continues in Africa's youngest sovereign state. Some would say that a country like Namibia is a child of the international community. Once a mandate of the League of Nations, later a trusteeship of the United Nations with or without South Africa's permission, this last colony on the African mainland to become independent did so almost as a global progeny.

Namibia was the last soil on the African continent to be decolonized. If the world community was not Namibia's mother, was it the midwife at Namibia's political birth? In the semi-archaic language of the League of Nations, Namibia had after all, been entrusted to "the sacred trust of civilization."

Yet there was a time when the semblance of a world community called the League of Nations handed over Southwest Africa to South Africa's tender mercies as a Mandate way, way back in 1921.

Then a more enlightened international community in the second half of the twentieth century helped Namibian patriots in SWAPO and elsewhere to end South Africa's formal domination. "The Sacred Trust of Civilization" was partially honoured in 1990.

Now the international community should help Namibians complete the job—and construct a free society out of derivative apartheid, construct peace out of violence and war, and construct viable institutions like the University of Namibia out of the void of wasted years. Africa's youngest sovereign state may have a lot to teach its sovereign elders.

Index

- A King's Story*, 48
A Shropshire Lad, 48
A'isha, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201
Abbasid Dynasty, 202
Abiola, 185
abortion, 303
Abu Ghuraib, xxix
Accra, 196, 232, 278
acculturation, 25, 28, 30, 39, 72, 74, 90, 92, 96, 115
Acholi, 31, 70–71, 112, 128, 333
Adam, 9–12, 20, 193
adultery, 199–200
Afghanistan, xxvii, xxviii, xxxi, 137, 201–2
African National Congress, 174, 196–7, 269
African Renaissance, 153–55, 157
Africanity, xiii, xvi, 153, 166
Afrikaans, 77, 87, 174
Afrikaner, 74, 77, 79
Afro-Arab, 73–74, 77, 79, 84, 94, 97, 108
Afrophile, 70
Afrostroika, 198
Aga Khan, 145, 302
Agonistes, Samson, 40
Ahmadiyya (Mirzai) Movement, 304
Akosombo Dam, 229–30
Aksum, 165
Al-Azhar University, 113
Al-Fayed, Dodi, 141–3, 145, 149, 150, 151
Algeria, xxvi, 17–19, 121, 167, 178, 198, 232, 275, 311
Algerian National Liberation Front, 278
Algerian War, 18–19
Algiers, 7
Al-Hambra, 113
Ali, Ayaan Hirisi, xxx
Allah, 195, 199, 268, 297–99, 301
Al-Qaeda, xxx
al-Siddiq, Abu Bakar, 197
Amailuk, Anna, 176
Amazons, 122, 185, 234, 273–4
Amazons of Dahomey, 185, 258, 274, 279, 280
Amhara, 193, 252–4
Amin Dada, Idi, xvii, 97, 100, 109, 111, 123, 176, 195, 213, 220, 235, 249, 260, 316, 319
androgenize, xix
androgynization, 135–7, 170, 180, 181, 195, 290
androgynize, 118
Anglicans, 145
Anglophone, 116, 177
Anglo-Saxon, 68, 87, 94, 215
Angola, 189, 233, 263–4, 270, 273, 275, 277–8, 323
Anya Nya, 295
apartheid, 47, 53, 68, 93, 95–96, 126, 130–1, 138, 154, 177, 192, 196, 233, 235, 272, 278, 336
Aptheker, Herbert, 84, 324
Aquino, Benigno, 133
Aquino, Corazón, 133
Aquino, Maria Corazón Sumulong Cojuangco, xx
Arabic, 53, 72, 78, 83, 90, 92–93, 96, 113, 144, 158, 167, 177, 178
Arabo-Berber, 167
Ardrey, Robert, 33
Argentina, 135, 230
Arusha, 3
Asantahene, 184
Asante, 184
Asian, xx, 62, 97–99, 133
Asimov, Isaac, 26
Assisi, 13
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 230

- Astrophil and Stella*, 43
 Atarov, T. S., 59
 Atatürk, Mustapha Kemal, xxiv
 Augustine, 11
 Australia, 213–4
 Ayensu, Edward S., 226

 Babangida, Ibrahim, 196, 296
 Bagaya, Elizabeth, 196, 258
 Baghdad, 113
 Bahr al-Ghazal, 78
 Banda, Joyce, xx
 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 132
 Bandaranaike, Solomon W. R. D., 132
 Bangladesh, xx, xxiv, xxxi, 97, 99, 112, 132–3, 137, 195, 203
 Bantu, 27, 78, 92–93, 105, 270, 311
 Bantustans, 95
 Banu Mustalik, 198
Bapu, My Mother, 134, 268
 Barnard, Christian, 41
 Barre, Siad, 195
Batuni, 16, 20, 252, 265
 Beatrice, Dona, 189–90
 Beattie, John, 217
 Bechuanaland. *See* Botswana
 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 15, 44
 Bege Channel, 230
 Beja, 78
 benevolent sexism, 184–5
 Bengali, 158, 159
 Bentham, Jeremy, 120
 Berber, 156
 Berkeley, George, 43
 Berlin, 59
 Bethlehem, 189
 Bhagwati, Jagdish, 226
 Bhutto, Benazir, xx, xxvii, xxx, 132–3, 136–7, 197, 203
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 132, 136–7
 Bicknell, John, 5
 bigamy, 194
 bigotry, 53, 76
 Biniathi, 16
 birth control, 298, 302, 307–9, 314, 325, 326
 Black Africa, 74, 93, 117, 119, 151, 178, 187, 191, 231–2, 235, 270, 287, 293–4, 301, 311, 321
 Black Diaspora, 29, 32
 Black Nationalism, 31, 239
Black Reconstruction in America, 84
 Blaiberg, Philip, 41
 Blick, Freda, 176
 Blyden, Edward, 79
 Boers, 74
 Bombay, 7
 Bosnia, xxvii
 Botswana, 142, 194, 233
Bounty, 291
 Bourgeois, 58
 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 226
 Brahmin, 105, 108
 Brazil, 29, 64, 73, 75–76, 79, 85–86, 94, 135
 Britain, xxiv, xxx, 49, 99, 112, 116, 122, 142–3, 152, 187, 191, 212, 216, 284, 291, 312, 318, 331
 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 143–4
 British Empire, xxv, 116, 277
 British India, 137
 British Royalty, 15, 150
 Brooks, Angie Elizabeth, 175
 Buckingham Palace, 152
 Buddhist, 133, 136
 Buddhists, 49, 301
 Bull, Mutumba, 176
 Bunche, Ralph, 198
 burning spear, 122
 Burundi, xvii, xxi, 94, 167, 177, 308–13, 319
 Bush, George, 146
 Busia, 99
 Byzantine, 80

 Cairo, 113, 146, 226
 Calabar, 118–9

- Calhoun, John C., 52
 Cambridge School, 161
 Cameroon, 116
 Canada, xxxi, 82
 Canary Islands, 103–4
 Cape Town, 42, 51, 54
 Caribbean, 187
 Carter, Jimmy, 324
 caste-system, 65
 Castro, Fidel, 35
 Catholic, xvii, 13, 79, 199, 301, 309
 Catholic Church, 68
 Catholicism, 102–3
 Caucasian, xxi, 27, 29, 31, 39, 74, 245–6
 celibacy, 79, 83, 185, 268–9
 Central America, 230
 Central Bank, 179
 Ceylon, 28, 132, 197
 Chad, 169
 Chaldaic, 53
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 284
 Chaminuka, 267
 Cheney, Dick, 146
 Chile, 230, 243
 Chinweizu, 332
 Christ, 12, 70
 Christianity, xvii, 11–12, 29, 35, 38, 52, 57, 60, 69–70, 81, 97, 102, 104, 108, 129, 133, 191, 194, 197, 237–9, 251, 266–8, 278, 293–5, 297, 300, 333
 Chuku-Emeka, 185
 Church of England, 144–5
 Churchill, Winston, 15, 48, 194
 Çiller, Tansu, 203
 circumcision, 8, 31, 37, 122, 190–1, 255–6, 274
 Civil Service, 113
 Clarke, Edna, 108
 Clementine, 31
 Clinton, Bill, xxvii–xxviii
 Clinton, Hillary, 147
 clitoridectomy, 191
 Cohen, Sir Andrew, 21
 Cold War, 163, 164
 Colored, 77, 87, 95, 243, 322–6
 Columbia University, 53
 Combe, George, 26
 COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance/ CMEA), 230
 Commonwealth Games, 116
 Commonwealth Immigration Act, 112, 212
 Communism, 57–60
Communist Manifesto, 58
 Communist Party, 96, 269
 concubinage, 82, 85–86, 88
 Congo, xxi, 123, 160, 189, 227–8, 231–2, 245, 305, 316
 Congolese, 244
 contraception, 302–3
 Copenhagen, 196
 copulation, 25, 34, 71, 240, 254
 Crispin, Paul, 118
 Crowder, Michael, 263
 Crucifixion, 14
 Cuba, xxix, 35, 286
 Curtain Theatre, 52
 Curtin, Philip, 26

 Dada, General Idi Amin, 97, 111
 Dahomey, 122, 185, 234, 274, 311
 Damascus, 113
 Damocles, 233
 Dar es Salaam, 14, 263–4, 312, 317
 Darfur, 78
 Darlington, C. D., 24, 34, 240
 Darvall, Denise Ann, 41
 Darwin, Charles, 22, 161–2
 Davidson, Basil, 28, 267
 Day, Thomas, 5, 282
 de Gaulle, Charles, 166
Death of a Princess, 228
 decolonization, xxvii, 29, 193–4
 Decree of Mans, 238
 Delilah, 40
 Democratic Party, 147

- Descent of Man*, 24, 33, 161
 Desdemona, 161
 détente, 229, 278
 Devereux, Penelope, 43
 Devil, 201
 Dhahran, 227
 Dhoti, 15
 Diana, vii, xi, 139, 141–6, 149–53
 diaspora, 161, 332
 dignity, 13, 33–36, 39–40, 195,
 197–200, 202–3, 246, 280, 284,
 322–3
 Dimbleby, Jonathan, 144
 Dimona, 232
 Dinka, 96, 151, 295
 Diop, Cheikh Anta, 27, 166
 Diouf, Abdou, 296
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 47
 Dodo, 251, 252
 Doob, Leonard, 326
 Draconian, 200
 Drayton, Michael, 46
 Du Bois, W. E. B., 28, 84, 151
 dual fertility, 125, 127, 331
duka, 100
 Duke of Windsor, 48
 Dutch Reform Church, 77

 Earl of Essex, 43
 East Africa, xii, 15, 30, 35, 98, 99–
 100, 111–12, 167, 179, 212, 282,
 302, 318–9
 Economic Community of West
 African States (ECOWAS), 168
 Economic Community of West
 African States Monitoring
 Group (ECOMOG), 168
 ecophilia, 153, 165
 ecophobia, 153
 Edward VIII, 48
 Egypt, xxv, xxvi, 28, 39, 52, 79,
 91, 123, 141, 149, 150, 160,
 165–7, 176, 191, 195, 197, 228,
 230, 297, 304–5
 Eid el Fitr, xxviii

 Eisenstadt, S. N., 256
Elegy in a Country Churchyard, 44
 El-Hamamsy, Laila S., 301
 Elizabeth Bagaya, 176, 195
 endogamous, 65, 100
 England, 215
 Equatoria, 78
 Erikson, Erik, 134, 250, 268
 Ethiopia, xxix, 116, 122–3, 191,
 193, 252–3, 297, 304–5
 Euraficans, 213
 Eurasians, 214
 Euro-Christian, 61, 65, 102, 186–8,
 251
 European Common Market, 212
 European Economic Community,
 166, 212, 224, 230
 European Renaissance, 165
 European Union, 164, 166–7
 Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 217
 Eve, 9–12, 20, 193
 exogamy, 108, 294

Facing Mount Kenya, 110, 192
 Fanon, Franz, 7, 17, 275, 278
 Faria, Reita, 29
 Fatima, 197
 fatma, 19
 feminism, xiii, xxi, xxii, 289
 Fernandes, Florestan, 85
 Fertile Crescent, 91
 fertility, xvii, 24, 94, 110, 125, 127,
 155, 237, 254, 293–4, 297–303,
 331
 Fez, 19
 Fifth Symphony, 44
 Filmer, Sir Robert, 209–10
 First Republic of Nigeria, 112
 Fitzgerald, Edward, 162
 Florida, 63–64, 75
 Fort Jesus, 34–35
 Fortes, M., 217
 France, xxiv–xxvi, xxx–xxxi, 50,
 68, 82, 115, 129, 152, 177, 203,
 232, 254

- Francophone, 116, 177
 French Revolution, 165
 Freud, Sigmund, 100, 120

 Galton, Francis, 148
 Gambia, 123
 Ganda, 21–22, 36
 Gandhi, Indira, 132–7, 175, 234, 258, 289
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 97, 129, 134, 250, 265, 272, 277–8
 Gandhi, Mohandas, 263, 271–2, 277, 279
 Gang of Four, 135
 Ganges Valley, 101
 Garang, John, 295
 Garden of Eden, 10–11
 gender-neutral, xv, 184–8
 Genesis, 193
 Geneva Convention, 120
 genocide, 177, 284, 298
 Germanic, 64, 81, 84
 Germany, xxv, xxxi, 60, 149, 203, 285
 Ghana, 97, 99, 104, 118, 142, 151, 159, 164, 170, 196, 216, 229, 277–8
 Gikuyu, 110
 globalization, 146, 162, 168–9
 God, 5, 9–13, 16, 20, 23, 43, 52, 60–61, 69, 81, 125, 133, 186, 189, 199, 236, 268–9, 298, 299, 326, 331
 Gonder, 165
 Goody, Jack, 259
 Gordimer, Nadine, 158, 335
 Gospel, 69, 243
 Graeco-Latin, 27
 Gray, Thomas, 44–45
 Great Britain, xxv, xxx, 115, 202, 216, 331
 Great Depression, 126
 Greece, 57, 72, 113, 167, 214
 Greek Orthodox, 35, 39
 Groote Schuur Hospital, 42, 54
 Guantanamo Bay, xxix
 Guinea-Bissau, 263, 275, 277–8
 Gulf Cooperation Council, 230
 Guru Nanak, 32, 35

 Hadhramout, 62
 Hadza, 259
 Haldane, John, 34
 Half Assini, 103
 Hamilton, Sir William, 238
 harem, 202, 298
Harvard Law Journal, 147
 Harvard Law School, 147
 Hasan, Fadl, 83, 90
 Haskins, Caryl P., 231
 Hassina, Begum, 133, 195
 Hatshepsut, 136
 Haupt, Clive, 41, 46
 Hausa, 122, 296, 299, 318, 335
 Hausa-Fulani, 122
 Hausaland, 186
 Hawaii, xxxii, 147, 152
 Hay, Margaret Jean, 126
 Hayworth, Rita, 145
 Heath, Edward, 212–3
 Hebrew, 53, 158
Henry the VIII, 47
 Her Royal Highness. *See* Diana
Hereditary Genius, 148
 Herodotus, 28
 Hertzogites, 87
 Herzl, Theodor, 284
 heteroraciality, 194
 Hijra, 198
 Hindi, 158
 Hindu, 101–2, 105–8, 133–4, 136–8
 Hindus, 49, 106, 133–4, 301
 Hiroshima, 163, 231
 Hitler, Adolf, 60, 68, 121, 152, 235, 284
 Hobbes, Thomas, 210
 Holland, xxx
 Holy Scripture, 201
 homo sapiens, 24, 33

- homogenization, 93
- homosexual, 24, 33, 60, 241
- Horn of Africa, xxv, 115, 128, 191, 304
- Hoskyns, Catherine, 244
- Hottentot, 34
- House of Lords, xxx
- Huizinga, Johan, 120
- humanitarianism, 243, 245
- Humayun, Nasir un-din Muhammad, 134
- Hussein, Saddam, xxix, xxxi
- Hutu, 177, 308–9, 312–3, 317, 319
- Iberian Peninsula, 68
- Ibo, 112, 318
- Igbo, 156, 186, 296, 299
- Immorality Laws, 77
- imperialism, 28, 69, 163, 165–6, 244–6, 263, 278, 286–7, 298, 320
- India, xxvii, 15, 28–29, 32, 35, 64, 98, 101–2, 105, 112–3, 121, 132, 134–7, 159, 175, 184, 263, 269, 325
- Indian, xxv, 4, 64, 76, 88, 105
- Indian Republic, 97
- indigenization, 157, 159, 160, 171
- indigenous, 84, 88, 106, 113, 115, 119–20, 123–4, 128, 141, 153, 156–7, 159–60, 162, 167, 174, 186, 193, 196, 231–2, 263–4, 266–7, 279, 282, 286, 289–90, 293, 294, 301, 333–4
- Indonesia, xx, xxv–xxvi, xxxi, 164, 203
- Indophobia, 100, 101, 114
- infibulation, 191
- Information Superhighway, 142
- intercourse, 15, 63, 71, 81, 85, 237, 265
- intermarriage, 62, 63, 65, 68–69, 74, 80, 86, 91, 108–10, 147, 215, 294, 300, 304–5
- intermingling, 74, 77–80, 88–89, 109
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 179
- Internet, 201–2
- inter-racial mating, 139–40, 143, 148–9, 150
- inter-sexual, 24, 208
- Iraq, xxv, xxix, xxxi, 113, 203
- Irish Naturalist*, 33
- Iron Lady, 135–6
- Isermia, 238
- Islam, xvi, xvii, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 14, 29, 36, 72, 80, 84–85, 87–88, 91, 97, 102–3, 113–6, 119, 120, 124, 133–4, 137–8, 144, 149, 153, 167, 197–8, 200–3, 223, 225, 268, 293–7, 299–300, 302–5, 333
- Islamic Law, 199–200
- Islamic Society of North America, 143
- Italy, xxv, xxxi
- Ithnasharis, 14
- Ivory Coast, 230
- Japan, xxv, 157, 163, 168, 215–6, 254
- Jesus Christ, 27, 38, 189–90, 269
- Jews, xxvii, 12, 37, 81, 149, 154, 193, 215, 233, 285, 294, 326
- Jihad*, 293–4, 297–8, 304–5
- Joan of Arc, 128, 333
- Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, xx
- Jomo Kenyatta University, 333, 334
- Jonson, Ben, 51
- Judaism, 35, 284
- Julius Caesar*, 160, 162
- Kabaka, 21, 32, 187
- Kabaka Yekka, 314
- Kabaso, J., 30
- Kagibwe, Wandira Speciosa, xxi

- Kakwa, 109, 316
 Kampala, 29, 45, 249
 Kansas, 140, 146, 147
 Kantrowitz, Adrian, 41
 Kanyoi, 16
 Karamajong, 241
 Karicho, 156
 Kariuki, Josiah, 16, 252
 Karume, Sheikh Abeid, 109
 Karume, Sheikh Abeid Amani, 110
 Kaunda, Kenneth, 129, 189, 270–3, 278–9
 Keen, John, 3
 Kenya, xxi, xxix, 3, 8–9, 16, 21, 30, 34, 36, 89–90, 92, 98–99, 110–2, 114, 116, 126, 143, 145, 147, 151, 156, 167, 186, 198–9, 229–30, 252, 256, 264–5, 267, 284, 294, 301, 303, 307–8, 311, 317–8, 325, 333–4
 Kenya Fertility Survey, 301
 Kenya Indian Congress, 110
 Kenyan Foreign Service, 176
 Kenyatta, Jomo, 192
 Kenyatta, Margaret, 176
 Kenyatta, Peter, 194
 Khadijah, xxiii, 198
 Khama, Seretse, 142, 194
 Khan, Prince Aly, 145
 Khartoum, 78, 96, 316
 Kigali, 178
 Kikuyu, 8, 36–38, 40, 93, 110, 113, 156, 192–3, 251–2, 265–6, 276, 307–8, 317–8
 Kikuyuland, 38, 193, 307, 318
 Kimbangu Church, 189
 Kimpa Vita. *See* Beatrice, Dona
 King Gezo, 273
 King of England, 141–5, 150
 King Solomon, 193
 King William, 141, 144
 King, Jr., Martin Luther, 198, 268, 271
 Kings of Dahomey, 273
 Kinigi, Sylvie, 177
 kinship, xvii, xix, xx, 26, 67–69, 71, 80, 97–98, 100, 102, 108–10, 113, 156, 208–16, 218–9, 237, 240, 242–4, 246–7, 296, 304
 Kisumu, 99
 Kiswahili, 106, 160–2, 167, 174, 176, 335
 Konzo, 255
 Kordofan, 78
 Korean, 156
 Kosovo, xxvii, xxx–xxxii
 Kowe, 126
 Koyo, George, 8
Kshatriya, 105
 Kumaratunga, Chandrika
 Bandaranaike, xx
 Kunene, Mazisi, 196
 Kuper, Leo, 269
 Kuwait, 192
 Lakwena, Alice, 128
 Lalibela, 165
 Lamarck, Jean Baptiste de, 23
 Langi, 109, 112
 Las Palmas, 103
 Latin America, xviii, 64, 73, 75, 77, 85–86, 135, 208, 228, 230, 281
 Law of Nations, 121
 Laws of Manu, 105–6, 108
 League of Nations, 312, 336
 Lebanon, xxv, 62, 285, 294, 303
 Legon, 159
 Lehai, Joy, 29
 Lemu, 251
 Lenin, V. I., 152
 Leninism, 283
 lesbianism, xxv, 194
 Levine, Donald N., 252
 levirate, 101–4, 106–8
 Levy, Reuben, 88
 Lewinsky, Monica, 200
 Lewis, I. M., 254
 Libya, xxv, 167, 198, 224, 230
 Lion of Juda, 193
 Liverpool, 104

- Lofchie, Michael, 17
 Lord Rich, 43
 Louvain University, 160
 Lowie, Robert H., 219
 Lugbara, 109
 Lukiko, 314
 Lule, Freda, 29
 Lumpa Church, 129–30, 176, 189, 271
 Luo, 112, 126, 147, 151, 308, 317
 Luthuli, Albert, 131, 198, 278
- Maasai, 156
 Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, xx
Macbeth, 160, 162
 Machel, Samora, 127
 Macpherson, Fergus, 270
 Mahfuz, Neguib, 158
 Maine, Henry, 211, 213–5
 Makeda. *See* Queen of Sheba
 Makerere University College, 29
 Malawi, 167
 Malaysia, 164
 Malcolm X, 151
 malevolent sexism, xv
 Malwai, xx
 Mandela, Nelson, 130, 198
 Mandela, Winnie, 130–1, 138, 177, 197
 Marcos, Ferdinand, 133
 Marett, Robert R., 14
 Marrakesh, 7
 marriage, xvi, xviii, xxiv–xxv, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67–68, 70, 74, 76, 80–83, 101–3, 105–11, 114, 119, 133, 140–1, 145–7, 150–1, 194, 218, 224, 241, 251, 284, 296, 299, 327
 Martin, David, 123
 Martinique, 7
 martyr, 130–3, 137, 268
 martyrdom, 12–14, 131–5, 189, 197, 303
 martyrs, 13–14, 52, 130
- Marx, Karl, 35, 58, 100, 120, 265, 274, 278
 Marxism, 283
 Masai, 3, 4, 8–10, 14–15, 19–20
 Masailand, 3, 8
 masculinity, xvii, 6, 34, 36, 122–3, 129, 211, 234, 236, 237–8, 240, 246, 249–50, 252, 254, 258, 261, 264, 268, 289
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 226
 Mathu, Eliud, 16
 matrilinealism, 186
 matrimony, 97, 103, 106, 150, 198, 240
 Mau Mau, 16, 20, 252, 265–6, 267
 Mau Mau insurrection, 36, 93, 252, 264–5, 318
 Mau Mau Rebellion, 16
 Mauritania, 167
 Mazrui, Alamin M., 160
 Mbiti, John S., 38, 102, 107, 327
 Mboya, Tom, 110, 282
 McLeod, William C., 80
 Mecca, 91, 199
 Medina, 91, 198–9
 Medinite, 198
 Mediterranean, 91, 97, 116
 Meiji Restoration, 163
 Meir, Golda, 135, 136, 138, 234, 258, 289
 Menelik I, 193
 mestizo, 64, 75–76, 88
 Mexico, xvi, 254, 286
 Middle East, xxv, 137–8, 143, 154, 176, 213, 224, 226, 228, 234, 241, 285, 298, 302, 320
 Mill, John Stuart, 121, 274
 Milton, John, 10, 97, 99, 109, 161
 Minh, Ho Chi, 278
 miscegenation, xiv, xviii, 52, 60, 62–63, 67–68, 71–7, 82–7, 91–2, 94–8, 139, 140–1, 147–50
 Moffat, C. B., 33
 Moller, Herbert, 81

- monogamous, xvii, 58, 62, 65, 68,
 71, 73, 75, 77, 80, 97, 108, 198
 monogamy, xvii, 36, 57, 59–61, 65,
 67–70, 106, 108
 Moor, 81
Moral Essays, 46
 Morocco, 116, 160, 167, 311
 Morton, S. G., 26
 Moussadeq, Mohammad, xxvi
 Mozambique, 127, 167, 190, 233,
 260, 263, 275, 277, 282, 286
 Mozambique National Resistance
 (MNR or RENAMO), 127
 Mugabe, Robert, 127, 287
 Mugabe, Sally, 176
 Muganda, xv, 9, 109, 287
 Muhammad, 197, 198, 299, 301,
 303–4
mujahidin, 297
 Mulattoes, 75
 Museveni, Yoweri, 128, 333
 Mushi, Samuel, 161
 Muslim, xiii, xvi, xviii, xxiii–xxxi,
 7, 79–80, 101, 113–17, 119, 121,
 128, 132–3, 136–7, 141–5, 151,
 176, 178, 186, 195, 197, 199–
 203, 255, 294–304
 Musoga, 109
 mythology, 20, 53, 192–3, 219, 269

 Nagasaki, 163, 231
 Naguib, Muhammad, 149
 Nairobi, 35
 Nandi, 256, 294
 Nasser, Jamal Abdel, xxvi
 National University of Lesotho,
 332
 Nazareth, 189
 Nazi Germany, 285, 326
 Nazis, 149
 Negritude, 20, 49–51, 166, 194,
 282, 335
 Negro, 5, 6, 26–27, 50, 52, 63–64,
 68, 75–76, 79, 85–86, 140, 246,
 324

 Nehru, Jawahahal, 97
 Nehru, Pandit, 15
 Neto, Agostinho, 196
 New Delhi, 7
 New Zealand, 202, 213–14
 Newfoundland, 183
 Ngorongoro Crater, 45
 Nigeria, 9, 115–16, 118, 122, 156,
 159, 168, 195–7, 228–9, 260,
 296–7, 299, 305, 313, 316, 318,
 332
 Niggers, 71
 Nile, 28, 78, 96, 191, 294, 317
 Nile Valley, 191, 304
 Nilo-Hamites, 27, 78
 Nilotes, 27, 105
 Njau, O. N., 8
 Nkrumah, Kwame, 97, 103–4, 109,
 194, 232, 277
Nkuho-Eket, 119
 Nobel Peace Prize, 198
 Nobel Prize, 131, 158, 159
 nomads, 84
 North Africa, xxvi, 160, 167, 300,
 304
 North America, xxiv, xxvi, xxviii,
 73, 80, 82, 84–86, 95, 164, 208,
 231
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), xxvii, 230
 Northern Province, 78
 nuclearization, 135, 136–8
 Nuer, 37–38, 40, 257, 294
 Numeiry, Jaffer, 295
 Nyanza, 126
 Nyerere, Julius, 9, 161–2, 228, 317,
 326

 Obama, Barack, 139–41, 146–8,
 150–3
 Obama, Michelle, 140
 Obote, Apollo, 161
 Obote, Milton, 316
 Obote, Newton, 161
 Ocol, 31, 71, 239

- Ogot, Grace, 176, 335
 Ogun, 196
 Ogundipe-Leslie, Molar, 196
 Okigbo, Christopher, 45
 oligarchy, 92
 Oliver, Roland, 69, 311
 Oloitipitip, Stanley, 3
 Olowo, Bernadette, 176
 Olympic games, 113, 116
 Oman, 62
 Orange Free State, 269
 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 78, 177, 228, 249, 259
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 168, 261
 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 201
Origin of Species, 22, 25, 161
 Original Sin, 11, 20
 Oromo, 122
 orthodox, 25, 101, 323–4
 Othello, 161
 Ottoman Empire, xxv, 19
 Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, 144
- p'Bitek, Okot, 30, 71
 Paine, Thomas, 11
 Pakistan, xx, xxiv, xxvii, xxviii, xxx, xxxi, 97, 99, 112, 132–3, 136–7, 197, 203, 225, 243
 Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), 270
 Pan-African, 79, 177
 Pan-African Congress, 246
 Pan-Africanism, 164–7, 171, 177, 335
Paradise Lost, 10, 161
 Paraguay, 64
 Paris Commune of 1871, 276
 Parliament, xxi, xxx, 3, 30, 173, 174, 212
 Parrinder, E. G., 49
- Pascal, Blaise, 48
 patriarchal, xviii, xxiii, 186, 211, 276
 patrilineal, 18, 72, 84, 91, 96, 186, 300, 304
 patrilinealism, 88, 92, 186
 patriotism, 52, 128, 185, 199
 Pax Britannica, 245
 Perham, Dame Margery, 68
 Perón, Isabella, 135–6, 258
 Persia, 96
 Persian, 162
 Persian Gulf, 89
 petropower, 169
Phaedrus, 58
 phallicism, 237–8, 250, 269
 Philip Blaiberg, 46
 Philistines, 40
 phrenology, 26
 Pierson, Donald, 76
 Pilate, Pontius, 12
 Plamenatz, John, 8
 Plato, 57–60, 113, 148
 Platonic, 58
 Polonius, 7, 17, 20
 polyandry, xvii, 58, 127, 190, 193
 polygamous, xvi, 36, 61–63, 65, 70, 77, 85, 97, 190, 198, 332
 polygamy, xvi, xvii, 58, 65, 67–68, 106, 189–90, 274
 polygyny, 70, 294, 296–7, 300
 Pope, Alexander, 4, 46
 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 264
 Portugal, 68, 81, 167
 Portuguese, 73, 81, 94, 189, 260, 263, 271, 274, 287, 318
 Pot, Pol, 235
Primitive Society, 219
 primogeniture, 215
 Prince Charles, 143–5, 150
 Princess of Toro. *See* Bagaya, Elizabeth
 Princess of Wales. *See* Diana

- Prior, Mathew, 46
 procreation, 297, 328
 progeny, 24, 76, 106, 336
 promiscuity, 59, 62, 68, 70
 Prophet Muhammad, xxiii, xxx, 88, 201, 294
 prostitution, 12, 58–59, 298, 303
 Protestant, xvii, 79, 155
 Protestantism, 102
 Putri, Megawati Sukarno, 203
- Queen of Sheba, 193
Qur'an, 114, 199, 201, 298–9
- racism, xxvi, xxxi, 64, 67, 99, 112, 124, 138, 147, 151, 160–1, 190, 192, 198, 212, 232–3, 239, 246, 263, 278
 Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred, 217
 Rahim, Muddathir Abdul, 78
 Ramadan, xxviii, xxix, 114–5
 rape, 18, 95
 Rawlings, Jerry, 142
 Reid, Harry, 140–1, 148, 151
 Reik, Theodore, 13
 religion, xvi, xix, 14, 32, 35, 38–39, 49, 52, 67, 71, 79, 81, 85, 91–93, 102, 113, 128, 137–8, 145, 167, 193, 196, 200–1, 203, 266–8, 295–6, 300, 304, 332–3
 Rembrandt, 32, 36, 39
 Renaissance Man, 166
 reproduction, xvi–xviii, 11, 31, 60, 89, 192, 254, 305, 324
 Republic of South Africa, 127, 166, 167, 190, 232–3
 Rhodes, Cecil, 326
 Rhodesia, 94–95, 114, 213, 264, 267, 270, 272, 278
 Rice, Condoleezza, xxix
rites de passage, 37
 Rivers State, 118
 Roberts, Christopher Davis, 186
 Roman Catholic, 67, 199, 295
 Roman Catholic Church, 103, 311
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 4
Rubayat of Omar Khayyam, 162
 Rubinstein, Helena, 170
 Rushdie, Salman, 200–1
 Russia, xxx, 203, 277
 Russian Revolution, 59
 Rwamaro, Vincent, 47
 Rwanda, xxi, 94, 167, 177, 308–13, 319
- Sadat, Anwar, 149
 Sahara, xxv, 78, 94, 116, 228, 231–3, 299–301, 331
 Salim, Shariff Abdulla, 90
 Samson Agonistes, 40
 samurai, 120
 Sarkozy, Nicolas, xxx
 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 5, 6, 50–51
 Satan, 10
satyagraha, 134, 271–2
 Saudi Arabia, 62, 195, 224, 227, 228, 261
 Schapera, Isaac, 216
 scientification, 158, 171
 segregation, 127, 270
 Seipei, Stompie Mokhetsi, 130
 Selassie I, Haile, 193
 Senegal, 5, 50–51, 108, 123, 142, 166, 231, 295–6, 302
 Senghor, Léopold, 5, 6, 50, 108, 142, 166, 194
 Serbia, xxx
 Service, E. R., 207
 sexercise, 118–9
 sexism, xv, 120, 124, 131, 164, 183–91, 193–6, 198–9, 274, 276–7
 Shaka Zulu, 165
 Shakespeare, William, 7, 15, 45, 47, 52, 160–2, 199
Shari'a, 114, 200
Shari'ah, 295, 303
 Sharpeville Massacre, 232
 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 132
 Sheikh Al'Amin, 199

- Shi'a, xxix, 302
 Shona, 267
 Sidney, Sir Philip, 43, 45, 54
 Sierra Leone, 168
 Sikhism, 32
 Sikhs, 32, 35, 132
 Singapore, 164
 Sinhalese, 136
 Sino-Indian, 136
 Smith, Ian, 95, 271
 Smith, J. Maynard, 28
 Socrates, 59, 113
 Somalia, xxix, 94, 128, 167, 191, 195, 198, 254, 311
Song of Solomon, 46
 South Africa, xvii, xxxi, 27, 46–47, 53, 73–74, 76–77, 79, 85–87, 89, 97, 114, 126, 131, 138, 154, 166, 169, 174, 177, 192, 197–8, 224, 232, 235–6, 242, 244, 263, 269–70, 272, 278, 326, 336
 South Korea, 164, 168
 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 166
 Soviet Bloc, 231
 Soviet Union, 59, 261, 283, 286
 Soyinka, Wole, 158
 Spain, xxx, 68, 81, 113, 167
 Sri Lanka, xx, 132, 136, 197, 301
 Sri Lanka Freedom Party, 132
 St. Francis, 13
 Stalin, Joseph, 235
 Stanford University, 41
 Stanley, Dean, 80
 Stanleyville, 244, 245
 Stevenson, R. C., 72
 Sudan, 62, 72, 74, 77–78, 80, 83, 85, 90–91, 93–94, 96–97, 123, 151, 191, 282, 294–7, 316, 317
 Sudanese, 78, 90, 92, 96–97, 295, 300, 302, 319
 Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), 295
 Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), 295
Sudra, 105
 Suez Canal, xxvi
 Suez War, xxiv
 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, xx
 Sundkler, B. G., 27
 Sungura, Iddi, 3
 sunnah, 302
 Sunnis, xxix, 302
 suttee, 101–2, 104–8, 133–4
 Swaziland, 94, 121, 170, 195
 Synod of Tours, 238
 Syria, xxv, 62
 Tagore, Rabindranath, 159
 Tako, Hawo Osman, 128–9
 Taliban, xxviii, xxix, 201
 Tamils, 136
 Tanganyika, 21, 92, 111, 128, 312, 326
 Tanzania, 3, 8–9, 17, 19–20, 29, 80, 109, 114, 116, 122, 128, 167, 174, 196, 228–30, 259, 263, 303, 310, 312, 319, 326
tarawih, 115
 technophilia, 153, 165, 166
 technophobia, 153, 165
 Tehran, xxvii
 Tertullian, 52
 Teutons, 68
 Thatcher, Margaret, 135–6, 234, 289
The Africans: A Triple Heritage, 333
The Anatomy of Female Power, 332
The Evolution of Man and Society, 24
The Guardian, 332
The Heart has its Reasons, 48
The Infernal Marriage, 47
The Merchant of Venice, 160, 162
 The Netherlands, xxv, xxxi
The People, 47
 The Philippines, xx, 133
The Republic, 58

- The Revolutionary Council of
 Zanzibar, 109
The River Between, 192
The Times, 214
 Thiong'o, Ngugi an, 192
 Third World, 135–6, 143, 168,
 223–30, 243, 261, 281–3, 286,
 323, 334
 Timbuktu, 113
Titanic, 183, 291
 Tiv, 156
 TransAfrica, 169
Transition, 43
 transsexualism, 242
 transvestism, 241
 Treaty of Westphalia, 284
 Tree of Knowledge, 11
 triple heritage, xiii, 113, 115, 119,
 120, 124, 153, 186, 231, 232
 Trotsky, Leon, 217
 Tse-tung, Mao, 20, 278, 325
 Tshombe, Moise, 244
 Tunisia, 167, 178
 Turkish, 63
 Turnbull, Colin M., 251
 Tutsi, 177, 308–9, 312–3, 317, 319
 Tutu, Desmond, 131, 198

 Uganda, xvii, xxi, 9, 21, 22, 29–30,
 32, 47, 53, 64, 70, 97–101, 105,
 109, 111–4, 123, 128–9, 159,
 161, 167, 176–7, 186, 193, 195–
 6, 213, 220, 229–30, 241, 258,
 260, 284, 313–7, 319, 333
 UNESCO, 170, 335
 Union of South Africa, 233
 UNITA (The National Union for
 the Total Independence of
 Angola), 264
 United Kingdom, 195
 United Nations General Assembly,
 175
 United Nations Resolution, xvi
 United Nations Trusteeship
 Council, 175

 United States, xviii, xxiv, xxvi–
 xxvii, xxix–xxxii, 29, 31–32,
 41–42, 63–64, 71, 73–77, 79,
 84–85, 87, 103, 122, 133, 140,
 145, 147–52, 156, 168–9, 176,
 188, 191, 195–6, 202–3, 214–5,
 220, 226, 232, 239–42, 245–7,
 271, 322–3, 331
 Université Lovanium, 159
 University of Petroleum and
 Minerals, 227
 Upper Volta, 311
 Urdu, 158
 US Supreme Court, 150
 Uwilingiyimana, Agathe, 177

Vaishya, 105
 van den Berghe, Pierre L., 86
 Van Gough, Vincent, xxx
 Vatican, 230, 296
 Venezuela, 64
 Venus of Brassempouy, 34
 Venus of Milo, 34
 Vietnam War, xxiv, 215
 Virgin Mary, 104, 197, 199–200
 Volta River, 229
 Vorster, John, 272

 Wajed, Hasina, xx, 203
 Walker, David, 323
 Walter, Eugene Victor, 207, 215
 Washkansky, Louis, 41, 45
 Weber, Max, 129, 155, 282
 Weeks, John R., 301
 Welbourn, F. B., 70
 westernization, 31, 77, 106
 Westphalia, 285–7
 widow burning, 134
 women's liberation, 239, 242
 Wordsworth, William, 4, 42–43,
 165
 World War I, xxv, 92, 159, 276,
 312
 World War II, xxiv–xxvi, xxviii,
 48, 108, 126, 163–4, 216, 303

World Wide Web, 201

Xenophanes, 27

Yeats, W. B., 159

Yemen, 62

Yoruba, 9, 158, 196, 296, 318

Zaire, 160, 189, 227

Zanzibar, 17, 74, 77–78, 83, 85,
88–89, 92–94, 96, 109, 303, 310

Zia, Begum Khaleda, xx

Zia, Begum Khalida, 132, 195

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad, 132

Zimbabwe, 94, 127, 165, 173, 197,
229, 233, 264, 267–8, 270, 283,
287

Zionism, 138

Zoological Philosophy, 23

Zulu, 53